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This thesis explores the communication of musical structure between performers and 
listeners; in particular, the prolongational structure of music (as defined by Heinrich 
Schenker). The concept of musical performance is explored at the intersection of the 
psychological and musicological agendas corresponding to different musical cultures. 
Accordingly, although this study is focused on the performance of 19th century western 
classical piano music, it also examines two sub-cultures that utilise this repertoire. The 
study starts by considering the objective performance’s framework, which is 
epistemologically related to classical cognitive science. However, since the postmodern 
musicological context claims that music performance goes beyond classical cognitivism, 
another theoretical and methodological framework is proposed. 
First, an empirical study was undertaken that was based on the classic cognitive 
perspective. It took communication to be a linear, rule-governed circulation of perceptual 
and/or conceptual contents. The results of the analysis of a series of piano performances 
and listening tests indicate that, although certain regularities of the prolongational features 
emerge in both performance and reception, these do not clarify the role of this structure in 
the performer-listener dyad.  
Second, a new perspective on the role of structure in communication during performance is 
proposed that acknowledges that need for originality and individuality characteristic of 
current performance practice. It is based on three theoretical pillars: (a) Transposition, 
which characterizes a dialectic relationship between composition and performance; (b) 
Intersubjectivity, which alludes to states of mutuality in which sharing a particular 
temporal configuration is crucial; (c) Narrativity, which is presented as psychogenetically 
linked to the configuration of time in music performance. An experiment shows (i) how the 
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prolongational structure of a composition can form the material of two different 
transpositions (one cinematographic and one pianistic), and (ii) that listeners comprehend 
that material by means of crossmodal capacities, which are communicated by the 
particular temporal configuration of the performance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“May the wise person pardon me if I sometimes 
speak too much like an artist…may he grant me his 
indulgence concerning those passages in my work 
that are too lyrical…and may the artist also pardon 
me, if, taken by the recklessness of the unconscience, 
I make too frequent a use of scientific language… I 
am sorry that in appearing with greater confidence 
before them and before the public I am missing the 
wonderful logic of the former and the inexhaustible 
creative power of the latter. But I have, at least, like 
them, conviction and good will”  
Jean d' Udine  
In some sense, this is an autobiography. These pages record, in certain way, important 
fragments from my life. And although I know this is not the right place to reveal myself 
intimately, I cannot get rid of this reference while intending to offer a coherent whole. The 
multiplicity of subjects, sources and theoretical frameworks that come together here only 
seem to receive coherence as they imply a life’s journey. So, only in order for the logic of 
the outlined ideas to become intelligible, I need to refer to my own experience and its 
course of events whose origin goes back, at least twenty-five years. I promise that readers 
will see me explicitly only during this introduction, which they will be able to skip if 
memories bore them. Nevertheless, I hope to be able to explain in this way why despite 
being neither a musicologist nor a psychologist this thesis settles in the field of confluence 
of these two disciplines. This brief story will also help me justify needing to historically 
cover the way in which the relationship between these fields has been conceived around 
the problems of musical performance, in order to understand that the issues which I will 
consider here depend on the cultural models on which they have been formulated 
according to different times and musical subcultures. 
My second piano teacher used to enjoy finding and “making hidden elements sing” 
in a piece of music. I was 14 years old when I took my first class with her. I still remember 
the impact that it caused me. I had been preparing Chopin’s Piano Etude in C sharp Minor 
5 
Op 25 N° 7. After listening to my performance and giving me a series of suggestions to 
interpret it, she sat at the piano “to exemplify” what she meant. Almost before the end 
something appeared that I had never heard before. An extremely clear imitation of the 
motif on the tonic C# minor triad (or, better said, the end of this motif g#3- c#3- e3 on the 
left hand, g#4- c#4- e4 on the right hand, that fractures the metric organization of the 
hemiola (figure 1.1)). 
Figure 1.1. Chopin’s Etude Op. 25 N° 7 in C sharp minor (mm. 61-63) 
For me, that reiteration infused the passage with new expressive meaning. There 
suddenly appeared before me a point of contact in that dialogue that both voices had been 
plotting from the beginning of the piece. But, in addition, in that passage, that point of 
contact materialized the melancholic sense of the complete piece in an almost agonizing 
expression, offered by a much slower repetition, capturing the mood (and the expressive 
strategy of that mood) that would prevail until the end of the piece. All in all, though at the 
time I was not very mindful of the scope of the experience, the motif that had been hidden 
and was then revealed to me at that moment “thanks to the art” of that exquisite pianist 
who was my teacher, gave me the key of access to an absolutely different understanding of 
the musical work. That day, I left my piano class convinced that a composition could have 
a deeper meaning which my preoccupation for pressing each key at the suitable moment 
did not allow me to see. This was the secret that I had to learn to decipher and to perform. 
Some years later I had the pleasure of attending a concert of a young pianist who 
coming from distant Russia impressed the audience of Buenos Aires because of his 
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virtuosity. Certainly, I succumbed to the effects of his pianism, but I was absolutely 
perplexed in the encores. As an encore, a piece was heard, which although it seemed very 
familiar to me from the beginning, I was not able to determine what it was. To me it 
seemed to be Chopin’s Etude in C Minor Op. 10 N° 12. But that was impossible: I myself 
had spent countless hours playing it, I knew it very intimately, but what I was listening to 
appeared distant, almost unknown. However, there was no other possibility; it could not 
have been any other composition. It was that etude. I could not understand the magic that 
the pianist was doing, but evidently the piece was his. It was not the same one that I had 
listened to so many times; it was not the one I used to play. Although I understood that day 
that performers do not reproduce a finalised work and that what they play are their 
masterpieces, only over twenty years later could I touch upon an explanation to this. This 
explanation is the one that can be read here in chapter 7, in which I attempt to describe the 
complex relations that tie the performer to the piece from a postmodern perspective. 
However, that day I left the concert hall with the conviction that my experience as a 
listener could sensibly be governed by what the performer did, and that the content of my 
experience was not the composition itself. On the contrary, that particular performance had 
been the nucleus of that experience, thus, that experience was unique and unrepeatable. A 
short time later I had the intuition that that nucleus was not only occupied by that 
performance, but that something of my own had also been there. 
Around that time another strong musical experience shook my emotions. By then I 
used to play the piano in an ensemble dedicated fundamentally to vocal chamber music 
from the 18th and 19th Centuries. One evening I was meeting with the soprano and the 
baritone of the group with the intention of choosing a song repertoire to study. We 
dedicated a good deal of time to sight reading duets by Schubert, Mendelssohn, Brahms. 
Thus, going through pieces, the time arrived for the duet Ich denke dein Op. 78 N° 3 by 
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Schumann after Goethe’s poem. None of us had even heard the piece, the reason why we 
were in truth sight reading. More than twenty years have passed since that episode, and I 
still have found neither the words nor the means to relate what happened to us. I can barely 
now assure that we were submerged in a state of mutuality according to what I attempt to 
explain in chapter 8. But at that moment I could only think that at very few times in my life 
had I felt so near to somebody, that the current communicating us had become incredibly 
intense, that that communication had nothing to do with what was possible to be said in 
words, and that there was no such thing as my emotion but rather our emotion. I remember 
the words that my friend, the baritone, was able to articulate when we finished performing 
the piece, filling a silence that the tears in the eyes of my other friend and a strong knot in 
my own throat prevented us from populating: “On occasions like these, I am grateful for 
being a musician and having the opportunity of doing music”. The quotation evokes 
neither a memorable thought nor an enlightening insight. Nevertheless, it reveals that our 
experience was woven around something outside of us and that, while serving to 
amalgamate to us in that state of mutuality, offered us a space to create it. Please, may it be 
understood, I am not saying that we had entered into a mystical critical moment gazing at 
the presence of Schumann, nor anything of the sort. I am simply saying that we were 
conscious of the fact that that joint action was what had bound us in the depths of that 
communication, and that such action was exerted on the composition represented on the 
score that we were reading for the first time in our lives. I had often performed with other 
people but I then realized that in that joint action one gambled much more that playing at 
the same time, imitating expressions and the rest of the propositions that until then defined 
for me musical performance as a communal experience. 
Only now can I bring together those experiences and give them a sense. However, 
this thesis obeys the old yearning of explaining them, and the plain intuition of there being 
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a link between them. The three experiences hinge around the problem of meaning in music. 
But the most interesting detail is that the three experiences locate meaning in the context of 
performance. Contemporary musicology is based on the assumption that musical analysis 
is able to offer a profitable approach to the problem of meaning in music. Nevertheless, 
there are some scholars who think that traditional musical analysis can provide the key to 
access only a partial aspect of musical meaning (Micznik 2001). Probably, as will be seen 
in chapter 7, an important part of what is left outside of traditional musical analysis is what 
is representative of the act of performance. Nevertheless, the first inkling I found in the 
direction of explaining my experiences was, indeed, this musicological optimism. The 
formidable development both in music theory as an academic discipline and music analysis 
as a technical resource came to my knowledge at a time when my attempts to achieve a 
performative creation as a musician were exhausting the route I had undertaken. Around 
that time I believed myself to be journeying through a process that could be understood as 
a kind of revelation, to which I felt that with effort, I was acceding. The effort was mainly 
placed in technical training, and observing in detail all the models I then had (my teacher, 
other teachers, the musicians I could listen to in live performances and others that I could 
analyse through recordings). It was necessary to add to the proximity to my teachers a 
receptive capacity (one’s own talent) to allow me to go from apprentice to sorcerer. 
But, as I have said, that route was being exhausted because, firstly, my contact with 
the most contemporary approaches to general education and, particularly, to music 
education took to me to consider learning in more systematic terms. Secondly, because 
performative problems that I was considering were already much more sophisticated: 
fundamentally I was troubled with the problem of obtaining a coherent performance, with 
both a sense of unity, avoiding performative contradictions, and a sense of graceful 
continuity, in such a way of envisaging the musical piece as an artistic whole. 
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Musical analysis seemed to offer a perspective of the musical work susceptible to 
be systematized in the necessary terms for its learning. But, in addition, it seemed to be a 
key to penetrate the intricacies of musical interpretation and a solid scaffold to construct a 
coherent and unobjectionable performance. 
Almost at the same time I came into contact with music psychology, which also 
raised my optimism in discerning the problems of musical communication. And that, in 
addition, this optimism was established in a more and more intimate alliance with that 
objectivist musicology. Thus, music theory and analysis offered the basis for performance 
and, at the same time, provided the premises to understand the way in which that 
performance touches the listener. The performer’s intention in action and the listener’s 
understanding in listening are taken as two faces of a same coin, tailored from the 
arguments of a musical theory, developed in order to clarify compositions as they come to 
us in writing. Unity and coherence could emerge from a conscientious analytical 
investigation and then, could be communicated to the listener in performance. 
Against this background it is not difficult to understand why I was excited to know 
about the prolongational theories of tonal music. Although in chapter 3 I will develop the 
concept of prolongation in a more extensive manner, now I can say that if the musical 
piece can be understood as transformations of a solid and fundamental basic structure, then 
coherence is genetically guaranteed. From that it follows that unity in performance is 
possible if the performance manages to capture the nature of those transformations and to 
communicate them to the listener successfully. 
As can be seen, until that point nothing referred me to the experiences previously 
narrated. Only the notion of prolongational structure, particularly as proposed by Heinrich 
Schenker (whose salient aspects will be seen in chapter 3), appealed somewhat to my 
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intuition, instilled by my piano teacher, that a deep and concealed facet of music exists and 
can be made to surface. Now, the theory offered me a frame that extended the possibilities 
of finding and unearthing such treasures and also linked this topic to that of coherence and 
unity within the musical form. As Nicholas Cook affirmed, “Schenker' s own analyses 
assume that music has form because the part acquires its aesthetic meaning from its 
relation with the whole, and the main sphere in which this happens is that of directed tonal 
motion” (1987a, p.64) 
Nevertheless, the problem was both theoretically and practically much more 
complex than it seemed: prolongational theories of music, specially that of Heinrich 
Schenker, are strongly questioned as far as their cognitive reality status goes (Cook 1987b, 
1990, Martínez 1999). That is to say, there seems to be certain consensus around the fact 
that, although prolongational theories are explanatory of important aspects of the 
composition, they do not capture its experiential aspects. Despite this, it seemed sensible to 
think that if (i) the notion of prolongational structure could help me, as a pianist, to form 
my performance in a particular way, and that if (ii) as my old experience in the concert of 
the Russian pianist had demonstrated, the performer can take part in a decisive way in the 
listener’s understanding of the work, then this underlying musical structure might, to some 
extent, touch the listener. As simple as that...! 
As complex as that; as dark as that! The very notion of an underlying 
prolongational structure is quite dark, but how it can configure a performance, how it can 
make contact with the listener, and other considerations in this line are, however, much 
more complicated issues. I was absorbed in these sinuous thoughts when the moment for 
proposing my thesis arrived. If the prolongation notion could be so useful to think about 
performance, but, at the same time, so questioned as far as its cognitive reality status, could 
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this mean that the very concept of cognitive reality was being seen from a very classical 
perspective as one tied to perception without considering its implications in the realm of 
action? I then found it necessary to think of the prolongational structure in the course of 
performance. 
Thus, the original idea of this work came into sight: Is prolongation an attribute of 
performance? And, in this way, my preoccupation with the problems of musical 
interpretation and its communication took me to the crossroads between psychology and 
musicology. 
This thesis settles in the heart of that crossroads, but from the perspective of my 
interest in music performance. In this way, psychology, music theory and analysis and 
musical performance constitute the three-dimensional framework of this work. 
Nevertheless, as the central subject is communication, there are inescapable references to 
semiotic, philosophical, and aesthetic theoretical frames, and as will be justified further 
ahead, to both evolutionary and developmental theories. I trust that I am able to guide the 
reader towards the relationship between all of them. In order to make easier this task, the 
next section outlines the entire structural organization of the thesis. 
1.1 The organization of this work 
Initially, two chapters develop general issues. Chapter 2 presents a historical 
approach of the relation between psychology and musicology, which almost naturally 
emerges in explaining music performance. This is not only a simple temporal 
contextualization of the main topic of this thesis from a historical perspective. The 
historical perspective is merely outlined as an excuse to introduce the epistemological 
problems that will be important subjects treated here. The aim of the chapter is, therefore, 
to explore the epistemological crisis through which the subject under discussion journeys. 
12 
Thus, one will see (analysed from a historical point of view, but reaching beyond mere 
chronological report) intersections of paradigms, affinities and divergences, and 
agreements that these two fields of knowledge have drawn up on the problem of “playing 
music”, always under a clearly defined context proposed by western academic music 
culture. This is not then, a heuristic illustration of the topic, which can be dispensable in its 
understanding, but, on the contrary, it tries to exhibit key aspects for comprehending the 
approaches discussed during the rest of this thesis. In that sense, the historical map course 
coalesces at the present time, in which the displayed perspectives are synchronously 
present. In another sense, this historical route constitutes a way, which tries to be elegant, 
of showing the tensions that coexist in the present scene. As I have just said, these 
superimposed approaches obey different epistemological perspectives around the topic of 
music performance, also being strongly tied to the dominant ideologies in each cultural 
context. My own musical formation took place in a socio-cultural context in which the 
political violence (identifiable in countries turned into active secondary arenas of the Cold 
War), resulted in a bloody dictatorship. Many of the musical conventions that marked my 
education, in interpretative terms, come from ideas associated to the ideologies that 
sustained that dictatorship. The notion of authority based on the unquestionable tradition of 
a canon, the absolute absence of intellectual reflection about musical problems understood 
in communicational and creative terms, are some of these points. In short, I propose 
viewing in historical terms the components of a present scene in such a way that allows us 
to find music-theoretical, psychological, communicational, and performative terms on 
which to investigate communication in performance. 
Chapter 3 presents, in a brief form, the aspects of the prolongational theory that will 
be useful to me in attempting to understand its possible intervention in performance and its 
communication. The necessity of this chapter arises from the fact that the prolongational 
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theories, in particular Heinrich Schenker’s, have been widely disseminated in English-
speaking musicology, introduced by his followers in the UK and USA, who have proposed 
an interpretation of it strongly befitting the dominant epistemology since the post-war 
period. Then, the chapter reviews different epistemological perspectives from which the 
notion of prolongation has been considered as one of the theory’s main constructs. Also, a 
critique of cognitive perspectives is glimpsed at for having colonized Schenkerian thought 
attributing interests and perspectives to it typical of the intellectual context found in neo-
Schenkerianism. Nevertheless, the chapter includes the treatment of psychological 
components that are relevant to the problem we are considering here, and the derivations of 
performative concern that music theory has found. This chapter is linked to Appendix I, in 
which the main theoretical views of prolongation are briefly summarized for the uninitiated 
reader in this topic. 
The rest of the chapters fully open the discussion of the three-dimensional 
theoretical frame, and these are different since this frame has been transformed, changing 
its approach to the topic, and therefore its utility for treating it. Chapters 4 to 6 approach 
the question of whether prolongation can be understood as an attribute of performance, and 
in that case whether it can be communicated to the listener from the perspective of the 
dominant paradigms that have contributed with a body of research to the comprehension of 
communicational aspects of expressive musical performance. Concretely, these chapters 
are centred on the meeting point between a musicology installed as science in academic 
realms and a psychology colonized by the so called Cognitive Revolution. In that context, 
chapter 4 presents a brief synthesis (which, without a doubt because of its brevity, is not 
absolutely fair to many excellent contributions that may have been disguised or omitted) of 
such approaches with the intention of contextualizing both epistemologically and 
methodologically the empirical evidence that will be shown, analysed and discussed in the 
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following chapters. This chapter gives the reader an idea about the prospect that has 
oriented my search from my first contacts with music psychology and in which, 
undoubtedly, it is possible to obtain many answers to an important portion of the questions 
here raised. Appendix II, which is linked to this chapter, presents some empirical 
psychoacoustic and psychological foundation related to this paradigm approached from the 
listener’s perspective. The following two chapters are sustained by the framework 
presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 shows the first empirical study of this thesis. In particular, it intends to 
give a systematic study of performance as its focus of analysis related to the structural 
interpretations of the composition emanating from opposed approaches of musical 
analyses. All the examination included in that chapter departs from the premise that 
attributes of performance are susceptible to be understood as mapping attributes of the 
musical analysis (in so far as structuralist musicology understands the attributes of musical 
analysis as the musical structure). The reader will easily notice that the entire suggested 
perspective rests on the objectivist approach to music performance. In that sense, 
descriptions of the performances are understood as sets of actions of the performers. That 
is to say, it is a musicological analysis with a clear psychological purpose, in which the 
focus of study is rather the performers and their intentions. The analysis of similarities and 
differences between a set of important performances of a piano composition from the 19th 
Century constitutes the nucleus of the study1, which identifies two performances that can 
be considered opposed in terms of their allegiance to an interpretation of the composition, 
                                                 
1 A preliminary analysis of these commonalities was presented at the 2002 National Meeting of Research in 
Arts and Design, University of La Plata, Argentina.  
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as either showing its prolongational structure or highlighting exclusive attributes of the 
musical surface2. 
The empirical treatment of the subject is completed by a series of listening tests that 
are presented in chapter 6. The first experiments were designed under experimental 
premises that attempted to investigate the problem whilst maintaining the conditions of 
performance and listening in a setting as similar as possible to its natural ones. In this, the 
experimental tasks involved listening to complete works as they were recorded by the 
original performers3. In contrast, the last experiments depart from the artificial 
manipulation of the musical stimuli, giving rise to the use of experimental paradigms 
which were developed and validated in compatible studies4. The results obtained in these 
experiments, as well as in the descriptions of chapter 5, uncovered some questions that the 
classical perspective, both in the psychological and in the musicological, seem not to be 
able to respond to entirely. Appendix III provides some additional interpretation of these 
data according to a theoretical framework derived from Pragmatics. 
In order to explore some alternative responses, chapters 7-10 present a broad 
multidisciplinary scope, starting from a reflexive proposal which relocates a perspective 
from which to examine music performance, up to the analysis of both psychological 
paradigms and musicological approaches, giving rise to this relocation, and that results in a 
more extensive explanation of communication between performers and listeners based on 
the new terms. For that reason, three brief chapters (7 – 9) cover those points. Although 
                                                 
2 A brief analysis of both performances was previously presented at the First Annual Meeting of the 
Argentinean Society for the Cognitive Sciences of Music, Buenos Aires, 2001 
3 Parts of these experiments were presented at the 2001 Conference of the Society for Music Perception and 
Cognition. Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, and at the 2001 National Meeting of Research in Arts and 
Design, University of La Plata, Argentina 
4 A brief part of these data was presented at the 2003 National Meeting of Research in Arts and Design, 
University of La Plata, Argentina 
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reading imposes a linear order of appearance of the ideas, it is necessary to consider that 
these three chapters will be understood exactly when each of them is thought of as based 
on the others. I am not asking for the reader, in a display of Cortazarian acrobatics, to alter 
the reading order or to read the chapters in different sequences. I am simply requesting 
patience until finishing the reading of the complete thesis in order to exactly understand the 
scope of each one of the chapters and its incumbency regarding the central subject of this 
thesis. This new perspective begins with a shorter chapter, the 7th, in which a series of 
reflections about performative practice are considered5. This is the chapter in which my 
profile as a performer can be seen more clearly. There, a reflexive performer writes, 
questioning himself about his artistic task. There I propose a way to understand music 
performance in which composition is considered as the material for elaboration of the 
piece of art, instead of a completed work of art in itself. In this way, Appendix IV shows 
the literary journey that inspired this idea. Basically, this proposal rests on two theoretical 
pillars taken from other compatible fields: the notion of transposition (taken from the 
semiotics of mass media) and the concept of dialectic of the materials (taken from the 
dialectic materialism applied to the examination of music, in particular after the philosophy 
of Theodor W. Adorno). In combination, both ideas draw up a battle area of performance 
that rescues it from its confinement to a reproductive and merely interpretative function to 
open a clear creative function. But in addition, music composition, understood as the 
material of the performance, guarantees the historical-social-cultural contextualization of 
the performative act. In this way, one will see that it is possible to glimpse some aspects of 
the cultural origin of the current music performance of academic music from the common 
practice period. 
                                                 
5 A preliminary stage of these reflections was presented at the Second International Symposium on 
Psychology and Aesthetics, Miraflores de la Sierra, Madrid, 2006.  
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For its part, Chapter 8 is located clearly in a psychological field. In it some critics 
from developmental psychology and primatology fire at each other against the backdrop of 
communication seen as information transmission. This perspective, which understands 
communication as a linear process that unidirectionally ties sender, message and receiver, 
presents serious difficulties at the time of understanding the reciprocal influences of the 
involved actors, the communicated contents and the cultural contexts in which the 
communication takes place. On the contrary, a different perspective, based on a dance 
metaphor, that has been developing strongly in recent years, mainly from the above 
mentioned disciplines, seems to better capture the components involved in musical 
communication. The chapter synthesizes the key concept of intersubjectivity as the 
operative platform on which communication is carried out. At the same time different 
approaches are discussed that developmental psychology has worked up for the concept of 
intersubjectivity, with the intention of understanding which is best adapted to 
understanding musical communication. In that sense, the utility of speaking about either 
states of mutuality or communion instead of communication will be considered in order to 
explore the processes that accompany both the first intersubjective exchanges in life and 
other intersubjective experiences throughout the vital cycle (such as that provoked around 
the sight-reading of Schumann’s Ich denke dein), which conserve intact many of the earlier 
features. This chapter also has an epistemological interest: I try to face the problem from a 
genetic point of view, since I consider that genetic psychology can account for many of the 
problems in general psychology. However, against this background it is also necessary to 
consider that the particularities of the expression in music do not constitute a universal 
phenomenon, because they are tied to the changing idiosyncrasies of the history and 
context of each musical culture that, by definition, are unique. Therefore, and agreeing 
with Blanco and Castro (2005) any correct psychological explanation should aspire to 
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being ontogenetic, phylogenetic and culture-genetic at the same time. After reading 
chapters 7 to 10 one after the other, the reader will see that the proposed diversity in them 
aims to clarify this triple genesis. 
In chapter 9, we come again to locate ourselves in a musicological field. 
Nevertheless, soon after starting, it will be seen that the chapter looks for a new bridge 
between psychology and musicology, already in the context of postmodern artistic 
realization. The chapter approaches the matter of narrativity of music. At first, the theme 
may be considered as a digression off the route I had been following. Nonetheless, as it 
will be seen, the subject of narrativity is taken in order to understand how the composition 
can serve as material for creation of the performance as independent artwork. I start off by 
considering that the narrative impulse is a part of the psychogenetic conditions for 
developing the imaginative activity that on the one hand characterizes the construction of 
performance, conceived as independent artwork, and, on the other hand, organizes the 
listener’s reception of it. In this way communication between performer and listener, 
understood as intersubjective experience unfolds itself narratively. In particular, it will be 
seen that this view allows for the fact that what performer and listener share is a way both 
to organize and to experience time in music. A clear epistemological perspective will 
emerge throughout this chapter. This consists basically of understanding music as 
performance (Cook, 2003) emphasizing its autonomy from composition as an artistic form. 
This is the reason for which many of the musical examples that illustrate or explain 
concepts developed throughout this thesis, from the first chapters onwards, are presented 
through recordings of performances instead of through the usual way in which 
musicological publications used to include their exemplifications, that is, by means of 
scores. As will be seen, a score is a representational form that captures some attributes of 
the composition but that does not account for the performance. Therefore the score will be 
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used when alluding to the composition. On the other hand, recordings, or other 
representational forms (such as graphical profiles of dynamics and timing) will be used 
when we are talking about performative issues. In this sense, the meta-language that 
musicology has developed related to performance as an independent form of art still is in a 
very precarious stage of such a development. Therefore, the communication of certain 
ideas relative to performance itself making use of propositional categories may darken 
rather than enlighten. In those cases (particularly in chapter 2) I will dispense with all 
meta-linguistic attempts. 
In chapter 10 I attempt to carry the ideas which were presented and developed in 
the previous chapters to an empirical terrain. The chapter begins with an example of 
transposition from a musical composition towards two different significant domains: on the 
one hand towards a musical performance and on the other hand towards a film. The idea is 
firstly to show how knowing the structural aspects of the composition, particularly those 
which talk about the prolongational structure and the underlying voice leading, can give 
rise to an imaginative activity that leads into the fulfilment of the transposed work (both 
with the music performance and the film). In short, the issue consists of seeing how the 
composition fires the imaginative endeavour that gives rise to the final artistic product, 
taking into account the existence of other materials while modelling the definitive work of 
art (Appendix V describes some more artistic materials used in the film along with the 
piece of music). But in addition, the way in which the prolongational structure can be 
considered as the basis for a time configuration of the transposed artwork will be 
investigated. Thus, I will attempt to show that the two different significant supports (music 
performance and film) can share characteristics of their temporal configurations. In other 
words, they can be temporally compatible, giving rise to a sort of crossmodal similarity. 
Crossmodality is a concept that is introduced in chapter 8 as one of the most important 
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characteristics of intersubjective experiences. In that way, when suggesting that 
crossmodality is a phenomenon also present in the reception of music performance, I am 
lending credence to the hypothesis that performance can be understood as an 
intersubjective experience according to which speaking about communion, in the sense of 
mutuality, is more convenient than referring to communication in terms of information 
transfer. The chapter also displays the results of an experiment in which the hypothesis of 
crossmodal understanding is submitted using the classic experimental paradigm of 
similarity judgments.6 
Finally, in chapter 11 there are some thoughts that I formulate as conclusions from 
a final analysis of the entire travelled path. These reflections are oriented, again from my 
personal perspective, to the radical change of perspective that I have been developing that 
has lead me from an initial undertaking involving a clearly explanatory intention about the 
problem of communication in performance towards an interpretative approach of it. In 
other terms the chapter will try to give an account of why all the road travelled has driven 
me in the direction of an interpretation of that earlier intuition related to the fact that, in 
some point, the three anecdotes that I spoke of above were tied around the knot of the 
preoccupations that as a performer I had always: how is it that the listener and me as 
performer, can in the course of performance understand each other so well! 
                                                 
6 An earlier version of the analysis of these data was presented at the Five Annual Meeting of the 
Argentinean Society for Cogntive Sciences of Music, Corrientes, Argentina, 2006.  
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Chapter 2: The relation between psychology and 
musicology in the course of music performance 
2.1 Introduction 
Assuming music as a knowledge domain entails thinking about it not only as an object that 
is elaborated and used in a particular way by a given culture. It also implies demarcating a 
field that is identifiable by the particular way in which human beings get to know it. In 
other terms, we understand a portion of the reality that opens in front of us at a given 
moment and context as a knowledge domain because we unfold a particular mode of 
creating meaning from it. Regarding the arts, it is not just any portion of reality, but a 
specific part of it that has been developed by the culture itself in order to be communicated 
among its members, and possessing a series of attributes that are denominated in a generic 
way as aesthetic (DEA 2003). Music can be defined as a cultural production aesthetically 
communicable. The discussion about what is aesthetic exceeds the scope of this work. On 
the contrary, we will approach here the problem of communicability. 
The question of communicability equally interests musicology as it does 
psychology. Performance studies have been an interesting arena in which musicology and 
psychology have aired many common problems. In the recent formulation of this field, a 
series of postulates have been set down as starting points (Dunsby 1995, Rink 1995): (i) 
music performance as cultural production has a structure, therefore it can be understood, in 
structuralist terms, as an object; (ii) that structure is susceptible to be described in terms of 
component attributes, (iii) communicability consists of the circulation of those component 
attributes between members of the culture, (iv) in western culture, its members carry out 
different roles in that circulation, (v) roughly speaking, musicology contributes to this field 
through the study, description and analysis of communicable structural attributes (that is to 
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say, point ii) whereas psychology undertakes the study of how that knowledge circulates 
(point iii) and the description of the intervening subjects (point iv). 
This will be the start point of this thesis. This approach comprehends music as an 
object in the classic communicational scheme involving a sender, a message and a receiver 
(Shannon and Weaver 1949). Inevitably, from this conception it is necessary to discuss the 
sender’s intentionality of communication, and the receiver’s recognition of this 
intentionality. In addition it requires defining the space the performer as subject occupies 
in relation to the place of the sender. Thus, the performer has frequently been seen as 
intermediary in a linear communicational chain - following the metaphor of information 
transmission - between the composer’s intentions, and the listener’s reception (Canazza 
and Rodá 1999, Hargreaves et al. 2005). 
However, we will see that the role of performer is variable according to different 
motivations and the very notions of music and music performance that have reigned at the 
diverse times and cultures, those that also depend on the dominant ideologies (Gembris and 
Davison 2002) that reciprocally operate on both the musicological and psychological 
agendas of every period. 
It is not possible to understand musical communication if the variable relations 
between musicology and psychology are not contextualised in relation to the mentioned 
dominant ideologies. This will be shown throughout this chapter. For this, different points 
of view will be discussed from which music performance has been considered in different 
historical times, showing, in addition, the variable tensions between music theory and 
performance. Taking the archetype of performer that it is possible to identify from the 
passage of Enlightenment to Romanticism, in early 19th century, the aim is to locate the 
possible lines of attack to the problem of communicability of musical structure that will be 
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treated in order in this thesis. Thus a brief analysis of the psychology-musicology relation 
around (i) the romantic performer, (ii) the modern performer and (iii) the postmodern 
performer as clearly identifiable archetypes (although not so clearly easy to situate 
chronologically) will be undertaken. Also, a review of the solutions for the problems 
derived from this relation with respect to the two first archetypes will be carried out. This 
discussion will allow approaching the first stage of the experimental endeavour of this 
thesis. The discussion on possible solutions of the tensions around the postmodern 
archetype will be left until chapter 7, after which different psychological and musicological 
approaches will be treated, necessary to understand the second empirical undertaking. 
2.2 The supportive – expressive function dichotomy 
Technical assistance usually is a condition for artistic realizations. In many cases a highly 
diversified technical support is needed. That diversified support frequently lies on several 
people different from the artist. However, the hallmark of the individuals involved in each 
instance of an artistic process seems to deepen itself regarding performing arts. When such 
an individual manages to leave on the work an original and creative mark that is associable 
to him or her as an individual, his or her role no longer is supportive but is fundamentally 
expressive and creative. 
This opposition seems to refer to the old technique-expression dichotomy. 
Nevertheless, this is not exactly the subject: the supportive role - the expressive role 
antinomy is built on the subject’s motivation. 
On the one hand, the subject’s motivation is to serve another’s will. It is a 
Supportive Function. The supportive function pushed to an extreme is represented by the 
entire cancellation of subjectivity. It implies meticulously accepting certain imposed 
canon. The merit of the work is strongly related both to the handling of procedures and 
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techniques, and to the stable and repeatable qualities of such procedures. The value of the 
product depends on the precision in applying the technical procedure and thus on how 
faithfully the work reflects that canon. 
On the other hand, the motivation may consist of following one’s own impulse, 
obeying one’s own personal creative and expressive will. It is the Expressive Function. 
The extreme of this function is represented by the purest manifestations of subjectivity and 
individuality (which, often, lose communicational strength). It implies creating one’s own, 
new and original canons, unknowing of all external voices and only acting under the 
dictates of one’s own will. Performance is viewed as a sort of exteriorisation of the self. In 
this case we are used to judging both the characteristics of individuality and the way in 
which the person is seen projected in the production. The value is estimated in terms of 
originality and creativity which turn the product into something special. 
The supportive function of the performer is a strong thought that modernity has 
maintained (Taruskin 1995), being held by some 20th Century composers (Schönberg, 
Stravinsky, Hindemith). In Schönberg’s opinion, for example, the performer is a sort of 
necessary evil for the incapacity that the standard listener has of directly receiving from the 
composer his or her message (by a written score) (Newlin quoted by Cook 2003). Without 
being so explicit, many other composers hold a similar idea about the role of the performer 
through a highly detailed, almost obsessive way of writing music. This yearning is seen 
brought to life in electronic music. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice the performing 
role that disk-jockeys have acquired in present self-denominated electronic pop music in 
the light of the creative nature of performance. Although the allegory of the necessary evil 
is remarkably extreme, the supportive function of the performer is one of the most 
important aspects of any model of music performance (Godlovitch 1998). 
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Perhaps, the expressive function is more familiar in music performance, although its 
extreme manifestation does not exist in this field. However many of its characteristics 
appear in diverse performative tendencies. For example, some pedagogical approaches that 
are contiguous with the self-help and new age psychology, propose the primacy of the 
performer’s self as the supreme value in the performance (Ristad 1982). Again, this kind of 
allegory of being oneself is also extreme, but, nevertheless, self-expression occupies a 
place legitimised by many projects relative to music performance (Kivy 1995). 
It is possible to affirm that the history of western music performance is the history 
of the tensions between these two functions. The performer’s exact incumbencies, the 
performer’s expected stamp on the artwork, the extent to which the performer’s task 
characterizes and mirrors the very artwork, arise from those tensions in every particular 
music culture. But, in each cultural context, the performer’s incumbencies are dialectically 
defined, respecting the ontology of the musical work (Cook 1999, 2003, Johnson 1999). 
The examples 1 to 4 of the disk show pairs of performances that are considered the same 
work in 4 different musical cultures (Example 1; example 2; example 3; example 4). 
Probably, the musical culture of the example 1 cannot consider the pair 4 as the same 
work. However, for the musical culture of example 4, the differences in the pair are part of 
the performer’s stamp, but they do not affect the identity of the piece. What we are 
attempting to demonstrate by using these examples is the fact that the “musical work 
conception” of a particular epoch, a musical culture, is the result not only of its structural 
musical notions that define the style, but also of the set of beliefs around the role of music 
in that culture, the way in which their members are involved, and the levels of participation 
that the different cultural actors have in the realization of the artwork. 
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Throughout these four pairs of examples it is possible to note different motivation 
on the part of the performer. In a same musical culture, whereas the motivation goes more 
and more towards being that of expressing one’s own ideas and senses, the characteristics 
that allow determining the identity of the new performance with the first, get blurred. What 
the personal motivation of the performer is questioning as the four examples pass is where 
does the musical work lie. The example 5 in the disk gives an account of this. 
In the mid-nineties, an Argentinean rock star, Charlie García, recorded a rock 
version of the National Anthem. Although many recorded versions of the National Anthem 
already existed, soon the idea of two Anthems began to circulate: a National Anthem and 
Charlie’s Anthem. Why they were not considered as the same work?  
Initially we are tempted to answer: “Charlie’s Anthem is not faithful to the original 
score”. However, in 2000, other popular musicians, Jairo and Lito Vitale, performed and 
recorded the National Anthem. They neither were faithful to the score but they were 
broadly accepted. However the denomination “Jairo’s Anthem” was never used. 
What was called into question in this episode is precisely the depth of the 
performer’s stamp, and the fact that opened out into controversy was that this stamp 
depended on the context and the dominant ideology in that context. García did what he 
always used to do in his own musical (sub)culture. Nevertheless, the context was another 
one there. 
The tension between supportive and expressive functions has emerged throughout 
different times and contexts, and with diverse names. Although not strictly superimposed, 
but at least to a similar extent, it is in the arena of the present debate. For example, 
Thompson (2001) mentions the dichotomy between the “authenticist correction” and the 
“aesthetic correction”, referring to the functional duality that we are presenting but limiting 
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the arena of the present debate specifically around ancient music. On the other hand, in the 
context of performance in the 19th century, Ferris (2003, p.354) proposes a dichotomy 
between composer’s music and performer’s music. According to this author these 
categories do not represent watertight compartments but are rather two poles that describe 
the aesthetic intentions that are beyond the piece and the expectations that the audiences 
bring to the performance of the pieces. Further away from this, Ferris mentions the 
partition suggested by Carl Dahlhaus between “virtuosity” - talking about the practice in 
which the performer adapts himself to the demand of the performance circumstance, in 
particular the demand of the audience - and “interpretation” - talking about the way of 
performance in which the performer obeys rather to the demand of fidelity to the 
composer, and to the original spirit of the piece. On the other hand, Lawrence Kramer 
(mentioned by Ferris) prefers to speak about “twin styles”: the first one oriented to the 
priorities of the performer and the second one oriented to the realization of the work 
accurate to the composer’s spirit. More comprehensively, according to Goehr (1992), this 
double sense of the performative activity dates back to classical concepts of mimesis and 
catharsis. The idea accounts for the relation of the performer both with the imposed 
restrictions from outside, and with the raised necessities from inside, relative to the 
originality, personal expression, and individual pleasure. 
During the rest of this chapter these ties will be examined in three different contexts 
throughout the history of western art music (WAM). Many of the prevailing ideas at those 
moments also subsist in certain current contexts. Some of them are intimately related to the 
perspective that dominates the agendas of research in music performance in the field of 
psychology of music. Others encourage certain changes of psychological approaches and 
accompany the transformations operated in the musicological perspectives in the light of 
the cultural approaches to the discipline (Clayton, Herbert and Middleton 2003). 
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2.3 The romantic performance  
2.3.1 The myth of genius 
Music performance in the 19th century is characterized by the presence of multiple 
dualities. For resolving all of them, the romantic culture reconfigured the figure of the 
genius. The notion of genius was used in the enlightenment period as synonymous to 
capacity, but throughout romanticism the concept was adopting its connotations of special 
ability, inventive intelligence, more insightful perception, and superiority with which we 
know it (Jaffe 1980). 
According to Eco (1992) its origin is very remote in western thinking: the hermetic 
thought of 2nd century, characterized by “the mystical intuition, the non rational 
illumination, and an instantaneous and non discursive vision. No longer is it necessary to 
speak, to discuss and to reason. It is enough with hoping that somebody speaks to us.” (p. 
36) Remarkably, this characterization resounds in many writings about musical 
performance: 
“From the more and more intimate understanding of art’s deep mystery, that 
inner tremor will be born, perhaps, at some sacred time of his studies that will 
give the feeling of proximity of artistic truth." (Cortot 1934, p. 15) 
The interpretative genius is not any genius. Genius consists of being transparent to 
let the work be seen and simultaneously be vividly present for the audience in lieu of the 
composer (Hunter 2005). It is not a question of subordination of the self to the composer’s 
desires. It is his or her own genius that makes it possible for him or her to enter the 
composer’s spirit. The performer is a medium. Thus, the supportive function and the 
expressive function may be seen as strongly integrated in such a figure. 
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The psychology of the second half of the 19th century turned towards a more 
scientific approach. Nevertheless, it had reserved a place for the ineffable. Genius occupied 
that site, and, at that time, psychology did not worry to investigate its nature more deeply. 
Thus, geniuses were often seen as strongly introspective subjects, worried about the course 
of their own reflections regardless of the collective consequences that these thoughts could 
carry, and knowing themselves to be exceptional beings. Geniuses were subjects ready to 
undergo the lack of understanding of a mediocre world that could not understand their 
genius. (Castro et al. 2005) 
2.3.2 Genius and the resolution of the dualities  
Early in the 19th century the partition of performer as independent from composer led to 
the first important duality. This process takes place in the context of capitalist 
transformation of compositional production. Therefore the entire musical production was 
adapted to the newborn “musical market”. These changes gave rise to a strong 
development of the concert as institution. In this, performers also had to sell their 
products. On the other hand it gave rise to the establishment of repertoires, implying that a 
more and more important geographic and temporal rupture existed between performers, 
who produced the concerts, and composers, who generated the pieces for them. Composers 
gradually began being considered naturally as absent in the concert. Their presences were 
replaced by the performers’ attendance. 
Separation between the composer’s figure and the performer’s person conveyed a 
great demand (particularly in technical terms) towards the latter. In this way, the growing 
development of instrumental technique begins to uplift the artist to a special category of 
being. Virtuosity little by little began to be the genius characteristic that was going to 
differentiate the performer from the rest of the mortals. Thus, the supportive function 
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impelled the development of the artistic pretentiousness of the performer. A great paradox 
is then, whereas the division between the technical and expressive components of the 
musical execution was attended (Macdonald 2002), that development of the supportive 
function leads to the imposition of the expressive function. 
This technical development gave to music performance the component of 
physicality that it required in order to be considered as an artistic labour. The concept of 
Fine Art (coming from the 17th century) assumed the creation of an artistic object. Highly 
sophisticated instrumental technique offered music performance a physical quality to be 
fused with a high spirituality, thereby allowing geniuses to access to their own artistic 
status. 
2.3.3 An enactive structure – performance relation 
Virtuossi acquired their status of genius by virtue of their superlative technical 
development. Virtuosity enormously excited audiences, and this was the one that finally 
granted the genius status to performers. In this way, although performers used to declare to 
be at the service of the composer, they were, in fact, inclined before the audience. 
Composers are a sort of mystical endorsement that is only present through performers. In 
this apparent supportive attitude, the performer’s stamp is always guaranteed because of 
the fact that only the genius has access to the true revelation of the artwork. In this context 
the expressive function emerges from the supportive function. Only the virtuosso can reach 
the reproduction of the composer’s spiritual height (Hegel 1818). 
Romantic performers developed their technique as a way to commit themselves as a 
supportive resource. But, this served as a platform to project their artistry. The romantic 
artist understands the composing genius through technical development. While being 
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owner of an amazing technique, the performer had access to the work’s truth (Macdonald 
2002). 
In this way, it is possible to appreciate that performance itself was being considered 
as a field in which many of the dichotomies raised within the frame of music aesthetics of 
the early 19th century were dialectically resolved: composer vs. performer; technique vs. 
expression; technique’s materiality vs. expression’s ineffability; etc. (Hunter 2005). The so 
strongly rooted idea of the performer’s loyalty to the composer, which until today governs 
most of the principles of music performance, arose from there. Shortly, the myth of the 
performative genius arose from an abstract notion of loyalty: the performer would be a 
better artist serving better the composer. Paradoxically, loyalty is a consequence of the 
expressive function. In general, the notion of loyalty arises when the hierarchies of power 
are threatened. When the subordinate can do something by their own motivation, by 
themselves (and possibly for themselves) the concept of loyalty starts to be considered and 
the idea of treason concomitantly arises. 
How did virtuosity become the key of artistic status? Musicians of the first half of 
the 19th century understood the supportive and expressive functions as an indivisible 
whole. The endeavour of playing difficult passages, developing virtuosity, which implies 
the application of a rigid discipline in contact with the musical piece, led inexorably to the 
creative expression of the performer in order to achieve the revelation of the artwork. 
Performers fulfil the presentation of the piece as it was conceived if they initially 
contemplate it, then capture its spirit and finally “content (themselves) with rendering it 
with all the facility of which (they are) capable” (Fétis and Moscheles, quoted by Hunter 
2005, p. 358). Technical facility is the passport to the knowledge of the composing genius. 
The performers belonging to the first romantic generation looked for a means in technical 
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ease to stimulate fantasy (Macdonald 2002). It is the way in which a relation between the 
artist-performer and the musical text, and between interpreters and their mission, is 
established (Eco 1992). And the myth of genius leaves room for everything to occur in a 
way that cannot be explained. 
Both intuition and revelation guide understanding; the understanding of the world. 
According to the German theoreticians in the early 19th century (Hegel, Baillot, Hummel) 
the apprehension of the content of a piece is a question of sudden inspiration (Hunter 
2005). But that inspiration did not arrive any old way, but through action, through 
meticulous and coordinated movement of all the actions necessary to activate the 
composition’s sound, to put the composition in sound. In this way, something remains 
inexplicable in the romantic perspective of music performance: “Interpreting an artwork 
(…) is neither taught nor reached by any pedagogical system." (Riemann 1916, p.103-104) 
This was the place that nineteenth-century psychology was allowed to leave without 
explanation. And this is what is often criticized of this romantic legacy: its (apparent) 
arbitrariness. 
2.3.4 The romantic performance institutionalised 
In spite of the apparent subordination of performers to the composer and their authentic 
relationship with the audiences, the place of genius always was a genuine space of power. 
In that way, performance could not be subordinate to arbitrary vicissitudes. In order both to 
consolidate the performing genius’s power and to avoid an anarchist abuse, romantic 
performance created mechanisms of perpetuation by means of the development of schools. 
The performance schools arose mainly as devices for the transmission of the technical-
mechanical knowledge involved in music performance. Nevertheless, the notion of school 
as performative tradition soon extended to the entire realm of the activity. The schools 
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were constructed around mythical figures who guaranteed good judgment to the 
performance, while they maintained the role of the genius as a unique guide and leader. 
The didactic work of the school was materialized by the music editions, which used to 
include a great amount of performance indication in the scores. Within the school’s 
pedagogical logic these indications not only had the purpose of nearing any disciple to 
genius, but they also established genius’s hierarchical level. Genius is always over the rest 
of the mortals and the disciples knew they could not reach his or her height: “Chopin, like 
every original talent, is not able to be imitated, however it is necessary to try to enter into 
the spirit of his composition in order not to do the opposite” (Zimmerman quoted by 
Bellman 2000, p. 152). 
According to Richard Taruskin (1995), performative traditions have the value of 
being socio-cultural constructions that give meaning to the musical experience. 
Nevertheless, these academic traditions separate from the very sense of socio-cultural 
construction. They are generally the dictation of one person that determines what is 
possible (or better, what is not possible) to do. Didactic works, produced in that way, are 
nothing other than compendia of instructions to play a piece well. They also tend, like all 
creeds, to create unconditional believers with a progressive loss of individuality and self 
esteem. The result of this is a strong dependency that performers establish with those who 
are illuminated. In the eagerness of not needing that truth, the unilluminated are forced to 
do what some musicologists have referred to as consulting the oracle (Taruskin 1995). In 
spite of all the changes produced both in the conceptions about musical performance and in 
the power relations that the conception of the myth of genius provokes, in particular in the 
pedagogical realm, this point of view continues to be effective in so many aspects of 
musical production as well as in instrumental education, musical marketing, both in pop 
music and western art music, and including folk music psychology.  
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2.4 In search of objectivity 
The reaction to the hyperbolic development of romantic ideas in the realm of music 
composition that could be clearly appreciated during the inter-war period became 
distinguishable in the scope of performance from the post-war period. Previously, 
composers - in particular Ravel, Stravinsky, Hindemith – had begun to make the emphatic 
request of performers: Do not interpret! Performers began to be seen more as executors 
than as interpreters (Stravinsky 1970). Therefore, the problem of their role definition 
became a problem more of ethics than of aesthetics. 
Particularly in the English-speaking countries, strengthening of the musical studies 
in universities came together with the new imposition of a music performance aesthetics 
that started to obey that composers’ demand. The “musical sciences” development, mainly 
music theory and historical musicology, opened a supply of important knowledge to the 
performer. In that context, such knowledge was stated as a vital source for artistic decision-
making. The perspective of genius did not satisfy an intellectual environment that explored 
knowledge from a psychology based on empirical evidence. 
2.4.1 A new psychological subject and a new epistemological 
object 
Musical science could not accept a concept of genius supported by the supernatural. This 
notion was replaced by the one of expertise or talent (Sloboda and Howe 1991, Sloboda 
and Davidson 1996, Davidson 2002, Welch 2001), according to which capacities 
considered as different actually display quantitative differences - throughout its phases of 
development – rather than qualitative ones (Sloboda 1991). Amongst their many attributes, 
the talented subjects have a great curiosity for sources and theories. In that way, hermetic 
explanations do not conform to those who are talented. In parallel, for a psychology which 
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is already totally rooted in empiricist bases, the account including a mysterious force can 
no longer take place in its agenda. On the contrary, a search of an account of expertise 
abandoning the previous explanations involving the gift and the ineffable began together 
with the development of learning theories. More objective means might be used for 
understanding and promoting excellence. In this context, the methods of experimental 
psychology were going to be the means and music theory and historical musicology were 
going to be the force of its epistemological base. The idea is that performers do not 
interpret yet, but they objectively offer the musical artwork. 
However, the concept of objectivity was taken immediately as a very difficult idea 
to be applied in artistic fields. Inevitably, including this concept in music performance 
agendas brought conflicts in milieux still closely related to the previous paradigm. Another 
term that takes part of the romantic lexicon and which would be used by performers, 
listeners and critics is loyalty. Loyalty to the composer, versus the subjugation of the 
virtuosso. Meanwhile, the specialized critic began to speak of authenticity. 
As Peter Kivy (1995) has stated, notion of authenticity is taken as being 
synonymous with validity (an expression of strong scientific connotation). A performance 
is considered authentic when it attains the supreme objective of serving the truth of the 
composer’s idea. From there, the idea of authenticity favoured the supportive function 
extending it to aspects that until this moment had been patrimony of the expressive 
function (tempo, phrasing, dynamic, rubato, etc.). The artistic correction idea was strongly 
intensified. Besides, correction requires a canon. Authenticity is based on authority (Kivy 
1995). This authority is always the composer’s authority. But at that moment, the middle 
of the 20th century, that authority did not speak through genius, but through science: 
historical musicology and musical theory. 
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2.4.2 A determinist structure-performance relation 
In the heat of objectivism at least two clear trends in music performance arose: The 
practice of historical performance, and the practice of analysis-based performance. In 
both cases, the search for objectivity leads to such an exacerbation of the supportive 
function that it practically results in the concealment of the performer’s identity. Both 
approaches aim at the composer speaking through performance, and differences between 
them concern the means used for this goal. 
The historicist perspective emphasises loyalty to the composer when recreating all 
the external conditions of the original performance. This implies an attitude of scrupulous 
double-faced fidelity: the replication of the practice of performance within the composer’s 
lifetime and the replication of the very sound of the performances within the composer’s 
lifetime. This perspective has a strong philological foundation since it is based on the 
analysis of texts. Not only scores, but also whatever sort of writings that allow their 
interpretation, in deciphering the signs printed on the score. But other documentations are 
also very important. In particular the musical instruments of the original time are a kind of 
archaeological key. From this perspective the expressive function is reduced to the 
interstices that current historical musicological knowledge leaves free between the text and 
the sonorous result (Kivy 1995). From the psychological point of view, this approach gives 
rise to a two-way thought: the scientificist, oriented towards generalizations, and the 
expressive, oriented toward particularizations. Thus, in their scientificist attitude, 
performers gather the particular situation and resolve it in a generalized way. On the 
contrary, in their expressive attitude, performers particularise a given musical trait as a 
unique and unrepeatable characteristic. This two-way directionality of thought was vastly 
problematic for performers and the scientificist attitude was accounting for all the realms 
of performance. Under these conditions, individuality in performance is little less than an 
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epiphenomenon, it is not a primary concern. Actions that performers must make in every 
moment of the performance are determined by musicological research, which give rise to a 
sort of historicist musicological canon. 
Under this approach, the performer’s creative behaviour consists of behaving as a 
composer (Kivy 1995). Here, questions of performers’ historicist composition (concerning 
the resolution of continuo bass, ornaments and cadenzas) play a very important part. But 
notice that this is rescuing the old idea that the composer is the creator because he creates 
the text; this is a very widespread idea both in classical music theories and in contemporary 
cognitively oriented ones (Williams 1950, Willems 1954-1964, Meyer 1973, Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff 1983). 
The approach based on musical analysis, is, in principle, sceptical regarding the 
historicist perspective by virtue of its chimerical aspects (Stein 1954, Taruskin 1995). The 
objectivity in performance that the analytical approach aims at comes from the intrinsic 
analysis of the musical piece as it is explicit in the score (Cone 1968). Performance is 
clearly a function of the musical structure. The mission also consists of filling the gap 
between score and sound output, but through the explanations that arise from the very 
score and not from external conditions to it (Stein 1954). 
This perspective is also distrustful of (romantic) traditions of performance. 
Concerning this, mimesis and intuition generate liberties that often give place to erroneous 
conceptions (Stein 1954, Berry 1989). Again, as a part of the musical-studies academic 
field, music performance is seen as one more science. In this way a correct expression of 
the musical content is guaranteed by a meticulous mapping of the musical structure (Berry 
1989). Each interpretative decision is consequence of a defined analytical insight. 
Performance is seen as a critical speech that is the product of the rational examination of 
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all and each one of the musical work’s structural aspects as they are expressed in the score 
(Berry 1989, Cone 1995). 
2.4.3 Music performance and the positivist appeal 
The analysis-based approach, a perspective that integrates the details of the analysis in the 
set of the musical form, would guarantee a coherent performance in which the parts are at 
the disposal of the whole. Coherence is one of the supreme values of performance. It is a 
sort of operating form of the widely sought after values of truth and objectivity. And 
performative coherence is defined by analytical coherence. 
Richard Taruskin (1995) understands the struggle between romantic performance 
and this objectivist performance in terms of the vitalist - geometric opposition. The vitalist 
performance “is an objectification of our own pleasure in activity, and our own vitality.” 
(T. E. Hulme, quoted by Taruskin 1995, p.108) According to this, the vitalist performance 
mainly rescues the dynamic qualities of music showed in fluctuations of tempo and 
sonority. On the contrary, the geometric performance reflects a desire to obtain a strong 
frame inside which to feel secure. The geometric execution is founded on decisions based 
on deductive or inferential demonstrations of coherence conditions that maintain the 
togetherness of its attributes. The performance problems are created as aims of research 
whose hypotheses are verified by applying logical principles and/or contributing empirical 
evidence. And therefore, aesthetics is considered as a logical problem: musically 
(artistically), what is possible to be accepted is possible to be demonstrated. Performance is 
taken as a manifestation of the state of knowledge relative to certain performative 
problems, often expressible in mathematical terms. The parsimony of the mathematical 
model is a guarantee of coherence (Cone 1968, Epstein 1995). It is not difficult to notice 
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the relation between this way of seeing music performance and a psychological agenda 
whose criterion of validity is the mathematical expression of its findings. 
There are two other important characteristics that link objectivist performance 
(geometric) with classical cognitive science. Firstly, we have the idea that the performer’s 
actions can be understood as obeying hierarchical systems, in which the relation between 
the parts and the whole is hierarchical. That is, in which certain actions control others. 
Secondly, according to the objectivist viewpoint, performance can be understood in 
grammatical terms as a set of rules that tie each aspect of the musical structure, the musical 
score, the traditions, or the external conditions of performance, to determined actions and 
expressive decisions. The individuality of the performer is developed in the eventual 
emptiness that the grammar leaves. At the same time, the impact that the actions of the 
performance also exert on the listener can be understood according to rules; for example, 
rules of the type if/then, which guarantee the performer’s mission of becoming something 
(structurally) audible (Levy 2001). Audibility becomes the goal that legitimises the action 
in relation to what is analysed. Thus, rules not only regulate the performer’s choices, but 
also serve the critical attitude as a judgmental element: if performance fulfils the rule, then 
the performance is better. This locks up a key concept of the analysis-based approach, 
namely, that the performance’s value finds foundations outside the performance itself, 
mainly in analytical models (often developed for other aims) and in the operations that the 
performer makes in relation to those models. Consequently, authors from this perspective 
talk about intra-musical relations, referring to all the others as extra-musical relations 
(Levy 2001, p.52). 
By all means, this is compatible with a psychology that is more concerned about 
generalizing, finding common behavioural patterns with the intention of describing an 
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average performer (paralleling the notion of average speaker), and determining the 
conditions of acceptability of a given performance, rather than in distinguishing and 
analysing performances and performers as individualities that affect the musical work. 
Succinctly, the objectivist programme defines a performance of a musical work as 
being materialised in the norm (score, grammar, etc.). In this approach, music theory is 
also at the service of a hierarchical conception of music, which establishes with 
performance a strongly determinist relationship. This music theory gives account of a 
musical structure that is characterized by the hierarchical organization of the events present 
on the musical surface. This hierarchy is organized according to rules that allow tying 
every detail of that surface to the whole. The Generative Theory of Tonal Music by Fred 
Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff (1983) is the most conspicuous example of this coalescence of 
music theory with the classical cognitive science program. Nevertheless, other musical 
theories also serve these aims (Cooper and Meyer 1960; Meyer 1973, Berry 1987; Lerdahl 
2001). 
 
In spite of its criticisms of romanticism, the modern programme shares two important 
characteristics with this. One is its philological identification that orients both perspectives 
around the notion of musical text. The second – linked to the previous one – is “the 
Romantic enthronement of the autocratic and infallible composer-creator, divorced from 
real time music making” (Taruskin 1995, p.167). At the same time, neither of the two 
traditions recognizes the role played within it by the performance’s oral tradition and the 
adaptation of this tradition - the dynamics of transformation of the tradition - to the current 
conditions in which the performance takes place (see the case of Arnold Schönberg as 
performer in Jackson 2005). 
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The objectivist perspective is the one that has generated, by its affinity with 
classical cognitive science, the epistemological support for the immense mass of 
investigation that nowadays exists about communication in music performance. In 
particular, the very notion of communication of structural attributes in music performance 
is one that obeys this epistemology. Therefore, all the first experimental endeavour of this 
thesis is based on it, and, in a certain sense, proceeds from the principles reviewed here. 
Thus, the experiments developed in chapter 5 will follow the logic outlined in these pages 
and the paradigms and methods developed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
In spite of the strong influence of these ideas, current musicology increasingly 
questions many aspects of this perspective of music performance. In the rest of this chapter 
we will briefly review the main criticisms the objectivist performance has received from 
current musicology, with the intention of making clear at the start of this thesis, that, in 
spite of comprising a hegemonic paradigm, the studies in performance seen from the 
classic cognitive perspective are not the only way to approach the topic of communication 
in performance. From chapter 7 we will venture towards some theoretical routes of 
development which tend to give answers to these criticisms from in the context of the 
postmodern musical performance: and some collected experimental evidence from 
alternative paradigms will be presented. 
2.5 Targeting objectivism 
The development of electronic means of reproducing music could have turned the 
objectivist program into a sort of arena of academic discussion. Roughly, each new version 
of a given musical piece implies an advance in knowledge about this piece. The paradox of 
this electronic revolution is that, far from demolishing the figure of the performer, it 
returned it to the pinnacle of glory. Certainly this could be academic glory, reached thanks 
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to the contributions made by advances in scientific knowledge in the field. Nevertheless, 
both artists and audiences seem to be more preoccupied by the performance’s individuality 
and idiosyncrasy than by any kind of objectivist precision. The re-editions of very old 
versions and a sort of postmodern upsurge of individuality place us face to face with the 
possibility of enjoying an enormous variety of interpretative styles and diversity seems to 
be the present hunger. If this is the case, in what way was the objectivist programme 
mistaken? 
2.5.1 Objection to the individuality of performance 
The objectivist programme has not solved what, according to Kerman (quoted by Dunsby 
1995, p. 47) is the key problem of music performance: the way in which the musician’s 
individuality must exert influences on the artwork’s individuality (Bowen 1999). 
We have seen that objectivism sees music performance as a declarative activity. 
What performers must display is their knowledge about the musical structure (Berry 1989). 
Performance is not only a declarative mode of conveying the knowledge the texts provide, 
but performance itself, at one extreme, is seen as a didactic text: the text that allows the 
listener to understand the composition. 
Objectivism also recognizes that performers can have other things to say, beyond 
the explanation of the composition. They may want to declare their feelings, for example. 
But these feelings will only be able to be expressed if they do not contradict the feelings of 
the work (Kivy 1995). The essence of objectivism is this: an objective reality exists that is 
the musical work. That reality is outside the subject that performs. The work consists of 
taking control of that reality and communicating it as it occurs. The objectivity of this task 
is guaranteed to the extent that the communicative guidelines are controlled by rules that 
the performer obeys. In this way, the creative activity is minimal. It is accepted that 
43 
performers are creative intermediaries when they behave like a composer, adding 
something to the composition that it did not have in writing, and that is susceptible to be 
set in writing. Briefly, performers can be creative so long as they act not as performers but 
as composers (arrangers). 
But the ontological boundary between composition, arrangement and performance 
is very porous and it strongly depends on the musical culture to which the phenomenon 
belongs. Therefore, this corset that constrains performers’ creativity by pressure of the 
objectivist approach, far from solving their problems concerning intervention, aggravates 
them remarkably. The text’s limit is already vague enough. The musical texts lock 
themselves up according to the specific practices that determine the meaning of the signs 
(Kivy 1995). 
The objective guidelines that colonize the entire action of the performer tend to 
guarantee not only a system of values by which to judge the performance, but also a frame 
for understanding its communicational particularities. Only when understanding 
performance as objective data, is it possible to consider it as the object of the sender - 
message - receiver communicational chain. The objective viewpoint declines to admit 
some aspects as part of the performer’s role that does not fit with its rule-systems, because 
it would not know how to explain its communication (which is basically what happens 
with some aspects of imagery and metaphoric thinking). When seeing communication from 
another perspective (as we will approach in chapter 8) we will be able to free ourselves of 
this problem, and to understand performance as a freer phenomenon including aspects that 
not necessarily require a propositional format. Rather than the truth of a performance, the 
contingency of it will be the heart of interest. We will see in chapter 8 that from this 
perspective certain performative resources such as repetition, which are very problematic 
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for objectivism (as was indicated by Kivy) are vital in communication (Stern, 1985; 
Imberty 2001, 2002). 
2.5.2 Performance Depersonalisation 
As a result of its hostility to performance individuality, the objectivist perspective does not 
fully acknowledge the role of the intuitive and the ineffable in performance. It confuses the 
ineffable with what is magical and associates it with the romantic perspective of the myth 
of genius (Berry 1989). Negating the intuitive as a performance’s strongly personal and 
human trait (Lester 1995) reveals some aspects of a very authoritarian conception, which 
objectivism has reserved for performative problems. The objectivist perspective denies 
intuition in performance because it is substantially denying its artistry. 
In addition, the objectivist perspective must depersonalise performance in order to 
guarantee objectivity, favouring the authority principle over the identification assumption, 
which accentuates subjectivity. This a priori authority principle accentuates the 
authoritarianism that objective performance already revealed elsewhere: (i) it is 
ideologically authoritarian, because it is ethnocentric; (ii) according to Taruskin (1995), 
objective performance represents a fundamentalist vision of the performance’s concerns 
sanctioning the idea that “what is not allowed is prohibited” (see Stravinsky 1971); (iii) 
this perspective becomes conservative, understanding the performer as a curator rather 
than a creator. 
Objectivist performance becomes an instrument of power. Objectivism asserts that 
there is an only way in which music should be listened to, there is an only truth held on the 
composer’s authority. If performers do not adjust to that truth they are misguided: for this 
reason, for Lester (1995), objectivist performance is alienating. But in addition the disloyal 
performers are subversive because they lead the listener somewhere that is not the truth. 
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The composer’s truth is transferred to the performers, then they have the truth and 
therefore who shows an ostensible power before those who are underneath in this 
hierarchy, namely the listeners. The recognition that the materialization of music arises 
from the composer-performer-listener relation (Narmour, mentioned by Dunsby 1995, 
p.51) which is vertical and linearly univocal, therefore the listener is the last link in the 
chain, without any kind of influence on the other actors. The ostentation of this power 
makes the performer a pretentious subject (Rothstein 1995). But this power is nearly the 
result of an obsequious attitude; is the result of their loyalty to the composer. The term 
loyalty appears in literature on music performance, almost as much as it appears in the 
fascist or nationalistic manifestos. 
Objectivism has a pejorative point of view of the listener. It considers that the 
listener has a passive attitude, and therefore does not contribute to the musical meaning. 
For example, objectivism tends to deprive the listener of ambiguity (Agawu 1994), which 
is a conspicuous attribute of music (and art in general) (Tanner 2000, Levy 1995). 
Objectivism’s systems of rules have tended to reduce ambiguity. From the cognitivist 
perspective, fuzzy systems and systems of rules of preference (see chapter 4) are attempts 
to approach the problem of ambiguity within classical cognitive science. But this is always 
made with the aim, more or less explicit, either of eliminating it, or, at least, of reducing it 
to a minimal expression. Objectivism in performance reflects this perspective. 
Exercising intuition, and artistically using ambiguity are some of the aspects of 
freedom that both the performer and listener have, in relation to the music composition. 
When denying these aspects, the objectivist performance incarcerates the performance and 
its listening behind the bars of the musicological canon. But, paradoxically, contemporary 
audiences vindicate their rights to listen freely. Performance should not then be understood 
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as something outside a strong commitment with that freedom, but as a part of a performer’s 
commitment with her social and intellectual obligations that emerge from the 
performance’s circumstances (Hunter 2006) 
2.5.3 Music as text 
Both the historicist performance and the analysis-based performance appear rather 
as text than as act (Taruskin 1995), establishing relation and action hierarchies that are not 
necessarily related to the core of the performative problems. They represent ways of 
considering performance as an artefact instead of an activity (Small 1998). The negation of 
performative aspects is practically a condition that the objectivist perspective imposes. 
Briefly, there is no possibility to be objective if we consider the performative variables. 
This comes from a much stronger ideological foundation according to which the ideas are 
propositions, and therefore everything that does not have a propositional format cannot be 
considered an idea. Therefore performances have not traditionally been treated like 
statements in themselves, but like renditions of statements (Lester 1995) 
One of performance’s own characteristics that the text is not able to capture is the 
issue of real time. According to Janet Schmalfeldt (1985) when the musician plays, his or 
her synoptic understanding must be completely put at the service of projecting the piece as 
a whole. In this situation, his or her thought is conditioned and restricted by time. Linked 
to this question, the performer also has to face a very high demand of completeness. In 
other terms, the performer should play all the notes. Unlike the analyst, who may select 
passages in order to clarify his or her demonstration, the performer must “manage” the 
whole. Finally, another aspect of performance itself that is absent in most of the theoretical 
approaches is the cognitive and biomechanical demand for the movement, the force and the 
stamina involved in performance that gives rise to performative decision-making (Dunsby 
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1989, Lester 1995). Such actions can acquire the status of signs in the context of real time 
performance, contributing to the performance’s meaning (Clarke 1995). 
The real time construction favours a conception of music performance more related 
to the other performing arts. One of the alternatives to the objectivism proposed is to 
consider music performance as dramatic action (Schmalfeldt 1985, Rothsthein, 1995). This 
approach to the musical work returns to it ipso facto the particular temporal experience that 
provokes the performative act. In an interesting way, Schmalfeldt rescued metaphorical 
aspects of the analytical language for shaping the character of performance. The musical 
structure is considered as a sort of stage on which the dramatic elements, which are going 
to happen during the development of the performance, are arranged. 
In this context, the analysis of the musical work has a more heuristic than 
normative value. It revalues the sense of privacy and empathy, and the understanding of 
the work that the performer obtains through the long hours of practice on the piece (Lester 
1995). Correspondingly, for Schmalfeldt, (1985), analysis and performance are cooperative 
tasks, but they cannot overlap because the psychological substrate of each of them is 
totally different. The analyst has a verbal substratum, while the performer has a final 
commitment with time and the contingent. 
Following the Schmalfeldt idea, we will propose that this side of music 
performance is badly interpreted by the objectivist approach because it does not consider 
an important psychological component. It is not considering the way in which time 
determines a modality of artistic thought. The arranger models a time configuration that 
does not impose constrains on the real time of his or her labour. This is the essence of the 
projectual thought, representative of the visual arts, but that, as we see, takes part at certain 
key moments in the process of temporal arts. On the contrary, the performer models a time 
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configuration that does impose constraints on the real time of his or her labour. If the 
performer decides to realize an accelerando, this decision directly affects the time 
configurations of his or her artistic production. In other terms, the time of the work is the 
time of its realization. This is the performative thought. For this reason we cannot confuse 
the performer with the arranger. The latter’s strategy of thought is a projectual one, 
whereas the one of the former is performative. Surely there is much projectual thought in 
the performer’s task. But finally it is performative thought the one that governs the 
decisions, and therefore the artwork in itself. 
Interestingly, when rescuing the temporal aspects of performance, a strong 
identification of music performance with theatrical performance clearly arises. This will be 
the key point of our proposal. But we say that the music performance’s quality viewed in 
this way will not be linked to the issue of value as it arises from the objectivist approach, 
but to the issue of verisimilitude, that is a theatrical one. This is compatible with the 
Rothstein’s (1995, p. 238) assertion about identifying in musical analysis an “analytical 
truth” and a “dramatic truth”, describing the way in which performance emerges from the 
dialectic between both. Similarly, Nicholas Cook (2003) proposes seeing the musical text 
as script. This perspective gives back to the former its primary character of indication for 
action, removing its condition of artistic object in itself. This argument will be further 
examined in chapter 7. 
2.5.4 Decontextualization of performance 
The objectivist perspective ignores the role of the listener as well as of the performance’s 
conditions and the audience in the artwork (Thompson 2001). The examination of these 
aspects is replaced by historicist or structural generalizations. This shows a naive approach 
to the contexts, tending to homogenize all contexts and preventing the recognition of the 
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contextual diversity in history and in the present moment. Thompson (2001) indicates that, 
in general, musicology ignores the audience because it considers it as a neutral element in 
the musical act. In opposition, he proposes the necessity of considering the time and the 
space of the listener. In that view, the musical works are seen as independent organizations 
that work in any context, unrelated to the type of event and ideology particular to those 
contexts. 
According to Small (1999), the objectivist perspective can only give rise to a model 
of unidirectional communication (sender - message - receiving) in which, as we have 
already seen (p. 45), the listener is the last link of the chain and as such has a passive role 
without participating in the musical meaning. On the contrary, a perspective that 
contemplates the context will allow appreciating that the meaning is shaped through the 
human relations that are provoked during the performative act. Therefore to think about 
other performative relations and other ways to understand music performance also implies 
questioning classical cognitive science’s agenda, because subjects’ responses are towards 
the performance itself and not towards an isolated abstraction called “a piece”. 
Nevertheless, the relations between the text and the context are problematic. The 
text participates in the context configuration (Monson 1996, mentioned by Cook 2003) and 
represents only one part of the meaning. The construction of the social context as one of its 
central functions is present in the musical structure. For that reason, to consider 
performance from an ethnographic perspective (Cook 2003) would allow putting the piece 
in the wider context of performance that offers one a clearer vision of the contribution of 
all the elements of such a context in the construction of meaning. 
In spite of all the criticisms the objectivist approach has received, musicologists do 
not manage to characterize performance because of this diversity. There is a key point in 
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this problem to which we will have to find an answer if we are interested in pursuing the 
relation between musicology and psychology in the course of music performance, in the 
postmodern scene. It is the way in which the composition is considered in the present 
performance. Where is the musical work in a scene in which the relation between the 
performer and the audience seems to fill all the available space? Is the musical work no 
longer a question to be considered? Have we gone from the composer’s tyranny to the 
performer’s and audience’s tyranny, which cancel the composition? Chapter 7 will try to 
address some of these problems from the set of criticisms that we finished reviewing here. 
Before this, as we were saying, we present an empirical investigation undertaken with the 
objective of approaching an answer to our central question, from the perspective of both 
the psychological and musicological dominant paradigms. This excursion will allow us to 
appreciate whatever might still be possible by advancing from that approach, and at the 
same time to indicate some of the limits that we need to overcome in our search. 
*** 
Summary. Music performance may be thought as obeying different motivations. According 
to these, performance exhibits either a supportive function (related to mimesis) or an 
expressive function (related to catharsis). The interplay of tensions between both functions 
within a given music culture describes the particular relationships between composition, 
performance and reception characterizing that culture. Romantic performance solved such 
tensions between both functions in the light of the myth of the genius. Modernity solved 
these performative tensions with the aid of the musical sciences. Understood as objective 
performance, the latter displays a clear epistemological affinity with the psychological 
perspective of classical cognitive science. In the light of this affinity a body of 
psychological research in the field of music performance has been developed serving as a 
background for the studies described in chapters 5 and 6. Nevertheless the objectivist 
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perspective in performance has been strongly criticized by the new musicology. The 
criticisms focus on four aspects: (i) objectivism does not acknowledge the individuality of 
the performance, (ii) performance is seen apersonally, (iii) performance is analyzed 
regardless of the context in which it occurs, and (iv) music is seen more as a text than as an 
act. In view of this last point a crucial characteristic of performance emerges: it is governed 
by a performative way of thinking - characterized by a time corresponding to the time of 
the piece – as opposed to a projectual way of thinking – in which the time of the project 
differs from the time of the work. The problem of performance time, considered as central 
to communication between performer and listener, will be tackled in the third part of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Music theory and performance 
As Joseph Straus has affirmed, undoubtedly “(p)rolongation is an idea of extraordinary 
power” (1987, p.1) . Although many of its supporters affirm that the concept itself comes 
from compositional problems and techniques, systematized by contrapuntal pedagogical 
practices and performative realizations of the 17th century, undoubtedly its success in 
contemporary theoretical thinking is related to current interests rooted in the performative 
and compositional problems of the 19th century as much as in the epistemological basis of 
the musicological discipline of the 20th century. These matters contain topics about unity of 
composition, temporal integration of sequences of events in music comprehension, 
strategies of musical unification during performance, attribution of deepness to music, 
notion of hierarchy referred to general human cognition, and intersections between music 
and language, among others. In this chapter the concept of prolongation is presented 
according to the theoretical perspective from which it will be considered throughout the 
thesis. Since an exhaustive theoretical discussion would exceed the scope of this work, 
only some ways of understanding prolongational structure of music in current musicology 
are presented; then the its psychological and performative appeal are discussed. 
3.1 What is prolongation? 
Prolongation refers to the function through which a tonal event remains active 
(understanding the activity as the capacity of such event to delimit and modify the 
conditions for which another sound is considered more or less stable) in its context, even 
when other notes can be actually sounding (Cadwallader and Gagné 1998). In figure 3.1.a 
it is possible to establish that the a4 (quavers)1 of the third and fourth beat of bar 1 are 
                                                 
1 Registral designation system: c4 is the central C 
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responsible for the g4 eighth note and b4 eighth note (of the weak parts of those beats) 
being relatively unstable. That is why it is said that those notes are expanding and 
embellishing the a4. However, in essence they do not interrupt the global form of the 
melody that links first g4 to a4 and, finally to g4, from measure 2. Therefore, the g as much 
as the b both represent the a in the instance when this note is physically absent, and 
consequently they prolong it. Nevertheless, the extent of this representation, as well as the 
nature and goal of this ‘keeping active’, varies according to the point examined. Within the 
background of Schenkerian theory (Schenker 1935), the word prolongation refers to 
“compose” (as a process), while in the work of Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983), it refers to a 
particular type of elaboration that represents either literal repetition or functional sameness 
quality very close to the event in elaboration (Lerdahl 2001, p.15). 
Figure 3.1.  Beethoven’s Sonatina Kinsky-Halm Anh. 5. bars 1-5. a: original; b and c: 
reductions 
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However, prolongation also refers to the structure constituted precisely by the notes 
that act as embellishments. This way, it is not strange to say, “the g4 eighth note is a 
prolongation of a4”. 
From the notion of prolongation itself the idea of hierarchy emerges: a prolonged 
note embodies a hierarchical level higher than its prolongation. In figure 3.1.a, a4 exhibits a 
higher hierarchy than g and b. The establishment of different degrees of structural 
importance for the notes causes a structural association of notes that are not immediately 
adjacent and are therefore not linked by contiguity but by the parity of their rank 
(Cadwallader and Gagné 1998). Thus, the a4 appears structurally associated to the initial g4 
half note and to the g4 of measure 2. By virtue of this structural association, g – a – g, 
constitutes a new structural level. Moreover we can start to distinguish a level, where the 
notes are related by their adjacency relation, note-by-note, called the music surface: this 
level (more reduced because it has less notes) is occupied by the notes among which a 
relation can be established not by adjacency, but by structural association of its hierarchy 
ranks (Cadwallader and Gagné 1998). 
The way of representing, of making explicit the hierarchical relationships between 
notes, is called reduction (i.e. figure 3.1b is the reduction of example 3.1a). 
Initially, example 3.1c introduces the idea so that these processes can be understood 
as recursive. For the moment, recursivity will be here presented as showing that the 
process’s result (of prolongation or of reduction) sets up a state of events in which the 
same process can be applied. Example 3.1c is the reduction of the reduction 3.1b, therefore 
it is also a reduction of 3.1a (although more abstract, more reduced). Music theory 
approaches (generally linked to music analysis issues) that use reduction as a 
representational device have been generically called reductional models. All the 
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reductional models make use of the prolongation concept (or similar). However, they refer 
to different properties and functioning modes of the music structure, and, because of that, 
prolongation entails in each one of them different epistemological status. 
Among several reductional procedures, there are some models which have reached 
a high degree of formalization. Although, for reasons that will be deeper discussed further 
ahead (p. 84 and ff), we shall work from the model of H. Schenker (1935), which openly 
ties the prolongational issues to the voice leading aspect of the musical structure, some of 
these models deserve a careful examination. As a comprehensive survey of them amply 
exceeds the scope of this thesis, and since they are suitably treated in musicological 
literature, only a brief review of three of them, is included in an appendix (see Appendix I). 
Readers not familiarized with that literature are invited to read it. The appendix includes a 
succinct glance at some literature that approaches prolongation in relation to. (i) voice 
leading (represented by the Schenker and his followers’ ideas); (ii) generativity (from the 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff [1983] work and further developments), and (iii) melodic 
expectation (from the work of Meyer [1973] and Narmour [1977, 1990]). They share a 
number of characteristics, but also disagree with regard to many important issues, both 
epistemological and methodological. 
The different prolongational approaches have also had different repercussions on 
performance studies. When investigating the causes of this disparity one faces some 
epistemological questions: what the prolongation is as knowledge object? And, from where 
is it possible to approach this knowledge object? 
In the following section different opinions about tonal music’s prolongational 
structure as knowledge object will be reviewed. These will lead us inevitably to a 
discussion about the psychological nature of the theories that model it. At the end of the 
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chapter the main problems of performance that could be related to knowing prolongational 
structure are characterized. The aim of this discussion is, first of all to show the reader the 
state of the art by which the prolongational structure as it was described by Schenker has 
been more appealing as an epistemological foundation for the music performance realm, 
and, as a consequence, why that theory was taken as the departure point for the route 
followed in this thesis. 
3.2 Prolongational structure and cognition 
Although the perceptual nature of music is sufficiently acclaimed, musicology has not 
always approached the exegesis of music in experiential terms. In fact, many ways to 
analyse music, as well as the descriptions of many musical structural components, have 
been based on considerations that are independent of the listener’s experience. On the 
contrary, theoretical formulations of prolongation are enunciated in experiential terms. 
Nevertheless, the extent of such experience is very variable according to the angle from 
which it is considered. 
In this section we will examine to what psychology Schenker’s original postulates 
ascribe, and how the successive discussions of prolongational issues, both in tonal music 
and in their extensions to non tonal music, tended to decontextualize it of its intellectual 
background, trying to understand it in terms of the dominant psychological paradigms in 
those given contexts. The reader will be able to associate this discussion about the 
historical trajectory of the relation between psychology and musicology concerning 
prolongational topics with that developed in the previous chapter concerning performative 
problems. 
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3.2.1 Schenker and the psychologism of music theory 
For Schenker, music theory was a psychological theory that aimed at elucidating musical 
experience. From his first writings, Schenker showed an explicit psychological inclination. 
The psychology of the harmonic progressions and all that is psychologically effective in 
counterpoint, are just some of his pleas in defence of a psychological dimension of music 
theory. 
It is not then by chance that the Schenkerian theory has been so attractive for many 
psychological perspectives on music (Bigand, 1994, Serafine, 1988, Sloboda 1985, Lerdahl 
and Jackendoff 1983, Deutsch and Feroe 1981). Cognitive music psychology saw in it a 
solid epistemological base to turn from being a set of isolated studies on perceptual 
phenomena related to extremely simple sonorous relations, into a discipline based on a 
theory of the experience of tonal music in all its complexity. Besides, it is connected with 
the intent of cognitive music psychology to take the formal descriptions of music theory as 
bases for explaining the cognitive processes involved in producing or receiving music 
(Krumhansl 1990). Thus, it would seem that psychology had looked for music theory 
(Krumhansl 1995). Nevertheless, in honour to the truth, it was music theory that was 
intending to go after psychology long before. Although it is clear that the preoccupation of 
Schenker was not in itself psychological but aesthetic, Schenkerian psychologism should 
be understood as part of the process by which aesthetics looked for psychology. Following 
the idea of Castro, Pizarroso and Morgade (2005), we could say that the work of Schenker 
is in “the theoretical transition of the aesthetic metaphysics of the later 18th and early 19th 
century to the psychological aesthetics that is postulated in the middle of 19th century and 
that, in many aspects, remains currently in effect” (p.197). In this way positivism and post-
Kantian phenomenological psychology changed its old “categories of spirit” for new 
“categories of nature”, without abandoning the philosophical speculation, but looking, 
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through measurement and observation, for indicators of human behaviour. The aesthetic 
fact is projected to an empirical and analysable domain. For the phenomenological 
perspective of that psychology, the art work is the object of such analysis. Schenker 
followed this way of thinking, pursuing psychology from aesthetic motivations. We 
propose that in this sense he contributed to the creation of a psychology of music, trying to 
provide an explanation of certain mental functions (or better said of “the psychological 
musical function”) from the examination and measurement of the musical piece. The 
nature of the piece’s structure, as an object that is outside the subject, guarantees an 
objectively reliable substratum for the measurement. The Ursatz and its transformations 
operate in the psychologicist Schenkerian system as measuring tools of the musical work. 
It is possible to affirm that, in that sense (and only in that sense), the proposal of Schenker 
is almost seminal in a line whose pinnacle is the work of Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983). 
However, the relation between the Schenkerian psychologism and the musical approach of 
the classical cognitive science ends here. 
Nevertheless, the Schenkerian programme itself is probably the one that gave rise 
to the cognitivist chimera: “If music exists as an organic creation, we should be able to 
perceive it” (Schenker 1935, p.106) In the analysis of the art work, the psychology of the 
later 19th century was conditioned by two positivist assumptions: empiricism and 
comparativism. Both assumptions can be traced in the work of Schenker. The first 
assumption is seen in the naturalist preconceptions that penetrate the notions of 
hierarchical structure, organic form and acoustic principles in the development of the triad 
as the horizontalization of the natural series of overtones. The description of pitch structure 
in terms of an organic force that provides music with a sense of direction in its temporal 
unfolding of its underlying structure is a concrete manifestation of such a naturalistic 
conception. The second supposition has to do with the comparativist and classificatory 
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perspective of the arts. Firstly, Schenker applied a sort of psychogenetic criterion when 
proposing that his model of underlying structure obeys not the music of a certain musical 
culture, but the pinnacle of the western music, to the ultimate goal in western music’s 
evolution. The entire body of Schenker’s work is consistent with the ethnocentric view that 
sees tonality and, in particular, deep tonal structure as the final goal of the History of 
Music. This ethnocentric perspective, that Schenker’s cultural context allowed him to 
express without consideration, pervades certain more recent positivist approaches, 
although the current cultural context forces them to pronounce it more modestly (see 
Lerdahl 1988a). As a result of the allegiance of the Schenkerian programme to this 
psychologism of that epoch, some type of perceptible commitment had to exist. What 
Schenker could say in psychogenetic terms could also be expressed in terms of perceptible 
functions. In other words, if what it constitutes the essence and the glory of the art of the 
West, the summit of the artistic creation, the manifestation of the genius, etc. comprises the 
musical work, therefore it must be perceived and not the opposite way (like a given 
attribute is perceivable, then it is possible to say that it is part of the work.) 
For historical reasons of intellectual and epistemological affinity it would be 
possible to talk, at least, about two levels at which cognitive psychology may be related to 
the very notion of prolongational structure: prolongation as perceptual representation and 
prolongation as conceptual representation. 
3.2.2 Prolongational structure as perceptual representation 
Schenker’s followers in USA kept his perceptualist rhetoric without noticing that the 
English speaking epistemic context of the decade of 1960s was different from the German 
speaking one of the 1920s. Salzer and Schachter (1969) use for example expressions like 
“the ear interprets...(the prolongation)” (p.119) almost simultaneously with others like “the 
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ear perceives ....” (p. 123), or “the ear connects….” (p.135). But the context in which these 
expressions are said implies an understanding of prolongation as an attribute of musical 
structure susceptible to be captured by perception, and therefore of being psychologically 
studied in terms of percept. Salzer’s endeavour (1962) is related to the tradition of ear 
training. It could be said then that Salzer speculated whether the prolongation can be 
listened to in structural terms and be labelled, as an interval or a chord can be. 
In the same line, more recently, Cadwallader and Gagné (1998) set the perceptual 
extent of prolongational structure: “[Y]ou will learn how to evaluate a musical context 
based on your hearing and perception of all aspects of that context” (p.4). 
Following the ear training tradition, Larson (1997) proposes a listening modality 
that abandons the objectivism of classical cognitive science to enlist himself in the stream 
of the experiential realism that links perceptual experiences and the development of the 
metaphorical thought (see Martinez 2005). He considers that to hear prolongation implies 
imputing relevance to the association between the events pertaining to a certain level. 
According to this, an associative hearing is activated in which the perceptively based 
processes of sameness, similarity and successorship have an important role. Prolongation 
results from transformations that turn the notes at a given level into notes at another level, 
and, in order for those transformations to be understood, they create similarity by 
preserving sameness in some elements and introducing differences through operations on 
the pitch patterns, based on identity and successorship. Prolongation, structural hearing, 
contextual stability, melodic forces, melodic continuity, and tonal induction and 
determination are components of the model (see appendix I) that are interrelated. 
From Larson’s perspective, to develop the ability to listen to prolongations means 
to operate with the displacement of traces in increasingly greater referential contexts than 
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constitute the different levels of musical structure. For this reason, he differentiates the 
psychological status of prolongation according to the structural level at which it is 
operating: at the deepest levels prolongation appears more as a merely intellectual process 
than as a perceptual process. In certain ways this idea becomes related to the Jackendoff’s 
assertion (1983) that when we imagine music, some components of that representation are 
perceptual and others are intentional (see further ahead p. 69-71). 
3.2.3 Prolongational structure as conceptual representation 
The psychological subject of the Schenkerian approach is ambiguous. Unquestionably, 
many passages of Schenker’s work allow thinking about a hermetic thought, in which the 
exposed knowledge is not accessible except, only, to certain spirits that can approach it. 
The analyst or musicologist (and quite often the performer) is the psychological subject 
present in the thoughts of Schenker and his followers in North America rather than the 
experienced listener, as Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983) propose. From this perspective 
more than as a perceptual representation, the notion of prolongation is raised in 
psychological terms as a conceptual representation. For example, Salzer (1962) sees some 
processes of deduction and induction implied in his complex notion of structural hearing. 
Rather than a perceptual modality, structural hearing is a mode of thinking. In this context, 
to listen to prolongation implies, on the one hand, a deductive process by which the 
orientation of the global direction of the musical work is determined. Deduction is shown 
in the successive representations that are displayed in the graphs of voice leading and 
which follow a deductive route of successive eliminations of prolongational elements. 
Thus, the student (analyst) arrives by deduction to the deep structure of the piece. But, on 
the other hand, the nature of such reduced elements is manifested through “the more 
important of the processes of structural hearing, the process of induction” (Salzer 1962; p. 
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207). Salzer proposes that a student will have learned to listen in structural terms when he 
can induce the prolongation from its structure. Therefore, being more a conceptual than a 
perceptual training, Salzer’s basic pedagogical strategy is the explanation of the voice 
leading graphs instead of techniques that directly involve the perceptual input. Thus, 
structural hearing is understood as the result both of the demonstration of the existence of 
a deep structure and prolongation, and an entire repertoire of their complex relations, and 
of the way in which such relations contribute to the musical work’s coherence. 
Close to this perspective is the point of view of Meyer (1973), who proposes that 
implicative relations (on which the prolongational structure in his system depends - see 
appendix I) are understood through inferences that the listener makes. Although Meyer 
speaks of inferences, the description of the process that he offers in most of the provided 
examples clearly alludes to deductive reasoning. Nevertheless, it would seem that the 
extent of the concept of mind and thought put into play is greater than that offered by 
classical cognitive psychology: for Meyer, the understanding of such relations in addition 
to those cognitive processes also involves some corporal and kinetic aspects. 
The key thinking process involves a mind operating both with the transformations 
that make the surface events abstract, and including these abstracted events in the 
reductions that represent the deepest levels. In order to understand prolongation it is 
necessary to understand how a certain event was transformed itself such that it became 
abstract (Larson 1997). An event is promoted to a deeper hierarchical level when the mind 
can retain the transformational operation that justifies that promotion. Music theory offers 
in strict counterpoint a system that can give an account of the nature of those 
transformational operations in terms of mental (conceptual) representations. 
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Near this idea is a notion originally enunciated by Schenker and more recently 
revisited by other authors: Mental retention. Cadwallader and Gagné (1998) used this 
expression to explain a precise phenomenon. In example 3.2 the g5 of bar 1 is observed as 
maintaining its activity throughout 4 bars at the end of which it is connected with the f5. 
The activity of the inner voices throughout these 4 bars preserves the concept of higher 
hierarchy of the first note. In other words, the note’s structural ranking is retained, that is 
to say, the manipulation of the mental object constructed by symbols and representations of 
the reality, not the physical object in itself. Thus, if the note is to be retained in their 
activity, such a note must firstly be conceptualized as hierarchically more important. Only 
by demonstrating that hierarchical status is the note retained in memory, and can maintain 
its activity. The mental retention generates tension between activity (of which it continues 
passing in the musical discourse) and immobility (of the retained note). This tension 
generates forces that can be thought as the responsible for the prolongation’s cohesion. 
According to DeBellis (2003) mental retention implies in the first place a pre-
Figure 3.2. Mental Retention in the Haydn Piano Sonata Hob XVI/35, I, bars 1-8 with 
analytical interpretation according to Cadwallader and Gagné (1998) p. 112 
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reflective instance necessary to discover what note must be retained. That discovery is 
brought to consciousness by the reflection that allows the mental configuration of 
prolongation. When this is already formed, then that first discovery (that had been the 
effect of a reflection) is considered as “intuitively natural” (p.584). 
For Schenkerian theory, prolongation fundamentally represents a coherence bond. 
In this case, to understand the prolongational structure is to interpret those bonds. The way 
in which the coherence is interpreted cannot obey a code. On the contrary, as the 
prolongational structure is the result of the synthesis of harmonic and contrapuntal forces 
that operate in divergent directions and generate conflicts and contradictions, to interpret 
the coherence that emerges from this structure depends on the previous (implicit) 
knowledge, a body of preconceptions and assumptions on which perception is organized. 
The prolongation at a certain level is susceptible of being understood clearly and 
coherently if the reality of the following level justifies it (Schachter 1999). 
From this perspective, the prolongational structure could be understood in 
psychological terms, oscillating between the search of perceptual empirical bases and the 
exercise of heuristic, introspective and conceptual insights (Blasius 1996). 
As has often been remarked, the classical psychological perspective has had serious 
conflicts with the Schenkerian program (the GTTM of Lerdahl and Jackendoff it is perhaps 
an effort to mediate in this conflict). Therefore, before exploring other psychological 
ramifications, the next section discusses more deeply the extent of the Schenkerian 
psychologism, in order to evaluate better its impact in performance and communication. 
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3.2.4 Schenker and cognitive science: A controversial relation 
3.2.4.1 The attributionist perspective 
In a very simplistic way, there is some affinity between the Schenkerian and the 
Chomskian rhetorical resources that encourages some kind of attempt of to compare both 
intellectual endeavours (Narmour 1977). The notion of deep structure, the hierarchical 
organization of structural levels, and the reduction concept are only some of these 
affinities. Nevertheless, any hurried comparison can be risky (Sloboda 1985). One risk 
consists of considering both theoretical corpuses as epistemologically equivalent. 
According to Keiler (1978a) this can lead musicology (in particular music analysis) to 
adopt an empiricist bias (which is both epistemologically and ideologically supported on 
numerous empirical undertakings in the music psychology realm; see appendix II) that is 
strange to it. Nevertheless, the opposite is also possible: the fact that that musicology had 
adopted an empiricist bias with the purpose of settling comfortably in the academic scope. 
In order to reach that aim, it was very important that musicology draws on compatible 
theoretical frames coming from other disciplines. 
The second risk consists of understanding the reach of certain concepts of a theory 
in terms of the other. Sloboda (1985) supposes that Schenker considered the ability to form 
underlying abstract representations as an inexorable support of the listener’s behaviour 
(p.11). Undoubtedly this is a cognitivist attribution: Schenker’s real preoccupation about 
human behaviour is, in general, very limited. His idea of ability is more associable to the 
romantic concept of gift than to the cognitivist concept of competence (Keiler 1978a). On 
the other hand, Schenker’s idea of representation is also far distant from the idea of 
representation in terms of cognitive psychology. The voice leading graphs, unlike the tree 
graphs, cannot be understood as computational representations. On the contrary, they are 
like meta-linguistic undertakings (Keiler 1978b). Further ahead, Sloboda (1985) states that 
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“Schenker would wish to claim that, at a deep level, all good musical compositions have 
the same type of structure, and that this structure reveals to us something about the nature 
of musical intuition” (p. 12). Indeed, Schenker thought that good compositions were based 
on the Ursatz as a primary fundamental structure. Nevertheless, it is difficult to think of 
Schenker inferring aspects of the nature of the musical intuition from the structure of the 
deep levels of the composition. For Schenker, Ursatz is an a priori configuration and its 
knowledge is not intuitive but, on the contrary, it is the result of a development, the goal of 
a directed effort, or, as a last resort, a quality of genius. 
Even the comparison for verifying differences between both theoretical systems 
may be noticeably attributionist. For example, Sloboda (1985) argues that: (i) unlike the 
Chomskian system, the Schenkerian one is an analytical and non generative system; (ii) 
Ursatz is discovered through recursive reductions of the musical surface, and unlike the 
Chomskian deep structure, that cannot be understood as a linguistic expression, 
Schenkerian deep structure may be appreciated in that way. Undoubtedly, Sloboda is right 
when he says that the Schenkerian system is not generative in the Chomskian sense of the 
term. The Schenkerian system does not fulfil the restriction of immediate constituency 
(although Martinez (2002) demonstrated the constituent nature of prolongation, their 
findings could only be applied to a basic level of the prolongational structure). In this way, 
Schenker’s theory cannot give rise to a grammar, although in many ways it has the 
appearance of one. Nevertheless, both the notion of discovery and recursivity that is so 
strongly used by neo-Schenkerian theorists is frankly debatable from an attentive reading 
of Schenker’s mature work. Der freie Satz is in fact an inventory of features proper to each 
level of the structure. If Schenker took upon himself the work of describing the 
background, the middleground and the foreground in such a detailed way, and if in those 
descriptions he established certain differences between internal levels, it is because the 
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structure of each one of these levels is conceived as a different organization, and having a 
substantially different genesis. Therefore, the processes involved in Schenkerian analysis 
cannot be understood as recursive, in the terms of current cognitive science. Schenker has 
questioned himself the use of the term “repetition” to describe to the movement of 
“transformation level to transformation level” (1935, p. 18). The computational notion of 
recursivity better adapts itself to the reduction process (from the surface towards the deep 
structure). On the contrary, Schenker proceeded from background through successive 
transformations that give rise to varied configurations in the different intermediate levels, 
to reaching foreground. Therefore we suggest thinking about abduction rather than about 
discovery (as it is seen from p. 73) that adapts itself better to the notion of circularity of the 
discovery procedures that Keiler mentions (1978b). In addition, even going from the 
foreground toward the background, it is uncertain that we are able to understand the 
successive reductions, including an Ursatz, as musical statements. In principle, the deepest 
levels are clearly abstractions that avoid both rhythm and metre, and by this reason they are 
removed from the most typical temporal musical quality, and are therefore not possible to 
be understood as musical statements. As indicated above, the voice leading graphs are 
meta-linguistic expressions. Their purpose is to explain the voice leading functioning and 
the pitch component of music, such that they cannot be considered linguistically 
admissible as statements. 
3.2.4.2 Beyond the attributions: The psychologicist context of 
Schenkerian aesthetics 
Worthwhile arguments exist for considering the psychological interpretation above 
discussed as naive. While certain empirical evidence seems to support some of those 
precepts, another body of evidence shows that the psychological principles that rise from 
the Schenkerian theory should not be understood in strictly cognitive terms (Cook 1987b). 
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The hypothesis about a hierarchical hearing brought until its last consequences, the Ursatz, 
does not seem to fit within the intuitions of the experienced listener, who is intended to be 
modelled by cognitive musical science. In this case, what is the extent of Schenkerian 
psychologism? What aspects of musical listening does the theory suppose to model? The 
reach of the psychological in Schenker “has to do with how things are experienced in 
particular musical contexts, and not with the physical or formal properties of those things 
considered in isolation.” (Cook, 1987a; p.54). As Blasius (1996) argues, the application of 
the psychologicist rhetoric to the field of musicology from 19th century should be 
understood rather as a convention to refer the metacognitive study (that according to the 
author refers to aesthetic problems) than to the cognitive (or pragmatic) musical problem. 
In this way the preoccupation is centred in “the critical examination of the psychic 
correlate of internal musical affect.” (p.5). Considered in this way, an important 
psychologicist contribution of the Schenkerian theory has to do with graphically 
demonstrating certain intuitions about the differential experience of the events according to 
the context, often tied to the formal organization of music (Cook 1987a). 
This has to do with a sort of psychology of totality, but with a strong idealistic 
foundation. For that reason, the idea of this psychology of totality does not have to be 
misinterpreted. As Blasius (1996) warns, it is not a reference to the school of Gestalt: 
“Schenker’s psychology (…)is fundamentally introspective, concerned with describing the 
experiential content of the passage, whereas the psychology of Koffka or Wertheimer is 
fundamentally distrustful of introspection” (p.34). In this case, it is about a totality 
dynamized by the organicist slant of its descriptions and the phenomenological orientation 
of its method. Indeed, as exponent of the German romantic organicism (whose greater 
exponents can be seen in Goethe and von Humboldt (Keiler 1978b)), such organic totality 
implies its own possibilities of transformation. On the whole it is a mature organism 
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subject to metamorphosis, and changes and transformations must exactly be understood as 
metamorphosis, rather than as computational operations. Then, from the point of view of 
an introspective psychology worried about the experience as individual and significant, 
how could prolongation be characterized? 
3.2.5 Prolongation as intention 
One of the basic precepts of the hierarchical prolongational theories argues that at 
progressively deeper levels the structure appears more and more organic, coherent, and 
organized like a whole, moving away from the complexity, variability, eclecticism, even 
disorder of its surface level appearance. Consequently, it is sensible to understand those 
underlying levels as intentionalities, that is, a kind of representation or mental state tied to 
things or states of the world to be realized (as a desire or state that such reality would have 
to accomplish) (Proust 1998). In general these intentionalities may be bound to 
propositions (propositional attitudes) or actions and/or perceptual states (Richard 1997). 
In this sense, there is abundant evidence in the literature on prolongational theories 
of a tendency to attribute mental states to the described musical structures. One reads about 
“the desire of the note to reach the goal”, or that “the leading note looks for the resolution”, 
or the “natural egoism of the notes” etc. (Snarrenberg 1994). This goes far beyond a 
metaphorical usage of the academic language. It is clearly related to the “epistemic 
propensity to confuse the known object with the subject that knows it” (Riviere 1991, p.43). 
This epistemological position appears clearly in Harmonielehre (Schenker 1906). 
According to Fink (1999), in prolongational reduction the conceptual representation 
opens a door to the derivation of the most superficial levels from background. But a 
different reductional operating force also exists in which the conceptual component is not 
so strong. For Fink, this is related to the intentionality that the listener exerts on certain 
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salient notes (i.e. notes in a linear progression), by which “linear dramas or ‘mechanisms 
of desire’ which ignore the intervening music” are traced. In this way, intentionalities are 
compatible with the tendency to “link up the high points of musical experience” (p.107)  
In this way, the depth - surface models explain how a listener’s necessity is 
satisfied. The interdependence of events is not the result of systems of generation or 
transformational laws, but of an inherent interest to link certain distant events in the time 
with no need to explain the nature of the subordination of the events that link them. 
In this way Larson (1997) considers that the experience of prolongation acquires 
meaning according to the way in which listeners assert their will to the musical stimulus. 
This is the base of the didactic approach of Salzer’s Structural Hearing (1962), which is 
patiently and methodically developed, until it is imposed on the listener. The strength of 
the musical forces not only depends on musical structure, as this is shown on the score, but 
also on the listener’s creative interventions. These creative interventions confer on the 
listener an active role in the structuring of the work. Interestingly, as Fink indicates, this 
role is related to the cohesion of the musical work in dramatic terms, which is extremely 
appealing to music performance. 
Prolongation, viewed as staging for dramatic action, also carries us back to the 
tension-relaxation topic. But here, these terms are taken not in the static and abstract sense 
according to which the stability conditions of each note are fixed by hierarchical structures 
stored in the listener’s long term memory (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, Krumhansl, 1990, 
Lerdahl 2001), and which are activated during the mental reconstruction of the work. On 
the contrary, the tension-relaxation notion is presented here by the way in which each 
event projects itself towards future in the specific time of the musical work. The salient 
events give rise to a particular configuration of the musical work’s time. In this context, 
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prolongation emerges from the way in which the listener intentionally fills in the temporal 
interval that is opened between those salient events. Thus, prolongation configures the time 
representation of the composition (Imberty 1992). According to this perspective, the 
prolongational structure captures those structural aspects by which the salient events of the 
piece are linked to each other (for example the relational conditions to be “higher than...” 
or “louder than…” filling the psychological temporal space that separates one salient event 
from another one). Thus, the prolongational structure is a subjective projection of relations 
existing in the course of music. Such projection is directed to perceptual goals or, in 
Imberty’s (1992) terms, points of perceptive condensation. When the goal is reached, the 
understanding of the work takes place by means of the understanding of tension and 
balance relationships. From this point of view, prolongation is not be simply a “quality” of 
the musical structure, but rather a behaviour or a sequence of (psychological) facts that 
confirm a hypothesis. 
It is possible affirm that this notion of the subject’s active intervention is intimately 
related to the genesis of the Schenkerian programme. As already mentioned, the 
Schenkerian psychologism emerges from an aesthetic preoccupation. The psychologists of 
the 19th century believed in the active and synthetic role of the will to put together 
expressivity and judgment and finally to reach aesthetic enjoyment. The psychological 
tendency of the 19th century outlines a governing principle which was able to put in order 
the experiential chaos transmitted by the senses or, in another perspective, to unravel or to 
catch the inherent harmony of nature (Castro et al. 2005). The affinity of this psychology 
with the Schenker’s ideas is evident. 
In synthesis, the perspective of the prolongational structure as a subjective 
projection of the will on the set of salient events of the composition is congruent with the 
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Schenkerian formulation of prolongational theory and with the problems of configuration 
of the musical time and dramatic representation of the musical work that, as we will see in 
the following chapters, are crucial to understanding the communicational power of music 
performance. 
3.2.6 Prolongation as sign 
Prolongation can also be understood as a sign. As it was early proposed by Saint 
Augustine, “a sign is something that, besides the species embraced by the senses, makes 
another thing go by itself to the thought.” (quoted by Todorov 1972, p.121). Thus a sign 
has two specific faculties: it is sensitive, and displays the absence of something (Todorov 
1972). In this way, this notion is compatible with the very definition of prolongation. 
Larson (1997) explained the idea of listening to prolongation as a process of meaning in 
which a sound is listened in terms of another. In this way, for Larson, processes of 
semiosis are included in the scope of the perceptual domain. The thinking related to 
prolongational analysis is associated with what takes part in the processes of semiosis that 
complement the purely perceptual processes (Cross 1998). 
In a certain sense, all of Schenker’s intellectual endeavour could be understood as 
an immense symbolic device by he examines many of his aesthetic preoccupations through 
the description of an ideal listener’s intuitions (projected in the composer’s genius). This 
symbolic device is built as a meta-language of high impact in musicology. For example, 
reduction is an heuristic built as a conventional symbolic system. The use of counterpoint 
in the exegesis of the organic coherence of the tonal composition is, in fact, a sign 
attribution (Blasius 1996). 
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3.2.6.1 Prolongation and interpretation 
As Cook (1990) has argued, the prolongational structure of tonal music is a reified 
abstraction. This is, something that does not have real existence, an intellectual device that 
serves to generate a coherent body of arguments that are used for explaining manifest 
musical phenomena. In this way, the emphasis should not be put on the device itself but on 
the resultant explanation. For Schenkerian theory, the observable phenomenon is the 
musical piece’s tonal coherence as an organic whole, and prolongational structure is an 
intellectual device used to investigate and to explain that coherence. Therefore, it is an 
imaginative construction that should be interpreted not as a literal description of the 
experience but as metaphor of the work itself. From this perspective, the listener’s 
experience must imply processes more sophisticated than matching up complex structural 
patterns of the stimuli with the listener’s descriptions (implicit or explicit knowledge) of 
the musical structure and which are activated before the presence of these patterns. In other 
words: to experience prolongation should be an interpretative act. 
Thus, the subject of this experience is not an ideal listener but an ideal interpreter. 
However, it is necessary to discuss whether to speak of interpretation is useful for 
characterizing the way in which the prolongational structure can be experienced. At this 
point, at least three topics need to be dealt with. 
In the first place, understanding interpretation in a very general way, i.e. as a 
process of meaning assignment, it is necessary to see how the meaning’s characteristics 
affect the process itself. Taking Larson’s idea that we can speak about listening to the 
prolongation as a form of to listen to x like y, we can establish a link between two domains, 
domain x and domain y (Zbikowski 2002). In essence, the domain x is a physical domain 
(i.e. sounds, the notes that configure the musical surface). For Eco (1990) we may have 
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two different kinds of bonds between domains, depending on the nature of the domain y: a 
semantic or semiosic bond in which the domain y can present a very varied nature 
according to the listener’s intention, and a critical or semiotic bond, in which the domain y 
is expressed in technical terms proper to music theory. Cook (1990) expressed a 
compatible idea when differentiating a musical from musicological listening. Also very 
near this conception is Jiranek’s (1992) notion of meaning by connotation and meaning by 
association. Whereas association defines a subjective correspondence between domains, 
connotation defines a causal correspondence (controlled by an objective rule). The former 
is related to hermeneutics, while the later is linked to traditional analytic methods. 
The semiosic-semiotic dichotomy allows glimpsing different but compatible 
interpretational levels. Throughout this thesis it will be tried to demonstrate that it is 
possible to identify the role that music performance plays in the semiosic interpretation of 
the musical prolongational structure on the part of listeners. For this reason, one of the 
aims of the first set of experiments reported here was to explore the nature of the domain y. 
In the second place, the process of interpretation cannot be simplified as a matter of 
decoding. Purroy Chicot (1992) suggested the possibility of understanding the 
prolongational structure in semiotic terms as emerging from an abductive process. 
According to Charles S. Peirce, abduction is a particular case of synthetic inference “in 
which we found a circumstance very peculiar that could be explained by the supposition of 
which it is the specific case of a general rule, and, therefore, we adopted this supposition” 
(quoted by Eco 1990, p.207). In that sense abduction is proposed as a sort of “discovery 
logic”. Briefly, abductive reasoning is the mechanism by which a rule is hypothesized from 
partial evidence, and the reasoning is built on the basis of both that hypothetical rule and 
that partial evidence. Abduction emerges from a circumstantial hypothesis provoked by a 
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surprising component of that same circumstance. For Peirce, every scientific investigation, 
every insight and even every perceptual judgment could be considered ultimately as a 
means of abduction (Kim n. d.). In addition, abduction is the creative opening that has the 
interpretative process, by means of which, the subject extends its freedom to find 
verisimilitude in which is otherwise (inductively or deductive) inexplicable. 
An epistemic community shares abductive habits, that is to say, habits by which 
rules are provoked that allow the members of this community to communicate to each 
other. This form of reasoning and communication is in the core of the Schenkerian 
epistemology represented in the graphic demonstrations of the deep structural levels. In 
them prolongation appears as the evidence that provokes a rule, and indeed that founds it. 
This idea, as we can see, is very near Larson’s view (1997), according to which the notes’ 
stability are defined themselves according to how the notes themselves behave as 
prolongation. In this case, “behaving as prolongation” is the immediate evidence that 
provokes the rule that establishes the contextual stability of the note. 
The idea of taking immediate evidence to elaborate the reasoning takes part of the 
modus operandi of the Schenkerian analysis. This was the intended meaning by Schachter 
(1999) when saying that “without some sense of background, one can’t begin to 
understand the foreground (…and) also needs to understand the foreground to make sense 
of the background” (p.198). 
Finally, the third aspect refers to the relationship between aesthetic experience and 
reasoning. Although Schenker’s aesthetic conception is very distant from Peircian 
pragmatism, it is possible to say that his epistemological position before aesthetics has 
related points? It has been indicated that the Schenker’s preoccupation is aesthetic. For this 
reason he is concerned about the distinctiveness of the great musical art works, rather than 
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in generalities about ways of listening to tonal music. Nevertheless, both his psychologicist 
rhetoric and his methodological approach implicitly espouse a search for universal laws 
about the behaviour of the music’s tonal component. For Pierce, aesthetics implies a 
reasoning form that put together induction and deduction, looking for laws in the particular 
and the dependence of the particular in such laws. For him, aesthetic experience is a 
formalization that comes from individual perceptions and the individual event, starting 
from general laws (Kim n.d.). Schenker, like Pierce, connects the aesthetic experience to 
the act of reasoning, because he feels that aesthetic is bounded to governing laws. 
These two psychological perspectives on prolongation (as intention and as sign) 
share the fact that both require certain explicit activities of the listener (performer, analyst, 
etc.) that involve both a subjective projection and the consideration of the context of 
listening, in order that prolongation can be configured in the experience. This issue goes 
beyond the classic perspective that considers the experience of prolongation as a 
representation controlled by processes regulated by grammars according to strongly 
formalized models (Chapter 4). The first empirical investigation on the role of 
prolongational structure in communication of expressive performance that will be 
attempted here is fundamentally based on this representational viewpoint, on the part both 
of the performer and of the listener, although as will be seen, it is possible to advance 
forward to more situated and pragmatic interpretations of the data. Nevertheless, in chapter 
10, the empirical investigation will be more compatible to these two last ways to consider 
prolongation from a psychological perspective. 
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3.3 Prolongation and music performance: the performative 
appeal of prolongation 
Performers usually do not speak of prolongation, or Schenker, or even of structural levels. 
Then, why do we speculate that the prolongational structure can play any role in 
performance and in what is communicated through performance to the listener? The idea 
of this section is to discuss in preliminary fashion how although performers do not often 
speak about prolongational structure, they are aware of some problems that are related to 
the issues that theoreticians discuss when speaking of prolongational theories. 
Links between prolongational theories and music performance are frequently 
present in the literature. It is well known that Schenker had a deep interest in performance 
puzzles. In fact, it is possible that his theory, as it was developed throughout time, would 
not have contributed to such an important extent if he had not been impelled by this strong 
motivation for performance issues. As epistemologically transitional, the theory shows 
compatible aspects both with the romantic and modern performer. The prolongational 
structure may be a source of performative decisions, but the true bonds between structure 
and performance are almost metaphysical (Schenker 1926, 1935; Rothstein 1995) 
More recently, positivist doctrines of musical analysis for performance usually 
consider the traits of the underlying voice leading as resources for performance. 
Nevertheless, even for these approaches, the relationship between the prolongational 
structure of tonal music and performance is very problematic (Berry 1989). Briefly, the 
analysis of the underlying voice leading is something like “discovering the composition’s 
soul”, and almost religiously it is accepted that this contact is good, although it is not 
known how it settles down and in what sense it can be useful. 
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For those who, as it was seen in the previous chapter, have reservations about 
establishing a linear relation between analysis and performance (Schmalfeldt 1985, 
Rothstein 1995) prolongational structure nevertheless continues to be central. But, moving 
away from objectivism, they try to find new relationships between them. 
This means that prolongational theory has a sort of magnetism as regards musical 
performance. Some performative problems, all of them related to temporal nature of 
performance, which as Schmalfeldt (1985) remarked is an important gap between analysis 
and performance, seem to have some responsibility in this appeal. Next, three of them will 
be discussed. 
3.3.1 The problem of unity 
The role of prolongation in the attribution of unity to the musical work seems crucial: 
when musicologists want to give account of a composition’s unity, the analytical 
descriptions of the prolongational structure would seem to be axiomatic (Cohn and 
Dempster 1992). In performance, unity is a central problem. It is strongly related to the 
problems of traversing the performance time by realizing sequences of actions that can be 
understood like parts of a whole. The unity problem is not considered here as a theoretical 
problem, as is usually the case, but as a pragmatic question of performative 
accomplishment. Nevertheless, its consideration cannot also avoid some aesthetic matters. 
As Schenker himself affirmed, unity may be seen as the value of a performance. In this 
sense, it is a topic that has been varying throughout historical time. Bellman (2000) 
investigated the performance indications that Chopin gave for repetitions and ritornelli (so 
typical in his style), revealing that problem of unity does not exist as such in performance 
(or at least it had other demands) during Romanticism. Nevertheless, this problem is 
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definitively settled by period of Modernity. It is not infrequent to consider that one mission 
of the performance is to show the composition’s unity (Cone 1968). 
It can be said that prolongational structure, as a theoretical device, contributed to 
the objectivist relationship between analysis and performance when facilitating an 
analytical corpus that did not contradict the performance aesthetic objectives of unity. 
Other analytical models would be working against this goal when providing a more 
segmented perspective of the musical structure. The prolongational perspective tried to say 
to the performer that to analyse is not to partition the work, but on the contrary, is to fasten 
it together as a whole; and in that sense to analyse a piece seems to be related with playing 
a piece (Rothstein 1995). 
The problems of playing are doubtlessly strongly conditioned by the problems of 
the musical surface, which often appears inhabited by contrasts, ruptures and 
discontinuities. This raises the question of continuity, which is directly bound to the 
performative restrictions derived from the instrumental technical-mechanical problems and 
the need of maintaining the performance throughout the real time. For the performer, then, 
to obtain continuity implies the ability to construct a whole under the pressures of those 
restrictions. Therefore, it can be said that the question of continuity represents the 
psychological, performative and operative side of the theoretical problem of unity. It 
contributes to the notion of experiential unity, as opposed to a mere theoretical unity 
(Maus 1999). 
The idea of thinking about a sort of subordination of the musical surface (with the 
inexorability of all its details in performance) to a simpler and inclusive underlying matrix, 
is both psychological and methodologically very attractive, and serves to anchor the 
performance of such contrasts, ruptures and discontinuities to the pillars of that underlying 
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structure. In that sense, the analysis of the underlying structure can almost be used like an 
instrumental technique, as a resource to obtain certain interpretative results. Furthermore, 
in light of the restrictions imposed by the performance’s temporality, related to the 
pressure of reviewing every detail of the surface and the complications that can be 
provoked at the motor level in the course of the performance, the possibility of taking hold 
of a representation that scaffolds the performance, revalues the analysis of the 
prolongational structure as a technical-performative resource. 
These restrictions are not only a property of music performance: all the 
performative arts suffer from them. Thus, for example, in drama the problems of unity 
have been considered extensively. If the problem of the unit seems to be, in this way, a 
question of performance in general beyond the musical object in particular, is it sensible to 
approach the problem of the unity in performance using a theoretical-analytical resource 
that is specifically musical? 
Contemporaneously with the development of Schenkerian theory, Stanislavsky 
(1922) developed the concept of “connectors” in dramatic performance. According to this, 
actors and actresses provide dramatic unity to their representation by identifying in the 
course of the play points that tie to each other in an underlying way (analogous to the 
points of perceptual condensation, mentioned by Imberty [1992]) from and between which 
they can establish relationships and lead their “psychical energy”. Stanislavsky was 
convinced that the best way to discover the intention of the dramaturge was in finding the 
action’s thread of the work, and that the relations between the parts and the whole were 
fundamental for such a conception (Magarshack 1968). In addition, Stanislavsky dared to 
go beyond this regarding the psychological aspects of this technique: he understood the 
ability of the actor to manage to hold the audience’s attention throughout the entire piece 
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as of high priority, as the most accurate way to capture the spectator’s attention. Thus, 
attention is a fundamental factor in the psychotechnique of Stanislavsky’s system, which 
allows deriving the parts from the whole and, at the same time, guaranteeing the 
performance’s continuity. The conception of unity of the piece that the performer has 
seems to appear while attention is oriented, and also in the way in which this orientation 
affects the expressive organization of the events throughout the time. The sense of unity, 
referred here to experience, is not inherent to the work, but is subordinated to the 
performer’s execution. Performer actions might manipulate musical features in order to 
strength or to weaken the experience of unity. 
3.3.2 The problem of directionality 
References to motion are present in all musicological discourse; in particular, motion is a 
core notion that is part of the prolongational theories. The voice leading concept itself is 
alluding to a directed motion. Expressions like structural goal, melodic direction, etc. are a 
common occurrence in theoretical writings. Jointly, the directionality idea regulates the 
gradients of intensity, time, tuning, etc. in musical performance. At the same time, this 
notion contributes to define the phrasing etc. determining units in articulated musical 
speech, where the way of saying the musical discourse is organized in the course of 
performance. From this perspective again, the analytical jargon is clearly tied to the 
language used to characterize performance. In the same way, Schenkerian graphic analysis 
devices, with their ties, bars, arrows and crossed lines, contribute to this notion of 
directionality. 
The idea of an underlying voice leading becomes a device that organizes 
performative variables in relation to the passed time and the goal to reach. Performers use 
to speak about “directional goals” concerning melodic, harmonic, rhythmic movements, 
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etc. In other words they attribute intentionality to the musical structure. From this 
perspective, to discover the underlying voice leading is analogous to discover the 
intentions of the musical structure. The performer’s behaviour would be regulated by this 
mentalist allegiance of the musical work. 
The idea that notes go towards or pursue a goal is therefore compatible with many 
performative strategies. These strategies can play an important role in relation to certain 
important aspects of communication between performer and listener. The idea of intention 
that performers may assign to music is comparable with the anthropomorphic allegiance 
that listeners tend to express (Watt and Ash 1998). Certainly, according to Sloboda (1998), 
to interpret music is to map onto the musical process not only the structural characteristics 
of the piece, but all other characteristics that arise from the psychophysical context of the 
musical fact. This mapping is neither associative nor iconic, but involves an abstract and 
deep representation of such components. 
This depth is related to the representation of dynamic aspects such as force, motion, 
continuity, unity, etc., that is either entirely imaginary, or that finds a correspondence in 
processes involved in music performance - such as motion. A possible consequence of this 
abstraction can be the representation of those dynamic aspects in anthropomorphic terms 
that give rise to the generation of moods or virtual characters. 
In summary, the analysis of prolongational structure alludes to directionality 
problems that are similar to the notion of directionality that allows the performer to 
regulate the expressive gradients in the configuration of the performance’s phrasing. This 
idea of directionality implies an attribution of intention whose representations are 
compatible with anthropomorphic, kinetic and dynamic musical representations that the 
listener can share with the performer. 
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3.3.3 The problem of depth 
Attributing intentions, shaping anthropomorphic, kinetic and dynamic representations are 
ways of symbolizing music. In the building of musical symbolic thought, the notion of 
surface-depth occupies an important place, contributing with two significant elements: on 
the one hand the idea that something deep exists, providing cohesion and modelling the 
experience; and on the other hand the intuition that there is something that must be 
discovered. 
Saying that music has depth and surface means that the components of the structure 
are organized into different configurations, depending on whether all the elements (point 
by point) of that component are considered, or as only some of then are considered 
according to a given reason. For Fink (1999) it is not possible to verify objectively the 
notion of depth. For that reason, the notion of depth is an idea that remains of symbolic 
status. The value of the metaphor is associated with its utility for analytical technique. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to think that the notion of depth has to do (as it will be seen in 
chapters 9 and 10) with the temporal aspects of the musical experience. In other words, it is 
possible to speak about a surface and a depth, because we have possibilities of 
experiencing different temporalities in music. 
Fink (1999) affirms that the dialectic depth-surface brings the implicit belief that all 
great work of art has an organic quality that appears like a whole, like a totality. In other 
words, the notion of depth allows us to explain and to understand the piece’s unity in the 
diversity of the events that constitute it. Nevertheless, it is possible to refer to the notion of 
depth in the terms of Sloboda (1998): it is not a depth which simplifies the diverse, that 
become the unequal homogeneous, but is a depth that allows experiencing the musical 
work beyond the evident, beyond the apparent notes, durations, and configurations. 
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This is related to the idea that there is something to discover. We have seen that this 
idea colonizes the mystic of the romantic performer, but also impels the search of 
objectivity in the modern one. The idea of depth allows understanding the performer’s task 
as the one of drawing veils, leaving manifest what is indeed present, although not still 
evident. The performer is the one that can see that what is hidden and that also has the 
power to exhibit it or not. We will see in the following chapters that this idea dominated 
the scope of the studies of performance for decades. 
3.3.4 Advantages of the Schenkerian approach concerning 
performative issues 
Although, both generative and melodic approaches - the GTTM (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
1983) and the IR (Meyer 1973, Narmour 1977, 1990, 1992) theories respectively (sketchily 
described in Appendix I) - explain prolongation, throughout this chapter we have focused 
on the voice leading perspective, which is mainly represented by the work of Schenker. 
The reasons for this are not only historical. 
Some points of affinity between the prolongational structure and the practice of 
performance have been indicated. In such affinity a tendency to consider prolongation not 
only in classical terms (concept and percept) but also as intention and sign may be 
observed. The inclination towards Schenkerian theory for undertaking the investigation on 
communication in performance has to do with this. 
In Schenkerian theory prolongation is understood as transformations of a deep 
structure throughout a process that goes from it towards the musical surface. The 
prolongational structure of GTTM, on the contrary, is not based on voice leading but is 
derived from the musical surface through reductional process, with strong incidence of the 
other structural components (metrical, grouping and time span reduction). For this reason 
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segmentation is an almost inexorable operation in the attainment of this reductional 
process. Unlike the prolongational approach based on voice leading, GTTM understands 
the art work’s unity by including the notion of hierarchy concerning its temporal units in 
the consideration of its other components also. The composition’s unity is understood from 
the splitting of the musical surface. From the psychological point of view it turns out 
counterintuitive to use it as a technical-performative tool, as was proposed in this chapter. 
The very concept of hierarchy in Schenkerian theory is more useful for configuring 
performance that the one of GTTM since the former does not depend on the strict relation 
of dominance - subordination of each sound (see appendix I). This allows seeing, as it was 
explained above (p. 69) prolongation as intention, characterizations that do not fit with 
GTTM. 
Compared with the notion of prolongation provided by the IR model, the 
perspective based on voice leading has the virtue of maintaining the associated idea of 
depth as linked to those of unity and directionality. Therefore, it is possible to assume that 
the strong appeal of prolongational structure based on voice leading terms have for 
theoretical studies about the practice of performance come from the fact that they capture 
the notions of unity, directionality, and depth in a such explicit way that many theoreticians 
assume them as to be truths in fact. Prolongational structure in Schenkerian terms may by a 
means of giving the performer a particular way of grasping the structure which may be a 
key for communication: 
“A performer who has grasped an extended piece in Schenkerian terms may be 
able to bring to his performance a higher degree of large-scale rhythmic or 
dynamic shaping just because he has a reflective awareness of the music’s 
structure that exceeds anything that is ordinarily experienced by the listener. In 
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other words, the value of a Schenkerian interpretation of a piece lies precisely 
in the extent to which it diverges from the listener’s everyday experience” 
(Cook 1990;. 4) 
Implications of this long scale awareness can be explained by understanding 
prolongation as cognition beyond the strictly representational, as was considered in this 
chapter. Suppose that a Listener (L) listens to a performance by a Performer (P) and makes 
a semantic interpretation of it – that is, he or she is sent to a concept, an image, an emotion, 
a state of the world, etc. By all means this is feasible, since what “exceeds anything that is 
ordinarily experienced by to listener” (L) is the semiotic interpretation. But, after that (P) 
configures a semiotic interpretation, including prolongation, which was achieved through a 
process that, surely, has very little to do with “the listener' s everyday experience”. It relies 
instead on score visualization and analysis, many reiterations, translations to a chain of 
physical actions to give rise to the performance, etc. From this interpretation (P) modifies 
his or her internal representation of the piece, giving rise to changes in the microstructure 
(timing, dynamics, etc.) of the performance. In the same way that Larson (1997) 
denominated structural hearing to the action of listening to a passage in prolongational 
terms (listen to x in terms of y), we could say that, in this example, (P) played a structural 
performance of the passage when “performing a passage in prolongational terms” (in fact, 
in order to avoid confusions, we prefer to talk of prolongational performance). If these 
microstructural modifications take to (L) to a different semantic interpretation, we will be 
able to say that the listener interprets the prolongation, although this interpretation is 
semantic (non semiotic) yet. In other words, it can be said that prolongation is playing a 
role in performer-listener communication although the latter (and, as we shall speculate 
further, the former) cannot give a critical account of it. The absence of that critical 
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awareness does not cancel the communicational bond (Rothstein 1995). This line will be 
explored further (Chapter 8 and 10). 
*** 
Summary. Prolongation is a widespread concept in music theory. It alludes to the 
phenomenon by which an event maintains its activity though not physically present. In 
Schenker’s theory prolongation appears as related to the development of voice leading and 
is therefore subordinated to strict counterpoint principles. In other theories (Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff 1983; Meyer 1973; Narmour 1977) prolongation is subordinated either to 
grouping and metrical structures or to expectations produced by the melodic surface. 
Although these approaches are highly interesting, the Schenkerian perspective seems to be 
more compatible to music performance concerns. Thus, this approach appears as directly 
linked to very conspicuous theoretical problems of music performance. These themes 
include the topics of unity, continuity and directionality, and depth. 
The treatment of the concept of prolongation as an object of knowledge has been 
diverse. Basically, as concerns its psychological condition, music theory has approached it 
either as a percept (a perceivable attribute of the musical structure) or as derived from high 
level conceptualisation and/or reasoning processes (prolongation as a concept). In spite of 
Schenker’s own psychologicist rhetoric, it has been argued here that these perspectives 
come from a sort of “attributionist” tendency both in English speaking musicology and in 
the field of psychology of music as regards the theory. It has been argued that these 
perspectives led to consider the theory from a psychological perspective associated to 
classic cognitive science. However, it is also possible to consider the notion from an 
epistemologically different perspective more compatible with some alternative 
psychological paradigms. Consequently, prolongation may be seen both as intentionality 
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and as a sign. As a result, prolongation can be understood as communicational content 
from both an interpretative paradigm and from a psychology of intersubjective 
communication. 
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Chapter 4: Communication in music performance and 
cognitive science 
As has been introduced (Chapter 2, p. 38), communication in performance became an 
academic realm in its own right from the development of the generativist ideas. This field 
was thereby strongly influenced by the cognitive revolution and English speaking 
structuralism. In this chapter we will briefly examine the most important contributions that 
this approach has provided for the study of this issue. The expression generative paradigm 
is used here almost in an interchangeable way with the expression classic cognitive 
paradigm. In that sense, most of the theories and models developed to account for music 
communication, are based on important findings of cognitive music psychology (the most 
relevant to the prolongational issues are reviewed in Appendix II). Although generativist 
theories do not represent the entire classical cognitive science perspective on 
communication in music performance, they are undoubtedly predominant in this. The 
qualifying generative is used in a very wide-ranging sense, taking its meaning mainly from 
the field of studies in linguistic interpretation, as opposed to other communication 
paradigms in which both stimuli and processing are not considered computationally, as is 
the case here. All other interpretations of the term generative are beyond the intention with 
which it will be used in this chapter. 
4.1 The generative paradigm 
The Generative Paradigm is based on the idea that perceptual and understanding processes 
basically consist of integrating the incoming information to some kind of more integrated 
informational structure. In this fashion, action processes are also provoked from more 
integrated action configurations. In every case, this more integrated structure, lodged in the 
mind, constitutes a coherent structure, and is sufficient to attract new information. This 
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more cohesive organization mostly consists of two types of components: (i) mental 
representations and (ii) a set of formal manipulations that are carried out on those mental 
representations. Understanding and action only take place due to those formal 
manipulations, without any kind of deeper tacit understanding (Jackendoff 1987). 
Accordingly, action and reception mental structures are either the same, or are directly 
linked. Action and perception consist of composing information in a coherent whole with 
previous or integrated information, from which to reinforce (or undermine) that level of 
previous integration by including the new information. 
Importantly from the psychological perspective, according to this paradigm, we do 
not have to decide what is the most relevant information to understand, but we must 
connect it to previous knowledge structures. Interestingly, those previous structures are 
dynamic and present permanent transformations every time new information hits them. 
From the epistemological perspective, the generative approach establishes a system or 
structure of production (of knowledge) that is independent of the effects that it causes (Eco 
1990). 
For many reasons, this paradigm has been extremely attractive for approaching 
music performance as an object of scientific study. One of these is that it understands 
performance as a domain that is developed through ordered stages according to the 
formalization levels of the suggested models. Due to this, in music performance, the 
paradigm is easily oriented towards the acquisition and development of performance skills 
problems. Nevertheless, the most important appeal is that by this paradigm music 
performance is naturally related to musical structure, a relation that, as it has been seen, 
has troubled both theoreticians and performers for years (Stein 1954; Cone 1968; 
Schmalfeldt 1985; Berry 1989; Dunsby 1989). The generative paradigm comes to reinforce 
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the concept of a skilful performance as being at the service of the musical structure, 
clarifying it before the listener’s ears. Consequently: (i) the performer is a means of 
approaching the sender’s (the composer’s) message to the receiver (the listener); (ii) 
communication fulfils a didactic function; (iii) the specific content (specific meaning) to be 
communicated is the musical structure; (iv) performers, as scholars, know their audiences 
and use, consequently, the rhetorical means necessary to enable them to know the musical 
structure; (v) those means conform to a common code between the participants in the 
process that allows for communication; (vi) communication is achieved when the receiver 
(the listener) captures the performer’s intention. 
Features of phrasing (Kronman and Sundberg 1987; Repp 1990b, 1992a, 1995a), 
metre (Sloboda 1983), rhythmic grouping (Clarke 1985), and texture (Palmer 1989; 1996), 
among others, are compositional characteristics that the performer can clarify. In all cases, 
the gathered empirical evidence that endorses such an affirmation is interpreted (i) in terms 
of the existence of an available relatively structured body of information on the part of 
listeners to which they connect the incoming information and (ii) reciprocally, on the part 
of the performer, in terms of a previous correspondence between the structural knowledge 
of music and concomitant action patterns, to which the musician connects the structural 
information provided by the score. Specifically on this point, the generative paradigm is 
supported on three types of evidence (Palmer 1997): (i) the performer’s ability to replicate 
the same expressive pattern with minimal variability between performances; (ii) the ability 
to change the interpretation of a piece and to produce a different expression with relatively 
little practice; and (iii) the ability to sight-read a non familiar piece with appropriate 
expression. 
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It is not a trivial fact that other structural attributes associated the composition’s 
tonal coherence have been less explored from this perspective. Nevertheless, in a 
remarkable study, Thompson and Cuddy (1997) tackled this subject, exploring whether the 
perceived distance between keys in modulating passages depended on some performance 
particularities. Their findings revealed that the expression in performance contributes 
significantly to the perception of the distance between keys, and that this contribution 
depends on the distance to the arrival key. In addition they discovered that it was not only 
global expression contributed to this end, but that the expression of each differentiated 
voice (for example, differentiated timings between the different voices) was the most 
influential. Linking these results with other studies (Palmer 1989, 1996) that promote the 
idea that expression contributes to defining the individuality of the voices, it is possible to 
speculate that (i) the expression of separated voices contributes to the experiential 
configuration of the voice leading (a tonal coherence resource); (ii) this configuration of 
the voice leading contributes to understanding (the logic of) the tonal relocation, and (iii) 
therefore that understanding affects the psychological distance perceived (the more logical 
the relocation, the closer the perceived distance). 
The structured knowledge on which communication is maintained can adopt 
different shapes. Next we will examine those that have been approached the most. 
4.2 Rule systems 
Typically, the formalizations that more appropriately adjust to the generative framework 
adopt the form of rule systems according to which knowledge is organized. Consequently, 
communication is feasible basically because those to whom the communication is 
addressed have in their minds identical systems of rules - they share those more integrated 
informational structures. The system is an abstract construction that intends to explain 
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available data by generating hypotheses to examine new evidence (Salkie 2001). Thus, this 
modality of formalization has allowed a scientific treatment of the linguistic problems with 
important epistemological implications. Briefly, the formal system is obtained from a 
partial observation of the reality. This system gives rise to the formulation of experimental 
hypotheses that allow obtaining new empirical data in order to confirm or reformulate such 
formal systems (Sundberg and Lindblom 1976). 
In the field of behavioural studies, these ideas encouraged a research programme in 
which a great number of behavioural aspects began to be understood as grammars. 
According to Clarke (1989a) it is difficult to establish a definition of a grammar that 
includes a clear distinction between aspects that clearly appear to be grammatical from 
those that have to be considered as such. Accordingly, a grammar should ideally be a small 
set of rules “which will account for a large (in principle infinite) number of diverse 
utterances” (p.17). Besides, a grammar should permit the distinction between “utterances 
that are acceptable in the language, and utterances that are not.” (p.17). In order to 
accomplish such a formalization, a generative grammar must separate the linguistic from 
the non-linguistic (contextual) properties of a statement. Thus, the grammar describes a 
common linguistic structure shared by many statements. In this way this perspective is 
anchored to the syntax of the information. This fact gives the approach a robust 
computational value, which is why it has had a strong impact on cognitive psychology. 
Some important concepts in this approach have been relevant to studying 
communication in music performance. One of them is the distinction between the 
competence, or the knowledge that speakers have of their language, and performance that 
is, the real use that speakers make of their language. Competence represents, to a certain 
extent, all the common patterns found among the speakers of a given language. Psychology 
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bases itself on them to describe part of the speaker’s mind. Thus, this psychology is based 
on an idealized subject characterized by empirical evidence of common behavioural 
patterns. The characterization of the system of common knowledge that constitutes the 
language is, from this perspective, what allows it to explain individual behaviours and to 
characterize the speaker’s mind.  
Other relevant concepts for our aims are the notions of: (i) Code - a particular type 
of rule system that ties signs to meaning, connecting messages (internal representations 
that constitute the object of communication) with signals (external modifications of the 
physical environments, that a communicator produces and that can be recognized by 
another person); (ii) Transformations - a special type of grammar rule that allows operating 
on a statement, transforming it into an admissible statement; and (iii)  Deep structure –
originally alluding to the mentioned abstractions, this comes from the idea that a statement 
can be represented in progressively more abstract ways, and that the successive levels of 
representation are linked through specific rules. By opposition, the concept of surface 
structure emerges, representing the statement as it appears in reality. 
In short, the generative theory itself has produced an important impetus for studies 
on communication due to the rigour of the formalizations of its descriptions of theoretical 
structure, the computational value derived from them, and the scope of the concepts on 
which its epistemological frame is based. In addition, and particularly interesting for 
music, generative studies in linguistics developed very useful concepts for understanding 
musical processes. 
4.2.1 Preference-rule systems 
In the context of the generative approach certain special systems, called preference rules 
deserve a separate section. Although developed for musical purposes (Lerdahl and 
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Jackendoff 1983; Temperley 2001), they can be extended beyond the musical domain. 
Contrary to the other systems, preference rules attempt to formalize aspects more related to 
semantics (Jackendoff 1983; 1987). 
Preference rule systems are mainly applied when the conditions in which they 
operate are susceptible to being scaled in a continuum. In addition, these kinds of rules can 
in certain circumstances be sufficient but not necessary. This means that such conditions 
are able to cause a certain effect, but nevertheless are not necessary to cause it, as there 
may be another motive causing that same effect. Jackendoff (1983) says that the preference 
rules systems are conceived because well-formedness rules cannot explain all the cases of 
very complex structures: “these rules establish not inflexible decisions about structure, but 
relative preferences among a number of logically possible analyses” (p.132). Thus, these 
systems show an interpretational bias in that (i) the more integrated information is not an a 
priori system, but derives from the implementation of the rules; (ii) the rules are applied 
heuristically instead of algorithmically; (iii) thus, their implementation depends on the 
subject making a kind of judgment (preference, coherence, salience, stability, etc.); (iv) 
there are overall guidelines for establishing contextual links that decide on the 
interpretation of a certain information (see chapter 5, p. 167). 
The preference rule systems come to fill many of the gaps that other rule systems 
leave, without losing its computational capacity. They come into play whenever one of the 
following possibilities occurs in making relational judgements: 
“(1) judgments of graded acceptability and of family resemblance; (2) two or 
more rules, neither of which is necessary, but each one of them is under certain 
conditions sufficient for a judgment; (3) balancing effects among rules that 
apply in conflict; (4) a measure of stability based on rule application; (5) rules 
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that are not logically necessary used as default values in the face of inadequate 
information” (Jackendoff 1983; p. 152). 
Although preference rule systems admit the permanent reconstruction of the system 
on the basis of the way in which preferences are applied and in the search of the system’s 
stability, they do not give any account of how this stability is judged. 
4.2.2 Rule systems in music 
In the field of musical studies, the generative paradigm is explicitly approached in a 
pioneering article by Sundberg and Lindblom (1976), which attempts to formalize melody 
through rule systems from some parallelism (hierarchical and constituent structure) with 
language. Nevertheless, it is possible to back track the interest in rule systems as bases for 
music from a long way, both in theoretical concerns and practical assumptions about oral 
tradition music (Clarke 1989a). Such interests made the affinity between music and 
language, particularly the idea of a musical grammar, become important both in music 
psychology and in music theory. 
The work that definitively installs the explicit concept of generative grammar in 
music studies is Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s (1983) Generative Theory of Tonal Music. 
According to them, a musical piece, like language, “is a mentally constructed entity, of 
which scores and performances are partial representations by which the piece is 
transmitted” (p. 2). GTTM clearly oriented music theory towards the cognitive sciences. 
The authors are strongly committed to studying the understanding of music rather than 
with aesthetic concerns. 
The high degree of formalization of the theory is responsible for the enormous 
attractiveness that it has had among music psychologists. The theory, raised like a 
monumental formal system that describes the hierarchical attributes of tonal music 
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according to specific rules, makes the application and the development of the generative 
paradigm as epistemological bases of a series of works in the field of music psychology 
possible. In this way, the theory works like an incessant source of hypotheses that 
stimulates the searching and collection of empirical data that also allow the reformulation 
of the hypotheses (Deliege 1987, Deliege and El Ahmadí 1991, Dibben 1994). GTTM, in 
addition, inaugurated a theoretical epistemological field that gave rise to manifold 
formalizations of different structural components of music (Temperley 2001, Fessel 1996, 
Rodríguez 2003) with direct applications in very diverse fields, from artificial intelligence 
to aesthetics. 
4.2.3 Rule systems in music performance 
Most of the studies of performance gathered empirical data giving rise to the formulation 
of hypotheses fitting the shape of the rule system. These, in turn, were able to generate new 
data or predictions. For example, Sloboda (1983) found that performers use certain timing, 
dynamics, and articulation patterns to convey an intended metre. Thus, he enunciated three 
principles (that can be translated into a rule system): (i) the expressive variations serve to 
identify the main metric subdivisions; (ii) notes with greater impulse are played more 
legato than the preceding ones; and (iii) notes with greater impulse are played louder than 
preceding and subsequent ones. For her part, in the analysis of expert performances, 
Palmer (1989) identified three expressive patterns intended to emphasise diverse structural 
features: (i) the chord asynchrony pattern, by which the different texture lines are 
segregated; (ii) the rubato pattern, used to emphasize the limits between formal units; and 
(iii) the overlap pattern that serves to emphasize a texture line over the others. An explicit 
and formalized generative approach to music performance has been proposed by Clarke 
(1988). Two aspects of his proposal are relevant. Firstly, he hypothesizes that performers 
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configure the musical piece in their minds in the course of performance (in real time), in 
terms of the hierarchical structure notion from the generative approach, which contributes 
to motor and expressive control in performance. Secondly, he identified a series of 
acoustic codes which the listeners learn by being immersed in the same musical culture, 
allowing the communication of some structural features from performers to listeners. 
Sundberg and his colleagues (cf. Sundberg, Friberg and Fryden 1991; Sundberg 
1993; Friberg 1995) have attempted to model the performer’s intuitions related to the 
communication of musical structure. For this purpose they developed an Analysis-by-
Synthesis procedure. From the intuitions of an expert performer they formulated a series of 
rules for synthesizing music performances that simulated live ones. The procedure assumes 
that if the simulation is successful, the rules that were used for the synthesized 
performances can be understood as attributes of a real performance. The set of rules 
codifies the use of durations, loudness, tuning, and vibrato amplitude and frequency as 
expressive variables. In that way the rule system not only regulates the performer’s actions, 
but also the listener’s decoding of these actions. In this sense, many of the studies adopting 
this approach have also examined whether the listener is successful in decoding the 
performative guideline. This success depends not only on the specific function that each 
rule fulfils, but also on the extent to which such a rule is implemented. For this, the notion 
of perceptibility threshold is crucial in order to verify the amount of application needed for 
the intended action to be recognized. Sundberg (1993) affirmed that the way in which the 
listener decodes information coming from a performance is not exclusive to music, but is 
observed in other domains of human communication such as language. In this way, the 
knowledge that the listener requires in order to decode an expressive action in a given 
music performance, due to being more general, is acquired through very diverse 
communicational practices. For that reason the expressive sense of a musical performance 
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can both be recognized and appreciated by people who lack any kind of specific musical 
training. Axiomatically, this procedure offers immediate derivations to the field of artificial 
intelligence (cf. Friberg and Sundberg 1995). 
Close to this procedure, Clynes proposed the theory of composers’ pulse (Clynes 
1983, 1995; see also Thompson 1989; Repp 1989, 1990a). This theory can also be 
recognized as a set of rules that tie a particular rubato pattern to each particular composer. 
Notion of composers’ pulse models the idiosyncratic stylistic characteristics of those 
composers, linked to the piece’s rhythmic shaping and fluidity of movement in 
performance. In this way a piece is suitably interpreted if the performance obeys certain 
timing patterns that are proper and idiosyncratic for each composer. Therefore, the 
composers’ pulse may be understood as a set of rules related to a very sensitive aspect of 
academic music performance, namely, its stylistic concern. However, as a clear objectivist 
account of music performance (pp. 34 and ff), this theory ignores some contextual aspects 
of the concept of style, associating it only with features on the score. 
4.3 Schemata 
Some researchers have asked themselves why are performers not able to play without 
expression, even though they may attempt it. Numerous studies (i.e. Palmer 1989) revealed 
that even expert performers cannot avoid any kind of expressive deviation (rubato patterns, 
changing dynamics levels, vibrato patterns, etc.) systematically applied according to values 
that are significantly different from the normative ones (in general displayed by the score) 
even though, frequently, performers are not aware of it. Similarly, listeners tend to 
consider a deadpan (inexpressive) performance as displaying systematic microstructural 
deviations to some degree. In other words, to a certain extent, systematic deviations are not 
considered as expressive. This implies that a level must exist below which the human 
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perceptive-motor system is not able to detect expressive differences as such. Thus, when 
can a deviation from a normative value be interpreted as expressive? 
Schema Theory, which is viewed seriously and applied convincingly to several 
phenomena in music psychology, offers important ideas for investigating this 
communicational issue. A schema is an integrated general knowledge structure which does 
not refer to the information in itself, but to the organization of that information. It was 
suggested that certain musical structures would function as schemata (Krumhansl 1995), 
incorporated by enculturation in the cognitive system (Castellano, Bharucha and 
Krumhansl 1984) and lodged in long term memory. For example, tonality may be 
understood as a schema that specifies the stability conditions of every event within a given 
context (Bharucha 1984). The context – a chord, a scale – activates the schema in terms of 
which incoming events are understood as stable or unstable. Therefore the schema makes 
musical information processing in real time possible. 
The power of schemata resides in the information contained about how all the 
different attributes of the input are related to each other. In addition the schemata’s most 
important advantage is that they can be used to predict what will probably be likely to 
happen. Applied to communication in performance, this concept suggests that expression 
in performance is understood on the part of listener because of the existence of certain 
typical expressive patterns in the mind that act as templates against which the present 
performance is compared. The studies on timing detectability are relevant to this issue. The 
powerful ability of expressive discrimination that listeners who are familiar with a 
particular performative style can exhibit is well known; most of their value judgments 
about performances are based on this fact. Listeners can discriminate natural – as human – 
performances from non-natural – exact, quantized, computer based – ones. But, at the 
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same time, they do not mistake non natural for non expressive – deadpan. This means that 
the deviation the performer realizes although attempting to performance without 
deviations, is captured by the listener (Clarke 1989b). 
This implies the existence of a basic temporal deviation that we cannot 
conscientiously account for, but which characterizes a performance’s naturalness. For 
Repp (1992 b), the ability to detect temporal variations is a function of a schema of timing. 
He found that the average of a set of expressive performances of a same fragment gives 
rise to a virtual performance that listeners may approve as expressive. In generative terms 
it can be said that such an average constitutes a grammatically acceptable statement. 
Curiously, he found that listeners can better detect timing variations in locations in which 
the average performance displays lower variations. Thus, for example, at the end of a 
phrase, in which note lengthenings typically take place, listeners are less successful at 
detecting changes in timing. A first account would say that the listener hopes that a 
lengthening takes place at that point and it will therefore be more difficult for him to 
identify one that indeed happens. In that way, an expressive schema would operate in 
perception and action, constraining both listeners’ expectations and performers’ actions. 
This would be a basic schema from which performers decide their idiosyncratic expression 
(Repp 1998 a, b, c). The origin of this expressive schema is, however, arguable. 
Two hypotheses have set out to explain both the existence and origin of this 
deviation threshold that characterizes the naturalness of a performance. Carolyn Drake 
(1993) proposed a perceptual hypothesis: this schema arises from restrictions proper to the 
perceptual system, and therefore, depends on the complexity of the musical structure 
attributes in interaction. Thus, some timing variations in performance are naturally 
associated with given structural configurations (Drake and Palmer 1993) (Figure 4.1). This 
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hypothesis establishes that some lengthenings are due to the fact that the performer 
perceives certain inter-onset intervals (in such structural configurations) as shorter and 
naturally tends to compensate them. Such distortions would require a low level of 
processing and would operate on a structural surface level with a local range - as it is seen, 
in relations of few notes. As listeners and performers share the same perceptual system 
constraints and, therefore the same schemata, then the lengthening is not perceived as such 
and the sequence is interpreted “without lengthening”. 
On the contrary, Repp (1992b, 1995b), proposed an expressive hypothesis, not 
limited to such restrictions but fundamentally subordinated to cultural guidelines 
(incorporated by enculturation) concerning the expressive handling proper to each 
performance style. The use of such a schema would imply a high level process because 
both the performer and the listener would have to grasp all the information relative to the 
structural context in order to activate the schema. 
Penel and Drake (1998) distinguished between low level processes of local 
grouping that lead to a non-intentional timing even in performances considered 
mechanical, and an additional high level of grouping processes that, under cognitive 
control, are only reflected in expressive intentional timing. Presumably only the obligatory 
Figure 4.1. Rhythmic and melodic timing variations in music performance according to 
Drake and Palmer (1993) 
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low level perceptual processes would play a role when the task is to detect the deviations 
with respect to an isochronous pattern, and a high correlation would be expected between 
the perceptual biases and the typical timing profiles of performances with mechanical 
intentionality. This level is restricted by psychoacoustic phenomena - like that outlined in 
figure 4.1. Nevertheless, in performances considered as expressive, the deviations found 
are greater. Therefore, both types of processes - high level as well as low level ones – 
could be involved. Penel and Drake suggested that under the expressive conception of 
performance there are bottom-up processes that can be appreciated in mechanical 
performances. Nevertheless, due to the hierarchical and multilevel nature of certain 
musical structures, these psychological processes should take part in processing both high 
and low structural levels. 
From the performance perspective, Repp (1998 c) suggested that although an 
involuntary level of timing variability can be due to local aural (and kinetic) aspects, such 
involuntary timing possibly has to do with a residual effect of structural perception that 
falls below our perceptual threshold and is therefore unconscious and involuntary. This 
residual timing would be typically related to the aural structures of music, while a more 
flexible (idiosyncratic and individual) genuine expressive pattern would be cognitively 
guided. The listener’s expectations come from their processing of musical structures (for 
example they recognize a phrase ending) in conjunction with their previous musical 
experience (they are used to hearing the tempo slow down at the end of a phrase). Such 
expectations are focused on musical structure and interact with the perception of musical 
time. 
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4.4 Dynamic systems 
In turn, several authors have proposed explanations of some aspects of music performance 
as communicational processes, describing the process as a whole in terms of a set of 
equations that “show how current values of variables depend mathematically on previous 
values of those variables” (Tagard 1996; p.169). These sets of operations are generically 
denominated dynamic systems. Some analogies of such models with a multiplicity of 
processes that happen in natural sciences are particularly attractive. These models suppose 
that important reasons exist to think that information is understood as being matched to a 
pre-existing knowledge structure, in most of the cases granting some type of physical 
advantage. Many of these dynamic system models capture the intuition of naturalness as 
linked to certain expressive modalities. In particular, the domain of time in music seems to 
be strongly marked by our experience of space in our relationship with the world. 
Numerous studies exist that seek to explain this relationship between the physical world 
and the aesthetic-expressive worlds in terms of dynamic systems. According to this 
perspective, such systems should operate as a knowledge foundation on which the 
listeners’ and musicians’ responses to expressive aspects of performance are based. 
Most of these models are based on empirical evidence gathered in the laboratory. 
One of the first attempts to characterize a performative feature mathematically was made 
by Sundberg and Verrillo in 1980. They analysed the typical pattern of performative 
deceleration at the ends of pieces in predominantly isochronous performances. They put 
forward an average function for a great number of performances characterized by the 
concurrence of two linear functions. Accordingly, listeners tended to prefer the 
performances that follow that principle. Interestingly, the proposed model was soon 
improved by Kronman and Sundberg (1987) with the sole use of a quadratic equation. 
These authors found a curve of retardation of certain physical movements generically 
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denominated motorhythmical (for example, to run or to walk), and compared it with the 
average curve of ritardandi studied by Sundberg and Verrillo in 1980. In this way they 
initiated a systematisation of the musicians’ and listeners’ intuitions about the fact that 
musical movements have a counterpart in the physical world. They proposed certain 
associative foundations for processing expressive information, based on the similarity 
between the physical motion curve of retardation and the average curve of ritardandi, 
suggesting that the ritardando evokes some type of motional retardation for the listener 
that incorporates a certain expressive value to the performance. 
The characterization of the spatial aspect of music shown through the multiple 
motion metaphors used to describe musical passages has been, since then, a search often 
described in terms of these dynamic systems. One of the more frequent concepts in the field 
of musicological studies on performance is that of the musical gesture (Repp 1994, Shove 
and Repp 1995). As indicated by Repp (1992a), this clear orientation towards the problem 
of performance is better than the simple rhythmic group problem since it reveals its 
psychomotor constraints. When studying the thematic rhythmic group at the beginning of 
Schumann’s Träumerei and its elaborative derivations in a set of 28 expert performances, 
Repp (1992c) could observe that all the expressive patterns of this motif roughly adjusted 
to a parabolic function, more or less pronounced according to the location of such 
groupings in the course of the piece. Accordingly listeners considered rubato patterns 
corresponding to the found function as the most acceptable for this motif (Repp 1992a). 
The dynamic system perspective captures a dynamical sense of music that 
grammars disregard because of their static nature (Kendall and Carterette 1990). In that 
way, expressivity in performance is viewed as a listener-directed message codification that 
is proper to the performer regardless of the composer’s message. The musical composition 
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is considered in this context as a frame “for the dialogue between performer and listener" 
(Kendall and Carterette 1990; p. 135). Thus, the imposition of the listener’s intention is an 
important component within the system. In this way, the listener affects the identity of the 
message beyond behaving as its mere transmitter. 
The relations between the notion of prolongational structure and this dynamic 
system may be promising. It is well known that listeners prefer performances that follow 
the acceleration/deceleration rule and that such patterns also characterize many forms of 
physical and biological movements. In addition, language about music calls for some kind 
of spatial reference. Musical motions are isomorphic and imitate physical motion in space. 
In addition, there is some evidence that encourages us to think that, at least in our culture, 
music is sound that is manifested both in time and in space. Thus, many authors speak of 
music’s kinetic properties (Shove and Repp 1995; Clarke 2001). It is by virtue of this that 
music seems to stimulate both the perception and the induction of motion. Logically, this 
quality has lead to important models in terms of dynamic systems linked with dynamic 
physical models. 
One of the most influential models in this field is that of Todd (1985, 1992). He 
proposed a kinetic approach to musical expression. According to this, music expression has 
its origin in simple motor actions and both the performance and perception of timing and 
dynamics are based on a sort of inner sense of movement. This internal sense of movement 
is located in the vestibular organs, which should allow tying movement with vibration 
(Todd 1993). Two types of movements should regulate expressive musical activity: (i) an 
inferred oscillatory movement with a rhythm at a constant tempo, a regular strong beat 
(associated to sinusoidal movement); (ii) a gestural movement (associated with rubato) that 
has a beginning, a point of maximum speed and an end. This internal movement is 
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organized in a hierarchical way that corresponds to the way in which the grouping structure 
is organized in the performer’s memory. Expressive timing consists of alternating phases 
of constant acceleration and deceleration, in which each cycle typically corresponds to a 
musical group or phrase. In this way timing consists of concave or convex segments with 
overlapping boundaries. At the same time, dynamics also model expressive phrasing. 
According to Todd (1995) the relation between tempo and dynamic can roughly be defined 
by the formula: “The faster the louder, the slower the softer" in absence of other 
considerations. 
Friberg and Sundberg (1999) proposed that the changes in tempo allude to 
locomotional patterns. They adjusted the abovementioned mathematical ritardando model 
to observations of runners’ deceleration. They could observe that: (i) the frequency of steps 
when decelerating did not decrease, and it was therefore not possible to use the steps’ 
frequency to elaborate a mathematical model for ritardandi; (ii) the length of the steps 
became progressively smaller (which therefore varies the instantaneous speed – the speed 
between steps); (iii) the speed showed a high correlation with the patterns of ritardandi 
analysed by Sundberg and Verillo (1981); (iv) speed does not decrease in a linear fashion; 
(v) the square of the speed, that is to say, the kinetic energy, presents a rectilinear pattern. 
In other words ritardandi were associated with the decrease of runners’ kinetic energy. 
Thus, runners as well as musicians decelerate, showing a comparable pattern of the 
handling of energy. This similar energy handling would indicate that the metaphor of 
movement in music could have an origin which is psychogenetically related to certain 
habitual human motions. Although the model seemed to predict the piece’s final ending 
better than any intermediate ending, it gave rise to speculations about the fact that the 
simplicity of the relation between energy and deceleration is presumably the base of the 
“naturalness” of certain forms of ritardandi. 
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The model offered a satisfactory explanation of the fact that listeners can anticipate 
the moment at which the final note appears in the musical piece. Nevertheless, it seems to 
adjust better certain musical styles. This fact accounts for an important limitation of the 
dynamic systems as part of the generative paradigm, namely: they are not able to account 
for the culturally specific characteristics of performance; this includes both the 
characteristics of the performance style, as well as the conditions of admissibility of the 
particular performances within a specific musical culture. 
These models encourage the study of other metaphors used in relation to music that 
allude to physical principles, such as inertia (vf. Appendix I Prolongation and voice 
leading). In addition, if, as we have just speculated, the metaphor of temporal movement is 
not in its origin a mere rhetorical resource, it could be that the metaphor of tonal movement 
is not rhetorical either, and that therefore the principles of inertia, magnetism, etc. (as 
Larson 1997 proposed) would not be simple metaphorical statements. They may at least 
have a quasi physical foundation. In a similar way Feldman, Epstein and Richards (1992) 
proposed a mathematical model for the tempo change (ritardando in particular) in 
performance. The model could predict temporal variations in orchestral performances. 
From their findings, they speculated on a sort a quasi-physical musical knowledge that, 
unconsciously shared by musicians, supports the metaphors of motion used in the speech 
about music. In that way, although the forces that regulate the aesthetic phenomena of 
music performance are psychological, they are nonetheless governed by constraints as if 
they were physical. 
4.5 Partially redundant, probabilistic systems 
Both rule systems and the other forms of knowledge integration appear as convincing in 
explaining the communication of structural musical features described in the terms of 
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music theory. As we have seen (chapter 2) this is the intended content for objectivism. 
Nevertheless, when considering other contents, the idea of a linear, one way 
communication seems insufficient. Such is the case in the communication of emotions. 
Concerned with describing emotional communication (related to both perceived and 
induced emotions) in music performance, Juslin (1997, 1998, 2005) developed a model 
that attempts to abandon the epistemological corset that the chain of linear 
communicational strictly imposes. He argued that it is not possible to speak of a one way 
linear relation between a given performative attribute and a determined emotional content. 
On the contrary, similar traits can contribute to communicate different emotional contents. 
Each characteristic of music performance is a condition neither necessary nor sufficient to 
guarantee the communication, but the great number of intervening features and the fact that 
those traits are redundant with respect to their possible effects assures a high probability 
that communication takes place. Thus, Juslin affirms that the relation between the 
performative characteristics described by the model and the provoked emotions is a 
probabilistic one and that therefore communication is better thought of as correlational 
rather than as deterministic. 
These ideas are the basis of the Lens Model (Juslin 1998). Basically, the model is a 
functionalist one, describing the communicative process in terms of functional relations 
between performers, performances, and listeners. The performer can communicate 
symbolic representations of emotions to listeners, making use of expressive characteristics 
in performance. In this way the performance acquires the essential symbolic function of 
making somebody think about something absent that is being symbolized. The model 
classically includes a sender, a channel and a receiver. But here, the performer, who acts as 
sender, produces a series of actions that act as indicators of what she or he is trying to 
communicate. These indicators constitute continuous signals whose function is 
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probabilistic. The receiver gathers a great number of indications from the environment, 
which is particularly uncertain, since there is no code of invariant communication: no 
invariant relation exists between the cue and the intended message by the performer. That 
is to say, the cues that arise from the environment are not completely dependent, but hold 
only a probabilistic relation (which is uncertain) with the performer’s actions. According to 
Juslin, communication is achieved because a substantial number of cues exist that are 
partially interchangeable and redundant. Thus, the environment offers cues to the listener 
that are not the message in itself but that are representative of that message, and as a 
response to this, the receiver acts as an intuitive statistician, assessing and combining cues, 
changing from those that are not available to those that are. This is due to the cues 
constituting a noisy communication channel, and therefore the receiver must separate the 
relevant input aspects (reliable aspects) from the rest of the noise (non reliable aspects). 
Here the subject is the person who must evaluate the relevant information. This perspective 
remarkably approaches the very concept of interpretation as heuristic, as opposed to 
algorithmic, process (Eco 1990). The model permits an evaluation of the adjustment 
between the performer’s intention and the listener’s comprehension, and the effectiveness 
of the used strategies. Besides, the model can account for central tendencies at the same 
time as performers’ individual behaviours. 
 
All the approaches reviewed here consider communication as a one way process, whose 
understanding depends on the way in which information can be organized in the mind (as 
rules, as a scheme, a dynamic system, etc.) or may be processed statistically. In this way: 
“Communication (…) requires that there is both a composer’s (or performer’s) intention to 
express a specific concept and recognition of the same concept by a listener” (Juslin 2005, 
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p. 88). This is, in essence, the way in which communication is understood from the 
objectivist perspective. How may this perspective contribute to undertake the problem of 
communicating prolongational structure? The final section of this chapter presents some 
advances in answering this question. 
4.6 The role of performance in the communication of the 
prolongational structure 
There are some studies that could be considered as precursors in considering the 
prolongational structure as a possible communication content in performance, and as such 
they are direct antecedents of the studies will be presented in chapters 5 and 6. 
Cook (1987c) made an empirical study from the detailed analysis of two 
performances of J. S. Bach’s Praeludium in C Major (WTC 1). His aim was to investigate 
possible correspondences between the expressive organization of timing and the 
prolongational structure of the piece, with a clear objectivist orientation since, early in the 
study Cook affirms “There should be a close relationship between the analysis of music 
and its performance” (p. 257) (although later Cook (1999) re-examined this assertion, 
affirming that it is necessary to re-define the nature of such a relationship). From this 
perspective, some of Cook’s findings are relevant for our studies. Firstly Cook 
acknowledged that certain expressive resources, for example the lengthening of a note, can 
fulfil different objectives, when looking for a convincing way to enunciate them as rules. 
Thus, for example, he affirmed that a downbeat lengthening emphasizes the corresponding 
fall to earth, whereas the upbeat lengthening emphasizes the following note. In this way, 
he is making evident a preoccupation for the contextual understanding of the performer’s 
actions. Therefore, for example, it is possible to interpret performance differences of 
parallel passages from a contextual interpretation of such passages as fulfilling different 
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functions in the whole. Secondly he speculates about the prolongational structure as being 
responsible for the organization of the piece’s segmentation (an idea that emerges more 
clearly from the GTTM notion of prolongational regions than from the Schenkerian notion 
of background as musical form generator). Thus, tying this idea with the Todd’s 
hypothesis (1985), he predicts possible ritardandi according to the hierarchy of the 
prolongational regions. In such a sense, this idea of linking an expressive effect, originally 
conceived in terms of the grouping structure, to the prolongational structure, is only 
possible if we bear in mind the GTTM notion of prolongational structure, which derives 
from splitting the composition up into discrete units (see Appendix I and Chapter 3). 
Starting off just from the idea that certain expressive deviations locally emphasize 
certain notes, Shifres and Martinez (2000b) studied the role of performance in the 
cognitive reality of the hierarchical structure. For it they began from the Serafine, 
Glassman and Overbeeke (1989) experiments (see Appendix II), taking expressive features 
as variables. They took one of the examples used in those experiments, the Bourrée from 
the J. S. Bach Suite for cello solo in C Major (bars 1-4, figure 4.2). The melody is a 
compound melody in which the rhythmic motifs belong to different voices according to 
their tessitura. Figure 4.2.b shows the voice leading reduction proposed by Serafine and her 
colleagues. They ignored the expressive component of the stimulus, and made use of 
artificial synthesis for the examples. Shifres and Martinez (2000b), on the other hand, took 
6 well known recordings of the piece (PC, PF, MG, MR, PT, YM) representing diverse 
performative traditions. From these recordings they analysed the timings of each 
performance, measuring the 22 inter-onset-intervals (IOI) in milliseconds. 
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From these they graphically displayed the respective timing profiles. Figure 4.3 
shows the graphic analysis of timing profiles. Panel a shows the average for the 6 
performances. Motifs corresponding to the inner voice tend to be played faster. Thus, 
tempo would serve to identify the motifs as part of a certain voice. Thus, slower would be 
a way to emphasize the main voice. 
Shifres and Martinez analysed differences between the performances by carrying 
out a factor analysis among the 6 performances that resulted in two Principal Components 
(Factor I and Factor II in panels b, c and d of figure 4.3). These principal components can 
be considered as abstractions of two different timing strategies. In this way they could 
identify 3 key differences between both strategies (Factor I and Factor II) that were 
denominated strategy’s properties. Property A is in bar 3’s upbeat. In this location Factor I 
emphasizes the e3-f3 relation, highlighting the e3 as upbeat of the f3. Factor II emphasizes 
the d3-f3 relation, highlighting the d3 as an upbeat of the f3. Property B is found on the 
upbeat to bar 2. Factor I emphasizes the upbeat’s c4, whereas Factor II emphasizes the b3 
of the downbeat shortening the following beat’s a3. Property C is on the final motif. Factor 
I emphasizes the last e3 before the final tonic, whereas Factor II emphasizes the d3 before 
the final tonic. This way, the melodic component of the final cadence is e3-c3 for Factor I 
and d3-c3 for Factor II. 
Figure 4.2. Bourrée from the J. S. Bach Cello Solo Suite in C Major (bars 1-4, upper 
system) and foreground reduction (lower system)according to Serafine et al (1989) 
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Finally, they analysed the individual performances, since they were more 
representative of these properties. They thereby determined that the MG performance was 
the most closely associated to Factor II. Regarding FI, analysing properties A, B and C, 
researchers observed that MR exaggerated Property A (as assigned to FI as opposed to FII 
emphasizing property A) and adjusted to FI as regards properties B and C (figure 4.3c). 
Thus, they considered MR as an exaggerated exponent of FI. Contrarily, YM, while highly 
associated to FI, adjusted to FII concerning to property A, whereas he behaved almost 
neutrally in regard to properties B and C. In this way, YM could be qualified as an FI 
exponent with a tendency to approach (exactly regarding properties A, B and C) Factor II. 
Figure 4.3. Average timing profile (panel a).Principal components timing profiles (panel 
b), MR and YM performances (Panel c) and MG performance (panel d). See explanation in 
the text. 
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Using these performances as stimuli, Shifres and Martinez carried out a listening 
test following the paradigm used by Serafine et al. (1989). In it, subjects had to judge the 
goodness of fit between the musical fragment and its voice leading reduction. For that 
objective, four reductions were composed, one Original (taken from Serafine et al. Figure 
4.2b) and 3 foils. Every foil was composed by modifying a note of the true reduction 
according to the differences observed in the properties A, B and C (figure 4.4). Therefore, 
foil A added the a3 that characterized to property A, foil B replaced the d3 by e3 in measure 
2, as it appeared in property B; and finally, foil C replaced the e3 before the final tonic with 
a d3, as it was announced by property C. 
 
Figure 4.4. Foil reductions used in the listening test (Shifres and Martínez 2000b) 
 
Subjects have to listen to the original melody performed by MG, MR and YM 
followed by two reductions, the original reduction and one of the foils. Thus, the authors 
predicted that: (i) when listening to the original/FA pair, subjects would prefer (matching 
higher) the original for MG and YM, and the FA for MR; (ii) when listening to the 
Original/FB pair, subjects would match higher Original for MG, FB for MR and an 
intermediate value for YM; and (iii) when listening to the Original/FC pair, subjects would 
prefer the original for MR and MA (less so) and the FC for MG. 
Some of Shifres and Martínez’s most important findings were that: (i) FA and FB 
tended to be judged as better reductions more for the MR pair than for the MG pair, as it 
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had been predicted. In other terms, MR’s performance is better reduced by the FA and the 
FB than by the original one. Also, FA and FB better reduced the MR performance than the 
MG one; (ii) YM did not present significant differences with MG. This revealed that 
although the YM’s performance displayed a timing profile more similar to Factor I, the 
timing similarities with FII as regard to properties A, B and C could be communicated to 
the listeners; (iii) property B is the one that adjusted most to the prediction: listeners 
preferred the original one for the MG’s performance, the FB for the MR’s one and doubted 
between both for the YM’s one; (iv) composition of the foil reductions were extremely 
important in order to appreciate the scope of the conclusions. The foil composed by 
Serafine for this melody included two different notes that were not part of the local context 
Figure 4.5. Results of the listening test. Below, each Foil Reduction. See explanation in 
the text. 
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(of the piece). Possibly, using other foils, composed utilizing notes belonging to the local 
context, the results would have been different. 
As listeners tended to match more strongly the option that displayed a more 
superficial level of reduction (FC), the authors concluded that this fact could reveal that the 
reductive process (as a cognitive process, Serafine 1988) is not automatic, but requires 
certain activation. When such activation does not take place spontaneously, the listener 
remains at a more superficial level and in that case, the role of the performance as activator 
of the reductive process would be relevant. 
As a direct antecedent of the experiments presented in this thesis (chapters V and 
VI) the work of Shifres and Martinez showed the need to reconsider the findings of the 
studies on the hearing of prolongational structures, in the light of the microstructural 
components of the performance. 
*** 
Summary. Communication in music performance has been approached by classic cognitive 
science through the generative paradigm, as it was named here. This denomination refers 
to the generative-interpretative dichotomy in the field of semiotic studies. According to 
this paradigm, the information entering the perceptual field (both for performers and 
listeners) is processed in terms of more integrated informational structures lodged in the 
mind, usually acquired by enculturation. According to different approaches, those 
structures may adopt diverse computational formats (rule systems, schemata, dynamic 
systems, probabilistic systems, etc.). The psychology of music has given rise to 
considerable evidence supporting this paradigm. It is particularly appealing because it 
allows relating the performer’s actions to the descriptions of the musical structure provided 
by music theory (as seen in chapter 2, a strong urge of the objectivist approach to 
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performance). Thus, the communication of structural attributes can be undertaken. Many 
structural attributes can be explored in such a way: metre, texture, phrasing (grouping 
structure), etc. Although pitch structure has received less attention, certain empirical 
evidence holds that performance affects the perceived distance between keys throughout a 
modulatory process. Some studies on the communication of the prolongational structure 
also account for the importance of considering the performance’s attributes (timing in 
particular). The studies presented in chapters 5 and 6 follow this line. 
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Chapter 5: First empirical approach: a performance study 
5.1 General issues  
We have seen that prolongational theories have presented a sort epistemological affinity 
with some performative problems. We have also indicated that the relation between 
musicology and psychology in the course of music performance has changed according to 
the dominant paradigms in both disciplines throughout time. As the problem of 
communication in performance has been considered here, our focus is on the question of 
whether the prolongational structure described in Schenkerian terms can, indeed, 
contribute to performance details and that being the case, whether that contribution is in 
some way communicated to the listener. 
Since the generative paradigm, as was reviewed in the previous chapter, dominates 
performance studies, in order to advance on that objective, it is necessary firstly to analyse 
the existence of some type of generative relation between musical structure and 
performance organization. The first empirical undertaking in this thesis was directed 
towards this end. In a wide sense, the aim of this exploratory study – in the epistemological 
line of Schmalfeldt (1985), Rothstein (1995) and Shaffer (1995) (who speculated about the 
interpretational consequences of the structural analysis) and methodologically following 
Cook (1987c) – is to find links between the prolongational analysis of a composition and 
the objective descriptions of a set of performances of that composition with the intention of 
enunciating them in the form of rules or grammars. As it was seen (p. 111 and ff.) 
precursor studies did not undertake the topic of performance of prolongational structure as 
form generator (as it is seen by the Schenkerian theory). Cook (1987c) studied that topic 
taking prolongational structure based on grouping structure (as in GTTM), whereas Shifres 
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and Martínez (2000) focused on textural consequences (saliences) of microtiming in 
certain notes linked to foreground reductions. 
In order to accomplish the objective in the context of a complete piece it is assumed 
that a set of microstructural performance characteristics - in particular rubato (timing) and 
dynamics, the more common microstructural characteristics shared by most means of 
performance - can be put into action by the performer with the intention of generating 
particular situations of: (i) discursive continuity; (ii) unity, cohesion and coherence 
between points far apart on the musical surface; (iii) salience of particularly hidden notes 
in the texture that could be associated to underlying linear organizations. From a 
methodological point of view, the key point consists in that these particular situations may 
find a more parsimonious explanation and foundation in the analysis of underlying voice 
leading than in any other structural surface characteristics. Thus, it is possible to enunciate 
an initial hypothesis, namely: 
“It is possible to categorize a music performance either as Prolongational or 
Non Prolongational according to how the arrangement of certain components 
of its microstructure (timing, dynamic, etc.), measured objectively, may be 
associated to explanations of the musical structure based on prolongational 
structural components or surface components of the musical piece 
respectively.” 
In such a sense we understand that a prolongational performance will involve “the 
act of (performing) a piece of music as containing a prolongation” (paraphrasing Larson 
1997; p.115). In other words, a prolongational performance is one that it is supposed to 
convey the prolongational structure of the piece. On the other hand, a non-prolongational 
performance is a performance that does not give rise to a convincing account based on the 
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prolongational analysis of the composition. In order to guarantee that the “convincing” 
judgment will not be arbitrary, both prolongational and non prolongational accounts should 
give rise to enough different microstructural configurations. In other words, the role that 
the prolongational structure may be playing in certain performances might only be 
identified in certain particular cases, in which the surface-depth relation generates 
contradictory configurations. In particular, it could be useful to explore those cases in 
which the musical surface presents discontinuities, absent in a deeper level. In that way, 
the depth may unite the composition, as Cook says “bind(ing) the sections into a coherent 
whole” (Cook, 1987a, p. 48) 
In the next chapter, a second stage of this study will be described, in which the 
interest focused on the problem of communication between performers and listeners. The 
role that Prolongational performance can play in the listener’s experience was 
investigated, as opposed to the role of a Non Prolongational one. From the perspective of 
the classical cognitive paradigm, that role could be related to the field of the 
representations that take place on the part of the listener during the musical experience. As 
will be seen when explaining the experiments, the a priori premise was to estimate that 
those representations could refer to very diverse contents: time, emotions and motion 
representations amongst others. A second hypothesis, this time related to the performer-
listener communication, was then formulated:  
“It is possible to describe either rules or principles that regulate 
communication between performer and listener, by means of which the latter is 
able to discriminate prolongational from non prolongational performances by 
making use of different types of representations.” 
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As seen in chapter 3 (pp. 77 and ff.), the theoretical bonds between music 
performance and prolongational structure would appear to take place at levels of relative 
interpretative sophistication. For that reason it is possible to hope that the aspects that are 
being investigated here arise clearly in the context of accomplished interpretations 
presenting a high degree of idiosyncratic detail and therefore originality and individuality, 
two conspicuous characteristics sought by contemporary performers (as we have seen in 
pp. 42 and ff.). In general, performances made by famous artists in recordings for 
important record companies, guarantee both that refinement and that intention of 
originality and individuality. A priori this methodology would seem to contradict the 
essence of the classical cognitive paradigm that tries to explain common behaviours more 
than particular performances. Nevertheless, it is possible to find good reasons in order to 
justify the study of highly idiosyncratic performances in the search of expressive 
characteristics that can systematically be enunciated as performative rules or grammars. 
Firstly, Repp (1992c, 1998d, 1999a, 1999b) demonstrated in a series of detailed, elegant 
and deeply aesthetic studies that it is possible to identify common features even in sets of 
deeply personal performances. This could be considered as empirical evidence on an issue 
on which both musicologists and performers have reflected since long ago: individuality in 
performance is not capricious, but emerges from the tensions among intentio operis, 
intentio auctoris, and intentio lectoris proper for any interpretative act (Eco 1990). 
Although individuality appears to see the triumph of intentio lectoris (interpreter’s 
intention), we will try to demonstrate here that its imposition is the result of the co-
performance of all those forces. From an objectivist perspective we can say that the 
balance between these forces takes place within a canon (as a set of constrains that 
regulates the performance activity; see description in chapter 2, p. 23-24). The allegiance 
to the canon appears to be the fact that allows valuing a performance as idiosyncratic but 
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admissible. Nevertheless, from chapter 7 we will propose an alternative interpretation for 
the way in which those forces interact in current performance. 
An epistemic community – understood as a group of people who share norms, 
epistemological, methodological and ethical values, metaphysical assumptions, etc., which 
constitute conditions of possibility for both knowledge and experience (Martínez 2002) – 
constructs its own concept of acceptable interpretations in a social way. The record 
industry (including the good name that artists build thorough their career in a given 
musical circle), is used here, from this perspective, as a measure of reliability of both 
individual and acceptable quality of each performance. 
However, it entailed a series of methodological difficulties. The first is related to 
the lack of certainty of the intentio lectoris (the performer’s intention). Due to working 
with commercially recorded versions we could not operate on this variable. We could only 
hypothesize about that intention. Undoubtedly, this limitation weakens the evidence’s 
strength. Two reasons moved us to work in that way. Firstly, the method shows important 
advantages related to gaining better ecological conditions. Thus, we had the opportunity to 
examine extremely high level performances. These kinds of performances insert the 
problem of individuality and originality, beyond the standard expressive attributes. This 
will be a crucial point in our final discussion (chapter 11) concerning creativity in the act 
of sophisticated performance. Secondly, although the problem of the sender’s intention 
seems to be a central issue for classical communication approaches, these approaches are 
being nowadays criticized in the light of new psychological, semiotic and social 
perspectives. Related to this, musicology has provided an important contribution from its 
discussion about musical analysis and the composer’s intention. Dunsby (1995) wrote: 
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“In my experience of taking bright students through their music analysis 
classes (…) I have been confronted countless times by one question: ‘Did the 
composer know about this?’ It takes a long time to put all the facts in a 
particular case that may persuade the student both that the composer did not 
know, and, however, that this is not relevant, that what matters is that we 
ourselves know” (p. 49). 
Why do we have to think that performers are always conscious of what they are, in 
fact, communicating? Communication, as is approached by cognitive science, is not 
thought without considering the (in general, conscious) intention of what is communicated. 
For this reason, in these experiments we will be extremely careful about attributing an 
intention behind a set of performance features. We will talk about association between a 
set of performance features and a set of structural, analytical accounts. In chapters 8, 10 
and 11 we will discuss other psychological perspectives that understand communication 
beyond the sender’s intention. 
5.2 Aims 
This performance study had a double objective: (i) to verify the first hypothesis (see p. 120 
above); and (ii) to analyse bonds between the prolongational structure of the musical piece 
and the performance’s microstructural characteristics, enunciating them in generative 
terms. Also, the attainment of these objectives will allow locating the performances 
susceptible to be understood as prolongational and non prolongational, in order to serve as 
stimuli in the listening experiments described in the next chapter. 
5.3 Method 
In order to hypothesize whether a performance can be considered as Prolongational or 
Non-Prolongational, it should be necessary to work with a piece that can hold the 
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possibility of different convincing performances. In addition those performances should be 
different enough and it should be reasonably feasible to attribute those differences to either 
some surface components, or the prolongational component. In other words, the piece 
should bring up a performance dilemma, forcing the performers to take strong performance 
decisions. The underlying assumption is that if the performer takes a given interpretative 
decision (X) it is revealing that he or she is favouring a Prolongational Performance, 
whereas if he or she takes another decision (Y), he or she is favouring a Non-
prolongational Performance of the piece. 
At the same time, it was possible to hope that these performer’s interventions were 
tied to refining performance aspects such as the issues of continuity and unity (p.78). 
5.3.1 The piece 
The selected piece was Chopin’s Piano Prelude Op 28 No 6 in B minor. Its place in the 
piano repertoire shows some advantages for this study. Firstly, the analysis of the sound 
signal is simpler because of the clearness of the piano onset. In that way onsets can be 
clearly observed on the graph displayed by the computer, which is, as we will see, the 
starting point for the micro structural analysis. Moreover, the piano repertoire requires a 
single performer, thus it is restricting interpretative tensions without diminishing its 
structural complexity, which give account of the co-occurrence of harmonic, contrapuntal, 
textural, melodic components, among others. Romantic short pieces have a noticeable 
advantage: they cover a limited time span conserving all of the particular features of a 
complete, more extended work. Thus it is possible to study in a range of a few seconds 
both every part and the whole. In addition the selected piece is well known enough, so it 
gave rise to numerous interpretations both in analytical and performative ways. However, 
it does not belong to the most famous group of this kind of pieces. In that way it is possible 
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that many listeners do not know it (or at least they are not able to identify it), permitting 
naive listening studies. Furthermore, this piece has not been the object of stylised versions, 
Figure 5.1 Chopin Prelude Op 28 N06 in B minor 
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pop versions, etc. (as Preludes Op. 28 N° 4 and 20, were) which can interfere in the studies 
to be done. 
More importantly, the piece accepts multiple readings, which can refer to typical 
surface features or particularities of its prolongational structure. Figure 5.1 shows the score 
of the Prelude. 
According to Charles Burkhart (1973) this piece constitutes a very strange case in 
the piano repertoire in that the main melody falls mainly to the left hand, in the low 
register. The lower voice represents one polyphonic melodic line. Thus, the 
accompaniment, realized by the right hand, does not play the bass voice (which habitually 
falls to that component of the texture). As a result of this, the voices that from the 
Schenkerian perspective are considered fundamental (bass and soprano) are both in a 
lower register than the accompaniment itself. From the compositional point of view this 
constitutes a challenge: “... the composer must give the impression that the hands’ roles 
have been exchanged, but achieve this impression within a tonal system whose outer-voice 
functions cannot actually be exchanged.” (Burkhart 1973; p.80) 
The key of B minor is installed early in the prelude with the descent d 4- c#4 - b3 at 
bar 11. This is one of the most interesting traits of the piece and one that also inaugurates 
the ambiguity between the surface and voice leading components: “I do not denigrate the 
(...) sixteenth notes of the first beat – on the contrary, I find this upward arpeggiation on a 
strong beat to a climax on a weak a most striking motivic idea – but pass over them 
because of their minimal voice leading role.” (Burkhart 1973; p. 80). This ambiguity has to 
do then with the down or up-beat character of the beginning. The attention to the 
component of voice leading is associated with an interpretation of this melodic gesture as 
                                                 
1 Registral designation system, see footnote on page 54. 
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down-beat, while the attention to the split of the melody at the surface level ties it to an up-
beat gesture. 
From the Schenkerian perspective the most important characteristic of the piece 
involves the composition as a whole. It is possible to assign the prelude to the category of 
interrupted form. The interrupted form 
“(i)llustrates a harmonic and melodic process that begins from  over I and 
continues to  over V, where the tonal motion ceases. At this point the 
processes are interrupted, resulting in a divided structure. Immediately, 
thereafter, the same motions begin again and this time achieve the goal,  over 
I, that was expected but denied in the first motion. 
“It is important to stress that the sense of completion is fulfilled only after the 
structure begins again, that is, after the second phrase retraces its path from  
over I, moves through  over V, and this time attains the  over I that is the 
goal of an Urlinie and bass arpeggiation. In short, the second part of an 
interrupted structure resolves the tensions created by the interruption of the 
first part. 
This procedure, called interruption, plays a significant role in shaping tonal 
structures, and appears in different guises and over various spans of music.” 
(Cadwallader and Gagné 1998; p. 167) 
This is a structural descending line – a linear progression - from the initial d4 – 
which is prolonged thorough the first eight bars and a transfer of register in order to 
achieve the c#4 of bar 8 (figure 5.2 shows Burkhart’s voice leading graphic analysis). This 
linear progression is supported by the structural harmony I – (I 6) - V (5/3). A neighbour note 
e (with a melodic roundabout f4#- g4 - e4#-) at a deeper level constitutes the structural 
129 
framework, which shapes the prolongation. The neighbour note will appear thorough the 
complete piece exhibiting thematic implications. In this way, we have two important 
thematic elements operating at different levels (both at the surface and at deeper levels): (i) 
the descending third; and (ii) the neighbouring tone– which often appears as an incomplete 
neighbouring tone. Thus, both motivic elements can be considered as inter and intra level 
cohesion factors. In addition, the neighbouring tone organizes the linear unfolding of every 
level of the texture (for example, note the melodic contour of the accompaniment voices 
played by the right hand from bar 15). The transfer of register emphasizes the particular 
status of the e5 of bar 7 as a neighbouring tone. This e5 is listened to as being supported by 
a c4, which comes from a voice interchange at bars 6 and 7 (through which the transfer of 
register is done). This inner voice note, c4, progresses to b3, giving rise to a parallel motion 
with the upper voice (e5-d5). This parallelism highlights the first two thirds of a hemiola 
between bars 7 and 8 (see figure 5.3). Meanwhile, the bass, which had shown such an 
extended prolongation of the b2 (as the root of I), progresses to the d3 before the final f3, at 
bar 8 (as the root of V, completing the arpeggiation of the tonic triad). Briefly, the 
Figure 5.2. Voice leading graphic analysis of the Chopin’s Prelude in B minor. (from 
Burkhart 1973, p. 86) 
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prolongation of initial /I is achieved through a neighbouring tone d–e–d, which is 
partially supported by the arpeggiation of the b minor triad (b–d in the bass) and partially 
held up by a parallel progression of an inner voice (c – along with which the e5 of the 
upper voice is simultaneously heard – b). 
Another point arises here from extreme ambiguity: the attention to the underlying 
voice leading approach will lead us to the interruption after the second beat, when the 
upper voice reaches . Thus, the last two quavers of bar 8 (d3- c#3) would therefore not be 
interpreted as an echo of the d5- c#5 of the two previous quavers (in octaves with d4- c#4), 
but as an anticipation (upbeat) of the following motif at bar 9 re-exposing the earlier d4- 
c#4- b4. The cut point between both units, the upbeat character of the two final quavers of 
bar 8 as falling towards the first beat of bar 9 (downbeat), appear as key aspects associated 
Figure 5.3. Foreground motivic analysis of the Chopin’s Prelude in B minor. (from 
Burkhart 1973, p. 83) 
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to an underlying voice leading interpretation rather than to a surface interpretation. 
Figure 5.3 shows a foreground reduction of the complete piece. Here it is possible 
to see that at this level a series of hemiolas arise as characteristic features that mark the 
boundaries of the interrupted structure. These mark the end of sections at bar 8 (hemiola 
between 7 and 8), at bar 18 (hemiola between 16 and 17) and at bar 22 (hemiola between 
bars 20 and 21) as a repetition of the previous one. Curiously, this metrical phenomenon 
(that, according to its metrical character, does not usually appear tied to the underlying 
voice leading) becomes explicit at the foreground reductional level. Nevertheless, it is 
important to indicate that the hemiola of bar 8 can be considered more structural since it 
directly jeopardizes notes of the upper voice, whereas those of bars 16 and 20 are formed 
according to the inner voices (where the upper voice follows the configuration of the 
thematic motif). 
As a particularly noticeable feature of this voice leading setting, the structural 
neighbouring tone, at the background level, appears much more emphasized in the second 
branch of the interruption. In the first place, the melodic neighbouring tone e4 is held up 
here by a passing note, natural c2, a tone that falls outside of the B minor diatonic frame. 
This natural c2 does not become a c# until bar 15. Besides, the voices interchange in the 
first branch of the interruption (bars 6 and 7) occurred between an inner voice and the 
upper one, whereas now it is happening between two main voices. In that way, the 
neighbouring tone e4 changes to the lower register, increasing its thematic and harmonic 
importance: it becomes the subdominant of the progression. 
Curiously, at bar 21, a new interruption seems to happen: a similar harmonic 
progression I 6 I 6/4 V 5/3 is supporting a linear progression d4-c4. This kind of structure 
takes place when the first branch of the interruption is literally repeated, but is extremely 
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improbable in a case like this, where the linear progression was sophisticatedly elaborated. 
A more detailed analysis shows us that it is rather a quasi interruption: on this point it is 
feasible to expect the  (b3) on the final I (in root position). However, on the I (in root 
position) the d4 reappears giving rise to an illusory new interruption. In fact, it is not an 
interruption, because what follows does not represent a new branch (that is, /I- /V- /I). 
Simply, the final b4 ( /I) is delayed, finally occurring at bar 24. The main thematic motif – 
which in fact consists of a descending d-c#-b, as mirroring the deeper structure on the 
surface level – is, in addition, repeated in the original register. This time, the starting motif 
functions as a conclusion. Will the Prelude start again? The prolonged tonic harmony, 
manifested in a stabilized chord, and diminution of rhythmical activity are indicating that 
that new reprise was an illusion. Thus, we can conclude that the Prelude is formally 
articulated into two parts, exposing the interruption at bar 8. This reading of the prelude is 
compatible with the idea of underlying phrase schema (Lerdahl 1991). Due to the 
underlying phrase schema being, in this case, founded just on the voice leading, we 
consider it valid to say that our proposal of articulation for this piece is based on the 
analysis of the prolongational structure in terms of the underlying voice leading. 
A pianist who is sensitive to this interpretation, will intend to point out the 
articulation of bar 8 as clearly as possible. In order to do this, he or she will differentiate it 
from other less important events in terms of hierarchical structure. At the same time, he or 
she will instigate a similar action on the downbeat of bar 22, but will immediately have to 
make his or her real intention clear: this action is not a definitive one. The progression d4-
c#4-b3 is finally completed there, therefore the piece is finishing. 
As it can be appreciated, this Prelude shows such complexity and a plan of 
ambiguities, that it is sensible to think of the possibility of multiple readings. In fact, our 
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reading of the voice leading structure presents many ingredients that are far from the 
normative principles of the theory. As Burkhart (1973) himself admits, the piece shows a 
strange case of textural setting, among other irregularities. The same element, on which the 
coherence of the voice leading interpretation is based, the neighbouring tone, invites 
another reading of the piece. This reading is based on surface features, which also present 
multiple ambiguities requiring some committed interventions on the performer’s part. 
From this angle the completed composition may be thought of as an extended harmonic 
neighbouring tone B (minor) - C (major) – B (minor). Instead of voice leading concerns, 
here a particular surface feature supports this: 
“As the Prelude opens, the left-hand melody sweeps up through arpeggiation 
sixteenth notes to hove on D, drawn out by its lower neighbour in languorous 
quarter-dotted eight-sixteenth. A lingering three eighth-note fall though the 
same arpeggio closes in sedate steps. The sheer registral span makes an arch 
of the melody’s contour; and the progressive lengthening of sweep, hover and 
lingering fall make it graceful. Dynamics, too, swell and shrink as the line rises 
and falls.” (Guck 1991; p. 4)  
Thus, the prelude can be seen as a concatenation of arcs, each of them having 
different paths but similar shapes. Each arc has a vertex in the upper tone of the lower 
melody (i.e. d4 at bar 1; f#4 at bar  3, and so on). From this perspective, the first semiquaver 
(i.e. b2 at bar 1 and 3, g2 at bar 5, and so on) is less important than for the previous 
approach. The arches are chronologically ordered according to an increasing tension in 
order to achieve a culminating point on the g4, the vertex of the third arch, at bar 5. Thus, 
this g4 is understood as a goal of a broader movement. Note that this emphasized g4, here a 
goal of a long distance structural direction, has markedly less importance according to the 
134 
voice leading approach. Besides, this perspective points out the harmonic progression I-VI, 
which highlights the passing from minor to major mode –another feature that remains 
relatively hidden in the previous analysis. This approach leads to us to re-signify the 
neighbouring tones, as they were described in the voice leading analysis. In that analysis, 
neighbouring tones were described as part of deeper structural levels, but according to this 
new analysis, they can be considered as associated to certain superficial phenomena. For 
example, the Neapolitan II (at bar 12 and following) is unfolded on a noticeable register 
expansion, which is associated, at the surface level, with an accelerating succession of 
events: a repetition of the ascending arpeggio earlier than is expected. That is, the 
ascending arpeggio used to appear every two bars, but at bar 13 it appears every other 
quarter note. This acceleration gives rise to a hemiola. But this hemiola is not present at the 
analysis of the voice leading and the deeper components (see figures 5.2 and 5.3). On the 
contrary, it is a surface phenomenon. However, as metrical irregularity, the hemiola is 
contributing to a different way to articulate the musical form. Notice that, in this way, the 
piece exhibits at least four hemiolas, but they are located at different structural levels. The 
deepest is the one at bars 7-8. Then, superficially, come bars 16-17 and 20-21. And, 
finally, at the surface level is the hemiola of bars 13-14. 
Regarding bars 13-14, probably, the double expansion – involving both register and 
rhythm – has been considered the foundation for writing down a f (dynamic indication), as 
it is given in many scores by well known editors (However notice that Henle Urtext 
edition, from which figure 5.1 was taken shows only one dynamic direction, a pp at the last 
bar.) If these surface phenomena regulate the use of expressive attributes, and if the chain 
of arcs reaches a culminating point from which its decrease starts, then activity at bars 13 
and 14 (or more extensively from bar 11 to 15) will deserve to be highlighted beyond 
whatever the formal articulation is. Moreover, it is pertinent to remember that this climax 
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(the passing from bar 13 to 14) is exactly the middle point, which divides the piece into to 
two equal parts (concerning length). The new presentation of the thematic material –at a 
lower register-, and its subsequent repetition and development are emphasizing the idea of 
a different content that is starting and that, subsequently, it is necessary to focus on this 
point. A pianist who is sensitive to this view will intend to clearly highlight bars 13-14, 
carrying out adequate actions in order to notify the listener about the increment of activity 
at this point. In this case, his or her actions will be more prominent than those he or she 
could do at bar 8. 
Also from a surface perspective it is possible to understand bars 22 and following 
as a Coda, which resembles the main thematic material of the piece. At this point we can 
locate another interpretative puzzle due to the structural importance of this passage: it 
concludes the harmonic progression towards the I degree but it is still holding a 
prolongation of d4. The ending character of the passage becomes ambiguous when the 
thematic material starts again at the following bar. This ambiguity is the root of the 
interpretative difficulty. Expression of this passage may contribute to clarify the 
interpretation. The performer may choose an intervention between playing the fragment 
either as a coda – that is, as a discretionary segment, which can be separated from the 
structural body of the piece - preceding it with actions that accentuate the b1 at bar 22 as a 
structural ending, or as a delay of the structural  completing the fundamental progression 
d4-c#4-b3. In this case the performer may introduce a change of either timing or dynamics 
(for instance, a stressed ritenuto during the quavers of bar 22.) 
We can say that the first reading leads us to a Prolongational Performance and the 
second one proposes a Non-prolongational Performance. This qualification categorizes the 
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performance as emphasizing either surface or prolongational structural features – “as 
containing or not containing a prolongation”. 
Furthermore, there are other structural problems that whichever the point of view, 
no performer should ignore. The most noticeable has to do with elisions produced between 
every two bar phrase, involving the last note of the previous phrase and the first note of the 
following phrase (cf. the b2 in the lowest register, bar 3). In that way, these elisions are 
generating functional ambiguity on theses notes, which are functioning both as ending and 
beginning. Although this dilemma is clearly a surface one, a prolongational performance 
also should have to solve it. This is a performance problem that no performer should 
ignore. 
5.3.2 The performances 
10 commercial recordings of the Prelude were taken, ranging over an extended period 
from 1934 to 1994. In that way, the sample involves performances of different periods, 
which represent different performative styles. These pianists are also well known as 
idiosyncratic performers. This aspect may be related to the singularity of their 
interpretative styles. They also exemplify different nationalities, ages, and backgrounds. 
Nevertheless, since this is a relatively small sample, this data could not be taken into 
account. Three of the performances were by Alfred Cortot (AC) who recorded the prelude 
several times throughout 20 years. This data allowed us to run an intra subject comparison. 
The complete list of performances is shown in table 5.1 (See examples 6-15 in disc). 
5.3.3 Apparatus and procedure 
Analysis of the ten performances was run using sound editing software (Soundforge 4.5) 
that allows visualizing the wave envelope. In that way, it is possible to identify the onset of 
every note very precisely in a range of milliseconds. However, an analysis-by-listening 
137 
complemented the visual procedure, increasing the reliability of the measures taken. Since 
a basic pulse of quavers is rendered through the entire piece, this value was considered as 
the unit for measurements, without including semiquavers onsets. Because this procedure 
does not allow measuring chord asynchrony properly, when more than one note was 
sounding simultaneously, the set was taken as a block. However, when asynchrony was 
well noticeable, the highest note’s onset was considered as the reference. These 
measurements give rise to establish Inter Onset Intervals (IOI). These were normalized and 
presented in a graphic way, where the horizontal axis represents time and the vertical the 
amount of deviation from the nominal value, according to which all the quavers (IOI) 
should show the same length. Therefore, values below zero show quavers shorter than that 
standard. This procedure displays a timing profile for each performance. 
Analogously, data related to dynamics were obtained and analysed according to the 
software resources. This software calculates the peak of loudness in a given IOI. This 
measurement is considered faithful enough concerning levels of general loudness in the 
case of the piano, due to its particularly percussive attack. It is important to make clear that 
this procedure does not allow discriminating the relative loudness of every note in a chord. 
On the contrary, it only reveals the loudness of the chord as a block, as a whole. However, 
Repp (1999a, appendix) demonstrated that, in some textures, such as melody with 
accompaniment, sonority of the block is highly representative of the main melody’s 
sonority. In spite of this, measurements concerning dynamics are more uncertain than 
timing data (Repp, personal communication). For this reason, dynamics information is 
discussed only as additional data. 
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5.4 Results 
First of all a global description of the analysis of the 10 performances will be presented. As 
this analysis lead to the selection of two performances, which constituted the musical 
material of the listening experiments (chapter 6), these selected performances will be soon 
described in particular. 
5.4.1 The average performance 
The arithmetic mean of all profiles represents a sort of average performance. This 
performance is particularly interesting because, while it can be considered natural and 
expressive, it can be estimated as a standard, not particularly idiosyncratic (Repp 1998c, d). 
If we examine a given individual performance, which is very similar to the mean, we can 
say that this is a relatively standard performance. Contrarily, if a performance is relatively 
far from the mean, it can be considered a more personal or original performance. 
(Remember the assumption that in this sample all the performances are acceptable). 
Figure 5.4 shows the average performance profiles. At a first glance two 
remarkable dynamic patterns are observed (squared brackets): (i) a dynamic pattern that 
indicates the foreground linear progression (d1- c#1- b1); and (ii) an increasing dynamic 
pattern from the third quaver of bar 2 that can be extended until the Kopftone, early in the 
following bar (this pattern is repeated with the following motif). 
Therefore, from the dynamic perspective, a strong tendency is observed to indicate 
the arcs mentioned in the above analysis. However, it is worth noticing that the dynamic 
arc does not correspond with the melodic arc. The rounded-point arcs in the graph 
correspond to both kind of arcs and it is clear that they are shifted. 
As far as the global dynamics of the piece it is possible to affirm that it is also 
compatible with that analysis since it presents two main peaks, one on the g4 at bar 5 (a 
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directional goal) and the second on the e4 of bar 13. On the other hand dynamic troughs 
seem to coincide with articulation points of the musical form at bars 8 and 18 (equidistant 
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Figure 5.4. Timing (full line) and dynamics (dotted line) of the average performance.
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correspond to different hierarchical levels, since the one at bar 8 represents an articulation 
point that appears in the background (the interruption itself of the interrupted form) and 
the one at bar 18 appears in the foreground (see figure 5.3). Thus, the dynamics of the 
average performance are reflecting the non prolongational interpretation, containing a 
great arc with its vertex at bar 13. 
Timing, in turn, seems to be more according to the interrupted form demarcation. 
The black full line of figure 5.4 outlines a noticeable ritardando towards the end of bar 8 
and another towards the end of bar 21 (and beginning of 22), indicating clearly the 
articulation of the two branches of the interrupted form. When observing the timing profile 
in detail it is more possible to identify some interesting issues. For example, a noticeable 
lengthening of the first note of the semiquaver ascent (odd bars) is clearly displayed 
indicating that the first note of the bar is more emphasized than the d4. In the even bars, on 
the contrary, the first note of the bar (longer) tends to be shortened. In this way an arc of 
the timing profile is settled by adjusting to the inversion of the melodic arc (see the 
arrowed arch). Nevertheless, the form of this inverted arc is not faithfully maintained 
throughout the successive arcs, and the unit of the timing pattern ends up being a single 
bar. For example, if we compare the timing of bars 1, 3, 9, 11 and 23 (presenting the same 
melodic motif) it is possible to appreciate a highly consistent behaviour across them. 
Figure 5.5 shows the detail of those five bars and the high level of association between 
them, through the correlations that are exhibited in the accompanying table. Interestingly, 
the timing of bar 11, where the motif preparing the modulation to C major and the great 
amplitude of the global arc appears, is the one that differentiates itself the most from the 
rest of the set (probably indicating that “something different is coming”). Anyway it is 
important to emphasize the fact that the timing pattern agrees with six-quaver units (1 bar). 
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On the contrary, by the configuration of timing patterns that include 4 quavers, a 
clear systematic conduct in the expressive treatment of the hemiolas is observed, that 
according to Burckhart (1973) is identified in the foreground voice leading description (see 
figure 5.3: bars 7-8; 16-17 and 20-21). The hemiola is a rhythmic resource that consists of 
replacing two notes by three occupying the same time span. In this particular case, the 
metre change is achieved by the replacement of two dotted half notes (each one 
representing one bar) by three half notes. This way, the hemiola can be understood as the 
reinterpretation of two ¾ bars as one 3/2 bar. The hemiola is a highly used metrical 
resource, particularly appreciated in ternary metre dances, related to key points for the 
musical form articulation. It works like a sort of natural retention of motion (ritenuto) at 
the moment of the harmonic cadence that closes the section. It is clearly a resource of form 
articulation, a kind of punctuation sign. For this reason it is possible to say that, in general, 


















*  p < 0,05 (bilateral). 
**  p < 0,01 (bilateral). 
 
 M 3 M 9 M 11 M 23 
M 1 .847(*) .965(**) .782 .921(**) 
M 3 .946(**) .775 .937(**) 
M 9 .766 .980(**) 
M 11  .718 
Figure 5.5 Detail of the timing profile of the Average Performance - bars 1, 3, 9, 
11 and 23. Correlation matrix between the six quaver timing patterns 
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to make the hemiola explicit is to reinforce the articulation. With respect to this, then, in 
the analysis of timing, the aspect to consider is whether the organization of the patterns of 
timing accompany this internal redistribution of both bars exhibiting a certain pattern 
whose logic adjusts more to the half notes (4 quavers) than to the dotted half note (6 
quavers). In regard to this, the timing of each set of four quavers (a half note) was 
analysed, 3 of them for each foreground hemiola (9 half notes altogether). A factor analysis 
(see below for an explanation of the use of factor analysis as a tool to identify common 
patterns among the timing profiles) of the nine rhythm groups was run. This analysis 
displayed two principal components. Each principal component or factor can be seen as a 
typified timing behaviour. In other words, the analysis allowed the identification of two 
different timing profiles for the 4 quaver groups that integrate the three analysed hemiolas. 
The left upper panel in figure 5.6 shows the profile of those two factors. Basically both 
consist of a parabola; the difference resides in the fact that either the first or the fourth note 
of the pattern is lengthened the most. However, in both cases the fact that the parabola 
embraces each pattern including the four quavers remains clear. The rest of the panels of 
figure 5.6 show the three foreground hemiolas indicating (with red or green lines) the 
pattern type (factor) that corresponds to each group, according to the values of correlation 
that each group showed with the results of the factor analysis rotated (see the complete 
explanation below, p.150). It is observed that almost all the 4 quaver groups fit the 
parabola described by factor 1, namely: Y = x2 .7245 + x (- 3.2166) + 2.6079. In such 
sense, the third half note of the hemiola of bars 7-8, is the only one that identifies with 
factor 2 (a parabola described by the formula Y = x2 .4744 + x (- 2.9892) + 3.9147) 
showing a correlation coefficient =.998. This difference in bar 8 may be interpreted as a 
break in the timing pattern when interpreting the two last notes of the bar as upbeats of the 
following bar. Thus, the d5 (of the structural progression /I) is substantially lengthened. 
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Nevertheless the d3 of the left hand appears not like an echo of the previous motif but like a 
part of what is going to come. In short, it is possible to affirm that the analysed bars 
roughly display an organization corresponding to four quavers, characterized by its 
correspondence with a parabola. This way, each hemiola is roughly in basic terms 
represented by three parabolas. 
Dynamics does not seem to accompany those points so systematically. However, in 
the surface hemiola of bars 13 and 14 one can observe in the use of the dynamics the two 
patterns that form an inverted U for the two first half notes (the ample arpeggios of C 
major) becoming blurred in the third half note - showing a marked diminuendo. In this 
way, this hemiola appears as indicated by dynamic arcs in the form of an inverted U (for 
the two first 4 quaver groups). On the contrary, concerning timing, this hemiola is not 
identified with an only systematic timing pattern. 
Figure 5.6 Factor Analysis of the timing profiles at the foreground hemiolas (bars 7-8, 16-
17 and 20-21). Extracted Principal Component graphs and their association with the 
analysed timing pattern (see explanation in the text) 
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From the average performance analysis a question inevitably arises: to what extent 
can this virtual execution be considered as representative of the several performances 
integrating the analysed selection? In other terms, to what extent does this analysis allow to 
make inferences about the individual expressive strategies of the different artists? With the 
intention of studying the representative quality of the average performance the association 
(correlation) between each individual profile (corresponding to each of the 10 
performances) and the average timing profile was analysed. 
Table 5.1 shows correlation coefficients between every individual performance and 
the means of the timing and dynamics profiles. For the timing profiles the closest 
performance to the mean was Maurizio Pollini’s performance. Curiously, the same 
performance was almost the closest to the mean concerning the dynamics profiles. In that 
way, we can see this performance as the most typical. Consequently, the analysis of this 
performance would provide some evidence concerning the relation between average 
tendencies and idiosyncratic expressive resources. 
Artist and year of recording Correlation with ...... 
Timing Mean Dynamics Mean 
Alfred Cortot (1934) .804 .852 
Alfred Cortot (1945) .750 .897 
Alfred Cortot (1954) .820 .892 
Andrea Lucchesini (1988) .746 .795 
Cyprien Katsaris (1993) .791 .860 
Martha Argerich (1977) .768 .894 
María João Pirés (1994) .821 .859 
Mauricio Pollini (1975) .909 .907 
Vladimir Ashkenazy (1979) .730 .910 
Vladimir Horowitz (1964) .783 .797 
Table 5.1. Correlation coefficients of every performance with the 
average values. 
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5.4.2 The Maurizio Pollini performance 
In figure 5.7 the timing and dynamics profiles of the Maurizio Pollini (1975) performance 
can be seen. Initially one can appreciate that, although it is the most similar to the average, 
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at least as regards dynamics, this performance shows itself as much less systematic. In 
other words, it seems to be that the dynamic strategy of this interpretation does not always 
maintain an obvious contingency with associable structural characteristics. For example, 
the dynamic profile of the linear progression d4- c#4- b3 is maintained only in its first 
appearance and then it becomes blurred from bar 3 (still more blurred at bar 5). Dynamics 
seem to be more at the service of global rather than local aspects. For example, it seems: (i) 
to indicate a global arc with a peak towards bar 13 (a smaller arc is also observed including 
the first 8 bars); (ii) to indicate the surface hemiola of 13-14 (notice the consistency in the 
use of dynamics between the first arpeggio in C Major – bar 13 - and its reiteration – bar 
13-14); (iii) to indicate the reiteration of the bar 15-18 phrase in 19-22; it is remarkable 
how the reiteration of the phrase is played much more piano in general, a resource that is 
indicated by the composer in other preludes of the series (for example prelude N° 20 in C 
minor), but not here. Nevertheless, beyond these very general considerations, there seems 
to be no correspondence between dynamic details and structural traits. 
With respect to timing, some characteristics conserve a systematic quality whereas 
others become considerably blurred: 
(i) The feature that seems to conserve a systematic treatment of its timing patterns 
the most is the arpeggio motif in quavers (see crochets) followed by a quarter note and a 
dotted quaver and semiquaver group. This motif appears 5 times in this way (bars 1, 3, 9, 
11, 22), another three times only the semiquaver arpeggio appears but the motif is not 
completed in the same way (bars 5, 13 and 13-14). Figure 5.8 shows the deviation curve of 
each quaver corresponding to the five complete repetitions of the motif and the matrix of 
correlations among the series of timing deviations; 
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(ii) The different treatment of the foreground hemiolas. Similarly with the average 
performance the three foreground hemiolas were analysed (bars 7-8; 16-17 and 20-21) by 
means of a factor analysis. This displayed two principal components. Thus, it was possible 
to identify two different ways of approaching the performance of the 4 quaver groups as 
regards timing. The upper left panel of figure 5.9 shows the profile of these two factors. 
Again, both factors consist here of a parabola, with similar characteristics to that seen for 
the average performance. In both cases it is clear that the parabola completes a pattern 
including 4 quavers. The rest of the panels of figure 5.9 show the three foreground 
hemiolas indicating (in full or dotted line) the pattern type (factor) that corresponds to each 
group (in agreement with the correlation values that each group showed with the results of 
the rotated factorial analysis). Thus, the third half note of the 7-8 bar hemiola, whose 



















 m. 3 m. 9 m. 11 m. 23 
m. 1 .982 (**) .983 (**) .786 .953 (**) 
m. 3  .981 (**) .825 (*) .975 (**) 
m. 9   .780 .951 (**) 
m. 11    .777 
*   p < 0.05 (bilateral) 
** p < 0.01  (bilateral) 
Figure 5.8. Timing profiles detail of the Pollini (1975) performance (m. 1, 3, 9, 11 and 
23). Correlation matrix between timing profiles of six eighth note patterns (below)
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factors (.760 with factor 1 and .643 with factor 2). In opposition to this, figure 5.7 shows 
that the surface hemiola at bars 13-14 (highlighted in arrowed crochets) does not establish 
any systematic timing pattern. It is possible to appreciate that whereas the two first half 
notes begin with lengthenings, the third one finalizes with a lengthening. There is no 
timing gesture reinforcing the 3 half note structure (instigated in the first two only by the 
dynamics); 
(iii) In spite of the observed 4 quaver patterns, a 6 quaver pattern also emerges 
Figure 5.9 Factor Analysis of timing profiles of the foreground hemiolas (bars 7-8, 16-
17 and 20-21) of Maurizio Pollini’s performance. Extracted Principal Components 














reiterating the b surface motif (see curly brackets in figure 5.7). The ambiguity of the 
passage stands out, therefore. It is possible to say that in this passage Pollini is exposing 
this ambiguity between the musical surface and the underlying structure by moving himself 
ambiguously according to both structures. 
From this analysis it is possible to infer that Maurizio Pollini’s performance 
captures some characteristics related to the interpretation of the composition in voice 
leading terms. In particular the articulation of bar 8 and the noteworthy timing of the 
hemiola passages affirm this idea. Nevertheless, other characteristics of the performance, 
for example the ritardando at the end of bar 13, allow linking it with the surface (non 
prolongational) interpretation. One has said repeatedly that the average performance 
manages to capture characteristics of the different performances. The data collected here, 
showing high correlations between the individual performances and the average one, seem 
to confirm it. Nevertheless, at the time of analysing those characteristics that define the 
performances and associate them to those structural issues that make the work problematic 
as an interpretative artistic object, it seems that these connections become blurred. It is 
possible to think, after that, that other performances existing as more extraordinary may 
therefore be more receptive of the contradictory interpretations proposed in the earlier 
analyses. 
With the intention of advancing in the study of the relation between the 
performance particularities and the composition’s structural components, some possible 
weaknesses of the analysis of the average performance were examined more deeply. The 
subsequent study advanced in two directions: (i) the search of more defined differences 
and similarities between the performances, for which a principal components factor 
analysis was run; (ii) the study of the relation between the most idiosyncratic behaviours of 
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the performers and the piece’s interpretative challenges for which problematic passages 
were identified along the entire piece. 
5.4.3 Factor analysis2 
In order to identify commonalities and differences among the performances, a principal 
component factor analysis was run. This procedure examines the individual profiles of 
every performance (ten, in this case), uses correlational analysis to determine how some of 
them share certain characteristics, and turns those into a smaller number of “virtual” 
profiles. These ‘virtual profiles’ are the principal components or factors. The procedure 
also gives a measurement of association between each of the individual profiles and the 
obtained factors – the profile’s loading. In that way, it is possible to evaluate to what extent 
each profile is representative of each factor. Thus, each of the factors may be considered as 
a performance strategy. If all of the profiles were highly similar, then it would be expected 
that the analysis only give one significant factor, indicating that the percentage 
unexplained by this factor is insufficient to constitute itself as a second factor. On the 
contrary, if strategies used by the different artists are dissimilar, more significant factors 
will arise. In this case, applying a Varimax Rotation is convenient. This procedure 
facilitates the interpretation of the factors and modifies the original factors in such a way 
that more individual profiles will be fitted to a given factor and less individual cases will 
be associated to two factors (for an inclusive discussion and foundation of this method 
applied to the analysis of differences and commonalities in performance, see Repp 1992c). 
The first interesting finding emerging from the factor analysis is that the study of 
dynamics profiles displayed only one principal component. This means that every dynamic 
                                                 
2 Although Factor Analysis, as an analysis (statistical) tool has been already utilized in previous pages, a 
more extensive explanation is presented in this section in order to better understand why each extracted 
component can became into an analysis unity. 
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strategy is identified to each other in a very similar way, in such a way that it is not 
possible to join them together into groups of performances sharing interpretative dynamic 
strategies. This way, the average performance analysis is the best representation of the 
dynamic commonalities. 
Concerning timing, the factor analysis of the profiles yielded two principal 
components, which together explain 75.86% of the variance. Table 5.2 shows the most 
associated relations between each profile and the principal component (indicating the 
highest loading for each profile). The most interesting result arises as a consequence of the 
strong association among all the Alfred Cortot performances, and the subsequent 
differences with all the others. Noticing the generational difference between Cortot’s 
performances and the others is also pertinent. 
Artist and year of recording  First PC – Loadings  
1 2 
Alfred Cortot (1934)  .882 
Alfred Cortot (1945)  .934 
Alfred Cortot (1954)  .868 
Andrea Lucchesini (1988) .864  
Cyprien Katsaris (1993) .653  
Martha Argerich (1977) .783  
María João Pirés (1994) .853  
Mauricio Pollini (1975) .665  
Vladimir Ashkenazy (1979) .715  
Vladimir Horowitz (1964) .692  
Table 5.2. Principal Components derived from a factor analysis for all performances. 
(Columns show rotated principal component loadings of each performance.)  
The graph in Figure 5.10 shows the timing profiles corresponding to the obtained 
Principal Components. PC1 starts lengthening the quavers located on the strong beat, every 
other one. Nevertheless, this strategy blurs and is definitively abandoned when the 
thematic motif passes to the upper register (bar 7). The last quaver of each two bar arc is 
considerably extended (see for example bars 2.6 and 4.6). This characteristic directly 
remarks an important interpretative dilemma the prelude displays in respect to its surface 
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characteristics: the overlap of contiguous two bar arcs. The first note of the arc (see for 
example b2 of bar 3.1) can be understood, at the same time, as the last note of the previous 
arc. Principal component 1 (PC1) shows a strategy in tackling this dilemma: it lengthens 
the last note of the previous arc and restarts the following arc much faster. On the contrary, 
the strategy of PC2 is completely different. Earlier in the prelude, timing would seem to be 
Figure 5.10 Profiles of the principal components (standardized values). 
PC1in black, and PC2 (Cortot Component) in red. 
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at the service of melody rather than to mark some metrical or formal issue. In principle the 
first quaver is lengthened, emphasizing b2. Soon the last quaver of the bar is lengthened 
giving time to clearly articulate the semiquaver d. And finally the fifth quaver of bar 2, d3, 
which anticipates the b2 as the end of the previous unit and the start of the following one, is 
lengthened. But the next arc presents a subtle difference: the third lengthened note is not 
the f3, occupying the fifth quaver of bar 4, but the b3, of the previous quaver. Evidently, the 
preoccupation is higher for the notes themselves, beyond rhythm and metric position. The 
problem of the overlapping is faced with this strategy remarkably retaining the problematic 
note, like emphasizing its sense of closure and soon setting itself in motion much more 
quickly. Evidently both PCs are accounting for different strategies to undertake ambiguous 
points that are crucial as regards the composition’s interpretative problem. Another 
remarkable feature of this analysis arises from the consistent strategy of PC2 for every beat 
that the ascending initial semiquaver arpeggio is repeated. This is not so consistent in PC1. 
However, the use of strategies clearly different for each factor can be observed, which 
modifies the metrical status of the motif. For example, PC1 lengthens the highest note. 
Conversely, PC2 lengthens the lowest note. This can be understood as two different ways 
to face an extremely ambiguous performance gesture. As such ambiguity is related to the 
metrical status of the notes, one strategy emphasizes the point as thetic, the other 
emphasizing its anacrusic character. But it is also possible to understand these differences 
from the point of view of PC2 in terms of favouring of the melodic component rather than 
of metre. In this way, by the lengthenings, PC2 would manage to emphasize notes that are 
of central importance in the structure shaping the line that contains the bass and soprano 
voices. 
Both in the average performance analysis and in Mauricio Pollini’s one, a high 
degree of consistency between the timing patterns with 6 quavers and 4 quavers was 
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observed. From this, a clear intention to give account of the particularities that emerge in 
the metric structure when the foreground level of the prolongational structures were left 
exposed, was assumed. In spite of this, the bar 8 performance, where a more forceful mark 
would be expected, seems to be less defined than the one of the other passages in the piece. 
Then, the question arising is, if the average performance did not show a clear definition in 
this point, will the factor analysis be able to identify performances that may be considered 
either as prolongational or non prolongational? Therefore, the idea is to examine the 
factors extracted in particular in those points in which ways to organize the rhythmic-
metric patterns according to 6 quavers may be related to a more non prolongational 
interpretation, while configurations of 4 quavers may be associated to a prolongational 
interpretation observing underlying attributes. 
Regarding this, bars 13/14 represent a crucial point. As we may expect, it is 
possible to observe noticeable differences between both factors. Both principal 
components have an accentuated ritenuto. In that way, both of them are leading us to focus 
on this passage. But a more careful examination shows us that PC1 (in black) makes a 
progressive ritardando divided into three stages, corresponding to the three parts shaping 
the surface hemiola. That means, the first four quaver pattern is slightly retained, the 
second one is more retained, and the third one is even more retained. In that way, the 
motion reaches its maximum retention. In opposition, the ritardando of PC2 (in red) first 
highlight the c2 in the bass. Then, it accelerates the tempo intending to link this passage 
with the following one. Finally, the theme, which starts at bar 15, is taken to a 
corresponding tempo (without sudden changes). In addition, this PC presents many more 
peaks of ritenuti – of this large range – than PC1. 
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However, both components display a more ambiguous behaviour with respect to 
the motives of 6 and 4 quavers. Figure 5.11 exhibits the graphs for the 6 (above) and 4 
quaver (below) patterns with the corresponding tables (similar to those exhibited in figures 
5.5 and 5.6). PC2 shows 6 quaver patterns compatible with a parabola, while PC1 seems to 
be reinforcing the metric position of notes: the zigzag pattern is lengthening the metrically 
Figure 5.11. Comparison of timing patterns with 6 and 4 quavers of the two 
Extracted Principal Components. (See explanation in the text) 
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strong quavers. The 4 quaver patterns are in no case as highly systematic as in the 
previously analysed cases. PC2 in particular, by virtue of the distribution that the three 
factors show in each hemiola, seems to ignore the distribution according to 4 quaver 
groups. 
The second ambiguous point is at bar 22, the fall to the b1 at the lowest register. 
PC1 lengthens the previous note (the upper voice a#4, bar 21.6), as though it were a real 
ending, much more markedly than PC2 does. Although PC2 does not lengthen this note so 
much, at bar 23 there is a noticeable feature. It very markedly replicates the initial gesture, 
while PC1 uses a new gesture. We could say that PC1 has just finished and now is playing a 
coda (a fragment displaying another formal function), while PC2 has threatened to finish, 
but started once again (displaying the beginning formal function). Finally, at the next bar, 
when the tonic arrives, it becomes clear that the prelude does finish and it progressively 
stops. 
Contrary to the predictions, we observe very similar behaviours for both factors at 
bar 8. However, notice that PC1 lengthens it considerably less than the point at bar13, 
which means we can understand that, in spite of the structural importance of bar 8 as a 
form articulating point, the emphasis is directed towards the mid-point of the prelude (bar 
13). Because of all of this, it is possible to think preliminarily that PC1 is more oriented to 
an interpretation of the piece as an ample arc. PC2, in turn, would be representing a 
perspective more related to voice leading. 
As we have indicated, each factor offers a description that is more representative of 
the essence of the actual performances than the average profile. Paradoxically, these 
profiles appear as less systematic. Contrary to that obtained from the analysis of 
commonalities, the detail of each performance in particular may offer a profile more 
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compatible with the hypothetical interpretations derived from the voice leading and surface 
analyses developed above. Accordingly it is possible to think that the profiles we are 
looking for are exactly the result of performances tending to be idiosyncratic rather than 
general. It is also feasible that the greater display of individuality is possibly related to 
those apparently more ambiguous structural aspects. In other words, it is possible to 
hypothesize that in the face of structural ambiguity problems the interpretative profiles 
appear more original. On this matter, this piece has many points of ambiguity, which are 
those that we have been observing. In order to find a more personal behaviour, the 
passages of the piece that appear more ambiguous were analysed compared with these 
more clear parts. 
5.4.4 The analysis of ambiguous zones 
As we have seen, every point in the average profile represents a mean of how far each of 
the ten pianists was from the nominal value for that particular note. However, since some 
notes show high standard deviations and others present less variability, the correlations 
found tell us little about the timing strategy of the group of artists. 
As we have already said, this piece has plenty of zones that exhibit structural 
ambiguity. A part of this ambiguity is due to issues related to the musical surface. In 
particular, we are referring to the overlap of successive arcs and the surface hemiola 
indicating the upper vertex of the major arc (at bars 13-14). Other ambiguities are due to 
the interpretation of the foreground hemiolas, which contradict the thematic material 
constituting the second theme. That is to say, if we think that, for example, bar 16 is a 
repetition of bar 15 (a 6 quaver pattern), then, it will collide with the idea that at bar 16 a 
hemiola starts (a 4 quaver pattern). Because of that we may think that more important 
differences between pianists concern the original way of facing and solving such 
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problematic situations of ambiguity. In order to examine this, the prelude was re-analysed 
marking three kinds of regions: (i) clear zones; (ii) ambiguous surface zones, and (iii) 
ambiguous deep zones. Figure 5.12 shows in the rectangular frames the ambiguous surface 
zones, and in smoothed frames, the ambiguous deep zones.  
Standard deviations were analysed for each zone. An ANOVA for the means of SD 
timing values in the three zones yielded significant differences among the different zones 
(F[2,148]= 5.561; p = .005). A post hoc analysis revealed significant differences between 
Figure 5.12 Ambiguous zones in the Chopin Prelude in B minor 
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ambiguous surface zones (mean = .699) and the other two zones (clear zones mean = .524; 
and ambiguous deep zones = .547). That means that in general pianists use more varied 
timing strategies in ambiguous surface zones. However, dynamics profiles just showed 
marginal significance [F[2,148]= 2.399; p = .094] for differences between the three zones, 
and for this reason dynamics were not taken into account for the following analysis. 
An analysis of the association (correlation coefficient) between every 
performance’s timing and the means of both ambiguous and clear zones was run. Table 5.3 
displays the corresponding correlation coefficients.  





AC (1934) .804(**) .818(**) .833(**) .832(**) 
AC (1945) .750(**) .753(**) .882(**) .695(**) 
AC (1954) .820(**) .882(**) .948(**) .605(**) 
AL (1988) .746(**) .817(**) .708(**) .525(**) 
CK (1993) .791(**) .823(**) .830(**) .648(**) 
MA (1977) .768(**) .855(**) .872(**) .359(*) 
MJP (1994) .821(**) .882(**) .823(**) .594(**) 
MP (1975) .909(**) .942(**) .866(**) .843(**) 
VA (1979) .730(**) .710(**) .845(**) .777(**) 
VH (1964) .783(**) .885(**) .741(**) .457(**) 
** p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
Table 5.3. Different correlations of timing measurements for every performance with 
standard values for the complete piece and for clear and ambiguous zones. 
Lower coefficients account for a more original treatment of the problematic 
passages. As can be seen above, from a more global point of view, PC2 (which represents 
the three performances of Alfred Cortot) could be accounting for a prolongational 
performance. On the contrary, PC1 (representing the seven more contemporary 
performances) could be accounting for non prolongational performances. Table 5.3 allows 
one to say that the 1934 performance by Alfred Cortot (as a member of the group better 
represented by PC2) seems to be the performance that resolves in the most original way the 
passages that locally would contribute to identify a prolongational performance (the 
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ambiguous deep zones). Accordingly, the Martha Argerich performance (as a member of 
the group better represented by PC1) seems to be the most original in resolving those zones 
that would contribute to identify a non prolongational performance (the ambiguous surface 
zones). 
For these reasons it was decided to study in detail Alfred Cortot’s (1934) and 
Martha Argerich’s performances with the intention of determining if, through their 
particular individual characteristics, they could be identified with a prolongational and non 
prolongational perspective respectively. Although these two performances represent 
different performative traditions, is not possible to determine from the data analysed here, 
if the differences that emerge from this analysis are associated to the performance epoch or 
to the artist’s idiosyncrasy. 
5.4.5 Analysis of two selected performances 
Although these performances were selected, as was shown, mainly according to the 
analysis of timing, in this section the concurrent use of both timing and dynamics will be 
analysed. In this way, the intention is to describe, as exhaustively as possible, different 
interpretative strategies in order to relate them to a particular interpretative analysis. 
The graph in figure 5.13 exhibits standardized values of each inter-onset-interval 
(timing) and their peak sound (dynamics) corresponding to each quarter note beat (in order 
to be clearer, values at the quaver level will be shown in more detail bellow). It is possible 
to notice some similarities between both performances. For example, in the concluding 
bars (bar 22 and following) both performances show a progressive tendency to decrease 
dynamic values while lengthening time. This dramatic fall in tempo and dynamic is a part 
of a remarkably extended process coming from bar 18 - when the reiteration of the second 
thematic material begins - which clearly indicates that the piece as a whole is ending. 
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However, as it was already said, differences are more interesting and relevant to 
this analysis than similarities. Those are indicated in the graphs of figure 5.13 and are 
extended in the subsequent figures. 
The most noticeable ritardando performed by Cortot occurs at bar 8 (Figure 5.14). 
This assertion does not contradict the previous one, which alluded to an extended 
rallentando at the concluding bars. The ritardando as a formal articulator - not only 
mentioned by the interpretative tradition (Keller, 1973) but also highlighted by cognitive 
theories (Todd, 1985) - consists of a certain time deviation followed by the restoration of 
the original tempo. In the case of the closing fragment of the Prelude, the performed 
Figure 5.13 Timing (blue) and dynamics (magenta) profile for performances by Alfred 
Cortot (top) and Martha Argerich (bottom) 
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rallentando is introduced, as mentioned above, as a macro process of closure of the piece 
as a whole, from the change of tempo happening at bar 18 in both performances. The 
ritardando at bar 8 is indicating, undoubtedly, the Interrupted Form (Figure 5.2). Although 
Argerich, as a logical interpretation, also plays ritardando in this place, such a resource is 
relatively less pronounced than the Cortot one (figure 5.14). Moreover, in the context of 
the entire Argerich performance, this ritardando is not the most prominent (cf. Figure 
5.13), contrary to Cortot's performance. The complete set of actions of this articulation 
point also involves, in both performances, a dynamic diminuendo tendency followed by a 
noticeable repetition of an initial gesture at the beginning of bar 9 (compare bars 1 and 9). 
However, these performances are slightly different: Cortot imitates the gesture d5-c#5 in 
bar 8.3 and 8.4 (long-short) in d2-c#2 in 8.5 and 8.6. This imitation enlarges the gap to the 
reprise at bar 9 more than Argerich’s strategy, which consists of accelerating the repetition 
of the gesture – 8.5 and 8.6 - as she was connecting this phrase-end with the beginning of 
the following idea. In that way, Cortot presents a very idiosyncratic treatment of the timing 
Figure 5.14 Detail of bars 7-9 (values of quavers). Blue lines represent timing 
deviations, red lines represent dynamic variation. Full markers correspond to M. 
Argerich's performance and empty markers correspond to A. Cortot's 
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of the hemiola. This feature is very important since this is a crucial point, where the 
hemiola is highlights the interruption. Dynamics subtly accompany this approach by 
continuously ascending from 8.5 to 9.3. On the contrary, Argerich’s performance seems 
not to recognize the hemiola, accelerating the beginning of the following phrase, with a 
relatively low nuance. 
The second place that deserves a special comment happens from bar 13 to 15, 
coinciding with the surface hemiola halfway through the piece (figure 5.15). Note the 
absolutely contradictory tendency between both performers' timing at bar 13 with its fall at 
bar 14. 
Clearly, Argerich – as we have already seen as a PC1 feature in the principal 
component analysis - emphasises the e4 (third quaver of each half note beat), both 
lengthening the note and playing it stronger. In doing so, she is bringing the hemiola into 
prominence. It is important to highlight that this behaviour is not a simple consequence of 
the way in which she faces the ascending arpeggio, but also constitutes an interpretive 
strategy for the hemiola, since the third half note is also marked even though it does not 
Figure 5.15 Detail of bars 13-15. 
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display the arpeggio. On the other hand, although Alfred Cortot highlights the first half 
note of the hemiola, at the end of the second (bar 14.2) he changes the gesture performing 
the rest of the bar 14 quavers rapidly and equally, as opposed to Argerich. The beginning 
of the motif b in the lower voice at the first beat of bar 15 is also hasty in Cortot's 
performance while in Argerich's the novelty is manifestly introduced by retaining the first 
quaver (bar 15.1). Dynamic gestures of both performances accompany these different 
timing approaches. Argerich plays both arpeggios using the same dynamics (f and cresc.), 
conversely to Cortot, who plays much more piano the second arpeggio, and reinforces his 
idea of subtracting importance to the last quavers of bar 14 by diminishing its dynamic 
level. Moreover, the beginning of bar 15 is, in Cortot's performance, more piano and 
shorter than in the Argerich's. Therefore, bar 14 seems less emphasised as a formal 
articulation point by Cortot than by Argerich. 
Concerning the concluding bars of the piece, where the articulation of the Coda 
occurs, both artists perform a noticeable ritenuto at the beginning of bar 23 (figure 5.16). 
Nevertheless, this rit. is markedly more plentiful in Cortot's performance. Note that he is 
Figure 5.16 Detail of bars 21-24.
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making the usual gesture in performing the raising arpeggios, but, this time, it is much 
more exaggerated. He is “pretending” to start again. Argerich's gesture is new instead. The 
lowest b1 (bar 22) is dynamically and temporally emphasised by both artists. But 
Argerich’s is more emphatic: the lengthenings of the previous two notes are the most 
pronounced of the passage. Her b1 is, therefore, more conclusive. So the following bars 
sound reminiscent of the prelude, but being clear that it has concluded yet. Bar 22 displays 
a noticeable performance similarity between both pianists (in fact, it is the most similar 
performance of the piece). Both of them dynamically and temporally emphasise the a4 of 
the penultimate quaver of this bar. Therefore, they are organising the continuity of the 
descending arpeggio a4 (22.3) f# (23.1) d4 (23.2) indicating a movement toward the main 
voice (the d4 of bar 23; see motivic reduction in figure 5.3). 
As already mentioned, another important similarity at this point is the final expiring 
process. The separation between bars 22 and 23 takes place in a unified and sustained 
process that, having begun at bar 19, involves an important decreasing of both tempo and 
dynamics (figure 5.13). In that way, both artists exhibit a unified line that contributes to 
making both the fall to bar 23 and the articulation of the 4 concluding bars more 
ambiguous. Therefore, both artists unify this ending and include the coda into a more 
widespread process. But it seems that they have different reasons to do this: while for one, 
the coda is a “pretend” re-starting; for the other it is only a resonance of something that has 
already finished (the lowest point of the arch). 
Finally, concerning the foreground hemiolas at bars 16-17 and 20-21, no artist 
seems to present a systematic manner of performing them in order to highlight them (figure 
5.17). Argerich configures in both hemiolas an irregular dynamic profile without 
exhibiting either a 6 quaver or a 4 quaver pattern. On the contrary, her timing profile seems 
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to adapt itself to the 4 quaver configuration, even though in a very blurred manner (Factor 
Analysis revealed three different principal components, therefore the 4 quaver 
configurations are extremely variable and can be interpreted in multiple ways). For his 
part, Cortot’s timing and dynamic profiles better match the 6 quaver configuration. This 
way, Cortot would be detailing the hemiola of bars 7-8 (which may be understood as more 
structural) and not the hemiolas of bars 16-17 and 20-21 (whose configuration depends 
only on the inner voices). 
Figure 5.17. Detail of bars 15 to 17 (upper panel) and 19 to 21 (lower panel)
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5.5 Discussion 
The aim of this study of performances was to verify the possibility of linking certain 
interpretative strategies, revealed through subtle variations of tempo and dynamics, to a 
convincing structural interpretation of the musical piece. In particular the intention was to 
find evidence of a bond between the attributes of an expressive music performance and two 
opposed interpretations of the piece generically denominated Prolongational and Non 
prolongational. 
Implicit in this account is the postulation that a structural interpretation of the 
composition offers the performance a solid base on which to outline its originality, 
individuality and distinguishing characteristics, while still maintaining certain conditions 
of acceptability. As seen in chapter 2, this postulate comprises the foundations of the 
performance perspective denominated as objectivist. We have seen in the previous chapter 
that the cognitive approach to music performance has been the key to understanding many 
of the characteristics by which we recognize a performance as expressive and identify it as 
natural. Although, as we have indicated, the objectivist performance tends to diminish the 
idiosyncratic aspects of an interpretation, in chapter 2 we reviewed that some of the 
criticisms held against this paradigm circle around a series of aspects that objectivism 
gives the impression of having ignored. The issues of originality and individuality having 
transcended the compositional orbit, and settled on the performative field, it is little 
wonder that performance should be studied in terms of its originality and particular 
characteristics and not only as regards those attributes of naturalness and expressiveness. 
Of course, from an objectivist point of view, it is even possible to wait for noticeable 
interpersonal differences between diverse performances, especially when the composition 
gives rise to multiple structural interpretations. In such a sense, the itinerary raised in this 
work would be indicating that the bonds between certain highly sophisticated 
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interpretations of the musical structure (like the voice leading analysis) and evident 
performance traits emerge more clearly when examining idiosyncratic performance 
particularities. This matter makes itself obvious when considering the methodological path 
journeyed here. We departed from observing both differences and commonalities of an 
important number of well known performances of the piece aiming to discriminate those 
characteristics that are common among the expert performances and make them naturally 
expressive, from those more idiosyncratic traits that make them original and individual 
musical expressions. 
Thus, it was possible to observe that the average performance presents a series of 
typical behaviours that appear associated to characteristics of the music structure (Repp 
1998c, 1998d). In this way, and favouring the generative hypothesis, it was possible to 
identify a standard behaviour in the use of rubato, directly associated to the grouping 
structure of the piece. This affirmation is congruent with some of the already classic 
studies that observe the handling of rubato as related to the phrasing structure of the piece 
(in particular see Todd, 1985). Thus, for example, during the first 8 bars of the studied 
composition, where the grouping structure is rather classical (figure 5.18) the rubato peaks 
Figure 5.18. Relation between rubato and grouping structure of the 
initial passage of the Chopin Piano Prelude in b minor (bars 1-8; each 
arc at the lowest level represents a two-bars unit)  
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(points of greater lengthening of notes) not only appear as indicating the lowest level units 
but also seem to emphasize the hierarchical nature of the grouping structure. In this way, 
the highest peak occurs at bar 8, followed by the corresponding one at bar 4, and finally the 
one at bar 2. From the generative perspective we could enunciate a rule: phrase end  
ritardando, concomitantly with another rule the higher the phrase hierarchy  the 
greater the ritardando amplitude. 
Nevertheless, a peak expected at the end of bar 6 does not take place (see the 
largest arrow). Evidently, this point is structurally much more ambiguous than the other 
articulation points. Structural ambiguity is translated into a sort of malfunctioning of the 
rule. Curiously, the structural ambiguity is provoked with the appearance of the second 
motivic element, and the rubato conduct here is the same as maintained during each 
appearance of such an element (see figure 5.4). From a classical perspective it could be 
said that in this passage another rule is being put into play competing with the first one. In 
principle, it is much more difficult to find a general way of enunciating this second rule 
because it does not seem to obey general structural principles but rather, the particularities 
of this motif. Nevertheless, hypothesizing a sort of fight while applying the rules, the 
statement of some kind of preference rule can be hypothesized. Let us remember that the 
preference rules systems were created in particular (i) to solve situations in which two or 
more rules can sometimes be applied in which neither of the two are necessary conditions 
but both are condition enough to provoke a given action; (ii) to balance the effects of rules 
that are applied in conflict. 
Something similar happens with the average use of the dynamic resource. 
Dynamics are clearly used for highlighting the motivic linear progression in the foreground 
d4- c#4- b4 (and its derivations). Nevertheless the dynamic behaviour when the second 
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motivic element appears in the high register is totally different from the opportunity when 
it appears in the lower (and again, it does not seem here to be associated to a general 
structural characteristic either). In other words, it appears to be that the more complex 
and/or ambiguous the musical structure, the less fitted to rules the interpretative solutions. 
On the contrary, when the performance gives the impression of being more typical or 
common (as seen in the average performance analysis, and Maurizio Pollini’s 
performance), it is more difficult to assign clearly it to a certain interpretative proposal. 
Thus, these performances present characteristics alluding both to the voice leading reading 
and the surface interpretation. 
When analysing the association of every individual strategy with the average 
performance, an individual intention arising more explicitly in the passages of greater 
ambiguity was observed. The performances’ variability (represented by the standard 
deviations of the timing and dynamics expressive deviations) was significantly greater in 
ambiguous than in clear passages. Nevertheless, in spite of its peculiar characteristics, 
every performance was strongly associated with the virtual average strategy. It is possible 
to think that this association represents a sort of guarantee of acceptability for the 
performance, a sort of imposition of intentio operis. The composition presence imposing 
on the performance a set of constraints relative to its structure, would be guaranteeing the 
coherence of the performance in structural terms. In other terms, to the extent that a 
performance is able to obey certain general performative principles that appear culturally 
relatively codified, a condition of acceptability is ensured. Under this “warranty” the 
performer contributes his or her personal traits, either clarifying in peculiar ways 
ambiguous situations, or transgressing trivial solutions for interpretative puzzles, or 
selecting particular characteristics where those restrictions leave space for multiple 
possible actions, etc. The intentio operis prevails in certain points, but it leaves in other 
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places, some interstices for the sprouting of intentio interpretis (paraphrasing the intentio 
lectoris of Eco 1990). At least, from an objectivist perspective, we could understand 
therefore the individual nature of performance. 
Nevertheless, two details will help us to understand that this intentio operis - 
intentio interpretis tension is more complex than it seems at first glance. The first 
peculiarity arises from the analysis of the actual performance most similar to the average 
(virtual), the one by Maurizio Pollini. In his dynamic strategy we could see how he 
indicates the surface linear progression d4- c#4- b4 when it appears but the artist soon 
leaves it. Something similar happens with the timing strategy of the first 8 bars. Although 
Pollini demarcates the two bar phrases, lengthening the notes at the beginning and the end 
of every one, the question of the grouping hierarchy does not appear so clearly (see in 
figure 5.7 that the bar 2 articulation is retained more than the one at the end of bar 4). We 
could say that Pollini, as an expert artist, knows the rules, nevertheless, he enunciates them 
and then transgresses them. If all the artists act this way, and if transgressions by definition 
are not obligatory, then it is expectable that the average performance (virtual) be more 
systematic than any individual real performance. 
The second detail has to do with the differences in the observed dispersions 
comparing clear and the ambiguous zones (table 5.3). We had inferred that, at least as 
regards timing, the famous artists seem to use more idiosyncratic strategies in the solution 
of more sophisticated interpretative problems. In other words, for ambiguous passages 
there seem to be less available standard strategies. But we also saw that this imposition of 
intentio interpretis also appears as highly systematic. When analysing the different Alfred 
Cortot performances, a high association among the different recordings that he did 
throughout his life was found. Interestingly, Cortot does not show any association with 
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other pianists as high as those with himself. The permanence of Cortot’s expressive 
variations throughout long years, compared with more important differences between 
Cortot and any other pianist, render an account of the existence of a personal component 
that goes further than music structure attributes and can be held all through the years. One 
of the supporting arguments of the generative approach to music performance is “the 
ability to replicate the same expressive timing profile with very small variability across 
performances” (Palmer 1997; p. 126). Nevertheless, whereas the generative hypothesis 
maintains that the higher systematic quality in the answers of the performers takes place 
around typified structural characteristics whose relation with certain performance actions 
may be codified more or less directly, the high consistency between the three Cortot 
performances appears exactly in those structurally less clear passages. In this case we 
should think about a personal grammar or at least in a set of rules ample and flexible 
enough for guaranteeing the imposition of intentio interpretis governing both the stability 
of an interpretation considered typical for certain artists and its endurance in time. 
Up to here, nothing moves away too far from the most traditional objectivist 
perspective, by which the performer’s creativity has space to be developed, as Kivy (1995) 
affirmed, only in the interstices that the composition (the composer) has left free. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider some data more deeply. The first question comes 
from the results of the factor analysis. In it, two factors, one representing the three 
performances of Cortot and the other identified with the rest of the performances, were 
abstracted. Although the set of investigated performances is limited and, therefore, all 
speculation turns out to be uncertain, it is possible to think of the differences in the Cortot 
performances as not simply reflecting the artist’s idiosyncratic characteristics, but as 
gathering some generational aspects that account for a performative style proper for his 
time. Curiously, the 1934 performance (the oldest) is the one that presents smaller 
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associations with the average in clearer zones than in more ambiguous ones. We could 
speculate that in Cortot’s time, in particular in that of his first performance (notice that it 
was recorded in the inter-war period), the preoccupation did not focus on problems of 
structural clarity or ambiguity, and therefore the performer creativity fields were other, 
different ones from those interstices left by structural indetermination. This shows the 
existence of other tensions that come from the performance style accepted at a certain 
time. These tensions challenge the generative paradigm postulates. It is possible then to 
speak about an intentio èpocha characterized by the set of forces woven with the thread of 
history, cultural habits, audiences tastes, record market tendencies, etc. Also, this tale of 
tensions and intentions makes matters more complex when considering that more 
contemporary performances are also under the tensions of that epoch, indirectly through 
this prelude’s performance history, that in turn restricts, performance by performance, the 
conditions for the subsequent performance’s originality. In this point, intentio èpocha is 
combined with intentio interpretis making those creativity fields flexible. It is possible that 
the Vladimir Ashkenazy performance, which just as the 1934 Cortot performance, turned 
out to be more original as regards clear zones with respect to ambiguous ones (see table 
5.3), may respond to this tendency. 
From what has been seen, it would appear that the relation between that which is 
common and that which is individual in performance was crucial for the study of the 
communication of sophisticated structural configurations. Such is the case of the voice 
leading and prolongational structures, which, almost by definition, involve interpretative 
matters (see pp. 73 and ff). The journey here has gone from the analysis of the 
commonalities towards descriptions of the more and more individualized performance 
actions. In this path it could be corroborated how systematic quality (one of the generative 
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paradigm pillars) in the structure-performance bonds goes progressively loosing as we go 
deeper into originality and study performance individuality in detail. 
In this scrutiny of individuality it became more and more difficult to univocally tie 
an expressive strategy to a composition’s structural characteristics (a certain intentio 
operis). Thus, for example, Cortot and Argerich lengthen notes with apparently different 
aims. However, affirming that this contradicts the systematic character that gives support 
to the generative hypothesis is an epistemological absurdity: the true interest of cognitive 
psychology is to understand mental operations, its development, regularities and 
anomalies. As in other scientific disciplines, it has focused on generalization. In this sense, 
the search of commonalities has been its methodological aim. Nevertheless, even with 
regard to the standard behaviours, the allegiance of a given performance action to a 
particular structural characteristic is also problematic. For example, the average 
performance showed how a lengthening in the second thematic motif was fulfilling a 
different role from the one of indicating a boundary between groups. 
On the other hand, it is easy to notice that the musicological interest has more 
variable purposes. Besides understanding general processes, musicology is interested in 
explaining the individual, particularly if the individual incarnates itself in an artwork and if 
what is considered individual can also be communicated and be shared within a certain 
scope of incumbency. 
At this stage of the study, the central question of this research can be explicitly 
formulated expecting the answer to support an objectivist perspective of performance: Is it 
possible to think of a rule system, or a combination of rule systems, schemata, or other 
types of formalized structure that is able to account for the delicate balance that appears to 
exist between the multiple tensions in an expert performance? And, in that case, would that 
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formal formulation be parsimonious enough as to grant itself priority before other 
explanatory models? It is possible to think that, just as the more sophisticated the music 
listened to, the greater the computational demand involved for its processing on behalf of 
the listener (Jackendoff 1983; p.139); so, the greater and more diverse the tensions on 
which the performance of a highly sophisticated musical work depends on, the greater the 
computational devices in use should be. Could this greater demand explain in 
psychological (computational) terms the difference between standard and supreme 
performers? 
Although much investigation in the field is needed, with the data collected here we 
can initiate a reflection on this topic. Let us begin with a paradox. Mauricio Pollini has 
been considered a pianist with a very rich dynamic palette (see for example Distler, 2006). 
Nevertheless when analysing his performance of this prelude, it has been observed that his 
performance’s dynamics do not give rise to as strictly systematic patterns as those that are 
possible to find concerning timing. We could a priori speculate that his dynamic handling 
originality rests on that strictly systematic temporal handling. Thus timing and dynamic 
would demand to be interpreted in cooperation. Something similar emerges from the 
Argerich and Cortot performances. Figure 5.13 clearly exhibits diverse ways of relating 
timing and dynamics. Observe the difference between the joint treatment of both attributes 
at bars 8, 13-14 and 22. At bars 8 and 22, ritardandi are accompanied by dynamic 
diminuendi. At bar 13, the ritardando is accompanied, in the Argerich performance, by 
crescendo, while the accelerando in the Cortot performance goes together with an 
important decrescendo. Thus, timing and dynamics appear as compensatory in certain 
occasions and as supplementary in others. 
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The great diversity of circumstances in which a certain expressive pattern is used as 
well as the infinite combinations of expressive attributes encourages an examination in 
which their use can be described transcending their local description. In this way, it would 
be advantageous to analyse each action in context within a set of operations as a whole in 
order to consider how those multiple tensions are resolved through the usage of these 
multiple expressive resources. As proposed by Clarke (1995), from this point of view, each 
expressive deviation acquires a contextual meaning. In other words, a certain action in 
performance acquires its meaning by virtue of the way in which it is related to its context. 
Context can contribute to identify structural content expressed through performance 
actions (Bertucelli Pappi 1993). For that, the performance actions require to be interpreted 
by virtue of their contextual relations. At the moment we will only outline a preliminary 
approach to the analysis of contextual relations in performance attributes in order to 
identify expressive characteristics allowing to verify the hypothesis 1 and to recognize a 
certain performance either as prolongational or as non prolongational. In the next chapter 
the idea of the interpretative context analysis in the communicational process will be 
looked more deeply. 
Performances of bars 22/23 both in Argerich’s and Cortot’s performances bring out 
the importance of analysing expressive deviations as regards their contextual relations. 
According to a simplistic view, this position in the Prelude should be considered as the 
articulation point corresponding to the highest structural level, because the most 
pronounced ritardando can be observed here (in particular concerning Cortot's 
performance). However, if this ritardando is analysed as part of a more global - future 
oriented - process that grows from bar 19 to the end and involves a particular behaviour of 
the inner voices (the arpeggio a4- f#4 – d4 at bars 22/23), it would be possible to evaluate 
whether the pianists intend to capture the ambiguity of this passage concerning the 
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structural functions of segmentation and continuation. Thus, this ritardando acquires a 
slightly different meaning to marking a phrasing segmentation, consisting in trying to 
highlight the formal ambiguity of the passage as a dramatic feature. That is, this extended 
ritardando should not only be seen as a way of indicating the end – as a simple rule would 
indicate – but as having another connotation rising from a configuration of the piece as a 
whole. According to some authors, this configuration could be drawn from narrative – or 
dramatic – content (Shaffer 1992, 1995; Schmalfeldt 1985). 
A peculiarity of this interpretative approach is the fact that, since it involves music 
performance, contextual relations are bimodal. On one hand, there are structural contextual 
relations, namely, those relations that give meaning to an attribute of expressive 
microstructure (for example a ritardando), by attending to the particular attribute of 
musical structure to which it is associated (for example, the ritardando that has just been 
commented upon.) 
On the other hand, it is possible to talk about microstructural contextual relations, 
namely, those relations that allow assigning meaning to an attribute in terms of expressive 
microstructure by attending to a particular attribute of musical microstructure to which it is 
associated. An example of this can be seen in the Cortot's performance of bars 13 and 14. 
The second half note of the hemiola is played with a dramatic dynamic contrast. Viewed in 
another context, this contrast could be simply justified by the motivic iteration. However, 
in this context, this feature appears followed by a speed increment of the quavers 
belonging to the third half note of the hemiola. Since this acceleration gives a sense of 
continuity, the dynamic change is "re-signified" as part of this intention to maintain the 
continuity of the passage. 
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A sort of combination of both modalities of relations allows understanding 
Argerich’s performance as non prolongational. She makes the ritardando that clearly 
indicates the interrupted form articulation at bar 8. Nevertheless, her most important 
ritardando appears at bar 13, where the surface phenomena are more appealing and 
important. The relation of that slowing down with the maintaining of the forte dynamic in 
the second arpeggio – a microstructural contextual relation - establishes a different 
structural contextual relation (the relation with the surface phenomena) from that 
established at bar 8, in which the ritenuto is related to the interrupted form. In other terms, 
would we have to think that Argerich is thinking of a phrase end at bar 13? Applying a rule 
that does not consider contextual relations this question would be answered affirmatively. 
But a careful examination of the situation leads to consider that she is emphasizing the 
vertex of the great arc including the entire prelude (considering the surface interpretation). 
Consequently, it is possible to say that Argerich’s performance may be understood as non 
prolongational. On the contrary, Cortot’s performance displays its greater ritardando at bar 
8 with a clearly additional dynamic pattern. These contextual relations contribute the 
evidence that allows us to say that it is a prolongational performance. We have seen that 
when considering the expressive actions in context we are able to approximate ourselves 
better to the idiosyncratic particularities of each performance and in this way we may give 
some support to the notion of the piece as object of multiple readings – notion in fact 
established through the numerous accepted performances of the piece that we may enjoy 
today. In the particular case presented here, one reading outlined a narrative departing from 
a series of surface phenomena (registral expansion, metrical irregularity, motivic iteration, 
etc.). The other reading rescued attributes of the deeper musical structure (particularly, 
ignoring the attributes of the musical surface in order to highlight the characteristics of the 
underlying voice leading). 
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However, both performances are avoiding an explicit explanation. Apparently, they 
do not intent to show these components overtly by projecting them directly on the 
microstructural surface. Contrarily, each performance presents its attributes (particularly 
timing and dynamics) as a coherent whole, which is manifested in a particular projection of 
the general organisation of the piece. Consequently, the manifestation of the underlying 
voice leading by Cortot does not consist of bringing out - singing (in pianistic jargon), 
making obvious – the notes of that voice leading, but of reorganising groupings in order to 
define a clear formal articulation at bar 8. To sing the voice leading notes would have been 
a trivial strategy, a commonplace (as we have seen in the average performance projection 
of the foreground linear progression, d4- c#4- b3 and on, through use of the dynamics). An 
original performance, that truly represents an original contribution to the work, will have 
by definition to avoid the trivial solutions. Therefore, the idea of observing a 
prolongational performance as idiosyncratic unavoidably makes us think about non-trivial 
strategies of organization of performance attributes around the prolongational structure. 
Just the search for non-trivial strategies is what differentiates the average 
performance from Pollini’s performance. Its dynamic strategy begins with a clear emphasis 
in the foreground linear progression d4- c#4- b3 at bar 1. Taking its expertise into account in 
the dominion of dynamics, if his intention had been to indicate those linear progressions 
(characteristic that might have been tied to a hypothetical prolongational performance) he 
would not have had any impediment to maintain the dynamic strategy in the following 
linear progressions. Nevertheless, he soon abandons this behaviour. The fact that the 
average performance maintains that conduct accounts for an obvious and excessively banal 
solution. As such, by definition, this solution would have gone against any sense of an 
individual and original performance. In this way, attenuation of the multiple tensions 
crossing the performance field seeks to be solved in performances by outstanding artists in 
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very idiosyncratic ways eluding the obvious associations and trying out more creative 
configurations (in the third part we will venture some descriptions of the way in which 
these creative processes may take place). 
Accordingly, data raised from the analysis of expert performances seem to 
vindicate that a musical interpretation, particularly at higher levels of performance, is not 
the mere result of corresponding a performative gesture to a given structural characteristic. 
On the contrary, the performer would interpret the structure as a unity, giving way to a 
global configuration of the attributes of his or her performance, making use of a myriad of 
microstructural gestures. In that way, a performative grammar seems to be insufficient to 
explain the most sophisticated, idiosyncratic and original performances. This is so because 
the performer’s contribution to the analysis, the description of structural attributes, the 
interpretative decisions and the representation of the performance as a whole, unavoidably 
alter, as a result of the imposition of his or her intention –and we could even include the 
intentio èpocha mentioned earlier (p. 173)- some features of the structure and their 
projection. The performer’s interventions update the relation between the work and the 
listener, since the performer would be acting based on what he or she presumes the listener 
to think or know in the moment of performance. In this sense, it is possible to say that the 
performer’s labour consists of making a cooperative contribution to the meaning of the 
musical piece. 
In the next chapter a series of listening experiments will be described. They were 
carried out with the intention of examining such a projection of the structure and its 
reception on the part of the listener. 
*** 
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Summary. The study presented in this chapter aimed to identify two different 
interpretations from a single composition. One of them was considered as prolongational 
and the other as non prolongational. The composition, Chopin’s Prelude in B minor, 
clearly offers the possibility of different interpretative readings according to whether one 
considers either surface or prolongational aspects. Commonalities and differences were 
observed in a number of well known performances, and features of common expressivity 
and originality were discriminated. In this way the general strategy consisted of going from 
the description of common expressive behaviours to accounts of more particular and 
idiosyncratic ways of approaching the piece. The identification of standard behaviours 
through the description of average performances and the factor analysis of principal 
component, as well as the identification of particular strategies for the resolution of 
structural ambiguities, allowed observing that only the most general aspects of the 
performances can be explained through rules that link performance actions to certain 
structural particularities. In order to provide a general explanation of the set of 
performative actions a contextual interpretation of those actions was proposed. From this, 
it is possible to argue that an idiographic, descriptive perspective may contribute to a 
generative analysis by identifying (i) contextual relations between performative actions 
and the structural context of the piece (contextual structural relations), and (ii) contextual 
relations between different performative actions throughout the performance itself 
(microstructural contextual relations). Finally two performances (Cortot, 1934; and 
Argerich, 1977) were identified as prolongational and non prolongational respectively. 
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Chapter 6: Communicating the musical structure to the 
listener 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, music performance was seen as an interpretative process in which 
performative decisions were promoted by contextual needs. In the reported study, the 
method firstly consisted of carrying out two different readings of a composition as 
specified in a score – the Chopin prelude in B minor. Secondly, it was suggested that the 
study of musical performances can draw near the performer’s intention on both the features 
of that musical structure and the idiosyncratic standard performance style corresponding to 
the moment of performance, through the analysis of contextual relations. After revealing 
how difficult it was to explain the particularities of expert performances based only on 
performance rules, it was proposed, in an embryonic fashion, another explanation that 
could include the study of multiple tensions altering the ontology of the piece, based on 
setting both structural and microstructural contextual relations. 
In this chapter the continuation of this study is presented, intending to examine the 
other link in the communicational chain: that relating performance to the listener. It was 
hypothesized that: “It is possible to describe rules or principles that regulate 
communication between performer and listener, by which the latter is able to discriminate 
prolongational from non prolongation performances by making use of different types from 
representations” (Hypothesis 2, p.121). 
In that sense, the studies presented in this chapter intend: 
(i) To verify the extent to which the contents seem to govern the analysed 
performances are communicated to listeners; in that sense it is necessary: 
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a. To investigate various kinds of representations provoked in the listener by the 
reception of different performances of a same composition. 
b. To analyse whether the listeners’ responses, elicited by the different 
performances, can be associated with their being either prolongational or non 
prolongational. 
(ii) To discuss the pertinence of generative principles in the context of distinctly 
noticeably personal performances, and in reference to particularly sophisticated 
structural aspects. 
The experiments presented here represent different paradigms which are intended to 
investigate the nature of listeners’ representations that different performances of the 
selected piece elicit. Two different experiments are described in which subjects had to 
complete a series of tasks by listening to stimuli. In addition to the tasks, the fundamental 
difference between both experiments relates to the treatment of the stimuli. In experiment 
1, the stimuli consisted of the selected performances. On the other hand, in experiment 2, 
the stimuli came from the manipulation of the selected performances by interpolating cuts 
and noise. In this way both experiments revolved around listening to the Alfred Cortot 
(1934) and Martha Argerich (1977) performances of the Chopin piano prelude in B minor 
Op. 28 N° 6. According to the analysis in the study presented in the previous chapter, the 
Alfred Cortot performance may be considered to be a prolongational performance, this is, 
a performance whose conspicuous characteristics may be associated to the prolongational 
structure analysis of the piece. On the contrary, the Martha Argerich performance may be 
considered non prolongational, because its more characteristic traits may be tied to a non 
prolongational (surface attributes) interpretation of musical structure. 
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6.2 Listening experiment 1: non-manipulated stimuli 
6.2.1 Aims and methodological background 
Experiment 1 consisted of three parts. In each one of them, subjects had to listen to the 
corresponding stimuli and perform a given task. The three parts of the experiment were 
successive and they were run in a single session. The complete session lasted around 40 
minutes. 
The purpose of the first task, segmentation, was to test a generative hypothesis 
according to which the listener interprets a performance in compliance with codes that link 
expressive deviations to attributes of the musical structure (Sundberg 1993; Sundberg, 
Friberg and Fryden 1991). For example: a ritardando marks the boundary of a grouping 
unit (Clarke 1988) and the more pronounced the ritardando the higher the structural level 
this unit represents (Todd 1985). If so, listeners would tend to segment the Chopin Prelude 
differently according to the performance listened to. If listening to Cortot’s performance, 
for example, they would tend to segment more at bar 8. Contrarily, if listening to the 
Argerich performance, segmentation at bar 13 would be more expected. In order to study 
this, a double segmentation experiment was carried out. As it will be seen, the 
experimental paradigm of double segmentation allows studying a possible hierarchical 
segmentation of the piece both from a statistical point of view and from an individual 
conception of this hierarchy. 
This part of the experiment is based on the idea that segmentation tasks are not only 
a logical operation used in music analysis, but also account for an actual perceptual 
process. This means that although musician subjects are systematically trained in logical 
segmentation procedures, it is possible that a task of this nature captures important 
attributes of the representation elicited by the listened work. According to Imberty (1981) 
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we can say that segmentation, like a possible observable subject behaviour provoked by the 
entire or part of the musical structure, is based on the perception of qualitative changes in 
the attributes of the perceptual input. Moreover, segmentation depends on both cultural 
reference models and codes and previous knowledge, lodged in long term memory 
throughout enculturation processes (p. 86). In this way, segmentation processes can 
account for the way in which the musical structure comes to be codified. Most importantly, 
this experiment supposes that the characteristics of the performance take part in such forms 
of codification. Moreover, if the process of segmentation has to do with Gestalt principles 
(as Dèliege 2002 asserts), then it is possible to assume that prolongational structure will 
play and important role in such a process, since it would be contributing to the piece’s well 
formedness. 
At the same time, segmentation may refer to different levels that can be understood 
as constituting a hierarchy (Imberty 1981). Thus, it is possible to think of a macro 
segmentation (highest level segmentation) and a micro segmentation (lowest level 
segmentation). 
Generally, the segmentation paradigm is accompanied by other methodological 
devices such as verbal reports (Imberty 1981, Dèliege and El Ahmadí 1990), continued 
responses judging amount of tension, new ideas (Krumhansl 1996; Krumhansl and 
Schenck 1997) and/or emotional engagement (Timmers et al. 2006). This procedure 
supposes that people without formal musical training related to theories of logical 
segmentation can fulfil the task. Particularly, this paradigm is advantageous when the focus 
is put on temporally extended stimuli and their time organization. 
According to previous studies, which combined segmentation task with more 
qualitative data (Imberty 1981, Dèliege and El Ahmadí 1991) the second task consisted of 
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a register of free semantic responses (verbal reports). As it was seen, music performance, 
as a communicational agent, is being exhaustively studied. Specific literature includes at 
least four basic research lines that comprise the communication of: (i) structural attributes 
(in terms of music theory); (ii) emotions; (iii) narrative content (in terms of either character 
features or story plots); (iv) motional, gestural and kinetic content. Most of the studies that 
examine music communication in terms of music theory, emotions, motion, etc. are dealt 
with using experimental paradigms that involve structured protocols. Such research 
instruments can report whether communication occurs in the examined terms when the 
listener is interrogated by these protocols. That is, they do not account for the effects they 
cause. The study of the content of the communicational experience becomes crucial when 
the attributes, intended to be communicated in performance, demand a high level of 
abstraction. This is the case of the underlying voice leading, which, bearing its complexity 
and level of abstraction in mind, could give rise to content of a different nature. 
The purpose of this part was to inquire into general categories related to the nature 
of the listener's experience while listening to a prolongational performance as opposed to 
listening to a non prolongational performance, without any particular (forced) focus. 
Although this data was examined by means of a content analysis, the complete analysis 
was not presented here, due to the interpretation of this data being more problematic 
(especially under an objectivistic paradigm). However, as some information will be used in 
the discussion and the task was an important part of the procedure as a whole, a brief 
explanation of the procedure will be included in order to understand the context of the third 
task. A complete analysis of this task is included in Shifres (2002).  
As the second task would provide some information about the representational 
modality to which the listener is referred when not particularly oriented to any one in 
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particular, listeners were not oriented to focus on performance features. In fact, several 
subjects wrote very similar (or equal) descriptions for both versions, probably because they 
did not focus on the performances’ attributes. With the aim of complementing task 1, a 
comparison task (the third task) was carried out inquiring into the representational 




Thirty four musicians (12 females, and 22 males) took part in the experiment. The average 
age was 28.2 years; and average length of musical experience was 12.8 years. Thirteen of 
them were pianists, twelve guitarists, three singers, two choir conductors, one saxophonist, 
one orchestral conductor, one composer and one flautist. As the data was collected in 
Argentina, all the subjects were native Spanish speakers. 
6.2.2.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli were the complete performances of the Chopin piano prelude in B minor Op. 
28 No. 6 by Martha Argerich (1977) and Alfred Cortot (1934). Although some subjects 
stated that they knew the piece, nobody could identify it as a Chopin Piano Prelude and 
nobody could identify either of the pianists. 
For the third task seventeen adjectives were selected from several sources in 
musical literature and they were analysed according to two dimensions. Dimension 1 refers 
to Representational Modalities. According to this dimension, adjectives were classified in 
four categories: (i) musical structure; (ii) emotions; (iii) motion (gesture); and (iv) 
anthropomorphic attribution (related to drama). Dimension 2 refers to sources in Literature 
about music (multiple approaches to music). Thus, adjectives were grouped into four 
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categories: (a) common to Schenkerian literature (Schenker 1935; Salzer 1962; Salzer and 
Schachter 1969); (b) common to performance studies (Berry 1989; Stein 1957); (c) 
common to amateur music analysis literature (Carpentier 1980); (d) uncommon in music 
literature. Table 6.1 displays the seventeen adjectives indicating their corresponding 
category according to both dimensions. 




Amable Kind, gentle iv B 
Apasionada Passionate ii C 
Cantable Singable, cantabile i A 
Clara Clear, unmistakable i A 
Falsa False, faithless iv B 
Femenina Feminine, female iv D 
Impulsiva Impulsive, impetuous iii B 
Inmóvil Motionless, rigid iii A 
Integrada Integrated, assembled i A 
Íntima Intimate  iv B 
Lánguida Languid iii B 
Melancólica  Melancholic ii C 
Optimista Optimistic iv D 
Orientada Oriented iii A 
Rítmica Rhythmic, rhythmical i C 
Tierna Tender ii C 
Triste Sad ii C 
Table 6.1. Adjective list of seventeen terms used for the comparison task (third task). See 
the text for an explanation of the categories. 
6.2.2.3 Apparatus 
The stimuli were downloaded from the commercial CDs in wav computer format for their 
analysis. The stimuli were played by the computer. All the parameters (sound level, 
balance, equalization, etc.) were constantly maintained for both recordings. Subjects 
listened through headphones directly connected to the computer sound card. 
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The first task was registered using the same software, which allows registering the 
subject’s actions as it displays on the wave graph’s envelope the exact moment when a 
given key is pushed. 
6.2.2.4 Procedure 
Task 1: Subjects were asked to listen to one of the performances of the Prelude with the 
instruction of indicating its segmentation on line (by pushing a button on the computer’s 
keyboard whenever they heard the end of a unit) according to two different and successive 
requirements:  
1) Attending to the piece’s highest hierarchical articulation points (highest level 
segmentation) 
2) Attending to the piece’s lowest hierarchical points of grouping articulation (lowest 
level segmentation). 
Initially, the meaning of the different levels of segmentations were explained to the 
subjects using firstly an analogy with verbal language, and secondly a warm up example 
(the Chopin piano prelude in A major op. 28 N°7, performed by the same pianist, either 
AC or MA, of the test example (example 16 in disc). Subjects had to complete this warm 
up task successfully before starting with the test task. 
Before fulfilling the task, they were allowed to familiarize themselves with the 
piece by listening to the performance as many times as necessary (at least once). Only 
when they were sure of their answer was the software for registering responses run. 
Subjects were in front of the computer’s keyboard, without seeing the monitor. 
After fulfilling both requirements, they were asked to complete a questionnaire related to 
their musical background. 
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Task 2: According to a non-structured protocol, the 34 musicians had to write down, 
freely, their impressions during the listening of the performance of the prelude during task 
1. They were allowed to listen to the piece as many times as needed. They did not have any 
time restriction to complete the task, number of words, kind of writing, style, etc. After 
that, they were asked to do the same, on another sheet of paper, with the other 
performance. They were not told any information related to the fact that it was the same 
piece, a different version, or whatever else might bias the experience, and no directions 
related to the comparison of both versions were given. Similar free conditions of writing 
were offered in this case. 
 
Task 3: After performing the first and second tasks, subjects were asked to complete a 
protocol in which they were to compare both versions in terms of an adjective list provided 
by the computer monitor. The monitor displayed the first adjective, for example “happy”. 
The task consisted of indicating in a 7 point scale how much happier is the second version 
you listened to compared to the first? The scale points were minus three (much less happy), 
minus two (less happy), minus one (slightly less happy), zero (similarly happy), one 
(slightly happier), two (happier), and three (very much happier). 
After writing this judgement down, by pressing a key, the monitor showed the 
following adjective. The monitor also exhibited two icons representing both versions, 
clearly identifiable. Subjects were permitted to listen to both versions as many times as 
they wanted, in any order, by clicking the corresponding icon. 
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6.2.2.5 Design 
For the first task 18 subjects listened to Alfred Cortot’s performance (condition A), and the 
other 16 listened to Martha Argerich’s (condition B). All of them carried out both 
conditions for the same artist. 
For the second task, the 18 subjects in condition A listened to the Cortot 
performance first (as they came from task 1), and the Argerich one next. Contrarily, in 
condition B, the 16 subjects listened to Argerich’s performance followed by Cortot’s. 
For the third task the 17 item adjective list was presented in randomised order.  
6.2.3 Results and discussion 
6.2.3.1 Segmentation task 
Firstly, a simple quantitative analysis was run. Concerning requirement 1 (First listening: 
highest level segmentation) the subjects indicated an average of 1.56 segmentation marks 
throughout the entire piece for the AC performance, whereas for MA’s performance, the 
segmentation average was 1.81. Nevertheless, this difference was not significant. On the 
contrary, for requirement 2 (Second listening: lowest level segmentation) the average was 
greater for the AC performance (13.17) than for the MA one (9.56). This difference was 
marginally significant (p=.021 (F[1-32]=5.884). On this matter, there is an unusual finding: 9 
is the number of “arcs” into which we could divide the piece according to the “surface” 
analysis made in the previous chapter, whereas 14 is the number of outstanding points in 
the voice leading analysis of the background (see figure 5.2). Nevertheless, this relation is 
highly speculative and any other conjecture would need more investigation. 
The number of segmentation marks per bar was computed (because the instructions 
did not include any reference to do it “as fast as possible”, analysing the marks by counting 
them by temporal units lesser than a quarter note, would be very uncertain). Each unit (bar) 
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was considered from the third quarter note of each bar to the second quarter note of the 
following bar, due to the phrasing’s characteristic overlaps. Considering the units in this 
way was judged more pertinent, since it would allow greater clarity when evaluating 
segmentation strategies. To each segmentation mark a value of 1 was ascribed, and when 
there was no mark a value of 0 was given. The chance level for the statistical calculation 
was considered as the total number of segmentation marks divided by the number of bars 
in the piece (25). This chance level was calculated for each performance and each task 
requirement. 
Frequencies of segmentation marks are displayed in graphic manner in figures 6.1 
and 6.2, representing experimental requirements 1 and 2 respectively. In order to give clear 
descriptions, figures also display graphical analyses corresponding to both timing and 
dynamics of Cortot’s (above) and Argerich’s (below) performances, which were presented 
in figure 5.14. The bars in the central graphs display the percentages of observed 
segmentation mark frequencies for every bar. Due to the described structural ambiguity 
existent at every other bar (the elisions), each bar in the graph represents the registered 
segmentation marks from the second quaver of each bar to the first quaver of the following 
bar. In any case, the graph has to be read in a flexible way, since the listener often took a 
considerable amount of time in giving the response. 
Concerning the results for the highest level segmentation, a generative hypothesis 
would predict significant differences at bar 8 with higher scores for Cortot’s performance 
than for Argerich’s. Nevertheless, this was the only position in which the segmentation 
frequencies were significant for both performances, and in addition, the differences 
between them were not statistically significant. It is easy to admit that the marks that fell 
within bar 9 correspond to the articulation at bar 8 (in the position where the structural 
193 
interruption occurs). However it is possible to wonder whether there may be some relation 
Figure 6.1. Highest level segmentation of A. Cortot´s performance (upper panel) and 









































































































































































































between that delay and the microstructural differences observed in the performance study 
(see chapter 5). In other words, that delay may be associated with the extra time needed for 
greater certainty before giving an answer. It would be possible to hope that a more 
pronounced ritardando anticipates the answer. Therefore a smaller response time for the 
AC performance may be predicted. Thus, the time used by the listeners to give their 
responses in this point was calculated. The exact moment of the fourth quaver onset at bar 
8 – the interruption articulation point, where the /V before the interruption arrival takes 
place – was taken as the reference point. Contrary to what was expected, the mean 
response time was higher for the AC performance (3.09 seconds) than for the MA one 
(2.39 seconds), whose difference was marginally significant (F[1-28]=5.165; p = .031). 
Clearly, this contradicts the prediction. Nevertheless, because what is being measured is 
response time (as opposed to reaction time, typical in experimental paradigms in which 
subjects are asked to give their responses as soon as possible) it is possible to speculate that 
this is also tied to the time configuration of the work in that position. In other words, if the 
performance gives rise to there being more time between phrases, the listener could take 
more time to respond as a natural manner of matching the performance time. For that 
reason the response time as a proportion of the total time of bar 8 of each performance was 
calculated. In this way, the difference between the onset of the listeners’ mark and the 
fourth quaver onset was calculated first. Time responses were next expressed in terms of 
the proportion of bar 8 (in each condition), and were denominated proportional response 
times. Averages of the proportional response times were compared. This time it was 
demonstrated that the response time for the MA performance was slightly longer (.682) 
than the mean for the AC performance (.653). This difference, however, was not 
significant. 
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In spite of the similar segmentation at bar 8, it is interesting to emphasize the other 
significant marks (figure 6.1). These are the responses corresponding to bar 14 (the vertex 
of the arc) for MA’s performance, and the marks corresponding to bar 22 (the fall to the 
final tonic, and the articulation with the coda) for the AC performance. Both positions 
basically fulfilled the prediction. With respect to the MA performance, significantly 
segmented at bar 15, it is possible to say that, without a doubt, these marks correspond to 
the position indicated by the analysis at bar 14 (just as responses at bar 9 were considered). 
Even so, contrary to what the length of the ritardando predicts, the frequency of 
segmentation marks in this position is significantly smaller than that observed for bar 8 (p 
= .001). Although for the AC performance the segmentation marks in that position were 
not significant (even considering the marks for bars 14 and 15 all together), the difference 
of segmentation marks between both performances at this position were not significant 
either (p=.248). 
Concerning segmentation at bar 22, it is clearly observed that the AC performance 
was significantly more segmented than the MA performance (χ2(1)= 7.666; p = .006; also 
considering the marks at bar 23, similarly to bars 8 and 14). It can be observed that 
Argerich’s interpretation is felt as being more unified, as predicted in the previous analysis: 
according to a surface view, this cadence is only a point in the context of a more globally 
recessive process from the vertex of the largest arc to the end. On the contrary, the AC 
performance leads to a more segmented region. Listeners of his performance would be 
segmenting more because he “pretends” to start again whereas MA continues with her 
process. 
Concerning task requirement 2, figure 6.2 shows percentages of observed 
frequencies for the lowest hierarchical level segmentation. The horizontal line establishes 
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the significant level at 0.05. First of all a remarkable similarity between segmentations of 
both performances can be noted. The correlation between the segmentation frequencies of 
Figure 6.2. Lowest level Segmentation of A. Cortot´s performance (upper panel) and M. 




































































































































































































every bar between both performances was r =.880 (p<.000). In particular this similarity is 
observed during the first section (bars 1 to 8). This section is clearly divided into units with 
four bars each, which are in turn divided again into two lowest level units with two bars 
each (the latter division is clearer in the first four bar phrase than in the second.) A 
generative explanation would say that such a clear segmentation in the first part should be 
associated with a similar pattern of timing and dynamics use. But nevertheless, it does not 
occur, particularly as regards the AC performance. As it is seen in figure 6.2, the first eight 
bars do not show a clear pattern of dynamics and tempo gradients at the lowest level. 
However, comparing this graph with the one in figure 5.18, the segmentation proposed by 
the listeners narrowly fits the average performance ritardandi, which, as it was explained 
before, is a kind of virtual performance that listeners had, in fact, never heard. On the 
contrary, none of the real performances that listeners segmented (AC and MA), present 
this pattern either in timing or in dynamics. The listeners seem to be “ignoring” the 
performance features in order to fulfil the segmentation task. In that sense, the average 
segmentation, as emerging from the set of listeners as a whole, is similar to the average 
performance elicited by the set of performers: both seem to originate from the 
characteristics of the musical structure. Thus, the remarkable thing is the listener seems to 
disregard the expressive information. 
Contrarily, in the second branch of the interrupted form, from bars 9 to 22, lowest 
level hierarchical segmentation seems to be more diffuse and randomly distributed. 
According to the ritardandi in both versions, Argerich’s should be more segmented around 
bars 12 and 14 (related to the most prominent ritardando at bar 13). Paradoxically, the 
performance by Cortot is more segmented at this point. Obviously, the ritardando is not 
functioning as a cue for the segmentation task on the part of the listener of Argerich’s 
performance. In other words, this timing pattern means a different thing for them. 
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Therefore, these results indicate that timing and dynamics behaviours are not, per se, a 
sufficient condition to convey the hierarchical grouping structure, as predicted from the 
generative perspective. 
However, these results also reveal some methodological issues that are worth 
emphasizing. The segmentation experimental paradigm supposes that segmentation at the 
lowest level displays the structural hierarchy and, therefore, it can give some account of the 
segmentation at the highest level. In other words, the second task requirement should be 
reflected in the first. The results do not strictly suggest this. In the first term in the AC 
performance, the articulations between groups at lower levels (for example bars 4 and 10) 
are more marked than some of at higher levels (for example bar 8). At the same time, the 
segmentation task at the lowest level should contain in some way the segmentation at the 
highest level, because the articulation belonging to a high level is also present in the low 
level, according to the recursive principle (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983). Nevertheless, 
the data observed here diverges from this: in the MA performance, the segmentation at bar 
14 it is not manifested with the same effectiveness (observe the trough formed around bar 
14 in the graph of figure 6.2). Two observations can be made on this matter. The first is 
that it would seem that the subjects were doing something else, that their attention, placed 
in the lowest level, weakened the preoccupation for articulations of the highest level. The 
second is that it would seem that new hearings of the piece elicit responses fully 
configured in another manner. This is clearly seen when examining the marks at bar 21. 
Notice that at this bar the /I was still not reached. For that reason it is possible to say that 
responses at bar 21 are anticipating bar 22. If figure 6.1 is considered in detail, it is 
possible to appreciate that in the previous hearing, responses are at bar 22 itself or delayed 
(bar 23). Nevertheless, after a new hearing, the listener can already anticipate. This 
anticipation tendency is also observed at bar 8. Compare figures 6.1 and 6.2 at bar 8. The 
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performance of MA, which for the first task requirement had elicited so many responses at 
bar 9, for the second segmentation has 0 responses at that bar. Evidently, the subjects that 
in previous hearings had needed more time for segmenting can already anticipate it in later 
hearings. Certainly, in spite of the familiarization in listening, the successive task 
requirements modified the listening conditions from one to the other. Although this is 
reasonable and therefore it is possible to expect this type of difference, the question that 
emerges is: to what extent is the incidence of expressive factors not different throughout 
successive hearings of the performance? Would it be possible to think of the structural 
attributes of the composition as acquiring progressively more weight in the segmentation 
process at the expense of the incidence that may be proper of the expressive attributes? 
This point will be discussed further ahead, and chapters 7 to 10 are significantly related to 
this query. 
Nevertheless, examining another important point of the generative hypothesis, the 
necessity of advancing simultaneously in other directions arises. The generative paradigm 
supposes that the structured knowledge that the listener has to match the incoming 
information is isomorphic with some type of theoretical formalism. In our study, for 
example, the structure of ritardandi of the performance would be isomorphic with the 
grouping structure of the work. This supposes a sort of mapping between both structures. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that that mapping is not fulfilled point by point, and that, very 
frequently, the emerging relationships seem to be more global than specific. In our case in 
particular, if the patterns of ritardandi in the work are not appraised by the listener in terms 
of grouping boundaries, then in which terms is it appraised? In other words, what 
alternative meaning (or alternative meanings), can that structure of ritardandi contextually 
acquire? (see pp. 176 and ff). In order to make progress in that sense the following tasks 
were developed. 
200 
6.2.4 Performance comparison task 
The objective of this experiment was not only to compare the performances, but in 
principle, to investigate what type of representations the expressive attributes might elicit. 
The idea is that if the subject can compare two performances in terms of a given adjective, 
then it is possible that their representations of the performance features may be tied to the 
type of content that such an adjective represents. For example, if the subject is able to 
compare two performances in terms of the adjective happy, this suggests that the 
performance attributes are being represented in terms of emotions. In the research literature 
on communicational aspects of musical performance, at least four areas of content exist 
about what is communicated in performance, and which constitute a sort of target domain 
of the performance’s meaning process on the listener’s part. The most orthodox proposals 
agree with the objectivist perspective and speak about meaning in performance in terms of 
the music’s structural attributes (see chapter 4), but there are also some scholars speaking, 
from different fields, of other musical performance meaning domains related to areas such 
as emotions (Gabrielsson 2001, Juslin 2005), movement and gesture (Kendall and 
Carterette 1990, Clarke 2001), and stories (narrative, drama) and characters (agency) 
(Rothstein 1995, Schmalfeldt 1985). For that reason, it was first investigated if the subjects 
made use of all the adjectives in the comparison, as a way of looking for possible areas of 
meaning in performance. A T test for the absolute values of the comparison judgments for 
each adjective showed that averages of such absolute values (termed here average use, 
because they provide a measurement of the use of such an adjective as a comparison 
parameter between performances) of all the adjectives was significantly different from 0. 
Therefore, it is possible to ensure that all the adjectives have been significantly used in the 
task of comparing performances. Nevertheless, knowing to what extent each adjective was 
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used would allow deeper investigation of the nature of the representations that 
performances, as the variable of comparison, may elicit in the listener.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with the adjectives list as within-subject factor and 
experimental condition as between-subject factor showed that the experimental conditions 
were not significantly different. In other words, subjects who listened to the AC 
performance first did not make use of the adjectives when comparing performances in a 
different way from the subjects who listened to the MA performance first. For this reason, 
the results of both conditions are combined from here onwards. On the other hand, the 
adjectives factor was significant (F[16-512]=5.149; p<.000). The graph in figure 6.3 exhibits 
























Figure 6.3. Average use (averages of absolute values of comparison judgments) for the 17 
adjectives. (Since English translation of adjectives is problematic, they are in Spanish; see 
table 6.1 for a rough translation) 
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adjective. In the graph it is observed that the most used adjective was passionate, and the 
least used was false. The use of the adjectives by category for the two dimensions by 
which the adjectives had been selected was analysed (see Method). Notice that Dimension 
1 alluded to areas of the domain of meaning (musical structure, emotions, etc.), whereas 
Dimension 2 alluded to the use of those terms in Literature (analysis literature, execution 
literature, etc.). The average use by category is exhibited in figure 6.4. A one factor 
ANOVA was run for each one of the dimensions. Both of them were significant: F[3-
574]=8.593; p<.000, for Dimension 1, and F[3-574]=5.569; p=.000 for Dimension 2. A Post 
Hoc study (Student-Newman-Keuls) for each case was run. For both dimensions two 
homogenous subgroups were obtained, the first one grouping the 3 first categories and 
other displaying the fourth category. In this way the categories Anthropomorphic 
Attribution in dimension 1 and Uncommon in dimension 2, can be seen to have been 
significantly less used than the rest of the categories. 
It is interesting to notice that, although all the subjects were musicians, the 






















Figure 6.4. Average Use (averages of the abs. values of the comparison judgments) for 
adjectives grouped in 4 categories according to 2 different classificatory dimensions 
Schenkerian literature 
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1. Adjectives referred to Musical Structure as well as those employed by Schenkerian 
Literature, were less used. 
With the intention of examining fully the comparison between both performances, a 
T test for each adjective was run. There were significant judgments for only 7 of the 17 
adjectives. Curiously, many of the adjectives with high average uses (averages of the 
absolute value of the comparison judgments) did not show significant comparison 
judgment averages. Thus, for example the adjective passionate, the most used, did not 
show an average significantly different from 0. In other terms, although the listeners 
emitted judgments of comparison around the quality of passionate for the performance, 
there was no defined tendency to indicate one of the performances as more passionate than 
the other. 
The comparison judgment averages for the adjectives that were significant are 
exhibited in figure 6.5. The bars to the left indicate that the MA performance was 
considered higher than the AC performance as regards the quality that the adjective 
describes. On the other hand, the bars towards the right indicate the opposite. Thus, for 
example, listeners considered the MA performance to be significantly tenderer than the 
AC, and the AC performance more impulsive than the MA.  
Concerning the quality of the performances as prolongational and non 
prolongational, the elicited use of the adjectives and comparisons do not seem to account 
for it. Expressions frequently used by Schenkerian theoreticians are not reflected in these 
results. Thus, for example, it would be possible to predict that listeners consider a 
prolongational performance to be more integrated than a non prolongational one. The 
results presented here suggest the opposite. This issue not only brings us face to face with 
the assumptions that the prolongational theory often presents related to performance, but in 
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the particular case of this research it also shows methodological problems. A refinement in 
the selection of adjectives is necessary in order to improve such methodological issues. For 
example, the rating for Schenkerian adjectives does not show the predictions of theorists 
about the relation between performance and listeners. This contradiction may be related to 
a methodological weakness, since these kinds of terms are (at least in the Spanish 
language) more ambiguous and less used. The fact that the most used adjectives have not 
presented a differentiated tendency between performances might account for the habitual 
use of terms referring to music that do not allude to performance problems. On the other 
hand those words that musicians do use to talk about performance problems are more 
ambiguous and less used, and so it is therefore much more difficult for the listener to 
operate with them when comparing. It is necessary to delve deeper into this topic in order 
to inquire into the more abstract levels of musical thinking. 
As we already saw, microstuctural and structural attributes are concurrent. The 
nature of the listener's experience regarding this concurrency seems to be multimodal. 
Ratings of use are quantitative indicators of the most active representational modalities on 
Figure 6.5. Significant Comparison Judgment Averages. Judgments considering the 
quality for the MA performance higher are showed towards the left. Judgments 
considering the quality for the AC performance higher are showed towards the right. (See 

















the part of the listener when comparing versions. The usage of some adjective categories 
reveals that listeners’ experiences of performance timing and dynamics do not always 
correspond with Music Theoretical terms. On the contrary, they tend to use representations 
that refer to emotions, motions, etc. To have a declarative access to a given musical 
attribute does not necessarily condition experiencing it. Moreover, and given that voice-
leading seems to imply extremely abstract configurations, it is reasonable to think that the 
experience of this particular structural attribute might contribute to the listener's experience 
in other domains (as Schenker suggests). 
Undoubtedly, one of such domains is the temporal domain, the area of the 
configuration of the experience in time. In order to investigate this particular area a second 
experiment was run. In it, the temporal configuration of the stimuli was manipulated in 
order to investigate some of the implications that the performance of the prolongational 
structure might have on the listener’s experience of time. 
6.3 Listening experiment 2: experimentally manipulated 
stimuli 
6.3.1 Background 
The aim of this study is to examine the reception process of the prolongational and non-
prolongational performances of the piece, inquiring into the temporal organization of 
listeners’ perceptions. As seen above (p. 97), the classical cognitive perspective affirms 
that the performer’s actions have an impact on the ways in which listeners perceive certain 
structural attributes (metre, texture, harmony, etc.). However, we do not know very much 
about the way in which the details of the performance can influence other kinds of 
cognitive processes. In particular, if timing is one of the main features that characterise a 
performance, it is to be expected that it can influence some aspects of the general time 
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configuration in music. As we saw in the previous experiment, the segmentation task 
shows a particular way to organize time in the listener’s musical experience. However, as 
we can appreciate, both structural and microstructural attributes seem to take part in the 
segmentation decisions.  
According to Epstein (1995) there is a particular way to experience time in music 
that it could be named experiential time. In this way musical events establish themselves in 
a sequence that – through memories and expectations - can be understood as a whole and 
be recovered in chronological order. So we have a sequential experience of musical time of 
episodic nature through which we recognize a before and an after. For the latter there are 
two main processes: (1) the retrieval of musical information that has already happened and 
(2) the retrieval of the information’s temporal order. Therefore, it is possible to think that 
the performance’s features influence this experiential time configuration in a way not 
revealed by the segmentation task (which is, as we saw, more influenced by structural than 
microstructural attributes). This study simply intends to gather some evidence related to 
this possibility. 
In our perception of time the emphasis that certain traits can possess throughout the 
sequence of events guiding such perception plays an essential role, and the emphasis can 
be inherent in the structural role which the event plays in the structure. Thus, certain events 
are temporally accented. These are important because they guide attention and perceptual 
capture (Jones and Boltz 1989, Jones 1992) and they are used for the recall of the temporal 
sequence (Boltz 1992). The network of such events constitutes an organization of 
prominences (saliences, accents) inherent to the musical piece. In other words, this group 
of particularly highlighted events constitutes a kind of setting in which attention and 
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perception are kept and organized. For this reason, this set of prominent events in the piece 
itself constitutes a structural attentional scaffolding (SAS). 
As the segmentation experiment demonstrated, expressive features may reinforce or 
contradict the structural information and from that conflict the listener may understand the 
musical time configuration. Consequently, we can also talk about an expressive attentional 
scaffolding (EAS) of the performance itself. To sum up, it is assumed that the listener’s 
attention is captured not only by the characteristics of the piece but also by the expressive 
information the performance supplies. 
In a series of clever and original works, Boltz and her colleagues (Boltz 1992; 
Brown and Boltz 2002) studied the way which highlighted events, interpolated both in 
musical sequences and in other types of time constrained sequences (for example filmic 
sequences) impinge on attending. In them, they showed the effects of extrinsic accentual 
organization on recalling filmed narrations using short commercials during the observation 
of television series. Commercials acted as focal points in the temporal sequence, 
facilitating or impeding the processing of time information according to how they might 
reinforce or contradict the intrinsic accentual organization. “By using patterns of temporal 
accentuation to guide attending, the inherent meaning or gist of the event will be revealed, 
as well as adjacent and nonadjacent relations within the underlying organizational 
scheme” (Boltz 1992; p.91). Subsequently we can talk about outer attentional scaffolding 
(OAS), supplied by fortuitous interventions during the listening act. 
6.3.2 Aim of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the possible interrelations between the three kinds 
of attentional scaffoldings (structural, expressive and outer), as they can affect the 
configuration of time in music performance, and therefore, in its reception. The general 
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hypothesis establishes that in conveying the prolongational structure, as the form’s 
generator, a performance will affect the listener’s experiential time, that is to say the 
experience of time in terms of before and after. For this reason the incidence of these 
scaffoldings in memory tasks directly related to the establishment of a particular temporal 
configuration are examined, particularly (i) time estimation; (ii) retrieving temporal 
information; and (iii) establishing the chronological order of the recovered temporal 
information. 
6.3.3 Method 
6.3.3.1 General issues 
This method (Boltz 1992) permits the investigation of how the structure of a given 
temporal sequence is used to guide its recollection. Its starting point is the assumption that  
“temporal accents are considered to be psychologically important because 
they capture attending and direct it toward the corresponding melodic 
information (...) The basic idea is that the same structural relations used to 
guide attending and perceptual pickup are used to recapitulate the event’s 
sequence of items. Joint accent structures offer particularly efficient schemes 
for perceiving and remembering because the overall hierarchical arrangement 
of nested relations is attentionally outlined.” (p. 91) 
This procedure is linked not only to the problem of unity (see chapter 3) in 
performance but also to the topic of music performance viewed as a narrative or dramatic 
sequence (as a sequence in narrative time). 
The experiment’s method is based on the fact that it is possible to coincide outer 
attentional scaffolding (OAS) – a set of marks such as interruptions or cuts in a 
performance - with structural attentional scaffolding (SAS) – for example cadences at 
209 
phrase endings – as much as with expressive attentional scaffolding (EAS) – for example, 
a set of prominent rubato points (places where the relation between acceleration and 
deceleration is more pronounced). As classical cognitive studies in music performance 
uphold, frequently SAS coincides with the expressive one. However, as we have seen (see 
chapter 5, p.175), it is not always like this because rubato (like other expressive 
components) is often used with different aims rather than simply pointing out the structure. 
Therefore it is also possible to match an OAS with an EAS, without it coinciding with the 
structural one (SAS). One can thereby study the interaction between the three aspects of 
the realization of different tasks that the subjects have to solve after listening to the musical 
material in question. 
Figure 6.6 schematically represents the three attentional scaffoldings of the 
experiment. The central rectangle represents the composition (SAS). In it the interrupted 
form was illustrated (using the conventional Schenkerian analysis symbols), and some bar 
numbers were added to locate events more easily. The upper panel represents the AC 
Figure 6.6. Representation of the experimental conditions. See explanation in the text.
Condition P-direct 
Condition P-intersecting 
Condition  NP-direct 
Condition NP-i 
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(Alfred Cortot) prolongational performance (in black lines). The R represents the 
performance’s most pronounced ritardando, and the r represents notable, though 
secondary, rubato peaks in the performance (see microstructural analysis of timing in, p. 
160 and ff). Thus, the black lines and the R-r-r set together represent the P-EAS 
(prolongational expressive attentional scaffolding). On the other hand, the lower panel 
represents the MA (Martha Argerich) non prolongational performance (in red lines). A 
large arc with its vertex at the position of bars 13-14 was schematically sketched. Thus, the 
red R-r-r set together represent NP-EAS (non prolongational EAS). The arrows represent 
cuts during the performances. Interpolations were introduced into the stimuli in these cuts. 
Therefore, each row of arrows represents an OAS (a set of cuts that disrupts the continuity 
of the piece). Notice that the filled (both black and red) arrows agree with the respective 
performance timing marks (R-r). In this way the black arrows agree with both the 
ritardando and the rubato peaks of the AC performance. For this reason this OAS was 
denominated OAS-A. In the same way, the red arrows agree with both the ritardando and 
the rubato peaks of the MA performance, denominated as OAS-B. 
A general prediction is that if the OAS coincides with the EAS, the tasks related to 
time processing will be favoured. On the other hand, if the OAS does not coincide with the 
EAS, these tasks will be inhibited. Briefly, it is hoped that some evidence of the incidence 
of the performance’s expressive features in the listener’s time configuration of said 
performance will be obtained, by analysing time processing tasks with stimuli that either 
facilitate or make it difficult because of the interpolations. 
6.3.3.2 Subjects 
118 university students participated in the test. All the subjects had had moderate musical 
instruction (from 1 to 4 years). They were distributed in 6 groups (N= 25, 17, 17, 15, 26 
and 18 respectively) assigned to four experimental conditions (with interpolations, see 
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Design) and to two control conditions (without interpolations). Only 1 subject recognized 
the musical piece we used. 
6.3.3.3 Stimuli 
As in the previous experiment, the selected piece was the Chopin Piano Prelude in B minor 
op. 28 N°6. The two performances of the Prelude were the same as in the previous 
experiment (Alfred Cortot 1934 and Martha Argerich 1977)  
In each performance three cuts were made –interruptions in performance- according 
to figure 6.6. The three cuts constitute an OAS. Two OAS were arranged, one matching the 
P-EAS, and the other coinciding with the NP-EAS. The first one was called OAS-A and the 
second OAS-B. 
A 10 second concert ovation clip (applause) was recorded and used as an 
interpolation. The interpolation was inserted into each of the indicated cuts. In this way, we 
obtained 4 (2 EAS [performances P and NP] x 2 OAS [A and B]) versions of the stimuli by 
manipulating the applause interpolations and inserting them into the cuts (figure 6.6). The 
versions manipulated in this manner were named complete stimuli. Recorded examples 17-
20 (in the disc) are complete stimuli.  
Thus, through the four experimental conditions, the performances appear either 
with the OAS matching its own EAS (examples 17 and 19), or with the non-matching 
(crossed) OAS regarding its own EAS (examples 18 and 20). In the first case, EAS and 
OAS are combined in a direct manner. In the second case, EAS and OAS are combined in 
an intersecting fashion. Therefore, the complete stimulus P-direct corresponds to the 
prolongational performance marked (interpolated) in the OAS-A positions (grey arrows in 
figure 6.7; example 19). The complete stimulus P-intersecting corresponds to the 
prolongational performance with marks in the OAS-B positions (white arrows in figure 
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6.7; example 20). The complete stimulus NP-direct corresponds to the non prolongational 
performance with cuts in the OAS-A positions (example 17) and the complete stimulus 
Figure 6.7. Score of the Chopin Piano Prelude in B minor op. 28 N°6. The simple 
descending arrows indicate the places where the marks (cuts in performance) that 
constitute the outer attentional scaffoldings were inserted. The grey arrows point out the 
marks that compose the OAS-A that coincide with the expressive attentional scaffolding 
(points of maximum rubato) of the prolongational performance. The white arrows indicate 
the interpolations that constitute the OAS-B, that coincide with the NP-EAS (of the non 
prolongational performance). The double horizontal arrows specify the sequences taken for 
the different tasks. The grey arrows indicate the sequences related to the EAS-A (type A 
sequences), and the white ones are related to the EAS-B (type B sequences). 
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NP-intersecting corresponds to the non prolongational performance with cuts according to 
OAS-B (example 18). These four complete stimuli represented the four experimental OAS 
conditions. In addition, 2 control conditions were arranged without the OAS. This simply 
means prolongational performance (control prolongational - CP condition) and non 
prolongational performance (control non prolongational - CNP condition) respectively. 
Therefore this experiment involved 6 different conditions. 
Additionally, 6 three-second sequences were taken from the material adjacent to the 
cut (before or after each cut) and used in the retrieval task as heard sequences (see Figure 
6.7). Three of them were selected from the adjacencies of the cut points corresponding to 
OAS-A. They were called Type A heard sequences (grey in figure 6.7; example 21 in disc). 
The other three were obtained from the material adjacent to the cuts corresponding to 
OAS-B (white in figure 6.7). Therefore they were named Type B heard sequences 
(example 22). Similarly, six other sequences of equal characteristics belonging to different 
pieces were taken and considered as unheard sequences in the same task. When selecting 
the musical pieces to extract the mentioned sequences, similarities in texture, tonality, time 
and character were observed. The preludes from the same Chopin series (Op. 28), N0 2 
(bars 8.3 to 8.4 and 10.2 to 10.3), N0 9 (bars 5.4 to 6.1 and 9.4 to 10.2), and N0 15 (13.1 to 
13.4 and 30.1 to 31.1 ½) were used and recorded by the same artists in the same recording 
sessions (Figure 6.8; Example 23). Between the sequences of the series a 7-second silence 
was interpolated. 
Finally 12, three-second sequences from adjacencies of each cut (in a similar way 
to the previous but now both previous to and after the cut) were taken. The 6 sequences 
corresponding to OAS-A were named Type A sequences, and the 6 that corresponded to 
OAS-B were called Type B sequences. Different pairs were set up using those sequences. 
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Three of these pairs had Type A sequences and were named Type A pairs (Example 24). 
Another three, Type B pairs, were formed by Type B sequences (Example 25). Finally, four 
pairs were Mixes, including one Type A sequence and one Type B sequence (Example 26). 
The pairs fulfilled the following criteria: (i) no pair could be formed by two adjacent 
sequences of a same cut, this means the pair could not take the previous or following 
sequence of a determined cut; (ii) all the pairs had to be formed by sequences of 
contiguous cuts (for instance a sequence adjacent to cut 1 and another sequence adjacent to 
cut 2); (iii) none of the pairs could be formed by non contiguous sequences (this means that 
Figure 6.8. Unheard clips – Retrieval task 
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for example there could not be a pair integrated by a cut 1 sequence adjacent to cut 3); (iv) 
type A and B pairs had to have sequences with the same position with respect to the cut 
(for example, a sequence prior to cut 1 and a sequence prior to cut 2); (v) on the contrary, 
mixed pairs had to have two sequences corresponding to opposite locations with respect to 
the cut (for example a sequence prior to cut 1 and a sequence posterior to cut 2), this last 
requirement sought for both sequences in the pair not to be too close in the original (in the 
complete stimulus); (vi) the pairs had to avoid thematic parallelisms (both sequences of the 
pair representing the same thematic motif); (vii) the pairs had to avoid ambiguous 
situations given by repetition of the material. The two sequences of the pair were separated 
by a two-second silence and between pairs a seven-second silence to carry out the task. 
6.3.3.4 Apparatus  
The stimuli were processed with a computer using a standard sound editor and were 
recorded on CDs following the test order for each experimental condition. Stimuli were 
reproduced using a standard JVC RC-QN1 WT CD player for all test sessions. 
6.3.3.5 Procedure 
Originally, the test had 4 tasks ordered according to the cognitive demands 
represented by each. For each task there was a similar procedure, subjects would first listen 
to the Complete Stimulus and then receive the instruction for the task. The subjects were 
previously given general instructions to listen to a musical composition with the purpose of 
doing tasks related to memorizing a heard musical piece, but, as was said, the nature of the 
task was revealed just after the listening practice. 
As Task 2 was similar to task 2 in the previous experiment (Register of 
impressions), the results are not reported here (for the same reasons). Therefore, results 
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presented here correspond to tasks 1 (overall time estimation), 3 (retrieval) and 4 
(temporal order recognition). 
Overall time estimation task: subjects were asked to estimate how much time seemed to 
have passed between the performance’s beginning and end. “Radically different 
impressions of duration can result from different degrees to which attention is directed 
toward temporal events.” (Brown and Boltz 2002). It is assumed that if attention is further 
disrupted – as in a non-articulation point condition – duration will be overestimated. Since 
it is possible to think that a prolongational performance will demand more diverted 
attention (due to the rivalry between surface and deep levels) predictions about the 
overestimation of the overall time of prolongational performances may be formulated. 
Retrieval task. Subjects listened to the Complete Stimulus for the third time (remember 
that they had already heard it for each of the previous tasks) and then a series of 12 
sequences was presented (6 unheard and 6 known, three type A and three type B). They 
were asked to decide whether each one of them was known (heard, belonging to a 
previously listened piece) or unheard (new). Besides making a heard-unheard judgment for 
each item, they were asked to indicate their certainty on a 7-point scale ranging from very 
uncertain (1) to very certain (7). This task took approximately 5 minutes. 
Temporal order recognition task. For the fourth time subjects listened to the Complete 
Stimulus and then a series of 10 pairs (three Type A, three Type B and four Mixed) was 
presented. They were asked to say which member of the pair (the first or second sequence) 
had appeared in the complete stimulus first. Furthermore, they were asked to indicate their 
answering certainty on a 7-point scale ranging from very uncertain (1) to very certain (7). 
This task took approximately 5 minutes. 
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The test was carried out in grouped sessions. Acoustic sound reproduction 
conditions were similar for all sessions. 
6.3.3.6 Design 
This experiment had 3 x 2 experimental conditions. The first factor represents relations 
between expressive and outer scaffolding: (i) without outer (control); (ii) coinciding outer 
and expressive (direct); and (iii) crossing outer and expressive (intersecting). The second 
factor represents the two types of performances: (i) prolongational and (ii) non 
prolongational. In this way the six conditions were: P-c (control prolongational), NP-c 
(control non prolongational), P-d, P-i, NP-d and NP-i (see figure 6.6). Consequently, one 
can observe (i) the incidence of the expressive attentional scaffolding compared with 
control conditions between them; (ii) the joint incidence of structural and expressive 
features comparing all conditions d and i amongst them since, for example, condition P-d 
has interpolations in the same place as condition NP-i. In that way those interpolations 
mark the same structural points but different expressive features. 
Both series of sequences in the retrieval task and pairs of the temporal order 
recognition task were recorded in random order. 
6.3.4 Results 
All the results obtained in the three tasks are presented. Several of them, as can be 
observed, do not achieve statistical significance. Nevertheless, due to the reduced number 





6.3.4.1 Overall time-estimation task 
Concerning this task some predictions were formulated: (i) expressive differences will 
elicit different time estimation accuracy; (ii) Time of interrupted performances will be 
judged less correctly; (iii) Inaccuracy will be higher for the intersecting condition. 
Differences between each subject’s overall time estimation and the actual stimuli duration 
were calculated. This value was termed the estimation error. (Because the stimuli in the 
different conditions presented different global durations, this estimation error was 
standardized as a proportion of the stimuli duration). In this way the mean of the overall 
time estimation error in the P-c condition was 63.94% of the actual duration of the 
stimulus. In the NP-c condition it was 43.16%. For the experimental conditions, the 
respective means were: P-d 112.71%; NP-d, 65.56%; P-i, 154.77%; and NP-i, 148.64%. 
These values are represented in the graph of figure 6.9. A univariate ANOVA with factors 
Condition (c, d, i) and Performance (p, np) as factors between subjects were significant for 
both (Condition: F[2-130]=34.022; p<.000; Performance: F[1-131] = 6.635; p = .011). On the 
other hand, the interaction between both factors was not significant. 
Figure 6.9. Estimation error (proportional) Averages of the overall time estimation for 
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These results show that performance traits affect the global appreciation of the 
length (time) of the performance. The greater estimation errors in the conditions with 
interpolations account for the interruption, when breaking the continuity of the work as a 
whole, distorting the estimation of the overall time even more. In other words, the 
disruption of the temporal continuity affects the time estimation task. Nevertheless, the 
differences between the direct and intersecting conditions are evidence of that distortion 
being greater when the disruption of temporal continuity does not adjust to the temporal 
organization proposed by the set of the performance’s most salient timing characteristics. 
That is to say, when external contingencies break the time configuration proposed by the 
performance’s timing, the overall time estimation is more inaccurate. This clearly accounts 
for the importance of the timing features taken as a whole in the listener’s temporal 
experience of the performance. 
6.3.4.2 Retrieval task 
Concerning this task some predictions were formulated: (i) expressive differences will 
elicit different retrieval levels; (ii) retrieval of short excepts will be higher for direct 
condition than for control condition; (iii) retrieval of short excerpts will be lower for the 
intersecting condition than for control condition; (iv) retrieval of short excerpts non 
adjacent to expressive scaffolding will be lower than retrieval of excerpts adjacent to 
expressive scaffolding  
Each of the answers and certainty judgments given by the subjects was gathered in 
a single response on a 14-point scale ranging from 1 (incorrect answer, very certain), to 
14(correct answer, very certain). The averages for the six groups can be seen in the graphs 
in figure 6.10. 
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An ANOVA Repeated Measures was run with the Sequence factor (unheard, heard 
A, heard B) as the within-subject factor, and Condition (control, direct, intersecting) and 
Performance (prolongational, non prolongational) as the between-subject factors. The 
factor Sequence was significant (F[2-130]=61.583; p<.000). A post hoc contrast determined 
that the difference between the averages for unheard sequences and heard a sequences was 
significant (F[1-131]=102.198; p<.000), and the difference between heard a and heard b 
sequences was marginally significant (F[2-130]=4.088; p=.045). It may therefore be 
appreciated that subjects could better recognize sequences already listened to than those 
belonging to other compositions. In the same way, sequences from the adjacencies of the 
rubato peak positions of the prolongational performance were better recognised, that is, 
sequences associated with important points of the musical structure viewed from the voice 
leading perspective. 
In contrast, the Performance factor was not significant. Thus, it is possible to 
Figure 6.10. Retrieval task. Left panel: Prolongational performance.
Right Panel: non prolongational performance. 
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speculate that the recognition task is similar when listening to any one of the two 
performances (without differences between the prolongational and the non prolongational 
ones). 
The Condition factor showed itself to be marginally significant (F[2-130]=2.611; 
p=.077). Although this evidence is very weak, it is worth analysing in terms of trends. This 
result suggests that listeners tend to recognize better sequences coming from the 
interruption points. It arises as evidence that the disruption of the temporal continuity alters 
the retrieval task. In other words, there is a slight tendency towards the attention to certain 
expressive characteristics facilitating recall of the musical sequence, or making it more 
difficult. That is to say that, although the evidence is weak, it is possible that according to 
how the performer manipulates the expressive features, certain sequences can be retrieved 
by the listener (with the subsequent configuration of the whole in the listener’s 
representation). 
6.3.4.3 Temporal order recognition task 
Concerning this task some predictions were formulated: (i) expressive differences will 
elicit different temporal order recognition levels; (ii) temporal order recognition of short 
excepts will be higher for direct condition than for control condition; (iii) temporal order 
recognition of short excerpts will be lower for the intersecting condition than for control 
condition; (iv) temporal order recognition of short excerpts non adjacent to expressive 
scaffolding will be lower than temporal order recognition of excerpts adjacent to 
expressive scaffolding 
For the analysis of the temporal order recognition task the procedure was similar to 
calculating a repeated measures ANOVA. The Pairs factor (type A, type B, mixture) was 
the within-subjects factor, and Condition (control, direct, intersecting) and Performance 
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(prolongational, non prolongational) were the between-subjects factors. The Pairs factor 
was significant (F[2-130]=12.701; p<.000). The graphs in figure 6.11 show that the type b 
pairs were the best ordered for both performances, while predictions estimated that type a 
pairs will be better ordered in prolongational performance. Neither the Condition factor nor 
the Performance factor were significant. Nevertheless, the Condition*Performance 
interaction appeared as marginally significant (F[2-130]=3.199; p=.044). It is possible to 
appreciate in the graphs of figure 6.11 that the control condition reaches the highest scores 
for one performance and the lowest scores for the other. The difference between both 
control conditions appeared as marginally significant (F[1-41]=4.106; p=.049). Thus, it can 
be appreciated that when listening to performances without interpolations, subjects manage 
to perform better on the temporal order recognition task for the AC performance than for 
the MA performance. This shows the way in which the expressive characteristics affect the 
task of establishing a temporal order between pairs of events. 
It is quite possible that the task was too difficult, implying an excessively high 





























Figure 6.11. Temporal order task. Left panel: prolongational 
performance. Right panel: non prolongational performance. 
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that relatively low standard deviations appear (between 2.06 and 2.28). This reveals that 
subjects were in general very uncertain in their answers. In spite of this, the data 
demonstrate that such a crucial task for the time configuration of the performance in on 
line listening, as is establishing the before-after relationships between isolated components, 
is influenced by the expressive characteristics of the performance. Remarkably, when 
introducing outer attentional scaffolding, the incidence of the performance itself seems to 
diminish (see the similarity of results for the direct and intersecting conditions for both 
performances). It would seem that what is externally attached orients the establishment of 
the before-after relationships better than the performance’s particularities. This point will 
be crucial in the analysis of the experiments of the third part, which will discuss how 
crossmodal information can give rise to similar performance time configurations. 
6.3.5 Discussion 
This experiment investigated the structural and expressive interaction attributes in the 
listener’s performance time configuration. The musical stimuli were manipulated by 
generating cuts throughout their continuity. In some cases those cuts agreed with the 
position of the most salient timing expressive attributes, whereas in others they did not 
coincide. In short, the rationale of the experiment was based on considering that if such 
timing attributes contribute to a particular performance time configuration on the part of 
the listener, then the cuts coinciding with them would facilitate tasks related to the 
construction of such a configuration. On the contrary, cuts that do not coincide with the 
most salient timing attributes should disturb the accomplishment of tasks related to the 
time configuration. The tasks were ordered according to increasing cognitive demand, to 
the extent that they demanded greater memory and attention resources. 
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The primary aim for including this kind of experiment in a research undertaking 
concerning the role of prolongation in performance communication is linked to the 
findings of the previous experiment in which listeners were asked to segment the course of 
the performance. In that experiment, in spite of certain smaller differences in the ways of 
segmenting the two remarkably different performances as regards their use of timing and 
dynamic resources, the listeners tended to segment both performances in the same way. 
This led to the speculation that such segmentation could clearly be understood as an 
imposition of the composition itself (the intentio operis). From this, generative 
speculations about the communication of structural attributes from the handling of 
expressive attributes on the part of the performer were seriously questioned. The design of 
the present experiment aimed to investigate possible interrelations between intentio operis 
(imposed by the composition) and intentio interpretis (imposed by the performance), 
through accentuating both intentios using outer accentuations (cuts and interpolations). 
The existence of these two intentios, revealed to the listener through different sets 
of features that function as scaffoldings to the attentional devices, shows an ontology of the 
musical piece that goes beyond what is possibly recoverable through the musical text 
written in the score. 
The findings indicate that some temporal activities are influenced by these 
intentios. Remarkably, the three tasks here are important for experiencing musical time as 
narrative (Epstein 1995). The obtained data also showed tendencies towards an interaction 
between the effects of the different scaffoldings. The results of this experiment show that 
the relations between structural, expressive and external marks are decisive for memory 
tasks. 
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These considerations allow us to estimate that the influence of the particularities of 
performance in listening tasks goes beyond the issue of problems of salience of the 
component and perceptibility. In contrast, we can observe that performance influences the 
way that the listener can recreate the temporal facet of the discourse, crucial for talking 
about a musical narrative (Imberty 1997a, Shifres 2004). The following chapters will go 
deeper into this issue. 
6.4 General discussion  
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the prolongational structure of music is an extremely 
intricate construct, whose systematic study becomes particularly difficult because of, 
firstly, a vague enunciation of its status, and secondly, methodological and epistemological 
problems arising as a result of such a lack of definition. 
This first study consists of an epistemological exercise in which we try out 
available paradigms and methods with the aim of finding an adequate frame for developing 
the study. 
We can see that most of the studies on performance have been firmly supported by 
the generative paradigm. Findings offered here seem only partially to support the 
generative hypothesis, since some of them are difficult to understand in terms of rule 
systems, grammars or other classical devices. We have seen that there is a very important 
interpretative task on the part both of performers and listeners mainly based on: (i) 
examining available information in the light of the context in which this information is 
presented, and (ii) a clear intervention of their own intention in the interpretative process. 
Because cognitive psychology, naturally preoccupied in finding general laws shared 
by subjects when thinking, acting, feeling, learning, remembering, etc., has focused on the 
search of commonalities in musical experience, it has had strong ties with the objectivist 
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approach to music performance (see chapter 2). The results of these experiments allow the 
consideration of important aspects of the prolongational structure of tonal music related to 
such common behaviours on the part both of the performer and the listener. In that way 
there are considerable elements for continuing the search for stronger commonalities. 
However, if this study continued following this path, some improvements of the present 
experiments would be necessary. Firstly, the intentio lectoris should be explicit by using a 
different experimental paradigm. That paradigm should be based on stimuli specially 
performed for the experimental treatment, in which performers be asked to play a piece 
with the intention of communicate the previously elucidated prolongational structure. This 
aspect is related to the classical communicational approach, by which communication is 
defined from a given communicative intention (although, as we shall see in the next 
chapters, some alternative communicational perspective may do without this intention 
attribution). Secondly, the exploratory listening studies presented here appeared as 
unsatisfactory in order to contribute with strong evidence about the way in which 
composition’s prolongational structure and performance come together in the 
communicational process. Understanding prolongation as percept would entail the use of 
alternative experimental paradigms, but, at the same time, it would confine the study to 
very short musical excerpts and surface prolongational issues. That is the case of some 
previous research that used the experimental paradigm of “matching” with a performed 
reduction (Serafine et al 1989, Shifres y Martínez 2000), and other paradigms (see 
Martínez 2006). 
Nevertheless, many interesting questions related to the individual both in 
performance and in the reception experience, which, as we will see in the next chapter, are 
crucial in the current music performance scene, seem to go beyond that perspective. Other 
alternative view of the role of the prolongational structure in music performance 
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communication will be proposed in the following chapters. However, before abandoning 
this perspective, the results of the experiments will be discussed, in this section, in the light 
of the most classical approaches in performance studies. 
6.4.1 The personal performer 
As we will see in the next chapter, individuality is currently one of the most appreciated 
features of a performance. All performers intend to be personal, intend to give a personal 
interpretation. A priori, it seems difficult and even contradictory to study this individuality 
from the perspective of a grammar. However, we have seen that certain clearly 
idiosyncratic components – related to a particular artist, a given epoch, a performative 
tradition, etc. – may be explained in systematic terms, tying the way the performer 
functions to the nature of the task, and the musical structure involved in such a task. 
Nevertheless, in other cases it seems difficult to draw up a mapping of a particular music 
performance from the description of each characteristic of the musical structure. On the 
contrary, the way in which the musical structure seems to support the characteristics of the 
performance would require a particular interpretation in each case. 
On this matter, it is interesting to consider the differences found in the analysis of a 
performance’s structurally clear and ambiguous zones. From these differences it is 
assumed that the performance’s originality is more crucial when the structure seems more 
ambiguous. In many cases, then, the possibility of confining the performance actions to 
rule systems or grammars seems to be related to the structural simplicity on which such 
actions are operating. In other words, when the structure appears in a more or less 
standardized way, that structure’s standard behaviour seems to correspond with ‘standard’ 
performance behaviour on the part of the performer. Such standardization is manifested, 
for example, in the average performance. This virtual performance presents many 
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behaviours that can be enunciated as rules (see chapter 5, pp. 167 and ff). Nevertheless, it 
seems that the most interesting and attractive aspects of the performance are lost in such 
manifestations. 
In addition, we have also seen that the relationship between the structural 
particularities and their treatment in performance is tied to the influence of the 
performance’s temporal context. We had therefore indicated that the performance involves 
multiple tensions between intentio operis, intentio auctoris, intentio interpretis, intentio 
èpoche (see p. 173), etc. These tensions conform to a framework that makes of each 
performative context (and as we will also see, of each reception context) a particular 
situation. If the generative perspective anticipates the rules of production of a textual 
object (in this case the production of a performance) “analysable independently of the 
effects that (such a production) causes” (Eco 1990), enunciating a performance grammar 
on this intersection of intentios may be inadequate. According to Eric Clarke (1989a) one 
of the problems with the generative paradigm is the rigid distinction between syntax and 
semantics. This distinction “requires that every aspect of musical structure be accounted 
for entirely in terms of a logic of structural relations” (p.19). Nevertheless, at least in the 
western academic tradition, “each piece can make use of a substantial number of principles 
that are specific not only to that work, and which are consequently inexplicable (or at best 
explicable only at a very general level) in terms of a broad and general structural theory” 
(p.19). The composition and its performance are, in the context of western contemporary 
musical production, original by definition. They emerge from that aesthetic interest. 
At the same time, the set of performance actions (each of them extremely simple), 
does not always seem to constitute a complex organization, of a hierarchic type, to which it 
is possible to attribute the originality of the performance (Clarke 1998). 
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Due to all of this, from our point of view, an interpretative perspective, involving 
the conjunction of the different intentios according to the production context constraints, 
seems more reasonable. From this perspective, the concept of interpretative criterion 
replaces the grammar. In this framework the Interpretative Criterion is the collection of 
expressive actions (in terms of expressive parameter deviations) exerted by the performer 
that responds to: (i) the structural attributes of the piece; (ii) the performer’s stylistic 
knowledge; (iii) the performer’s intention, (iv) the performance style of the epoch, etc. In 
this way an interpretative criterion is unique for each performance. The interpretative 
criterion is more exposed when the performer has a good opportunity to put in action his or 
her individuality. In this case, the organization of the musical structure is altered by the 
performer’s intention and the epochal performance style. Thus, with the concept of the 
interpretative criterion, certain evidence that supports the generative hypothesis could also 
be explained, with the advantage of including the idiosyncratic component in such an 
account. It could be used, for example, to explain the stability of expressive attributes 
across successive performances. From the generative perspective, this is evidence of the 
performer’s actions being governed by rules directly linked to attributes of the musical 
structure (Palmer 1997). Nevertheless, we have seen in the analysis of Alfred Cortot’s 
performances, recorded throughout 20 years, that the stability of certain characteristics 
seems to be an attribute of their individuality rather than the result of forces inherent to the 
composition’s structure. On the other hand some aspects of this individuality have been 
consciously specified by the artist himself. Talking about the performance of the Prelude in 
B minor, Alfred Cortot said: 
“Here, the rubato consists of giving the essential melodic notes, those that are 
more painful, their total expressive value. It is in the first line where this 
masterpiece becomes more stirring, by the quality of the dream that then 
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bathes the melody, by its unmaterialization. The theme of this prelude requires 
a slight impulse in its ascending part, and abandonment in its descending 
part” (1934, p.36-37) 
Influenced by semiotics (and signs theory) and hermeneutics, the interpretative 
perspective is anchored to the semantics more than to the syntax of musical production. 
According to this, the interpretative perspective maintains that the crux of understanding 
happens when the relevant knowledge is placed in a hierarchy. Unlike the generative 
perspective’s proposal (see chapter 4), from the interpretative point of view the more 
integrated, processed information is not lodged in the mind in abstract structures onto 
which the incoming information is mapped. The greater integration of the information is 
achieved through heuristics in which the input is integrated into structures that emerge 
from the relations constructed with data provided by the context. By all means, these 
heuristics imply the use of previous knowledge, but the information does not integrate a 
previous organization, a prefabricated structure, but rather the current context. However, 
up to now, the way in which the incoming information is considered and processed in the 
current context, as well as the criteria by which a certain type of information can be 
relevant, have not been explored enough in the field of musical communication. 
In spite of all this, it is possible to think, following Jackendoff (1987), that the 
originality of an individual expert performance may no longer be explained as a deviation 
with respect to a norm (which allows understanding a certain natural, human and 
expressive base of a given performance), but rather as a deviation from an expressive, 
culturally accepted structure. Certainly, this expressive, culturally validated structure may 
also be understood as a norm but a higher level norm. In other words, knowing the 
expressive structure that generatively ties a given structural component to a type of 
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conspicuously associated action makes the processing of original components of an expert 
performance possible: it represents a kind of generative base for further interpretative 
processing. Thus, the generative and interpretative approaches are not in opposition but 
complement each other. For example, different hypotheses exist about the origin of certain 
expressive timing deviations within the scope of generative studies. Thus, a perceptual 
hypothesis (Drake 1993) seemed to be opposed to a cultural one (Repp 1998a). Despite 
them seeming absolutely contrary, it is possible to think that both hypotheses account for 
the phenomenon of rubato at different levels, one tied to psychophysical aspects (a sort of 
phonological level) and another related to culturally validated expressive aspects (a 
syntactic level: Pennel and Drake 1998). In the same way, it is possible to think of an 
interpretative approach as more tied to a semantic level of musical communication, 
involving the analysis of the musical structure relative to more sophisticated theoretical 
constructs, such as the prolongational structure. 
Some of these aspects will be treated over the remaining chapters of this thesis, in 
which a perspective of musical communication situated in its context will be further 
investigated. As part of this investigation, the role of performance in the completion of the 
musical work will be explored. The generative paradigm places the performer in the 
middle of the communication between composer and listener. As a medium the performer 
must project the structure revealed by its systematic analysis. This projection in terms of 
structure-performance mapping constitutes the point of confluence between the 
musicological perspective of the objectivist performance and the generative paradigm’s 
psychological approach. Nevertheless, the results presented here speak in favour of a 
conceived, produced and socially accepted performance even though such a basic principle 
does not conquer all the aspects of the performance itself. Musical communication does not 
seem to happen entirely through a channel scaffolded by rule systems. In that sense 
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"(u)nderstanding and trying to explain musical structure is not the same kind of activity as 
understanding and communicating music. There is a genuine overlap between these poles 
of activity, but it cannot be a complete overlap" (Dunsby 1989; p. 7). Therefore, there have 
been other ways of understanding performance that without excluding the musical 
structure allow extending the horizon of communication in musical performance. 
We hope to have demonstrated that an alternative interpretation of performance 
actions to the generative explanation is necessary. The alternative explanation would have 
to account for the performer’s contribution, but it would also have to account for the means 
at his or her disposal for constructing his or her performance as a solution to the 
aforementioned tensions. 
6.4.2 The cooperative listener 
In the same way that the performer put the features of his or her performance in context 
according to the composition’s structural traits, it is possible to find, in the listeners’ 
responses to the performances, a particular manner of understanding the expressive 
features in context. 
The results of the experiment involving segmentation tasks indicated that 
expressive deviations were not enough to predict the structural segmentation. It would 
seem to be the case that, paralleling the performance process, listeners do not organise their 
listening exclusively according to rules; they have to solve ambiguous problems by 
interpreting structure and expression (microstructure) as a whole. Structural and 
microstructural attributes are concurrent. If, as we have seen, expressive traits are the result 
of the intersection of multiple tensions occurring in a particular place, in a particular 
context, the listener also will have to contemplate these tensions in order to understand the 
communicated content. In that way, musical listening is also an interpretative task. 
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As we have just insisted, in this framework, the performer is not a mere transmitter 
of structural features, but interprets these features and with them constructs a new 
representation of the piece. This new representation is the content that he or she projects 
during the performance. Every expressive action, in this way, has a new and renewable 
contextual meaning. In that sense, results seem to confirm that performers use their 
expressive resources with different aims or functions, according to the context in which 
they act. For example, Argerich does her most important ritenuto at bar 13. However, that 
does not mean that she is conceiving this point as the highest hierarchical level articulation 
point. Listeners note the ritenuto but understand the particular use of this attribute in this 
context. They understand, for example, that such a ritenuto does not necessary mean phrase 
(formal) closure. As with a literary text, listeners have the ability to assign meaning 
according to context. In that way, listening to music is also an interpretative event. Thus, a 
piece of music requires co-operation (in terms of Eco 1979) not only from performers but 
also from listeners. Thinking in a musical way is on the part of the listener therefore, a 
cooperative activity. We can then talk about a cooperative perspective, where individual 
performance features are contextually understood, linking the context of the musical 
structure with the context of the interpretative microstructure. 
The existence of a gap is evident between performance grammars and their derived 
common codes between listeners and performers, and the interpretative experience itself. 
An Interpretative Paradigm will have to account for the expressive deviation as decided by 
the performer as a function of his or her idea of the piece as a whole. This particular use 
has to be understood by the listener through the contextual appreciation of that expressive 
deviation. 
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This encourages us to go deeper into the nature of the processes involved in the 
cooperative tasks both of performers and listeners, in order to determine whether they are 
similar or if it is necessary to formulate a different hypothesis for each one. A brief 
epistemological exercise complements this chapter (Appendix III). It is a sort of 
explanation of some of the previous findings according to a framework provided by the 
pragmatics studies. We consider it is worth thinking of a pragmatics of music performance 
as an axis in the study of communication between performers and listeners. 
 
If the listener does without the expressive information when segmenting, then the rules that 
organize the performance do not organize its reception at the same time. The standardized 
behaviours (for example the average performance or the segmentation data that appear to 
include the individual responses from a considerable group of listeners) seem to be 
strongly tied to characteristics that emerge from the analysis of the musical structure. 
Naturally, the conditions of acceptability for a performance that, as we have discussed 
above, emerge from the average performance, can be understood as being generated by the 
piece’s structure itself. But, at the same time, they represent a trivial solution to the 
interpretative problems as the piece itself makes clear. In other words, the nature of a 
structure is so obviously organized in such a way that it does not require an artistic 
intervention to be manifested; a standard intervention is enough. On the contrary, it seems 
that the original performer deliberately avoids that trivial behaviour on such an obvious 
feature of the composition. This is a very widespread idea among performers (see, for 
example, Berry 1989 p. 13, 20 and following). The experiences presented here support the 
idea that a generative hypothesis can explain the general conditions for a performance’s 
235 
acceptability. Nevertheless, this search cannot advance the paradoxical acceptance of 
aspects related to the performance’s individuality. 
In the pragmatic study of language one says that the understanding of a statement 
(that which is spoken, with its particular syntax) derives from the possibility the speaker 
has of transforming it into a phrase (the writing, with its own syntax) (Bertucelli Pappi 
1993). Transferring this to the field of music, it could be said that the possibility of 
understanding the musical structure derives from the listener’s capacity to reduce the 
expressive components. For this, performers and listeners would have to share the 
knowledge of the rules of expressive performance by which expressive statements can be 
reduced to phrases (its manifestation in the norm). 
“If we were able to formulate such rules explicitly and definitively, the problem 
of the relation between linguistic competence and performance would be 
solved, settling the primacy of the first over the second. If, however, we 
reached the conclusion that rules of this type do not exist, or that they exist but 
are not necessary, we will conclude that the competence that maintains the 
communicative interaction is supported by assumptions and principles entirely 
different from the grammatical ones” (Bertucelli Pappi 1993, p.149) 
This is the crux of the dilemma we are considering here, between the generative 
perspective and the alternative perspective/s. 
However, the problem that arises has to do with the performance’s expressive 
stamp. If the listener can ignore the expressive information to configure the music’s 
structure in its reception, then that information is not destined to clarify the structure, as 
proposed by the objectivist perspective. To what, then, is it destined? The task of 
performance comparisons has not been able to offer as forceful an answer to this question 
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as might be expected. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the musicians that carried out this 
task preferred to compare the performances in terms of emotions, using terms employed by 
an amateur musical meta-language, instead of terms linked to musical theory or studies in 
performance, as the objectivist perspective had hoped. However, as Sloboda and Lehmann 
(2001) suggested, the participation of many emotional aspects in performance remains 
highly restricted both by the musical structure’s features and by the contemporary 
performance’s conventions. Nevertheless, it is doubtless the case that expression in 
performance has always been bound to the scope of the emotions, a relation that certain 
objectivist tradition preferred to avoid. 
The tasks of semantic expression (Shifres 2002) suggest that this search could be 
oriented to the construction of narrative structures. The following chapters and particularly 
the experiment in chapter 10 go deeper on this. Notwithstanding, it may be highly 
interesting to include in this discussion the data of the presence of very similar semantic 
expressions between listeners and between listeners and the artist himself. For example, 
Alfred Cortot wrote about Chopin’s prelude in B minor: “Meditative, melancholic, 
autumnal, such is the Sixth Prelude. The impression that must be produced is not in fact to 
express the pain, but… something that one wanted to retain, and that it flees” (1934, p.36). 
One of the subjects of the test wrote when listening to Cortot’s performance: “Melancholy, 
piano, autumn, lonely” (male, 23 years old). Another, when listening to the Martha 
Argerich performance, wrote: “Many images of blue and grey colours that demonstrate 
depth and give peace”; and when listening to Cortot’s he added: “The same images but 
they are now moving away” (male, 39 years old). In this sense, the coincidences around 
expressions such as melancholy, autumn, etc. are highly remarkable. 
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For their part, the results of the memory tasks of experiment 2 are more oriented 
towards the search of the incidence of the performance’s attributes in time configuration 
problems in performance as part of the communicated content. The task of the overall time 
estimation forcefully suggest that the expressive characteristics contribute to a different 
temporal experience, at least quantitatively speaking. The differences found among the 
experimental conditions account for the overall time experience being more independent of 
the composition’s structure and more dependent of the expression’s microstructure - the 
opposite of what happens with the segmentation experience. The retrieval and temporal 
order recognition tasks, although showing weak results, allow supposing that such 
important aspects in the narrative structure configuration in performance such as thematic 
capture and thematic temporal sequence, are influenced by the expressive characteristics of 
the performance. All these aspects will constitute the crux of the exploration that will be 
approached in the following chapters. 
*** 
Summary. In this chapter two listening tests, which used the performances identified in the 
previous chapter, were developed in order to investigate the communication of the 
prolongational structure between performer and listener. The first one presented no 
manipulated stimuli. In the second one, the performances were manipulated by 
interpolating cuts and external sounds. In this case, the aim was to modify their temporal 
structure by superimposing a structure of temporal accents that either reinforced or 
contradicted the more salient timing expressive features of each performance. The results 
indicated that a generative hypothesis seems to be insufficient to predict the subjects’ 
responses to the segmentation task. Moreover, the attributes used by the listeners to 
compare the two performances are more related to everyday rather than technical 
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descriptions of music: listeners tend to use categories related to the emotional realm of the 
experience. Concerning the tasks linked to the experience of time in terms of before and 
after, time estimation, recognition and temporal order, findings seem to indicate that they 
are influenced by the particularities of the performance’s expression. The data indicate that 
listeners are sensible to performance context. In this way, they can identify the contextual 
relations that give a particular meaning to the expressive characteristics of the 
performances. Consequently, the communication of expressive features seems to go 
beyond the establishment of a rule system around which information circulates from 
performer to listener. Instead of this, the concept of interpretative criterion, as a part of an 
interpretative paradigm, is proposed in order to consider systematicity of performer’s 
behaviours. It is proposed that such a paradigm is also useful to understand listeners’ 
cooperative activity. 
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Chapter 7: Towards the construction of the performance 
In chapter 2 (pp. 41 and ff.) we sketched out the current scene regarding studies on music 
performance in which different points of view come together to strongly criticise 
objectivism. The questioning of an assumed deterministic relationship between musical 
analysis and performance is one of the most general and conspicuous traits of this 
criticism. The disruption of this relationship seems to show us the way towards a new 
context in which composition and performance, as independent activities, fail to reconnect. 
Questioning the musical composition as a finished work of art has led to a revisitation of 
issues concerning the musical work’s ontology. If the musical work is not finished in the 
score itself, then, how much further does it extend? 
7.1 Composition as material 
The idea that the musical work is an abstract set of scores, performances, arrangements, 
etc. may be a firm point of view. However, the topic of how all of them are related at the 
core of the piece remains problematic. Cook (2003), to begin with, proposes abandoning 
the idea of a performance’s conception as based on unequal vertical relationships among 
all those elements, to start thinking instead in terms of more horizontal relationships from 
whose core the construction of musical meaning emerges. The idea that “there is no 
ontological distinction among the different modes of a work’s existence, its different 
instantiations, because there is no original” (p. 207) re-defines the scope of the musical 
work to the complete set of its realizations. Nevertheless, this scope, assumed in this way, 
far from solving the problem of the nature of these relationships (particularly the 
relationship between composition and performance) once again leaves the performer 
wandering in a field of uncertainty. 
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The general issue concerning the musical work’s ontology deserves such extensive 
discussion that it would exceed the scope of this work. However, as many factors relevant 
to performer-listener communication fall outside the objectivist standpoint in the previous 
chapters, at this point that part of the ontological problem cannot be avoided. This chapter, 
then, presents some of the most important ideas on this issue within the current 
musicological arena, in particular Cook’s insights on music as performance (2003). Soon 
some ideas around a definition of the relationship between performance and composition 
will be outlined that, following the ideas of many of the authors already mentioned (Cook 
2003, Johnson 1999, Rothstein 1995, Schmaldfelt 1985, among others), allow defining an 
ontology of the musical work that permits understanding the performer’s role in the 
communicational process. 
When leaving behind the notion of “the score as the work”, an idea from 19th 
century musicology, different proposals can be found in the current academic field. Cook 
(2003) briefly reviews some of them. For example, Bowen (1999) proposes studying the 
musical work from the set of its performances. Cutting himself off from the score, he 
focuses on the comparative analysis of performances. For this reason, this perspective does 
not shed light on the relationship between composition and performance. On the other hand 
Lester (1995) considers such a relationship, but the deterministic relation does not 
disappear, it only changes direction: he proposes that a performance is an analytical device 
that deserves to be considered in itself with the same epistemological status as a graph or 
an analytical description. Thus, Lester conserves the objectivist notion of a relation 
between composition and performance established point by point throughout the musical 
work. Cook also criticizes something similar in the work of Clarke (2001) and Davidson 
(2001), regarding the “composition”-“motion in performance” association. In short, not 
only the composition-performance determinism, but also all kinds of composition-
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performance bonds as a rigid moment-to-moment attachment is the focus of criticism. In 
other words, Cook is questioning any notion of the “performance of…”, which splits the 
work from performance. The idea of the “performance of…”, as found in the basis of 
romantic and objectivist performances, reduces the performance’s artistry. But, if 
performance is not the “performance of…”, what then is it? Cook proposes understanding 
the composition as a script. According to this, performance might be understood not only 
regarding the musicological bonds to the composition but also according to its 
ethnographic factors, since a script leaves room for flexible social interactions in the 
realization. Thus, the script allows the incorporation of the context of the performance into 
its realization more naturally than the rigid notion of composition as a finished work. In 
that way the musical work is a process and every time, each performance contributes to 
this process. Besides, the script is more flexible for the intervention of social relations (and 
what’s more, it stimulates them) involved in performance. For this reason, Cook (2003) 
affirms that, in that way, social meaning emerges naturally in performance. 
Going more deeply into this argument, and following Johnson (1999), it is 
proposed here to consider composition as a material for building the performative work. In 
this sense, the composition is one of the materials (among many other materials). 
Appendix IV explores this notion of material as suggested by the work of Marcel Proust. It 
is interesting to understand how this author arrived at the idea of what the material is for a 
performative work, since this path is very similar to the one sketched here. When 
considering the composition as the material, the performance does not derive from the 
examination of the musical structure but rather it is created from it. Then, for the 
performer, knowing the musical structure is to know the material that he or she must 
dominate to make his or her own work. The same material can give rise to infinitely 
different works, and for that reason the record industry did not do away with musical 
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performance. In that sense, the score is not a set of directions that the performer must 
execute as though it were a recipe, but it is an accumulation of potential for his or her 
artistic accomplishment (Tanner 2000). The material allows the performer to produce 
meaning, by performative realizations representing unity, character, motion, etc. They 
promote communication with the listener at multiple levels and through multiple channels, 
although those realizations sometimes may contradict an objective analysis, leading to a 
definitive conclusion (Lester 1995). That is the substantial difference, referred to by 
Dunsby (1989), between understanding to explain music, and understanding to 
communicate music (see p.232). To communicate music implies the circulation of those 
representations the performer realizes understood as actions or as events instead of as 
objects. 
Cook (2003) explains how recent studies of performance have led us more and 
more to think of each performance as an artistic accomplishment that keeps an intertextual 
reference with other performances “of the work”. He puts “the work” in inverted commas 
because if we say that the performance is the artwork, then it is not possible to speak of the 
work-performance dichotomy. Cook proposes advancing in this study by combining 
ethnographic approaches, musicological theoretical traditions, and computerized 
measurement methodologies to understand how the relationship between composition and 
performance works in a context of social interaction. The research proposed here clearly 
follows his suggestion. 
7.2 Defining the composition–performance relationship 
The notion of composition as a script (Cook 2003) has important advantages as compared 
with the idea of the work fixed by a text. A text is a device that codifies meaning whereas a 
script is a resource to activate the production of meaning. The script gives rise to an 
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integrated meaning that contemplates all the components of the context that contribute to 
the production of meaning. 
In spite of the advantages of the idea of a script, we will argue that the notion of 
material allows a better characterization of the genitive relation between composition and 
performance. Nevertheless it is necessary to understand precisely to what we are referring 
when speaking of material in order to avoid usurping from performance what is within 
composition’s aesthetic scope, paradoxically denying the role of composition in the benefit 
of the performance’s artistic quality. For this, the exploration of two key concepts may 
shed light on the problem. 
7.2.1 Transposition 
Recognizing the artistry of music performance a priori, the idea that the particularities of 
the musical structure established by the composer constitute the material of the 
performance seems almost self-evident. Nevertheless, it is necessary to characterize the 
performance’s degree of autonomy with respect to the composition in relation to its 
appearance as a finished work of art. The comparison that Proust made between Berma’s 
performance and Elstir’s paintings (Appendix IV) shows the nature of such autonomy. 
When Elstir paints a school, his material presents less aesthetic integration than the 
material used when painting a cathedral. Such integration defines that set of features as an 
artwork. The artistic quality of the cathedral is part of the material he works with. Of 
course, we are dealing with the core of that material. 
There is an important difference between using a material that has not been the 
object of a particular artistic approach (as Elstir’s school building) and using a material that 
is in itself the result of artistic elaboration. Of course, although that difference is 
significant, a clear distinction between these circumstances does not exist. This point may 
244 
be seen more clearly in the field of pop music. For example, let’s take the case of the 
performance of a Jazz Standard. Standards may be a simple sequence of chords, or the 
harmony that characterizes a certain composition (as is the famous case of Les Feuilles 
Mortes). The key point is: what is the stamp of this previous artwork as an independent 
artistic object in this new work of art? 
In order to solve this point it may be useful to borrow a concept from the realm of 
mass media semiotics: the concept of transposition. According to Steimberg (1980) the 
term transposition was used initially within semiotics to allude to “the mechanisms that 
(…) condition the reproduction of a literary or artistic work in a format or genre that is 
not the original” (p. 19). In particular, semiotics has been preoccupied with contemporary 
transpositions that fundamentally talk about the reproduction of the literary work in the 
mass media (cinema, TV, radio, comic strip, etc.). Nevertheless, art historiography has 
taken the idea to refer to other cross-genre transfers previous to the appearance of the mass 
media, such as opera, ballet, etc. Thus, the scope of the term has been extended so as to 
include any reproduction of any type of artwork (not only literary) in which changes in the 
signifier medium take place, or the means of production. In this way, the Mona Lisa 
wallpaper of a mobile telephone is a transposition of Leonardo’s painting, in the same way 
that Elstir’s painting is a transposition of that gothic cathedral. Initially, the idea of 
transposition was used to differentiate it from that of version, which implied a 
reproduction without a change in the signifier medium. For example, Martin Scorsese’s 
film Cape Fear (1991) is a version of J. Lee Thompson’s (1962), since both works of art 
have been developed on the same signifier medium. At the same time both are 
transpositions of John D. MacDonald’s novel The Executioners. Nevertheless, it is 
opportune to indicate that in the scope of semiotics, these two concepts (transposition and 
version) have gradually modified their range and have been a matter of controversy. At 
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present there are more than a few scholars who interpret the idea of version in the sense of 
free version, that is to say, as the use of some rhetorical topic coming from a work of art in 
particular (topoi), without needing to appropriate the entire structure of this art work. In 
that sense, for example, Salman Rushdie’s novel The Ground Beneath Her Feet (1999) 
may be understood as a version of the Orpheus Myth. At any rate, entering into this 
controversy would be a sterile exercise for this work. Therefore, the original idea of 
transposition will be employed here in virtue of its utility. Also, this idea will be taken in 
its most general sense, not only including the transposition from a literary work, but also 
extending it to the reproduction of meaning on other signifier mediums in general. 
According to this wider perspective, the constraints of a transposition are much less 
strict than those for a version. When going from one signifier medium to another, the 
author of the transposition is much freer to do and undo his creative work. 
Interestingly, Steimberg (1980) affirms that the study of transposition  
“(A)llows investigating the ways by which contemporary culture establishes 
bonds between the arts and apparently distanced practices, fitting meanings 
and assigning hierarchies in the social reading of stories and plays. In each 
transposition there is an interpretation of the transposed work” (p.20) 
This is directly related to Cook’s idea (2003) of considering “artistic” performances 
as cultural manifestations that can simultaneously talk about and link multiple texts. More 
precisely, the concept of transposition linked to the circulation of contents in different 
media, goes beyond a simple historical substitution or the idea of an absolute choice 
between different cultural practices (Steimberg 2003). In this way, thinking of performance 
as transposition leads to a situation in which each performance is not simply the 
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substitution of a previous one, trying to adapt to the new historical-cultural context. On the 
contrary, it is a new re-signification of the transposed work. 
The transposition’s freedom is responsible for altering the work’s ontology, as an 
abstraction, according to the cultural context in which it is read. For example when we say 
Carmen we think of Bizet’s Opera, more than Merimee’s novel. Merimee’s work is one of 
the most transposed literary works (Traversa 1995). In particular, Bizet’s transposition has 
had a strong impact on its ontology. In fact, it incorporates the character of Michaela who 
is central in the story and at present, a structural part of the work (not something added on). 
Other works carried out from this material have not had such a hard impact on the work’s 
ontology. For example, in the transposition of Saura’s film (1983), Carmen kills Don José. 
Here, the idea of transposition is going to be much more useful than that of script, 
as proposed by Cook (2003), because the latter implicitly brings to bear an imposition on 
the temporal dimension absent from the former. In other words, a script fundamentally 
imposes an ordered sequence of actions to be carried out in a time, at least in its narrative 
organization, responsible for the notion of before and after, which limits the performer’s 
actions. On the contrary, transposition is freer as regards time. Thus, as set out in the 
following chapters, the performer’s task consists of shaping the performance time in order 
to produce its own narratives. The performer creates meaning when configuring the 
performance time. Therefore, the notion of script will be excessively restricting to host 
performance’s creative capacity. 
One could see each transposition as a commentary, modification, correction, etc. of 
the work, thinking about itself throughout the successive transpositions. On the other hand, 
when one understands transposition as artistic creation, the habitual meaning of 
reproduction is reversed. The transposition recovers meanings belonging to the work that 
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were lost or hidden in previous transpositions and introduces “changes that are ideological 
fractures, in the sense that they introduce new general keys for (interpretation)” 
(Steimberg 2003, p. 296). 
The transposition’s freedom consists of a delicate balance in which certain 
structural characteristics remain evident. The abandonment of those structural 
characteristics would render the transposition illegible as such. But at the same time, the 
disruption of the structural basis is necessary in order to allow attending to the current 
context. 
The history of artistic practice has denied that freedom to the version. And music 
performance has been traditionally viewed as a version and not as a transposition. Now, is 
it legitimate to understand performance as a transposition of the composition? This 
question introduces the debate on the nature of composition itself as artistic realization. 
Although this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is not possible to continue this 
research without briefly mentioning it. 
7.2.2 The autonomy of performance in the light of the signifier 
medium 
Understanding performance as the transposition of composition implies accepting that they 
have different signifier mediums. Contrarily, if we considered that they share the same 
signifier medium we would be speaking about versions. It was said that a version is less 
free concerning the impositions for its realization than a transposition. Probably, this 
strictness with versions is due to the fact that the notion of version itself is strongly tied to 
the supportive function of performance. If one supposes that what the composer did (seated 
in his or her study and writing on the stave) has the same signifier medium as an 80 
musician orchestra playing on the stage in a theatre, and conducted by a person who is 
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gesticulating in front of it, it is because one is only assigning to the latter a supportive 
function. Considering the work as a script, as Cook proposes (2003), still attributes a 
considerable supportive function (see chapter 2) to the performer’s role. 
However, is it possible to identify transference of contents through different 
signifiers in the path from composition to performance? It will be tried to justify the 
affirmative answer to this question. As was clearly expounded by Deliège (2000), in 
western academic musical culture “the text put in place by culture mediates language and 
at the same time engenders discourse” (p.216). The text is fundamental in the 
compositional heuristics. That importance becomes obvious in certain styles and particular 
compositional techniques, such as medieval isorhythm or 20th century serialism, and 
appears extremely clearly in certain works throughout different epochs (John Cage’s Atlas 
Eclipticalis (1960), or Luigi Nono’s Liebeslied (1954), are some recent cases). 
Nevertheless, from Guillaume de Machaut’s Ma fin est mon comencament (14th century), 
works may be registered in which the written part obviously plays a fundamental role in 
the structure and meaning. On the matter, Deliège (2000) explains the way in which the 
change from the rhythmical writing based on the ancient rhythmics to a system based on 
proportionality generated a revolution in the conception of music. This entails that the 
composer operates within a signifier medium in which the writing occupies an important 
place. In such a sense, the written representations - as well as the computational 
representations in relation to computer music - can be seen as “domains of interaction” or 
“interfaces” in which the composer acts when designing musical processes and structures. 
According to Hamman (1999) these representations are resources that the composer uses in 
order to fulfil well-structured tasks, offering cognitively redundant patterns of action and 
observation. In this exercise, the score (or any other means of registration) can give rise to 
multiple feasible (although still non-existing) scenes. That is to say, the score is not only 
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the representation of substantial realities, but also the scope of enunciation of not yet 
existing realities. The representation orients and models the interaction on which the 
composition is generated. (Mountain 2001). 
Even more so, many of the most generalized compositional problems are often 
treated from the written text. Thematic organization and coherence are two of them 
(Deliège 2000). In addition, if this approach is considered more deeply it is possible to find 
a somewhat more subtle difference between which is the signifier medium of the 
composition, and which is that of the performance’s. William Rothstein (1995) claimed to 
differentiate between an analytical structure and a dramatic structure of the piece. The 
former arises from the critical examination of the piece’s constructive components (that 
only exposes a determinist relation remote from the problems of musical performance). 
The latter is a structure of tensions and characters that the performer derives from the 
composition and that, far from maintaining a deterministic relationship with performance, 
serves as the work’s staging. 
From all this, it is possible to think that the structures the composer works with are 
not essentially the same as those the performer handles. Music is not only made up of 
sound, and as well as music in composition seeming to be set up with written support, and 
with musical structures that are justified in theoretical structural terms, music in 
performance seems to be based on schemes of movement and strength, and tension-
relaxation relationships that emerge from the physical domain, amongst many other things. 
In other words, from this perspective it is difficult to maintain that composition and 
performance share the same signifier medium. It is easier to conclude that the meaning 
circulates through different supports: we would then be qualified to understand 
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performance in terms of transposition, and therefore to understand its autonomy and its 
artistry. 
7.2.3 A dialectic structure-performance relationship 
At this point, the terms of the relationship from “that which the composer did” and “what 
the performer does”, referred to so far as “structure” and “performance”, have to change, 
defining “composition” as part of the performance’s “material” understood as an 
independent artistic accomplishment. Nevertheless, the nature of this relation has still not 
been explored. Is the performer able to do anything with any material? If, as Eco says, “(if) 
there is something to interpret, the interpretation should speak of something that should be 
somewhere and that it should be in some way respected” (1992, p.47), and as Imberty 
(1992b) argued it should be possible, if not to speak of a correct interpretation, at least to 
identify when an interpretation is incorrect, then the performer as artist should find a 
feasible way of achieving artistic accomplishment from the material at hand. This would be 
the essence of the interpretative task in the current scene. Paraphrasing Todorov, “in the 
picnic of the musical work the composer brings the structures and the performer the 
meaning”, then those structures “constitute an embarrassing handful of material evidence 
that (the performer) cannot let pass in silence, or noise” (Eco 1992, p.26). 
In short, it is necessary to explain why the way in which the available material is 
understood allows the performer to do certain things and not others. The rationalist 
tradition has taken us to look for logics of interpretation, both convincing and true (Berry 
1989, Kivy 1995). Nevertheless, if one is operating with some material in an artistic 
endeavour, the production need not be logical nor convincing, but beautiful. Therefore the 
interpretative problem is not so related to the discussion between the idea of multiple 
251 
meanings and the absence of meaning (Eco 1992), but through the understanding of the 
material’s potential meaningfulness. 
For this, the concept of material that Theodor W. Adorno introduced to the 
philosophy of music, and in particular his conception of the dialectic of the material 
(Adorno 1930), is especially useful here. Before developing this idea it is necessary to 
explain something. Adorno always talks about the material of the composition, and all of 
his references to the work corresponds to the notion of work as composition, not as 
performance, as we have been arguing. Doubtless, performance as an artistic event does 
not seem to be within Adorno’s agenda, although it is interesting to indicate some ideas 
possibly related to this point of view. For example, he argues that the “new music” (always 
talking about the music of the School of Vienna) “questions what many progressive folk 
expect of it: finished images in themselves, that can be admired once and forever in the 
musical museums, that is, in theatres and concert halls” (1958, p.33). Although he does 
not explicitly recognize the performer’s role in the work’s conclusive process, he does 
allow one to understand that the dialectic in which the material is involved exceeds the 
compositional process in itself. 
Adorno affirms that the composer - and, mutatis mutandi, the performer – 
establishes a dialectic relationship with the material. In this relationship composers are not 
simply “executors of material laws”, but, on the contrary, they are the makers, “the 
sovereign structurer of the form”. This structuring is supported by a dialectic between “the 
material’s original meaning” and “the composer’s position of freedom”. Thus, the notion 
of dialectics has to do with the ambiguity between the artist’s submission to the constraints 
of the material, and on the other hand, his or her independence (rebellion) with respect to 
those impositions. Therefore, the artistic quality of the work emerges from that dialectic. 
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This dialectic is, then, responsible for the fact that sometimes material that seemed 
to be exhausted is revitalized in the work of certain composers. Because, finally, each 
material is affected by the composer’s individual labour. Thus, in the same way that the 
composer cannot act independently from the material, the material cannot be restored to its 
original meaning. 
The artist’s freedom is set apart from the work’s objectivity, understood as the 
imposition of the material, but  
“(t)he narrower the contact with his material, the freer will the author be … 
All sovereignty with which he externally intends to act upon the material, slides 
into the work without penetrating it, and from thence proclaims its permanence 
as mere faded points of view of a past history” (Adorno 1930; p.16) 
Here, the conception of musical performance as resulting from a material-work 
relation will be more useful than from a work-realization relation (that is to say, from the 
work-performance split). In this conception, the material is not only “what the composer 
did”, as a synthesis of the structures found in the score, but also what other performers 
have done (that is to say, the history of that material as such), the current conditions of 
artistic realization, the current conditions of reception, etc., because music “presents social 
problems through its own material and according to its own formal laws - problems which 
music contains within itself in the innermost cells of its technique” (Adorno 1978, quoted 
by Cook 2003 p. 213). 
Thus, the social-historical-cultural context conditions, stylistic rules, notions of 
epoch, intentio auctoris, intentio èpoche, etc. do not generate restrictions on the material, 
but conform that material with which the artist works. In this way the understanding of 
music is not invariable throughout time, because the psychological subject is not constant: 
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“The demands imposed by the material on the subject come rather from the fact that the 
“material” itself is sedimented spirit, something socially preformed by man’s conscience” 
(Adorno 1958; p. 34). 
In this way, for example, when incorporating Michaela into Carmen, Bizet 
manifested the result of the material’s dialectic conformed by a current moral perspective 
(at the time of the creation of Bizet’s Opera) and a literary material that originally did not 
adopt that perspective: the morals of the second half of 19th century imposed a female 
character who could oppose Carmen’s perfidious and indecorous face with an image of 
purity and chastity. But, in addition, the inclusion of Michaela represents the dialectic 
solution of another of the material’s conflicts: the romantic opera - and in particular in mid 
19th century - required a soprano in a leading role to balance the vocal registers. It can 
therefore be seen how the same material holds not only technical but also social and 
cultural problems. According to Adorno (1958), the struggle which the artist maintains 
with the material implies a confrontation with society, because society “has emigrated” to 
that material. Society is not an external factor to the work, not simply a receiver of the 
work, but it is the work itself. “The warnings that the material transmits to the composer 
and which he transforms while obeying them, are constituted in an immanent interaction” 
(p.34). 
The idea of a dialectics of the material allows capturing the dynamic aspects of the 
work of art understood as performance, emerging from its own contexts of meaning. For 
example, in his study on the historical development of performance, Bowen (1999) 
explains how Toscanini considered Nikisch corrupt, in the same way that the present 
generation considers Toscanini corrupt, and possibly in the same way that future 
generations will consider Haitink and Harnoncourt corrupt. This progressive perspective of 
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music performance is a remainder of the objectivist view, as it is seen to be very 
compatible with positivist thinking. This progressive valuation does not get to understand 
the nature and the materials of the genesis of the musical work as performance. In this 
sense interpretation is the process of understanding the material and in this way it is 
necessary to make good use of that material. Here the role of music analysis as a heuristic 
tool for this process is important. But, far from having a determinist objective, this musical 
analysis, the knowledge of certain structures based in the score, is directed to knowing the 
material better. In the same way that the sculptor examines the stone that is to be carved to 
get to know its form, its porosity, its hardness, the performer analyses a score, to 
understand the particularities of the structure that are its material and to be able to make 
good use of it. But such good use will not only depend on this. It will depend in particular 
on the performer’s creative accomplishment. 
The conversion from a conception of music as text (situated along the work-
performance dichotomy) to a conception based on performance with its own artistry 
emerging from the dialectic relation with the materials (understood in an ample sense), 
requires a change in the psychological paradigm that sustains its understanding and its 
communication. The next chapter approaches this problem. 
But in addition, what is ‘making good use of the material’? What does creative 
accomplishment mean? As we have seen, it is necessary to explore these questions to see 
how the musical structure - and what still concerns us, that is, the prolongational structure 
of tonal music - can be communicated in performance - that creative accomplishment - to 
the listener. It will be argued here that such a creative accomplishment – following, on the 
one hand, the line of Schmaldfelt (1985) and Rothstein (1995) and on another hand the 
perspective of Godlovitch (1998) – has a dramatic narrative nature by virtue of the 
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temporal incumbency of performance. This aspect will be developed in chapter 9. But, due 
to that temporal nature, a psychology that describes communication in terms of dance 
instead of the traditional metaphor of information (linear) transmission will be more 
suitable to the treatment of the subject, as will be seen next chapter. 
*** 
Summary. This chapter described the current performance scene, as of the criticisms to the 
objectivist perspective (as seen in chapter 2). This description was mainly based on the 
notion of composition as material, extending some aesthetic ideas related to dialectic 
materialism, particularly Theodor W. Adorno’s notion of material. Therefore, composition 
was considered as the material of the performative work. From this perspective the 
performer does not derive his or her work from the composition but creates it from that 
material. In this context, the composition-performance relationship is subordinated to the 
concept of transposition. This is opposed to the classic notion of version from which 
performance has been traditionally analyzed. The idea of version restricts the 
performance’s function. Contrarily, according to the concept of transposition, performance 
is extended by accomplishing compositional features and vindicating its artistry. Since 
transposition alludes to the mechanisms by which an artistic work is reproduced in a 
signifying media that is different from the original, it was necessary to show that both 
musical activities (performance and composition) operate on different signifying media. In 
that way the role of the text (the score) both in composition and performance and its 
implications in the attribution of artistic meaning were reviewed. Finally a dialectic 
composition-performance relation was outlined, accounting for how the material 
determines the performance and, at the same time, is permanently renewed by it. 
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Chapter 8: Crossmodality and intersubjectivity: looking 
for other channels of musical communication 
Over the first chapters of the thesis, the communication of prolongational musical 
structures from a orthodox cognitive perspective was reviewed. It was seen that, in spite of 
some evidence supporting the existence of that communication, questions such as why the 
individuality of performance is not only accepted but also hoped for in current 
performances, and which is the role of the performance and reception contexts, remain 
unanswered. One has serious problems when trying to answer them according to the 
classical communicational paradigm. According to this paradigm, to communicate implies 
understanding the objective content of the message, the sender's intention and the receiver's 
attribution of intention. Thus, this classical scheme implies that the communicated 
knowledge adopts a propositional format in at least some point of the communicational 
channel. This is compatible with the format of knowledge in music theory, but does not 
correspond with other modes of music knowledge, such as listening and performing 
(Stubley 1992), which are strongly related to the aesthetic nature both of what is 
communicated and the communicational activity itself. Therefore, that scheme seems 
insufficient. This insufficiency will be argued as being the reason why many aspects of 
musical communication have been questioned, particularly those aspects of musical 
performance that emerge from complex interpretative processes (or that comprise complex 
interpretative attitudes, for instance the performance of voice leading) and include the 
performance of structural aspects of the musical piece in the context of a creative process 
in which the musical structure is only a material contributing in the organization of 
performance time and narrative. In addition, this scheme, disregarding the contexts of 
musical production and reception, does not comprise the role of the audience and listening 
context in the meaning process that completes communication. For this, it will be 
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necessary to explain musical communication in other ways. Thus, the chosen route of 
study will consider the communication of general aesthetic phenomena and other forms of 
non propositional communication, particularly affective communication, implying non 
verbal factors which are involved in the psychogenetic and functional features of aesthetic 
sensitivity – particularly those referring to the temporal arts. 
This path has motivated an increasing opposition between the classical 
communicational perspective and an approach that tends to see communication as dance, 
in which the emphasis in the definition of a goal in the communication of pre-determined 
messages is replaced by the idea of joint doing as a co-regulated activity in which 
communicative intentions emerge in their own context (Shanker and King 2002). Thus, the 
information transmission metaphor is replaced by a dance metaphor. This fixes the 
communicational process’s focus on maintaining the feeling of rhythm and shared 
movements, changing from the idea of information processing to that of intersubjective 
experience. This change of paradigm is what can best account for the change in 
interpretative perspective reviewed in the previous chapter, and it has finally taken us to 
consider performance as an inextricable component of the musical piece that configures a 
narrative vision of it. 
8.1 Intersubjectivity and development  
The expression intersubjectivity is used in different psychological realms and with 
different scopes. In the developmental literature, it generally refers to the processes and 
structures which, throughout interpersonal commitments, put a subject in contact with 
another subject through behavioural and emotional aspects that are not explicitly 
manifested in the environment, but form part of the mental life – or subjectivity - of the 
other. Basically, there are three different perspectives on how we know other minds. The 
258 
first, or first person approach, is not so relevant to our concern and will consequently not 
be treated here (see Gallagher 2001), where we focus instead on second and third person 
intersubjectivity theories. 
According to Trevarthen and Hubley (1978), intersubjectivity implies deliberately 
sharing experiences about events and things. Interpersonal actions go from the open 
answer and action, to internal subjective states found behind manifest behaviours (Stern 
1985). When this happens, the self and the other achieve subjective or internal states of 
experience (apart from open behaviours) which are vital for the joint experience. This kind 
of experience was initially studied using microanalysis techniques with filmic sequences of 
a large range of behavioural patterns that human babies display in the presence – and with 
the agreement – of an adult (Stern 1985, Trevarthen and Hubley 1978) or older children 
(Dunn 1998). These techniques allowed finding certain principles that govern such actions 
related both to emotional aspects (the baby’s and the adult’s) and to particularities of the 
interaction’s temporal organization. From this Trevarthen and Hubley (1978) proposed a 
way of understanding intersubjectivity that, because it involves joint experiences, is named 
the second person approach (Gómez 1998). 
On the other hand, Meltzoff (Gopnik and Melzoff 1999, Meltzoff and Moore 1998) 
has developed, in concurrence with the Theory of Mind, a hypothesis according to which 
an understanding of the other’s subjectivity is based on some form of theoretical 
knowledge as to the other person’s mind. Since the intersubjective experience is built from 
theoretical elaborations about the other’s mind, it is named the third person approach 
(Gómez 1998). This approach is built from an innate capacity for imitation that allows the 
infant, through crossmodal association, to identify relationships between what is observed 
in the other and their own proprioceptive records (Beebe, Sorter et al 2003). Thus, as of 
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perception and contriving similarities, infants build representations that let them 
rationalize the self and the other. This perspective is based on strong empirical evidence 
that the intellectual-representational activity (including discovering “mirror neurons” as 
Beebe, Sorter et al (2003) suggest) on which the intersubjective relationship is established 
has a very early ontogenesis. Although this perspective does not abandon the commitment 
of propositional knowledge both in communication and in thought, an important 
contribution to our concern is that knowledge about the other is based on the possibility of 
establishing a crossmodal relationship between evident behaviour and possible internal 
states. 
Crossmodality is crucial in intersubjective experiences and, as will be seen in the 
following chapters, it is a central part in the argument about musical communication 
(particularly concerning the temporal experience linked to prolongational structure of tonal 
music). It basically refers to the capability to transfer perceptual experiences from one 
sensorial modality to another. It is currently accepted that certain aspects of musical 
performance, listening and composition resound or adjust to psychological functions 
developed in early childhood and are presented as developmental variations of such 
functions in future life. Crossmodality is one such function (Lakoff 1987; Johnson, 1987; 
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Trevarthen, 1999/2000; Zbicowsky 2002). Therefore, 
Meltzoff’s contribution is relevant for our topic in highlighting the importance of 
understanding the other by temporal (synchrony) and spatial (the format of movements) 
correspondences (see chapter 10, p.328). 
Furthermore, behavioural evidence at very early ages (Kugiumutzakis 1998) can 
account for neonatal imitation as being the basis of an innate receptive consciousness 
(Beebe, Sorter et al 2003). All this evidence demonstrates that human neuronal resources 
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are prepared to integrate the body’s perceptions and actions, eyes, face, mouth, vocal 
apparatus, hands, postural attitude and expressive movements with emotions and regulation 
states. 
By contrast, the second person intersubjectivity approach suggests that apart from 
the intersubjective bond of intellectual disposition, a more emotional relation exists that is 
inseparable from it (Gomez 1998). According to this, the intersubjective experience 
involves two subjects sharing the process of capturing the other’s subjectivity. 
Traditionally, studies have focused on earlier ages, involving the first exchanges between 
infant and adult, whose interaction patterns are strongly related to a set of human 
behaviours that could be termed musical. 
In this framework, Stern (1985) proposed that the link elicited in intersubjective 
experiences is established by the association between the attentional focus and internal 
states, rather than by certain bodily similarities (Bråten 1998a). Before language and 
conscious awareness, infants achieve certain senses (understood as forms of simple and 
non self-reflexive awareness gained through direct experience) that allow them to start 
differentiating the self from the other. Thus, the baby acquires a sense of time continuity, 
affectivity and physical cohesion, among others. In other terms, this sense of the 
surrounding world is achieved by ways of feeling. Amodal perception (which establishes 
the background to crossmodality) is one such way. This acquisition of the sense of 
something by direct amodal experience will be crucial to understand the sense of 
prolongational structure by crossmodal direct experience that we will propose from the 
experiment of chapter 10. 
Vitality affects are another way of feeling. Many emotional qualities are not 
mirrored in the lexicon nor in the discrete categories provided by Darwinian theory. On the 
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contrary, they are more clearly characterized in dynamic and kinetic terms: agitation, 
fading, brief, explosive, crescendo, decrescendo, outburst, extended, etc. These ways of 
feeling are caused by mood changes and motivational tensions. The whole set of feeling 
qualities is what Stern (1985) calls vitality affects (further ahead in his work he talks about 
activation profile). 
Vitality affects are related to ways of experiencing the vital processes in the first 
stages of development. They are therefore amodal, involving “the whole body-mind”, and 
often cannot be expressed in words. Their amodal nature makes them common in all 
expressive modes. Therefore, they constitute the affective mode in which something is 
done, since they provide an emotional colour to the individual’s actions (Imberty, 
mentioned by Miroudot 2000). 
For Stern (1985), abstract dance and music are perfect examples of the expression 
of vitality affects. In the presence of parental behaviour, babies are as adults before music. 
They do not recognize the actions as such, save in relation to the vitality affects they 
express. 
In the context of amodal perception, where information is not experienced as part 
of a particular sensorial mode, the passage from one sensorial mode to another is not a 
simple translation. Rather, this process implies the conformation of an abstract and amodal 
format, which can then be recognized in any of the sensorial modalities. In this way, 
information can be taken from a sensorial modality and later transported in some way to 
another perceptual modality. Important behavioural and neurophysiological evidence 
reinforces this idea (Lewkowicz 1992; Lewkowicz and Kraebel 2004; Self and Zeki 2004): 
infants are seen to operate with abstract mental representations of perception, constituted 
by the most global qualities of experience, not with visions, sounds or touch, but with 
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shapes, intensities and temporal patterns. This ability may represent the basis for future 
learning about the relations between different perceptual modalities and may be closely 
related to the psychological grounds for general communication and affective 
communication in particular. This is a particularly interesting point for our concerns, since 
we are going to suggest in chapter 10 that in our experimental undertaking, that abstract 
and amodal format may be strongly identified with the prolongational structure of musical 
piece. 
Stern suggests that strict or true imitation is not enough to accomplish a state of 
communion. Rather, it is achieved when the affective state is shared without alluding to the 
involved behavioural expression. Thus, the concept of attunement refers to the 
reproduction of enough behavioural characteristics to reflect a determined emotional 
condition (clearly keeping other features aside) without imitating the open behaviour. 
Therefore, attunement is an expression of the inter-affective relation which is characterized 
by: (i) the presence of a kind of behavioural matching which does not constitute a faithful 
translation or imitation; (ii) paired behaviours linked to different perceptual modalities for 
which the attunement process in itself is considered a crossmodal process; and (iii) a 
matched object that is not the behaviour in itself, but some kind of feature of it that reflects 
an emotional condition. The matching reference is the emotional condition and not the 
external behavioural event. In this context “the behavior (is viewed) as an expression and 
not as a sign or symbol” (Stern 1985, p.177). Another important facet of attunement is that 
it is not consciously noticed and is practically automatic. 
Attunement is part of the repertoire of behaviours integrating intuitive parenting 
(Papoušek, M. 1996) – the set of behaviours that adults display in the presence of infants. 
However, it is possible to derive some ideas from this notion. On the one hand it is 
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reasonable to suppose that our capability of attuning to babies’ behaviour can reach other 
types of relationships and partners. It is possible that many spontaneous movements and 
tension-relaxation games displayed in the presence of music have the same psychological 
origin. Moreover, this capability should be acquired early on in the ontogeny. In a 
longitudinal study with a baby between 12 and 24 months old, Español and Shifres (2003) 
described how the infant was capable of matching his personal actions (facial gestures, 
head movements, etc), showing a crossmodal association with certain behavioural 
characteristics taken from his environment (guitar sounds, melodic motives, etc.). In this 
context the gestures represented the felt pattern of the music performed by the guitar. 
Thus, the idea of communication goes from a process that depends on a code in a 
given sensorial modality to an exchange in a multiplicity of modalities allowing for mutual 
closeness (Shanker and King 2002). This process reflects the role of emotion in 
communication, being especially explanatory of the place that music occupies for the 
synthesis between cognition and emotion (Sloboda 1999). 
The internal states that are the object of the intersubjective experience show up as 
motivational impulses that mobilize the adult’s and infant’s actions. Each partner can 
reflect the other’s motivations and reasons and so become involved in immediate receptive 
contact. According to Trevarthen (1998, 1999/2000, Trevarthen and Hubley 1978), these 
motivational impulses are innately organized in relatively regular temporal patterns 
(Intrinsic Motive Pulse - IMP). There is empirical evidence (Wittmann and Pöppel 
1999/2000, Trevarthen 1999/2000) for the existence of a neural substrate (Intrinsic Motive 
Formation - IMF) of this temporal organization. The IMF synchronizes and balances the 
movements of the different body parts anticipating the effects of the actions so they can 
coincide in time and space in the most adjusted way. 
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All intersubjective regulator mechanisms are displayed over three different 
interaction dimensions: time, shape and intensity. Since music is also organised on theses 
three dimensions, they are giving intersubjective experiences an intrinsically musical 
character. 
Because this basis is innate, Trevarthen states that intersubjectivity starts much 
earlier and is why he identifies two different levels or domains. Primary intersubjectivity, 
as of two months from birth, in which dyadic interpersonal communication is established 
in a reciprocity subject-subject format, in which attention and the adjustment of emotional 
expressions and gestures from one to the other take place producing and controlling 
sounds. This format basically acquires two modalities: (i) neonatal imitation and (ii) proto-
conversations (or non-linguistic vocal exchanges). They both offer the dyad a sense of 
intimacy and proximity, present throughout normal life as a potential for the establishment 
of intimate approaches with others and “to underlie higher-order modes of engagements in 
symbolic and conceptual mediacy” (Bråten 1998b, p.373) 
In secondary intersubjectivity, from 9 months of age (Trevarthen and Hubley 
1978), the interest in objects is included in the dyadic interactions, sharing their 
manipulations, perceptions and emotions. It is, indeed, a triangular interaction. This 
interchange unfolds independently of any notion system or previous concepts, and includes 
joint attention to the object and shared emotional referentiality (Bråten 1998b). 
8.2 Musically relevant characteristics of intersubjectivity 
experiences 
Early intersubjective exchanges are characterized by a series of features that can be 
appreciated as being musical (Stern 1985, Papoušek, M. 1996, Papoušek, H. 1996, 
Trevarthen 1999/2000), while others contribute to understand communication in terms of 
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dance. Some of these characteristics are: (i) mutual imitations, (ii) emotional expression 
interchanges, (iii) turn taking, (iv) rhythmicity, (v) melodicity, and (vi) interactive 
synchrony. 
Intersubjective interactions are permanently changing. They themselves generate 
the patterns of change. The establishment of such patterns appears from mutual coactions. 
Likewise, communication is seen as a continuous unfolding of the individual action 
susceptible to be continuously modified by the continuously changing actions of the co-
participant (Fogel 1999). This transforms the nature of our comprehension of 
communication. Whereas for the information processing paradigm the comprehension of 
what is being communicated takes place when the receiver decodes the sender’s message 
(implying they both posses a common code that allows such processing), for the 
intersubjective experiences perspective mutual “understanding is something that emerges 
as both partners converge on some shared feeling, thought, action, intention, etc., and 
develop or deploy various behaviours that signify this convergence” (Shanker and King 
2002). 
Co-performer communication has similar components. For instance, Williamon and 
Davidson (2002) affirmed that the pianists in a duo they studied “were able to converse 
‘musically’, with information being given and received, modified and consolidated” (p. 
63). So it is not difficult in the interaction to see a kind of diachronic and synchronic 
concertato that evokes music making. This has taken Malloch (1999/2000) to develop the 
idea of Communicative Musicality. In this context, music is understood as a cultural 
artefact emerging from a natural psychological source that is musicality. 
“(Musicality) seems to be an eternal, given psycho-biological need in all 
humans (…) The rhythmic impulse of living, moving and communicating is 
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musical, as is the need to “tell a story” in “narrative time”, a need that is 
inseparable from the human will to act with imagination of the consequences.” 
… “musicality is the coordination of this acting emotionally, and its 
channelling into an imagined narrative of purposes with concern for their 
consequences. The moral and spiritual tone of music, or its festival vigour and 
passion arises from the instantaneous sympathy of a listener’s response to the 
action of making sounds with that tempo and in that way.” (Trevarthen 
1999/2000, p.157, 162) 
According to Malloch (1999/2000) and Trevarthen (1999/2000) the most important 
features of musicality, timing, emotive expression and intersubjective sympathy, are 
innate. Small babies’ sensibility to the musical dimensions of maternal vocalization in 
natural or experimental situations evidences such innate capability (Papoušek, H. 1996). 
This is manifested in: (1) the way in which infants can be attracted to particular 
accentuations and phrasing in adults’ speech (Papoušek, H. 1996); (2) their ability to 
articulate vocalizations and gesture movements in accordance to the rhythmic regularities 
of adults’ actions and even in their absence (Papoušek and Papoušek 1981; Murray and 
Trevarthen 1985); (3) their participation in “proto-conversations” – including the temporal 
organization of vocalization fluctuation and length – implying the coordination of different 
expression channels and mutual comprehension in coherent and fluent actions (Stern 
1985); (4) the aural discrimination of rhythmic attributes related to tempo and rhythmic 
grouping patterns and the establishment of those attributes’ musical preferences (Trehub 
2003). The temporal relations established in the baby-adult dyad present features of 
synchrony, contrapuntal game and isochrony are equivalent to the characteristics of the 
expressive performance of music. 
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Significantly, communicative musicality is not music. It is a general behavioural 
substratum for human companionable communication that conveys shared emotions 
(Malloch 1999/2000). However, a series of attributes inherent in human communication 
are highly exploited in music: (1) pulse, (2) quality and (3) narrative permit the appearance 
of coordinated fellowship (Malloch 2002). 
Pulse can be considered a near-universal attribute of music (Arom 2000, Snyder 
2000, Cross 2001). As is known, the pulse is the basis of the clock-like experience of time 
(Epstein 1995). Malloch (1999/2000) demonstrated the pulsated nature of the mother-baby 
interaction, providing, at the same time, evidence about the quasi-hierarchical 
organization of such pulses. 
Quality is linked to the melodic and timbral contours of vocalization. Babies are 
sensitive to these attributes (Trehub 2000, 2003), which are correlated to the shape and 
speed of corporal gestures. A mother’s vocalization shows clear timbre differences 
depending on the formal function assigned to certain vocalizations (introduction, closure, 
etc). Noticeably, the mother and baby’s timbre quality is linked in a sort of timbre 
counterpoint where the baby imitates the timbre features of the mother and proposes new 
ones which in turn are imitated by her. Throughout this quality game in their dialogue, 
mother and baby achieve understanding. 
Narrative refers to a way of making significant sequences of organized events 
within a pulse and with determined quality values in a concerting game that acquires, with 
its own joint creation, shared meaning. These creations imply temporal units that range 
from tenths of a second to a few minutes. Its presence in such early and musical 
interactions accounts for the essential nature of narratives and human companionship and 
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communication, as seen in the creation of joint meaning, and their strong relation with 
music (chapter 9). 
Adult-baby interaction may be analysed according to its formal and contrapuntal 
structure. Moreover, its narrative structure may also be described. However, the rhythmic 
peculiarities of the interaction are particularly relevant here. 
The word pulse is ever-present in any theory of rhythm, especially of musical 
rhythm. As mentioned before, adult-infant interactions present features of temporal 
periodicity that allow talking about a pulse. However, it is necessary to distinguish both 
notions. Merker (2002a) has remarked that the temporal (precision) ranges of pulses in 
intersubjective interactions are different from the temporal ranges that characterize music 
pulse in western and most musical cultures. The use of similar temporal ranges to musical 
pulse starts in the adult–baby dyad not before the 9 months of age in a mode of parenting 
stimulation that acquires the modality of play (named musical play). Rhymes, hand games, 
as well the kinetic, gesture and tactile contact behaviours of adults gain this higher level of 
temporal precision that corresponds to the temporal constraints imposed by the underlying 
pulse in music (see Fraisse 1982, Arom 2000). Noticeably, this attention to an underlying 
music pulse structure coincides in the genesis with the development of secondary 
intersubjectivity, characterized by joint attention to an object appearing from without the 
dyad. In this case the underlying pulse is constituted in the object that captures the dyad’s 
attention. The incorporation of this pulse structure to the interaction implies the 
development of a new mechanism by which the members of the dyad temporally regulate 
their interactive behaviours. 
Merker (2000) mentions that the mechanism based on an underlying pulse is not 
present in species that are phylogenetically close to Homo Sapiens. Therefore, it is possible 
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to consider it as a human evolutionary achievement. However, it is well known that many 
communicational aspects of lower species seem to be based on pulsed structures of high 
temporal accuracy. Nevertheless, there are at least two important differences concerning 
the capacity humans have: (i) humans can interact with others according to an underlying 
pulse, making use of a comparatively wide range of pulse tempi; (ii) humans can show 
interchanges of emotional expressions in interactions that involve adjusting to an 
underlying pulse. In this way the underlying pulse mechanism has a particular motivational 
foundation in Homo Sapiens. 
The interactive behaviour timing mechanisms in mammals look much more 
(concerning time accuracy) like the adult-infant dyad ones before the period just identified. 
These can be presented as interactive mechanisms through reaction time (according to 
which a behaviour is the consequence of the reaction to a previous action of the other dyad 
member) and through familiarity (according to which a behaviour is the result of previous 
knowledge of the other dyad member’s behavioural patterns). These mechanisms may be 
related to the most primitive emotional interchanges that mainly arouse interest and 
pleasure (Kugiumutzakis 1998). It is important to state that although towards the first year 
of life the human baby acquires the capability of interacting based on an underlying pulse, 
the other interaction mechanisms endure into adult life. It will be argued (chapter 11) that 
the endurance of these mechanisms is precisely what allows us to understand the 
expressive nature as well as the idiosyncratic character of the time deviations originated in 
expressive music performance. For this it is necessary to previously look over, firstly, 
which is the role intersubjective experiences play in the formation of what is called an 
aesthetic experience, to then explore the feasibility of this mode of interaction in the 
interpersonal exchanges of adult life. 
270 
8.3 Intersubjectivity in the genesis of the aesthetic function 
According to Ellen Dissanayake (1992, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Dissanayake and Miall 2003) 
some of the characteristics of early intersubjective interactions, musical as they may be, 
have been, evolutionarily speaking, the result of increasingly longer altriciality, which 
allowed greater resources for the attention and care of the offspring, and promoted social 
cohesion. In particular, this demand gave rise to the elaboration of some affiliative 
behaviours aimed at extending their permanence and therefore making them more 
effective. Elaboration bears the crossmodal, temporal and dynamic modelling of the 
behaviour that leads to progressively extend a state of inherently pleasant mutuality 
(Dissanayake 2000b). Elaboration makes some features of early intersubjective interactions 
“break out” of the dyad, marking a course for the aesthetic imagination’s phylogenesis. 
In this way, sociality and affiliative reinforcement transform many basic 
behaviours. In interactions with infants numerous adult behaviours are exaggerations and 
repetitions of gestural, facial and vocal qualities used by adults for interactions between 
themselves. These would show the adult’s affiliative intention or disposition (Dissanayake 
2001). This is manifested in the process of ritualization by which an instrumental and daily 
activity is taken out of its normal context, ritualized, and used as a communicative signal 
with a completely different motivation (so as to ensure joint attention in early interactions). 
During this process the signal becomes unmistakable and more prominent with the purpose 
of drawing attention, differentiating itself from the original by presenting simpler and more 
formalized shapes and by rhythmical repetition. This involves greater motor regularity and 
an exaggerated use of time and space in action. As in phylogenesis, ritualization in 
ontogenesis should play an essential role in pretend play and the genesis of the symbolic 
function (Español in press). Interestingly, Dissanayake (2000a) suggests that ritualization 
is one of the features that “breaks out” of the specific context of adult-infant interaction 
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and installs itself in adult life situations contributing to the reinforcement of social 
bonding. 
The same may happen with other features of the first dyadic relations. For instance, 
relational imitation, which emerges from the establishment of intersubjective relations, is a 
cognitive mode (mimesis) whose rudiments are present from birth and which covers such 
varied behaviours as mirroring, matching, motor mimicry and simulation. Imitation 
understood in this way involves on the one hand a crossmodal correspondence in 
perception and on the other, a temporal correspondence in action patterns. The essence of 
such imitation should be modelling many “forms of acting” in adult life. In particular 
crossmodal, supramodal and nonverbal processes, extrapolated from the dyad, should have 
important implications in the evolution of aesthetic thought. 
Many of the behaviours involved in normal dyadic interactions between adults and 
infants progressively exaggerate, pattern and ritualise themselves. This gives way to their 
playful use, endowing them with a meta-communicational value (in other words, the dyad 
members set up a sort of communicative pattern they understand as playful, not “confusing 
it with reality”) and having a very particular structure: repetition-variation (Stern 1985, 
Imberty 1997b, 2002). In the course of this structure, attention is progressively extended 
and in addition the baby starts gaining control in the recognition of invariants and subtle 
changes. In this way the game becomes a field for comparison. Thus, the repetition-
variation structure confers time a sort of embodiment. Time is organized in one direction 
and establishes the before and after pattern which is central to narrative perception of time. 
Music (as narrative, see Chapter 9) is based on this temporal nature (Epstein 1995, Ricoeur 
1985) in addition to its clock-like nature. Through the repetition-variation structure we 
learn to gain knowledge in early childhood in a mode that persists in adult life, although 
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overridden by language. As Dissanayake (2001) remarks, this mode resembles the methods 
of the performing arts. 
From this point of view, the author suggests that responses to music and emotional 
narrations have common origins in early interactions. In addition, when relating early 
interactions to the phylogenetic origin of the human aesthetic experience, she is not only 
pointing out the importance of intersubjective experiences in the adapted mind but also the 
remote origin of the aesthetic experience. 
Extending these ideas, Español (in press) suggests that it is possible to identify this 
“breaking out of the dyad” in the context of ontogeny. In a longitudinal observational 
study, she describes how imitative, ritualised and repeated-varied behaviours break out of 
the dyadic interaction context, connect with objects, stimuli, environmental and internal 
signals, elaborate and become intrinsically pleasant behaviours. Her contribution involves 
two important facts. The first is the distinction between motion and action. While motion 
has an emotional motive, during an action motivation is intentional. Concomitantly, motion 
prepares for emotional appreciation, and action for intentional appreciation. The 
elaboration of motion should play a key role in the establishment of an action sequence, 
contributing an organization of time in movement that can be understood in narrative terms. 
The second of Español’s contributions is the incorporation of sequences of regular 
motion with a high level of temporal accuracy to the playful context in which the 
symbolic-fictional capability develops. Shifres and Español (2004) observed that from all 
the particular characteristics of primary intersubjective experiences (interchanges of 
emotional expressions, turn taking, rhythmicity, melodicity, etc) interactive synchrony 
seems not to be present – in a subsequent stage – in the appearance of pretend play. 
Nevertheless, another modality of play introduces a wedge in the playful context, where 
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the involved subjects achieve a state of empathy around an underlying pulse, organizing 
their joint actions in interactive synchrony. Following Merker (2002a), they have called 
these playful instances musical play. While observing 24 and 36 month-old children, 
Shifres et al (2004) could identify at least three types of musical components present in the 
genesis of pretend play: (i) protomusical components or remainders of the musical aspects 
of intuitive parenting; (ii) pseudo-musical components or music structures instrumentally 
taken for pretend play; and (iii) musical components in themselves, or musical play. In this 
context, protomusical attributes contribute to reinforce the sense of shared expression and 
emotion and, in this way, strengthen the bond during playful activity. But musical 
components, in the form of musical play, seem to have another role. It was observed that 
musical play alternates with fictional situations in the playful context (Shifres and Español 
2004). When this happens they found that the prime sequence is pretend play-musical 
play-pretend play. Interestingly, the regular rhythmic pattern characteristic of musical play 
is incorporated into the succeeding pretend play with a different meaning. Thus, as they 
concluded, musical play enriches and extends pretend play. The musical play modality 
invades pretend play, shifting its thematic content and replacing it with semantically vague 
actions and representations that would leave some form of new signifiers in the infant’s 
mind, later to re-signify themselves in pretend play. These will serve the narrative-fictional 
sequences contributing to temporally organize the experience and to thematically unfold 
the fictional scene. 
It is proposed here that this way of making use of the musical structure is similar to 
when performers rehearse their performances – take an abstract musical structure (for 
example the prolongational structure) and put it at the service of narrative – and that that 
imaginative modality is prepared in our early interactions. 
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8.4 Other types of intersubjective experiences 
We have examined the notion of intersubjectivity in development. However, other studies 
have successfully used this concept in other domains (i.e. see Beebe, Knoblauch et al 
2003). Bråten (1998b) suggests that an important contribution of this approach to 
developmental psychology is it considers that the initial level characteristics of 
development preserve their operative character in subsequent normal development. 
Therefore, it is possible to expect the arousal of any behavioural feature distinctive of these 
early developmental levels in later levels, in situations that jeopardize aspects of non-
verbal communication or self-other divisions, amongst others. In addition, as in general 
terms the Cartesian vision of a solipsistic mind is severely questioned nowadays, mind 
issues tend to be seen as problems of intersubjectivity (Kirschner 2003). However, some 
contexts are particularly sensitive to the intersubjective approach due to their entailing the 
communication of internal states and approaching epistemological objects that present a 
great variety of manifestations and personal meaning, as is the case in music. 
Interestingly, some studies in ethnomusicology show musical situations in which 
the variables that participate in intersubjective experiences have a crucial role. Zeranska-
Kominek (1992) explained the mukam of Turkmenistan as an exponent of what she called 
evolutionary musical thinking. This conception of music composition consists of the 
peculiar strategy of composition in real time. Although it seems to be “on extreme 
individualism and emotionality (...) creation of music is oriented towards the listener and 
is entirely determined by the listener’s perception of it.”(p. 250). The performance 
demonstrates the particular way in which musical pacing is related to the listener’s 
perception at that particular moment. Performance can be described as a dynamic growing 
process principally determined more by emotion than by any other preconceived structure. 
In this way, compositional technique is affected by the effect of each note in the real time 
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process. The use of particular modal structures, the structural organization of rhythmic-
melodic patterns (segmentation, repetition, etc) as well as the unfolding of details and 
nuances capture the listeners’ attention and give them a pleasant experience, guaranteeing 
a sense of composition coherence as a whole. If one thinks that a Turkmen music concert 
can last up to 8 hours, these goals become a matter of powerful motivation. 
At the other end of the world, Liska (2006) studied tango dance phenomena in 
Buenos Aires milongas (dance clubs) from a generational perspective. She found that older 
dancers (more than 80 years old) could discriminate the stylistic variables of the different 
typical orchestras (tango orchestras) and could for that reason adjust the steps and figure 
choreographies to the particularities of the musical arrangement. She concludes by saying 
that these greater subtleties in the dance variables in accordance with the performance 
particularities originate from the older dancers having developed their dancing skills at a 
time when people danced in the milongas to live music. This circumstance gave the 
milongueros (dancers attending a milonga) knowledge of the idiosyncratic performative 
features of each orchestra, which is very difficult to acquire from the recorded 
performances. One of her informers mentions that at the time of the typical orchestras it 
was not only the dancers who would pay attention to the orchestra’s performance, but the 
latter would also attend to the dancers’ steps. In that way, communication between 
performers and dancers was very close and would allow for more profound, mutual 
emotional knowledge. These two examples provide some evidence for considering the 
performer-listener relationship (in performance) as an intersubjectivity experience. 
More specifically, Malloch (2002) has suggested that the interaction model 
proposed as communicative musicality underlies many human interactions, for example 
interactions between client and therapist (Trevarthen and Malloch 2000), and between 
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teacher and pupil in the classroom. Similarly, Schögler (1999/2000) studied the 
interactions that occur in a jazz duet at a temporal regulation level. He presented 
behavioural evidence for asserting that those jazz musicians use similar communicational 
resources to the ones used by babies to communicate with their caretakers. In particular, 
“time sharing” (sharing a way of feeling and structuring the time experience) is what leads 
to awareness of the other, their motivations, purposes and interests. When musicians act in 
synchrony they understand each other without the need to account for the intention, 
content of the message or awareness of the other’s intention (as the classical 
communicational scheme would require). In addition, this shared representation is what 
permits the development of the symbolic and imaginative capacity that transforms 
communication into art. Musical expression is carried out through shared rhythm in the 
same way as the mother-infant interaction. In addition, synchronization allows the jazz 
duet to maintain the musical piece’s dramatic coherence since it gives rise to an agreement 
in the moments of the piece where changes are produced. It is important to mention that 
this synchrony contributes to organize the composition’s narrative sequence in terms of the 
before-after temporal experience, reinforcing the communicative process (Schögler 
1999/2000, p-86). 
Furthermore, Trevarthen and Schögler (2002) proposed that this communication is 
possible because rhythm and mimetic sympathy embody thinking and action time. Timing 
and gesture (movement) are therefore two key aspects of intersubjective experiences that 
reach beyond childhood. They both contribute to the organization of the temporal 
experience and they crossmodally link the experience of (musical) time to subjective ways 
of feeling. 
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Music performance, as a performative art, is a field in which the relation between 
the temporal and kinetic experience is naturally strong (Shove and Repp 1995; Davidson 
1993; Salgado Correia 2006, 1999; Clarke 2001). This is another reason for understanding 
almost axiomatically that music performance can be understood as an intersubjective 
experience. During the performance of a piece of music, performers manipulate their 
timing and these then become the object of joint attention shared with the listener. After 
this, it will be proposed in chapter 11 (p. 374) that in further emotional interactions the 
diverse mechanisms of interactive temporal regulation create joy and interest towards the 
object’s details – the music – focusing both dyad members’ attention and maintaining it 
during the (musical) object’s temporal development. Furthermore, it is possible that once 
the attention is centred on the music, the emotional communication originated from the 
activation of these mechanisms does not require the real presence of the other dyad 
member, giving way to a sort of virtual other (Murray and Trevarthen 1985; Bråten 
1998c). 
However, if the timing mechanisms are the strongest data available to say that 
music performance can be understood as an intersubjective experience, it is necessary to 
find evidence of the commonalities between the time regulating mechanisms present in 
music performance and in mother-infant interactions. During early adult-infant interactions 
an invariant extraction process (Stern 1985) takes place. According to Stern one of the 
most important invariants is the coherence in timing structure. During the course of it the 
baby can identify elements that share a temporal structure. The baby can thereby identify 
that a gesture (movement) connects with a certain vocalization because it can identify the 
common temporal structure to both patterns. Many works show that the perception of two 
simultaneous behaviours with the same temporal structure is important for communication 
in music performance (Davidson 1993; Correa Salgado 2001). Yet little is known about the 
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extraction of invariants, in particular of the coherence of the timing structure, in non-
simultaneous behaviours. To determine whether this process takes place, it is first 
necessary to identify the presence of expressive invariants in the performer. This means 
verifying the existence of the coherence of the timing structure in expressive music 
performances. 
In an experiment with professional singers, Shifres (2004) studied (i) whether a 
coherent timing structure remains throughout successive performances even when it obeys 
different expressive intentions and (ii) the extent to which this coherence is shared by 
different performers. The study involved examining the timing structure of several 
performances by the same performer who sought different interpretations compared to 
those of other performers in a similar situation. 
Four professional singers were each asked to sing 4 times, a capella, Schumann’s 
Lied Auf einer Burg from the Liederkreis Op. 39. They were asked to include all the 
interpretation variations they would consider necessary to obtain a finished performance; 
these would of course include timing variations. Any instruction about expressive 
variations was purposely avoided in order not to force performances that would not fit the 
interpretative idea of the composition each singer already had. The recordings were 
analysed from two perspectives: (i) regarding macro-timing – the tempi of each Lied’s 
phrase was measured – and (ii) regarding micro-timing – the timing of each version was 
measured according to the IOI deviation percentage with respect to the nominal value 
prescribed by the score. 
The results showed the existence of temporal invariants in expressive performances 
that determine the coherence of the timing structure. Interestingly, these invariants seem to 
belong to the micro-timing structure more than to the macro-timing one, since the overall 
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relations of tempo do not seem to be as associated between the different performances in a 
same performer. Even in the cases where the singers looked for other expressions through 
obvious tempo changes with very different macro-timing pattern changes, the micro-timing 
structure remained pronouncedly invariant. In this way, as in early interactions, these 
invariants are probably unconscious. 
Another important fact is that the invariant behaviours found are idiosyncratic. A 
principal component factor analysis produced two factors that represent the performances 
of the different singers. None of the singers had a version more strongly linked to either of 
the factors, this means they identified with only one of the factors, and this reveals its 
individual character beyond the particular features of the piece’s musical structure. These 
results reinforce the idea that the coherence of the timing structure, as one of the features 
of early adult-infant interactions, remains in expressive and sophisticated behaviours that 
adults display in other types of interaction. 
More recently, Shifres (2006) used those song performances and asked 10 pianists 
to accompany 4 of them in a rehearsal session according to 3 experimental conditions: (i) 
normal familiarization (the 4 performances were the same singer’s different recordings); 
(ii) intensified familiarization (the 4 performances were the electronic repetition of one 
performance); and (iii) attenuated familiarization (the 4 performances were randomly 
chosen among the different singers). Although his results are preliminary, some evidence 
of the existence of the three interactive behavioural timing mechanisms proposed by 
Merker (2002a) was found in a particular succession. One could appreciate that the pianists 
first tended to synchronize with the recorded singer based on the underlying pulse. But 
then, when they realized that singers break such regularity, they tended to follow them, 
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synchronizing by time-reaction. Finally, when they were already familiarized with singers’ 
timing, they synchronized by familiarization. 
This evidence supports Schögler’s proposal (1999/2000) according to which the 
performer uses their earliest communicational resources in performance, and can be 
extended to expression in the performance of pieces from the academic repertoire. 
*** 
Summary. The dance metaphor arose as an alternative to the information-transmission 
metaphor in many studies on communication (nonverbal communication in particular). 
From this perspective, communication is considered as occurring in intersubjectivity 
contexts, that is, in contexts in which subjects share non-propositional contents such as 
ways of feeling, attention, movements, etc. The concept of intersubjectivity is used in 
numerous realms, but it has been strongly employed in the field of developmental 
psychology. Early adult-infant interactions are conspicuous intersubjective experiences. In 
particular, these interactions express the phylogenetic and ontogenetic foundations for the 
development of the arts. These interactions are considered typically musical due to their 
behavioural features. Above all, it is possible to recognize rhythmic and metric traits as 
well as some attributes related to sound quality. This fact has led scholars to outline the 
concept of Communicative Musicality: the (innate) ability of getting on with another 
through rhythm and gesture contour (motor and sound). This ability, which is in the 
foundations of many human communicational behaviours, would be crucial in musical 
communication. It is based on very sophisticated mechanisms for the interactive timing. 
This interactive timing facilitates the emergence of states of intersubjective communion. 
The intersubjectivity approach allows interpreting communication beyond the adult-infant 
dyad, as demonstrates an increasing body of studies examining communication in multiple 
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musical dyads, such as jazz improvisers, dancers and accompanying musicians, singers and 
pianists, etc. Some studies also allow appreciating the existence (and extraction) of 
temporal invariants in expressive behaviours, characteristic of adult-infant interactions in 
contexts of relations between adults. The intersubjective communicational perspective may 
shed light on music communication even though there may not be any explicit content or 
manifest intention. In the same way, in this framework, it is not necessary to identify a 
communicational intention for the interchange to occur. As this may be the case when 
prolongational structure is involved in performer-listeners communication, this perspective 
will be the theoretical support of the experiment developed in chapter 10. 
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Chapter 9: Music performance as narrative 
“the over-positive spirits and the idealist spirits hold 
(synaesthesia) in certain disrepute; some, like Max Nordau, 
consider it a sign of regression towards the times in which the 
senses of the human species were not differentiated and were 
confused with touch; others (generally musicians, preferably 
inclined towards metaphysics) revolt at the thought of an art’s 
splendour not consisting first and foremost of its purity: they seem 
to consider sacrilegious the idea that, for example, a symphony 
can be valued in a different concept than as an edification of 
sonorities that have in themselves their origin and aim; they speak 
of music like those mathematicians who absolutely want 
mathematics to have been born by itself, outside from all sensitive 
experience, and that it should not have any further aim than itself 
outside from any practical application. These mathematicians 
forget that when they were young they reasoned just like that girl 
who was taught that 4 and 5 is 9, and then immediately asked: 
“Nine what?” In the same way musicians forget that they too 
asked when listening to a Chopin Nocturne, what was that piece 
representing, and likewise forget that they would dance in the hall 
when their aunt played Mozart’s sonatas on the piano”  
Jean D' Udine 
 
“...telling stories may be something more than mere 
fun... Something fundamental, something the very 
existence of a people depends on.” 
Mario Vargas Llosa  
9.1 Introduction 
It was seen in chapter 2 that in postmodern times audiences consider the performer and the 
performance as the work of art. In fact, audiences still prefer any form of live musical 
performance; even virtual live musical performances, which are manifested in the 
numerous existing recordings of live concerts (often giving up sound quality). This 
ontological status of music as performance is supported by a psychology that understands 
communication as communion, replacing the metaphor of information transmission by the 
dance metaphor to explain it. Thus, music should not only be understood as suitably 
organized information packs as suggested by classical cognitive science, but also as ways 
of organizing musical substance, able to be shared in action. Given the importance of the 
temporal dimension, and shared time in the musical experience, it will be proposed here 
that such organization may be denominated narrative in the light of current narratological 
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discussion. In turn, the narratological perspective may find a place for the prolongational 
structure in the relation between music performance and the listener’s experience. 
It was also seen (chapter 3) that the prolongational structure could be considered as 
being different epistemological objects. The classical perspective imposes the idea that 
prolongation is to be considered as an object. Thus, we experience its objective structure. 
Contrarily, a psychology centred on ways of sharing will focus on the temporal structure 
that events (stimuli) are able to elicit. The conception of narrative as “a set of temporal 
experiences that should be shared” (Ricoeur 1985; p.536, added emphasis) therefore shows 
significant affinity with the study of intersubjectivity. 
Narrative may be considered as a particular way of knowing, understanding and 
configuring the musical experience that has the potential of assigning meaning to music 
(Pederson 1996). Nevertheless, musical narrativity is a controversial topic in current 
musicology. As a correct treatment of the subject would widely exceed the frame of this 
work, the topic will be considered here only as a new meeting point between psychology 
and musicology, regardless of the objectivist perspective, gathering criticisms from the 
new musicology (chapters 2 and 7) and contributions by developmental psychology and 
communication approaches (chapter 8). First, certain terms of the debate are defined. 
Shortly after, this chapter focuses on the musicological perspective in favour of narrativity 
in music. Further ahead some structural, functional and genetic foundations of narrative as 
a way of knowing will be briefly presented. Finally, the pertinence of the idea of music 
performance as narrative to some topics concerning both performer-listener 
communication and performance realization will be discussed. 
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9.2 Narrativity in music 
Topics of narrativity and meaning in music appear to be interlocked. Music does not have 
words and does not seem to have outer references (Petrobelli and Rostagno 2004). 
Nevertheless, the concern of narrativity in music emerges from the affinities between 
musical discourse and literary story. For Newcomb (1987), one of the pioneers in this 
approach, narratology has the advantage of dealing with long term signifying units, instead 
of focusing on a sort of semantic mapping of the minimal units and their paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic relations (as intended by the semiology of music (Nattiez 1987)) or their 
semantic relations (as proposed by the semiotics of music (Monelle 1992)). On the 
contrary, narratology relates meaning to the macrostructure. 
The examination of narrative pertinence in music has been approached mainly in 
two different ways (Almen 2005): On the one hand, the notion of literary narrative is taken 
in its pure state and attributes in the musical field compatible with attributes of the former 
are identified. This perspective is linked to the philosophy of music and musical criticism, 
leaving the problem of musical meaning confined to the semiology of music – of strong 
linguistic concern (Nattiez 1990; Maus 1997b). On the other hand, the approach parallels 
literary and musical practices, since they share certain foundations and common processes. 
This view is partly related to the narratological studies that see narrative as process, and 
inquire as to the particularities of those processes that differentiate narrative from other 
literary genres. This perspective is more associated with psychology and the anthropology 
of music, and here, the problem of meaning is approached from a wide semiotic 
perspective touching psychological and sociological aspects. 
The first approach, due to its semantic anchoring, is naturally more pessimistic: it 
basically considers that it is not possible to speak of narrativity in music. On the contrary, 
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the second approach (i) emphasizes temporality as the essential component of any narrative 
undertaking; (ii) gives a broad conception of narrativity, beginning from the temporal 
experience of the human being that colonizes manifold human activities, instead of just 
from the literary experience; (iii) establishes when and how music makes use of those 
temporal components, giving rise to a differentiation between more and less narrative 
musics; and (iv) offers useful strategies to integrate narrative theory with historical and 
analytical studies (Almen 2005) 
9.3 The sceptical position 
For Lawrence Kramer (quoted by Pederson 1996) a musical narratology is 
impossible. Nevertheless, he proposes exploring narrative elements without going deeply 
into structuralist narratology. Those elements are: (i) narratographic, or narrative projected 
within discourses on music. Strictly speaking, the narratographic element would be the 
musical properties by which it is reasonable and sensible to explain music in those terms. 
In other terms, the narratographic elements are those properties that encourage talking 
about music in a narrative format (the narratographic effects of music). Thus, for example, 
it emerges in musical analysis texts. (ii) Narrativity, or quality that distinguishes the 
narrative from the non-narrative. Narrativity is the musical piece’s potential for being 
narrated through action, for being performed, exerting a concrete influence on the real 
world in which it is being performed. Thus, narrativity and performativity are associated. 
(iii) Narrative itself alludes to the musical manifestation that proffers, complements or 
accompanies a verbal story. 
In turn, Nattiez (1990) also affirms that music cannot be narrative. His reasons 
allude to the fact that music cannot express itself through some type of metalanguage. If 
music is a set of actions in the course of time, and narrative is no more than the story of a 
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set of actions in the course of time, then a metalanguage is necessary for the narrative to 
emerge. Thus, there are reasons of a discursive nature that distinguish problems of literary 
narrative from musical discourse issues. Among those reasons, the issue of meaning 
impedes establishing causal relationships between events. However (i) why does Nattiez 
differentiate historical narration from fictional narration, since in both, the plot implies 
causal relationships? And (ii) why does he deny a causal bond to musical organization, 
being that, especially for music of the common practice period, causal bonds are usually 
accepted by many compositional theories? Nattiez limits his concept of narrative to a kind 
of explanatory text, which also does not include many aspects of literary narration, leaving 
out interpretation, metaphor, symbolization, imagination and the like. He ignores the 
reader’s activity. Probably, this conceptual limitation derives from his ontological 
perspective in examining music, which limits the psychological incumbency of musicology 
(Nattiez 1987). Contradictorily, he founds his view on a quasi-experimental style of 
psychology. He asked about three hundred children to listen to Paul Dukas’ The Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice and asked them to “tell the story”. Three relevant conclusions emerged from 
these data: (i) children identified the macro-formal organization and tied it to their 
narratives; (ii) characters in those narratives were not linked to (musically) thematic 
aspects; and (iii) a pattern of calm/agitation/calm emerged from the narratives. According 
to Nattiez, this evidence does not show a musical narrative but speaks about a plot 
imagined and constructed by the listener from elements found in music. With this 
conclusion he reaffirms that his analysis eludes any psychological incumbency. 
Remarkably, such a wide restriction to the concept of narrative questions any type of 
narration, even a literary one. 
For that reason Nattiez disapproves of Newcomb’s confusing of narrative structure 
with a culturally typified behavioural scheme. But, if a narrative is not that, then his 
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concept of narrative is extremely narrow. Nattiez condemns musical narrative because any 
attempt of following a narrative in music implies interpretation, ignoring that the problem 
of interpretation and over-interpretation is the problem of literary narrative (Eco 1992). 
This view comes from understanding musical narrative as derived from literary 
narrative: music imitates, adopts the appearance of literary form. Finally, the contradiction 
is made explicit when he argues that music can be recognized as “a mode of narration”. 
Clearly, if it is a mode, therefore it is narration, although other modes may exist. 
Thus, this sceptical perspective is based on two pillars: (i) a conception of music 
unrelated from a psychological subject, supported on an abstraction, the neutral level, 
distinct from the experiential. Thence, musical understanding is only possible through 
paradigmatization (which is Nattiez’s political preoccupation: to demonstrate that his 
theoretical corpus is the way to approach music). Difficulties for acknowledging the 
“discourse content” have to do with this theoretical (probably, ideological) limitation. (ii) 
A folk conception of narrative rather than a disciplinarily documented one. From this 
commonsense conception he ignores the debate about narrative as human activity, its 
psychological incumbency and its anthropological implications (Abott 2001, Tooby and 
Cosmides 2001). 
When going deeper into the narrative concept as currently considered, many of the 
sceptical arguments lose strength (Almen 2005): 
(i) Needing a verbal indication for listening to a narration. This idea loses force 
when considering that listening to conventionalised forms (a sonata for 
example) also receives an important impulse from the indication offered by the 
denomination. 
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(ii) Absence of causal relations. It was seen that in the context of tonal music, this 
argument is fallacious, since analytical compositional techniques (as opposed to 
associative ones) establish strong causal bonds between musical events. 
(iii) Absence of a narrator. The presence of a narrator would fulfil two basic 
functions: (a) generating the past tense of the story, and (b) organizing plot 
coherence, beyond any chronological order. Almen (2005) considers that the 
first function is not a requisite for defining narrative, since there are multiple 
forms of establishing temporal distinctions. From an anthropological 
perspective, the requirement of the past tense (Abbate 1990) is also deceptive. 
In many cultures, whose linguistic structure lacks a past tense, narrative is not 
only possible but also essential (Solís Fonseca 1998). 
Further ahead, it will be proposed that the crucial function of the narrator is to guide 
the narration as a shared experience, giving rise to the presence of an other. The psycho-
anthropological perspective of narrative allows this view of the narrator. Thus, the 
narrator’s function may be identified with the performer’s role, from which the “necessary 
temporal distinctions” for such an identification emerge. 
9.4 The optimistic perspective 
A parallel perspective of narrativity in music and literature shows: (i) a set of topics 
originated in literary fields that require to be reviewed in the musical field. It clearly 
constitutes a musicological view, although, as will be seen, it has a psychological bias. 
This point is treated in this section. (ii) A set of topics approached in parallel by both 
disciplines, which clearly show the strong psychological incumbency of narrative. This is 
considered in the next section. 
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There are two central subjects in treating literary narrative that ought to be re-
examined in speaking of musical narrative: (i) the plot, or the internal disposition and 
bonds among the story’s constituting parts or events; (ii) the agency, referring to the agent 
who realizes the actions that mobilize the story. From a compositional point of view, both 
aspects are traditionally related to musical morphology (musical form, motivic elaboration, 
etc.). Therefore, they clearly depend on the musical style involved (Newcomb 1987, 
Micznik 2001). For that reason, studies on musical narrative tend to focus on certain styles, 
authors and even particular works, rather than undertaking more universal studies. Such is 
the case in the resurgence of this theme in musicological literature at the beginning of this 
century (Mizcnik 2001, Klein 2004, McDonald 2004, Raphael 2004), after almost 10 years 
of scarce scholarly output. Although this particularistic perspective has been the object of 
criticism (Maus 1997b), it is in effect the approach adopted in this thesis. However, the 
discussion about nomothetic vs. idiographic explanations has colonized the entire 
musicological field. For that reason it also affects the examination, use and validation of 
the prolongational structure both as structural constituent and analytical model. 
9.4.1 Plot 
In order to examine music as narrative, Newcomb (1987) started from a structuralist point 
of view (based on the Russian formalist school, Propp’s analysis of folk stories in 
particular, and Levi Strauss’ studies on the structure of myths). But he also took one of 
Ricouer’s (1985) psychological assertions: the crucial role of the activity of the subject 
who follows the narrative thread in the narrative definition of a text. From all this, his most 
important contributions are (i) to have glimpsed the analogy between the narratological 
method of extracting structural commonalities between texts considered as narrative, and 
the musicological method of extracting commonalities between archetypical musical 
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sequences that are traditionally denominated musical forms; and (ii) to have speculated 
about the role of following the thread in the stability of the musical form as an a priori 
structure. In this way, he argued that narrative emerges from the organization of events 
according to which each event takes and exhibits a certain function. This organization is 
the paradigmatic or archetypical plot and although the inner content of the events change, 
their function in the succession always remains the same. Interestingly, the archetypical 
convention, that is to say, the way in which a given formal structure becomes a narrative 
organization, takes place on every structural level (macro-form, period, phrase, etc.). Thus, 
the paradigmatic organization may also emerge in the way in which a consequent follows 
an antecedent, a melodic sequence is completed, the symmetry relations between phrases 
are settled, and so on. As of the establishment of these archetypical forms, following the 
thread becomes more demanding and therefore over-activated when the compositional 
structure problematizes (taking Newcomb’s term, problematization) such archetypes. In 
this way, for example, 20th century music proposes a deep change in the employed 
narrative strategies with respect to 18th century music. 
Briefly, narrative is shaped from the tension between the paradigmatic plot to 
which the work is attached (and which is relatively easily recognizable by the listener) and 
the successive alterations to that paradigm which the work proposes as it takes place. 
Those alterations can either be syntactic (relative to the structure of the parts, the amount 
of parts, etc.) or functional (for example, to wait for a consequent that finally does not 
occur; transitional sections that become more stable than the episode; etc.). That is to say, 
the composer guarantees first that the composition clearly attaches itself to the archetype, 
for example, a rondo, with the intention of putting it upside down with what is to follow. In 
this way the “attentive listener is forced to move beyond static recognition of formal 
schemata to [the] dynamic questioning [of] formal procedures” (Newcomb 1987, p.174). 
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Thus, Newcomb subordinates the narrative to the knowledge of formal archetypes. 
Thus, “the attentive listener” is in fact a listener formed in 19th century musicology, from 
where these formal archetypes arose. For this reason he affirms that musical narrative 
increased as the 19th century went by, because what happened in the course of that century 
was the problematization of the classical form as proposed by musicology at this time. 
In spite of this severe restriction, Newcomb’s proposal is of a wider scope. The 
tension between the paradigmatic plot and its successive alterations is temporal by nature. 
Since it governs the musical work’s long-term issues we could name it macro-temporal 
tension. This macro-temporal tension is built on the listeners’ need of not being taken by 
what they expects in order to “follow the story”, that which indeed is coming. 
In this direction, it is possible to think that, as musical narrative, through the 
paradigmatic plot, can reach different levels of the formal structure, it can also colonize 
different structural aspects. For example, Patrick McCreless (mentioned by Pederson 1996) 
uses the Schenkerian organicist conception to propose a possible principle of implied 
musical narrative in the notion of tonal closure. Here the tensions are provoked between 
the expected tonal patterns and those actually carried out. This has to do with the key point 
of the plot definition according to Ricouer (1985), who says that the very concept of plot is 
supported by the idea of order. 
Thus, plot is the structural conformation of what is being told. In narratology 
theory, what is told is the story, and the structural arrangement by means of which this is 
told is the discourse (White 1981). But, in music, what is “what is told”? The tradition of 
absolute music (Dahlhaus 1978) would ratify that what is told corresponds to the structural 
attributes and relations (motifs, keys, modulations, rhythms, etc.). If a composition may be 
structurally described in more than one way, then we could say that we have a single 
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discourse telling different stories. This is the narrative possibility that Maus considers 
(quoted by Pederson 1996). Nevertheless, it is evident that the musical metalanguage (in 
this case each analytical description) is the narrative rather than the music itself. For that 
reason Maus (1997a) talks about the dramatic potential of music, rather than its narrative 
quality. 
This proximity between musical narrative and the narrative of language about 
music has probably been the cause for which many of the proposals supporting a musical 
narrative are mainly directed to function as compositional models of analysis. On the 
contrary, narrative may be understood as a mode of experiencing music (a mode of musical 
knowing). However, as structuralist narratology has been founded on the supposition that 
plot is built from actions and incidents found by the reader throughout the discourse 
(Culler mentioned by Newcomb 1987), it is necessary to refer to the question of agency. 
9.4.2 Agency 
Agency refers to the identification of the agent of the narrated action. For some scholars, 
agency has to do with the composition’s features and the way these are related. For others, 
agency is, in fact, imposed by the listener. The idea that the musical surface can be 
understood as an arena in which different actors play their roles (Tarasti 1994) makes us 
consider that narrative is in fact a capacity of the listener that allows him to interpret 
musical events in anthropomorphic terms (Maus 1997a). As was seen in chapter 3 (p. 82) 
the anthropomorphic hypothesis has been experimentally explored (Watt and Ash 1998) 
and theoretically discussed in the light of a psychological perspective of musical meaning 
(Sloboda 1998). Nevertheless in these arguments it is not clear whether the 
anthropomorphic interpretation is part of the understanding of musical phenomena (an 
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genuinely psychological aspect) or if it is a rhetorical resource to describe such 
understanding (a problem of musicological discourse). 
For example, Maus (1997a) emphasizes the role of the listener in transforming 
musical events into a narrative of human actions. Therefore, he understands that narrative 
is not in music but in the listener’s response to the dramatic characteristics of music. In 
other words, the analysis narrativizes (a term of Nattiez’s) the sequence of dramatic 
actions throughout the piece. Evidently, Maus is not using a psychological viewpoint in his 
foundation of the notion of narrative in music. 
In turn, Tarasti (1994) proposes that the musical piece is generated from the way in 
which musical motifs act, in the same way as actors both participate and generate the play 
(in drama). In his more dramatic than narrative suggestion, the narrator is absent. When 
seeing the musical piece from this perspective, the work may be analysed in terms of those 
actions. Such is the actantial analysis of the piece. What happens in the course of the piece 
is not understood as linear narrative but rather as a sort of alternation “between Being and 
Doing, between tension and rest, between dissonance and consonance” (quoted by 
Pederson 1996, p. 185). According to this proposal, in general terms, actions in tonal 
music have to do with conflicts often derived from short-term harmonic distances. Thus, 
his actantial analysis is a type of semiotic mapping of the musical surface. According to 
Tarasti, that which is structural in music is in its surface meaning. 
Mizcnik’s contribution (2001) follows this line. Although she does not mention it, 
she seems to explicitly understand the problem of agency in terms of the nature of the used 
motivic materials and the way in which transformations of such materials in the course of 
the composition operate. Motivic transformation reinforces the motif’s semantic content. 
Therefore when the motivic elaboration, rather than the tonal development, maintains the 
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work’s plot (as happens in 19th century pieces as opposed to more classical forms) a higher 
degree of narrativity becomes manifest. As one of the variables considered is the nature of 
the material itself, it is the material that impels the narrative content of the piece. The more 
independent the compositional materials are from standardized organizational structures, 
the more probable the music will sound more narrative. In other words, the narrative 
quality of the piece depends on the material’s identity, characterization, and 
transformational potential. 
According to Hatten (2001, lecture 7) agency is related to gesture, because in 
considering musical events as gestures the reference to the performer of these gestures 
cannot be avoided. He argues: “Gesture (…) communicates information about the gesturer 
(or character, or person the gesturer is impersonating or embodying).” (n.p) Opposed 
musical gestures imply both protagonist and antagonist roles. Performance may also give 
rise to other types of agency when the performer narrates the composition…  
“Directing the listener's attention (possibly over-didactically) to the structure 
and significance of events, although not changing or reordering the events 
themselves (exceptions: productions of operas, some 20th-century scores 
offering the performer options). Commenting upon the events from the 
perspective of the individual point of view and prejudices of the performer as 
engaged participant in the "telling" of the story. May (over-) emphasize 
characterization of actants (protagonist and antagonist), or especially unusual 
(narrative) reorderings or disruptions of expected events or event-sequence 
(narrator).” (n. p.) 
Thus, the topic of agency is indissolubly related to the issue of representation. As 
music passes in time, musical representations are prone to be understood in terms of 
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actions. Consequently, the relation between musical events and anthropomorphic 
representations appears logical. Claus Cluver (quoted by Pederson 1996) shows how action 
is related to representation. A typical musical referent mentioned in psychology is the 
sound source. Thus, when listening to a violin, one tends to imagine a violin. Cluver shows 
the paradox of how Schaeffer’s Etude aux chemins de fer, composed from real sounds of 
trains, gives rise to fewer representations of trains than Pacific 231, Honegger’s famous 
symphonic work. For Cluver, Honegger’s piece presents a complete action of a train, 
whereas Schaeffer’s does not behave as a train. The train is a referential mark that does not 
get to shape a narrative. These referential marks become blurred, dissipated, or lose their 
representational power, and get to be understood abstractly by the way in which the 
structure is shaped. Thus, paradoxically, certain apparently concrete components (as the 
sound of a train) become abstract. As a corollary, other apparently abstract components 
may re-signify themselves in the course of the piece acquiring a representational value that 
they perhaps did not present earlier (the Wagnerian leitmotiv might be an example of this). 
In this way, both art conventions and listening expectations play a crucial role in the 
relation between music and narrative (Pederson 1996).  
Cluver understands musical narrative not only as structural characteristics but also 
as significant human behaviour. In this sense, this notion is related to Micznik’s assertion 
that music cannot get rid of the “common trait of most human cultures which amounts to a 
natural impulse to impose a certain kind of order upon the perception and representation 
of the world” (Micznik 2001, p.193). This conception of narrative as a way of experiencing 
the world (Forsey 2003) is what we will discuss in the following section. 
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9.5 The psychological perspective 
9.5.1 Time and narrative 
The discussion on the definition of narrative seems unavoidably to be psychologically 
oriented. Determining what is experienced as narrative seems more important than 
defining what narrative is. For White (1981) there is a universal need to narrate and to give 
the events inhabiting our experience a narrative aspect. For many scholars, narrative is 
inherent in every human experience (Forsey 2003). For that reason narrative is not only a 
way of informing events in sequence through time, but also of conceiving the particular 
form in which events are organized in time. “Time becomes human time in the extent in 
which it articulates itself in a narrative way, and the narrative reaches its total meaning 
when it becomes a condition of the temporal existence” (Ricoeur 1985; p. 113). 
This narrative impulse, fundamental and far-reaching, appears as a cultural function 
by which people narrativize discourses in general in granting the events of their lives a 
formal structure. This shows that narrative consists of linking events through a structure 
that imbues them with meaning, which those events as a mere sequence do not have. The 
plot is nothing more than a story’s mechanism of abstraction as of a set of incidents 
(Ricouer 1985). It is important to emphasize the formal character of this definition of plot. 
It allows for every temporal organization that synthesises heterogeneous events to be 
understood as a plot. In this way, the formal functions of this structure, closure function for 
example, are defined as psychological functions because they are not the result of the 
intrinsic characteristics of the event but of a coherent organization imposed by the subject. 
They give discourse its narrative character. This probably happens, by definition, with the 
concept of the underlying voice leading and the idea of the prolongational structure 
(chapter 3). Thus, the plot is the structure of relations in which events acquire meaning as 
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part of an integrated whole. The plot fills in the blanks between these events with causal 
connections and intentionalities, and provides the succession with continuity. Extending 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s idea (quoted by Forsey 2003) that the unity of human life is the unity 
of a search for narrative, we can think that the unity of the musical work is only possible in 
the search for narrative. 
For White (1981) the plot is something inherent in the organization of events that is 
not anchored to an external referential structure and is proper to the present succession of 
events. This plot arises from the way in which the subject assigns a hierarchy to the events 
according to their cultural meaning. By means of that hierarchy, the discourse gains 
continuity instead of appearing as a set of isolated events. Since the important thing is the 
way in which the events gain coherence in the sequence, the facts themselves are taken for 
granted, so that what is of interest are those facts and not their agents. The narrated world 
is “a world in which things happen to people rather than in which people do things” (p. 10) 
(original emphasis). Briefly, the narrative function emerges from the intentionality the 
subject assigns to an order of things with the idea of conferring a particular meaning to that 
order in which the events contribute to the sense of continuity that justifies their unity, 
bypassing the possible breaches between them. 
Along these lines, Sloboda (1985) suggests that the mental substrate of music 
should be similar to what underlies certain types of stories. Music and story may both be 
characterized according to the evolution of states of tension and relaxation, stability and 
instability, etc. Paraphrasing Ricouer (1984, p.533), the problems of musical narrative are 
confined to the reconfiguration of time by musical events. As Chatman (1981) indicates 
“narrative itself is a deep structure quite independent of its medium” (p. 117). For that 
reason, it is not difficult to talk about narrative even though no semantic reference exists, 
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when the medium is not words and there are no propositional representations. The essential 
restriction that determines a statement as narrative is temporal. According to this, the 
condition for speaking of narrative is the presence of a double temporal structure. But in 
addition, this double structure must generate some kind of tension. 
“All narratives, in whatever medium, combine the time sequence of plot events, 
the time of the histoire (“story-time”) with the time of the presentation of those 
events in the text, which we call “discourse-time”. What is fundamental to 
narrative, regardless of medium, is that these two time orders are independent 
… This independence of discourse-time is precisely and only possible because 
of the subsumed story-time. Now of course all texts pass through time: it takes 
x number of hours to read an essay, a legal brief, or a sermon. But the internal 
structures of these non-narrative texts are not temporal but logical, so that 
their discourse-time is irrelevant, just as the viewing time of a painting is 
irrelevant. We may spend half an hour in front of a Titian, but the aesthetic 
effect is as if we were taking in the whole painting at a glance. In narrative, on 
the other hand, the dual time orders function independently. This is true in any 
medium: flashbacks are just as possible in ballet or mime or opera as they are 
in a film or novel. Thus in theory at least, any narrative can be actualized by 
any medium which can communicate the two time orders” (Chatman 1981; p. 
119). 
Therefore, what is important is: (i) the presence of two time orders, (ii) the 
independence of those two orders, (iii) the relevance of both time orders in the experience, 
and (iv) the conflict established between both orders. It would seem that the narratological 
proposals in musicology cannot fulfil these four requirements. There is a point that 
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musicology cannot recognize: in spite of the attempts, like Mizcnik’s, to identify a double 
temporality in the relation between the quality of the musical themes and the way in which 
these are developed in time, it is doubtful that those two supposed temporal orders can (i) 
be independent, and (ii) establish a clear conflict between them. The proposal here is that 
the problem musicology faces in defining a narrative quality in music stems from its 
central activity as an academic discipline, musical analysis, presenting non-temporal, 
logical constraints. Following Chatman’s ideas, for musicology, the time of its discourse is 
irrelevant. For that reason the musicological approaches nearer to the notion of narrative 
are not those that depend more on structural analytical tools (as those used when discussing 
plot and agency). Is it possible then to talk about a double temporality? 
Raphael (2004) approaches musical narrativity by avoiding the topics of content 
and agency, instead referring to underlying forces that motivate the configuration of 
narrative structures. Narrativity emerges from an equidistant point between the musical 
structure and the listener’s narrative construction. According to Raphael, the listener 
unfolds a reflective (metacognitive) activity as of the composition’s structure. Such activity 
elicits, highlights, emphasizes the narrative quality that belongs to and lies in such musical 
structures. Thus, not every structure is able to give rise to a narrative activity. Narrative 
emerges from a structural substrate that presents discursive disruptions or destabilizations 
of the discursive order. In particular, the main discursive disruptions are those that alter the 
notion of before and after in the course of the composition. According to Raphael, 
narrative is a vehicle by which time, voices and plot structure are ordered and made to 
appear as a coherent whole. For that reason musical narrative is more frequent than is often 
recognized. The narrative idea glimpsed in his proposal is compatible with the notion of 
Transposition proposed in chapter 7: it is an instantiation of a story. 
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9.5.2 Narrative predisposition (structure and function) 
Narrative is one of the most important activities of human life. As far as its psychological 
incumbency is concerned, narrative is interpreted in diverse ways. On the one hand people 
live surrounded by explicit narratives: films, novels, etc. that we visit because of the 
psychological need of being in the company of a story. Here, the story, in as much as it is 
aesthetically communicable, is considered an artistic object (Dissanayake 2001, 1992, 
Young and Saver 2001). Nevertheless, narrative activity settles in all human activities, and 
is integrated into life in such a way that life itself is seen as a narration (Forsey 2003), 
while at the same time the narration organizes some aspects of life (Turner 1996, Bruner 
1991). In that way, narrative not only speaks of stories that have happened to us in the past, 
but also allows people to understand their lives as these develop. 
Thus, narrative constitutes the modus operandum of many psychological functions. 
For example, for Young and Saver (2001), narrative organizes memories. In this case 
narrative is seen as a cognitive resource that allows designing the processing of events so 
they may be retrieved later on. Narrative organizes episodic memory, which Young and 
Saver denominate autobiographical memory. This memory is related to temporal 
phenomena and therefore is the opposite of the memory of images and concepts, which the 
authors name generic memory (whose contents are not related to time). We can speculate 
that generic memory is related to the enculturation of non-temporal musical structures 
(tonal hierarchy for example, Krumhansl 1990). On the contrary, autobiographical memory 
would be crucial for recognition of musical structures in a discursive sense (recognizing a 
theme, a melody, etc.). 
Thus, narrative is thought of as a human activity of high adaptive potential. 
Consciousness requires a narrative structure to create a sense of self based on the 
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characteristics of telling stories (characteristic of coherence, sequence and attainment). 
This perspective has two important implications for our discussion. Firstly it has 
everything to do with what Malloch (1999/2000) defines as narrative in communicative 
musicality – a way of organizing the experience of the self in the course of time (chapter 8, 
p. 267). Secondly, the narrative experience of time allows assigning to the experienced 
time the attributes of coherence, sequence and attainment (Young and Saver 2001). 
Narrative organizes from early childhood the abstract sense of tension and 
relaxation, through its timing (Trevarthen 2004). At the same time, it is known that music 
orders the temporal experience. Both storytelling and music communicate time. Both 
activities are based on the possibility of the human brain perceiving and producing 
organized durational patterns, from which a substantial part of their meaning emerges. 
According to Thaut (2005) “music, especially rhythm, can serve as a model of temporality 
in the human brain (…) Music must be viewed as a biological fact, not just as a cultural 
phenomenon” (p. 184). 
In addition, Dissanayake (2001) associates the activity of storytelling with music as 
far as both of them are based on the communicative musicality. But, at the same time she 
emphasizes the dovetailing of music and narrative with a particular type of aesthetic 
imagination. For her, aesthetic enjoyment (both in reception and production) arises from 
the imaginative activity elicited from the organized time experience. On their part, Tooby 
and Cosmides (2001) assert that there is considerable psychological predisposition in the 
human being for the creation and narration of fiction. This predisposition is based on the 
possibility of understanding fiction to be so (as opposed to “reality”) through the intrinsic 
contextualization of the statements that compose it. In other words, what allows us to 
understand fiction as such and therefore achieve a state of aesthetic enjoyment from a set 
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of proposals gathered in a narrative, is the fact that they “refer internally to each other 
rather than to the world”, so that “the entire (set of prepositions) is cognitively walled 
off…” (Tooby and Cosmides 2001, p. 13). The temporal organization arising from the 
intrinsic disposition of the statements would be the platform on which fictional imagination 
unfolds. In this way, the intrinsic organization (or the way in which some propositions 
refer to others within the same set) would be more important that the extrinsic reference in 
the formation of aesthetic meaning. For that reason it is possible to understand that 
narrative arose before language in ontogeny (Donald mentioned by Trevarthen 2004). 
Without words, storytelling is made up of rhythms, sounds, movements and gestures. 
All this leads us to adjust the scope of the word narrative in the context of this 
discussion. Having taken a term clearly related to linguistics (and language in general) the 
intention is to present it here unrelated to its allegiance with language, as a mode of 
thought. 
9.5.3 Time, performance and the subject in the musical 
experience 
If narrative as a mode of thought makes sense due to its temporal nature, it is not surprising 
that a musicology identifying music as text and based on the analysis of musical texts as a 
methodological resource should reject the topic. As a result of this, the discussion on the 
narrativity of music faces two important obstacles. The first is to maintain the discussion 
on different conceptions of narrative. Authors averse to speaking of the narrativity of 
music have a semiological perspective on the topic and based their rejection of this 
approach on the apparent lack of significant musical language resources (Abatte 1991, 
Nattiez 1990, also see Mizcnik 2001, p.244 footnote). From the perspective adopted here, 
this is not a problem of narrative but of language. Arguing that “narrative is a way of 
expressing knowledge of the world” implies that whatever constitutes an exhibition of 
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knowledge sequenced in time may be understood as narrative. Music performance is just 
that. 
The second pitfall refers to issues of musical ontology (fundamentally on the 
trichotomy of music as text, music as performance, music as social construction). Scholars 
who understand music as text reject the narrative hypothesis because music, in lacking a 
metalanguage, cannot explain the split between story and discourse. For example, as a 
consequence of the philological and non-performative perspective on music, White (1981) 
suggests that in music, story and discourse may possibly be collapsed in the structural 
organization. On the contrary, this thesis’s proposal is that the story-discourse split appears 
in music as soon as it is thought of as performance. Thus, the story-discourse dichotomy 
derives from the composition-performance partition. This is not a metaphorical bond, but 
rather is based on the idea of performance as transposition: “an important consequence of 
this property (the two time orders, is) the translatability of the narrative from one medium 
to another” (Chatman 1981, p.118). Thus, music performance, as a transposition of the 
musical composition, conserves the time of the story and contributes its discourse with its 
own temporality. 
As Ricoeur remarked (1985, p.93), the story’s time is in no way equivalent to the 
time of events in the real world; in the story an event may take much less time than it 
would in reality, just as something can appear in a more prolonged amount of time, when 
internal compositional reasons demand more time for an event. Music performance can 
offer musical experience either a longer or shorter time according to the “internal 
compositional reasons”. Thus, the time of the performance is in no way equivalent to “the 
time of the events in the world” (the time of the composition, of the abstract musical 
structure as exposed in the composition). It is possible to understand music performance as 
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paralleling what Ricouer calls the time of the plot construction (mimesis II). Music 
performance takes on a mediating role between the pre-existing temporal configuration 
(that of the composition) and the “re-figuration of the temporal experience by this 
constructed time” (the re-figuration of the listener’s experience of time). “We thus follow 
the passage from a pre-figured time to a re-figured time mediated by a configured one” 
(Ricouer 1985, p. 115). That configured time is the performance time, it is the real here and 
now time. 
Narrative does not deny a chronology, but reconfigures real time in a way that is 
shared and perceived by the reader. This reconfigured time imposes on the reader new 
expectations and new temporal logics. In other words, narrative proposes new temporal 
logics that the reader is always willing to interpret. It will be suggested here that expressive 
music performance (performance of academic instrumental tonal music in particular) 
which makes use of resources such as rubato, among others, gains its narrativity when 
breaking the constraints of the preformed time (given by the metrical corset of the 
underlying pulse) and introduces its own discourse time, which uses other mechanisms for 
the understanding of the passing of time. 
According to Ricouer (1984), the tensions between the story’s time (narrated time) 
and the discourse’s time (the narration time) are the result of temporal arrangements and 
disarrangements, synchronies and asynchronies between both time orders that project a 
fictional experience of time. In the sphere of expressive musical performance, it is easy to 
find those tensions. For example a performer is ready to play a composition with a certain 
rhythmical pattern. In other terms, he or she is ready to narrate a certain temporal 
structure. For this, he or she uses a particular narration time: the time that as a performer he 
or she alters by using rubato. This fact produces conjunction-disjunction, synchrony-
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asynchrony tensions between both times that triggers a fictional experience of time, an 
imaginary time. By no means is this Ricouer’s exact idea. What is trying to be rescued here 
is his notion of this temporal split generating an experience of fictional time. Pre-figured 
time is the time of events in the world. It is the time of musical structures gained by 
enculturation, which in western music are governed by the metrical structure and 
proportional rhythmic patterns (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, Cooper and Meyer 1960). 
But the real time is that of performance, in which durational relations are much more 
complex, and in which strong and weak are not the abstract terms of a dichotomy but the 
extremes of a dynamic continuum. 
Accordingly, narrative emerges in performance. Speaking about narrative will 
make sense if music is understood as performance. This is possible if a series of reasons 
are examined. 
Firstly it is not possible to think of music as an object in the world, unconnected 
from the consequences it produces on the subject. A clear example of considering music as 
an object unconnected from all subjects is Mizcnik’s (2001) warning about the 
disadvantages of anthropomorphizing thematic processes. In contrast, when considering 
music as a phenomenon that emerges from experience, such inconvenience does not exist 
because the musical experience is related to every temporal experience in life, narratively 
constructed on the basis of metaphors with an “affective quality that describes agents 
going places and doing things with energy and style, conscious of how their bodies move 
and how experience is made by moving” (Trevarthen 2004, p. 20). In addition, abundant 
psychological evidence exists that makes the idea of considering thematic processes in 
music in anthropomorphic terms reasonable (Watt and Ash 1998, Sloboda 1998). 
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Furthermore, if while speaking about music people refer to the musical experience 
(of playing, composing, listening, etc.) then music is no longer out there, music is what 
happens to the subject that experiences it. Thus, experiencing a musical piece as narrative 
would not be substantially different from experiencing a novel as narrative (see Imberty 
1997a in which the author evokes a passage from A la recherche… where Proust explains 
how narrative is an attribute of experience rather than a trait of the object). This is closely 
related to the idea of a narrational mode of knowing music, by which it is possible to 
capture attributes of the musical experience that other modes of knowing (for example 
analytical-logical knowledge) do not achieve in shaping (Micznik 2001). Along these lines, 
Small (1999) argues that symphonic music is a narrative form equivalent to the novel. 
From this perspective, contrary to what the dominant musicology affirms, listening to a 
symphony does not imply recognizing abstract formal structures, but identifying instead 
with a dramatic sequence of events, characters and their intentions. “Structure or form are 
concepts imposed later, by critics and scholars, as when they speak of the structure or the 
forms of a novel. Neither the average reader of a novel nor the average listener of a 
symphonic work must worry about such things.” (Small 1999, n. p.) 
Secondly, music performance not only has an expressive function (Bhüler 1933, 
Ducrot 1972) in the sense of referring to a psychological and emotional attitude, but also 
shows a metalinguistic function (Ducrot 1972; Cobley 2001) because performance may be 
understood as an action that implies, in an open or concealed way, a reference to its own 
code. Performance alludes to composition, and to the code of composition. This is 
manifested precisely in the restrictions the composition as material imposes on the 
performance. Those constraints are precisely the points at which the performance alludes 
to its own material. In other terms, the performance works as a metalanguage. Performance 
speaks of composition. Mark Tanner argues that “the listener's understanding is shaped by 
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the narrativity of the performance” (2000, p. 196). Thus, performance not only captures 
the temporal attributes of the narrativity but also its metalinguistic attributes. When 
narrating, a reflective judgment is made on what is being narrated (Ricouer 1984). To 
narrate is to reflect on the narrated facts. In that sense the way in which the performer 
reflects on the composition (Cone 1995) is part of their narrative task. 
Thirdly, the previous section referred to how certain musical behaviours lend 
credence to the psychogenetic conditions of narrative; and this section defended the view 
that when understanding music as performance, the time of the story (that of the 
composition) and that of the discourse (of the performance) emerge as different from one 
another. For that reason, it is sensible to suppose that in cases where music is identified 
with practices in which composition and performance are not different activities, this split 
does not take place. In other terms, the intention is to outline a cultural limitation upon the 
notion of musical narrative within the scope of common practice music (of interest since 
prolongational theories allude to it), “because not all human ways of making music are 
dynamic in this way, and very few musical cultures advocate that concept of change and 
development by opposition, struggle and victory that characterizes the musical works of 
the western symphonic tradition.” (Small 1999, n. p.) 
Finally it is necessary to consider the performer’s experience, and the role that 
narrative may play in that experience. As regards this, David Carr’s assertion that 
“narrative activity… is a constitutive part of action, and not just an embellishment, 
commentary or other incidental accompaniment” (quoted by Forsey 2003, p.177) draws 
attention to the importance of narrative in the organization of performance. In other words, 
just as some psychologists and neuroscientists speculate about the role of narrative in 
memory, it is also possible to advance by considering the role of narrative in action and 
308 
performance planning. In the same line, Levy (2001), from a musicological perspective, 
proposes a similar valuation of narrative in performance. She considers that narrative may 
be thought of as psychological and conceptual scaffolding for the accomplishment of the 
piece. But that scaffolding is not just a tool that leaves no trace of its existence in the 
finished work. On the contrary, this scaffolding, by virtue of the idea of transposition, 
becomes part and parcel of the final work and therefore of the communication between 
performer and listener, organizing the dynamic meaning that is put into play in such 
communication. In this idea, communication between performers and listeners is strongly 
related to communication in early childhood, its content is not propositional, although it is 
narrational in its temporal organization. And its path is fundamentally crossmodal. The 
next chapter will show the results of an experiment that illustrates the crossmodal nature of 
communication in performance, reinforcing the hypothesis that its content consists of a 
particular way of organizing time, described, after Ricouer (1985), as the configuration of 
time in performance. 
*** 
Summary. Musical narrativity has been a controversial subject in the musicological debate 
during the last two decades. If the possibility of understanding music as narrative is 
examined from a literary perspective, the intellectual attempt faces the problem of meaning 
in music and musical content. From this perspective, music can no more than pretend to be 
narrative. Some structuralist approaches, looking for some narrative elements (plot and 
agency) in the musical form as it takes shape, the motivic elaboration and psychological 
ways to adhere to or distrust the a priori structures, do not manage to answer the previously 
formulated semantic objection. Nevertheless, musical narrativity is possible if it is 
approached from an anthropological and psychological perspective, as a human 
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behavioural propensity more than as an aesthetic product. This is the line that was followed 
throughout this chapter, after examining the problems that emerge from the first 
alternative. Pondering narrative as a way of knowing the world allows including music in 
that modality of knowledge. From this view, the narrative function is emancipated from the 
expressive medium (words, images, etc.) and is subordinated to the establishment of a 
double temporality: (i) the story’s time and (ii) the discourse’s time. If both of these time 
structures are independent, tensions between them will give way to the narrative function. 
We hypothesize that these tensions are captured thanks to the mechanisms of interactive 
behavioural timing since they are involved in performance understood as intersubjective 
experience. 
From this perspective, story-time is the time of the musical structure, and 
discourse-time – the time of the medium of the narrative – is the time of the performance. 
Most of the hostilities that this idea received from musicology are related to the fact that 
traditional musicology is based mainly on the analysis of the musical text (score). In this 
sense, music may be understood as narrative only if considered as performance. 
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Chapter 10: Creating performance from prolongation 
We have proposed a dialectical relationship between structure and performance as an 
alternative to the enactive (romantic) and determinist (objectivist) relationships. 
Accordingly, this chapter proposes the performer uses, together with the composition, a 
varied set of materials in order to construct his or her work as a transposition. The 
performance’s verisimilitude (as the means of valuing a performative art) will depend on 
how the performer uses these materials as emerging from a dialectic between the 
impositions of that material and the will of the creative act. In the first part of this chapter, 
aspects of a composition that can be taken as structural materials of a performative creation 
are analysed. In the second part, a set of 5 performances of that composition is examined to 
analyse how those structural materials are used in the transposition. These uses are 
discussed in comparison with another transposition to a filmic support. In particular, the 
time configurations of all transpositions are compared (particularly concerning the 
prolongational structure of the composition). After this, the incidence of such a time 
configuration on the listener’s experience is investigated. The aim is to find out whether 
the listener is able to experience the musical (prolongational) structure according to the 
way in which the performer has made use of it. For this, a listening experiment is presented 
that investigates the experienced analogies between the performances in the set, and the 
performance in the film. Finally, these analogies are discussed in the light both of the 
notion of crossmodality as related to the concept of intersubjectivity as a communicational 
paradigm (chapter 8), and the idea of musical narrativity (chapter 9). 
10.1 One of the materials: the composition 
The composition chosen was the Chopin Piano Ballade in G minor op. 23 (1835). The 
ballad is a genre of popular origin that unfolds an epic meaning. By the 15th century, the 
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genre had lost its dance character and adopted a clear narrative style (Björling 2002) based 
on a series of repetitions of a refrain. 
Chopin’s Ballades are relatively extensive works and are considered to be within 
his most serious repertoire. They were to be based on an interpretation by Chopin of 
Lithuanian legends, gathered by the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, as an allegory of his 
contemporary political context. Nevertheless, the ballad, as a folkloric genre, is not 
associated to the Polish nationality, so the Polish spirit is thereby supplied by the 
Chopinian style itself. 
10.1.1 Some structural surface aspects 
Chopin’s Ballades are considered as an experimental genre in which attributes of relatively 
free styles (i.e. character pieces, Charakterstücke) are combined with more structured 
compositions (the waltz for example). For reasons of space, only the first bars are analysed 
here. However, it is worth indicating that the tension between thematic elements represents 
one more reason for displaying opposition as a deliberate search for ambiguity. 
Figure 10.1 exhibits the first 40 bars (example 27 in disc). Although it begins in 
binary metre, the ternary metre, used by Chopin in all the ballades, appears just after the 
introduction. Although the ternary metre is not associated with the ballade as a genre, with 
such a metre Chopin can reference and combine different folkloric and popular elements 
(the pastoral rhythm, some stylised dances such as slow waltz, brilliant waltz, etc.) in order 
to contribute to his Polish-rooted identity (Björling 2002). In this way, the binary metre 
beginning and such a slow tempo clearly indicate the fragment to be introductory, since 
audiences at the composer’s time knew that the Ballade’s beginning was always marked by 













As an introduction, the extremely simple texture of the first bars introduces a clear 
heraldic element, declared explicitly in the initial C, like a call. This element appears in the 
second ballad but is reduced to the first few notes (Figure 10.2). 
This recitative-like introduction denotes the influence of Italian opera – Bellini’s 
work in particular – on Chopin’s style (Rothstein 1995, Klein 2004). Therefore, in spite of 
its apparently rigid rhythmical-metrical writing, it is likely that the entire Largo is more of 
a free performance. This Largo is clearly divided into three segments, indicated by two 
important pauses and changes in melodic behaviour and tonal harmonic function, with 
implications for textural treatment. Despite such metrical and textural clarity, this 
Figure 10.2. Chopin’s Second Ballade op 38 





beginning inaugurates ambiguity as a narrative topic that will characterize the entire 
composition. The beginning starts by unfolding an A flat major arpeggio, determining the 
main key until the bar 3 f sharp contradicts it. Remarkably, Chopin accompanies this note 
with a diminuendo mark. This tension (between a flat and f sharp) is maintained across the 
rest that connects bars 3 and 4. In the following segment, a series of embellishment notes 
emphasizes the first f sharp and soon the d, reinforcing the D major chord – an emphasis 
that derives in the bar 5 d along with a definitive arrival to G’s dominant (the real tonic of 
the composition)1. The arrival at the d indicates the beginning of another much more 
extensive pause between bars 5 and 6. After this, a remarkable texture change introduces 
the perfect cadence while maintaining an ambiguous atmosphere until well into the 
Moderato. This ambiguity is carried out by the incorporation of the e flat as the 9th of a 
cadential tonic six-four chord (bar 8). Notice how Chopin extends this cadence for 4 bars 
and uses it to harmonically unify the Largo’s end and Moderato’s beginning (where the 
theme of the Ballade’s refrain is introduced). Prominently, that 9th chord is extended 
throughout 7 half notes (the longest duration up that moment). 
The Moderato (Figure 10.3) presents the refrain – typical of the genre – suggesting 
an initial segmentation criterion. Firstly the ternary rhythm (a waltz rhythm for many 
scholars – Björling 2002, Klein 2004) and fundamentally the advent of the refrain, with its 
successive repetition-elaborations, account for the poetic composition. Each refrain lasts 12 
quarter notes (four dotted half notes) and the refrains in turn form quatrains (four refrains 
form a well structured stanza). An intermediate grouping level comprised of two refrains 
each can also be identified, consistent as well with the typical grouping structure of the 
poetic text in such folkloric compositions. Each refrain displays two motifs: the x motif 
                                                 
1 Since the f-natural of bar 5 is functioning as a neighbour note of e-flat (which, in turn, is a neighbour note 
of d), belonging to a more superficial level, this note does not modify the harmony content of the passage. 
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constitutes an accented rest (acephalous, headless) emphasizing the fall to the tonic by 
unfolding the dominant emphasized by embellishments of its root note (c, d’s neighbour 
note) and its fifth (b flat, a’s neighbour note) and presents, with the quavers, an important 
rhythmical impulse. In opposition, the y motif is dynamically less rhythmical and melodic, 
consisting of two long notes moving by steps. This motif appears much more “varied” than 
x throughout this entire exposition. The x motif finalizes in (and therefore dynamically 
emphasizes) the tonic. The y motif, on the contrary, emphasizes generally located moments 
of tension, usually placed on the V or the ii, alternatively contributing to indicate, with the 
use of the V, the before mentioned intermediate grouping level. 
The imitation of the poetic structure composed by the literary ballad’s verses and 
stanzas is a way of keeping the substrate on which a story unfolds (that told by the ballad) 
in the minds of listeners – thereby introducing the composition’s narrative impulse into the 
Figure 10.3. Refrain organization of the beginning of Chopin’s Ballade in G 
minor op. 23.  
x y
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formal structure itself (Björling 2002). In a strophic composition, it is possible to hope for 
a clear tension-relaxation pattern at the ends of successive refrains in such a way that each 
stanza finalises a tension cycle at a clear relaxation point. However, in very simple poetic 
compositions, smaller and simpler tension-relaxation patterns can be expected, resolving at 
every verse. On the contrary, this ballade cancels the expectations again as each refrain 
inverts the pattern, displaying the first motif (x) resolving at a relaxation point while the 
second (y) generates tension. In this way, such tension-relaxation patterns contradict the 
formal logic of the stanza’s organization, crucial for generating ambiguity. Such deep and 
structural ambiguity undermines the initial segmentation criteria, based on the form given 
by the harmonic content. As will be seen (p. 320), these last criteria are more compatible 
with that emerging from the analysis of the underlying voice leading. Interestingly, this 
type of opposition is very typical in epic folk songs as a resource for maintaining attention 
throughout an extended composition. Therefore, by using this resource Chopin is 
accentuating the composition’s popular character. The ambiguous articulation blurs the 
stanza’s boundaries. With the intention of approaching that ambiguity’s meaning, figure 
Figure 10.4. Hypothetic resolution of the Ballade’s first stanza.
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10.4 shows a hypothetical, unambiguous resolution of the first stanza, on the tonic, clearly 
marking the meeting point between the highest hierarchical grouping and the moment of 
most harmonic relaxation. Contrarily, as the original composition stands, the gravitation 
towards this point is softened, avoiding the hierarchic importance of articulating the 
stanza’s fourth verse. 
As the work progresses the formal clarity is blurred: the absence of words forces 
Chopin quickly to suspend any complete repetition of the stanza (Björling 2002). Thus, the 
second stanza is incomplete (Figure 10.3) and the structural ambiguity operates in a much 
subtler way. Suddenly, several simultaneous segmentation criteria may be established. 
Thus segmentation becomes progressively more doubtful. From then on, melodic 
reiteration (literal or sequenced) is handled as a resource that instead of organizing the 
discourse according to a strophic archetype will create ambiguity in a beautifully elaborate 
way. The contradiction between content and (melodic-harmonic) form follows its course 
from bar 21, giving rise to new elisions. Nevertheless, from that point on the segmentation 
is more elusive still. This appears clearly manifested in the phrasing slurs displayed from 
bar 21. Figure 10.5.a shows the slurs in the score. It is very difficult to find a logical 
foundation for them. According to the discourse organization up to this point the 
segmentation of this fragment should be 4+4+2 (dotted half notes, figure 10.5.b) based on 
two facts: (i) the linking of four anacrustic dotted half note refrains, and (ii) the trill closing 
the phase at the semi-cadence, at bars 25-26. On the other hand, the treatment of the 
texture contradicts this perspective, telling us to segment into two units, 5+5 (figure 
10.5.c). Likewise, repetition of the harmonic-melodic content presents these two halves as 
a kind of partial overlapping (figure 10.5.d). Thus, it could be understood as a 1+4+4+1 
pattern, where 4 represents the sub-pattern that is exactly reiterated (metrically coinciding) 
In this way, the 5+5 segmentation presents a group of 4 common notes that, although 
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maintaining their metric position, change position in the unit’s serial order. This causes 
certain notes to be understood as the end of a unit and beginning of the next, contributing 
to the atmosphere of great ambiguity that, as was said, is evidenced by the placing of very 
uncertain slurs. 
The following phrase, from bar 26, presents the same structure and the same 
ambiguity – but this time reiteration appears as a sequence, a third below (Figure 10.6). It 
could initially be understood as 4+4+2++ (the last bar is virtually lengthened since the a4 is 
reiterated to prepare the cadenza passage at bar 33 – Figure 10.6.a). But soon a 5+5++ 
(figure 10.6.b) or 1+4+4+1++ pattern (figure 10.6.c) emerges. 
Although the rhythmical configuration in this unit supports the last option to clear 
the ambiguity, since this time the last note is lengthened, the uncertainty is reinforced. 
The reiteration of the a4 represents the beginning of the preparation for the final 
cadence at bar 36. It impels the thematic dissolution that takes place at the bar 33 cadenza. 
Consequently, all the segmentation criteria meet at the gravitational point upon reaching 
Figure 10.5. Motivic relations and phrasing conflicts at the 






the tonic at bar 36, the first clear formal articulation. To summarise, since the stanza is 
abandoned until the perfect cadence at bar 36, formal ambiguity is continuing: everything 
seems to conclude, when in fact something is beginning, and vice versa. Clearly this 
dislocation of relationships is re-located at the bar 36 cadence. After the cadenza at bars 
34-35, the perfect cadence, metrically and tonally classical, analogous to the cadence that 
finalizes the introduction, definitively closes the section with the first clear tonic in G 
minor. Bar 36, inaugurates a new motif, indeed derived from an elaboration of the x motif 
(figure 10.7)  
Briefly, this structural perspective of the Ballade in G minor offers: (i) an 
introduction segmented into three units; (ii) a complete stanza with four refrains 
contradicting the surface harmonic content, (iii) another incomplete stanza; and (iv) a 
segment in which formal ambiguity is much more imperative until (v) a cadenza dissolves 
the thematic content preparing (vi) the end of the section where all the ambiguities are 
solved with a perfect cadence at bar 36; (vii) after which, a new motif inaugurates the next 
section. 
 






10.1.2 Some prolongational aspects 
The prolongational structure can shed new light on some of the conditions of ambiguity 
presented. Figure 10.8 shows the underlying voice leading analysis suggested by Rothstein 
(1995). As shown in the graph, the initial A flat major arpeggio operates as an unfolded 
chromatic neighbour note of the tonic G. The movement from this A flat major harmony to 
the tonic G, on which the melody finds its first structural note (Kopftone) at bar 9, takes 
place through a linear progression displayed by the upper voice (that Rothstein 
parenthetically indicates due to its auxiliary structural status), tying the d5 with the g4. This 
linear progression thematically anticipates two important aspects of the Ballade: both d, as 
the first structural note, and e as its neighbour note will operate thematically throughout the 
entire Ballade. This anticipation of thematic material in the underlying voice leading 
crosses the introduction and penetrates the moderato, overlapping with the Ballade’s 
refrain. In this way, this linear progression not only unifies the transition from the Largo to 
the Moderato, but also reunites the three surface units, which compose the introduction, 
bridging the abovementioned expanded pauses. Thus, the underlying voice leading 
formally and tonally unifies a fragment that appeared disjointed and ambiguous at the 
musical surface level. 
Figure 10.7. Relation between the x motif and the bar 36 motif. (Notice 




Figure 10.8 shows, with the use of bars, the organization of refrains and stanzas 
overlapping with the linear progressions, from the fifth to the tonic on the harmonic i6- ii-
V-i progression. These linear progressions are developed on different structural levels, the 
unfolding of bar 34-36 being the fragment’s deepest progression. The double bars indicate 
the stanza level, the dotted bars, the verse (refrain) level, and the simple bars, the two-verse 
level (an intermediate hierarchical level in the structural organization of the poetic form). 
In this way, the graph clearly shows how the strophic organization is abandoned as of bar 
Figure 10.8. Voice leading graphic analysis of Chopin’s Ballade in G minor op 
23 (Rothstein 1995, p. 231) 
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21 (as discussed above). In addition, the graph also shows how the linear progressions 
could be organizing the segmentation on a deeper level. 
When considering the course of the linear progressions as a new segmentation 
criterion, a new dovetailing of different criteria arises, but now, involving underlying 
levels. Thus, certain units that are parallel at the surface level, at the level of the underlying 
voice leading represent different structural levels. For example, the third reappearance of 
the x motif at bar 12, comparable to the previous appearances at bars 8 and 10 respectively, 
is now a suffix prolongation of the g4 (bar 11) and by definition constitutes a display nearer 
to the foreground than that of bar 10. Likewise the y motif whose first appearance at bars 
9-10 installs the linear progression Kopftone at the highest hierarchical level, in its second 
appearance (bars 10-11) is the manifestation of a much more superficial hierarchic level – 
notice that the e4 does not even appear in the graphic analysis. Its third appearance, in the 
g5- f5 (bars 13-14) is a prefix prolongation of the d5 (bar 15). From the underlying voice 
leading perspective, this is a very interesting point since that register transfer (g4- g5) gives 
meaning to those prolongations, emphasising (filling the gap and favouring mental 
retention [see chapter 3, p. 63]) the structural relation between the d5 at bar 9 and 15. In 
other words, that octave jump separates what could be understood as the prolongation of 
the g4 as the final note of the first linear progression, from what may be thought of as the 
prolongation of the d5 – the first note of the linear progression immediately following it. 
Finally, the underlying voice leading graphic analysis reveals that the most 
ambiguous section at the surface level, from bar 21, can unitarily be understood, at deeper 
levels, as an extensive prolongation of the e5 – d’s neighbour note. Therefore, the analysis 
of the underlying voice leading does not contribute to solve the segmentation problems 
found at the surface level. 
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Summarising, until bar 21, the surface organization presents contradictory 
segmentation criteria (according to the strophic form and harmonic content) at the same 
time as the voice leading organization offers criteria that reinforce the harmonic content 
aspects but unify the units in more comprehensive segments (which cross the introduction 
and unify the successive refrains into stanzas). From bar 21, the segmentation is much 
more elusive, both at the surface as well as deeper levels, and all ambiguities, on every 
level, are only resolved at bars 33-36, in the final cadence. This is the clearest formal 
articulation to the moment, where elements belonging to surface and deeper levels come 
together. 
10.1.3 Narrative aspects 
Thinking of the ballade as a narrative genre is almost tautological. The ballade as a genre 
fits the narrative impulse of the romantic generation. In addition, one could conceive of 
this Ballade’s particular organization, which may be understood as a plot archetype 
(Newcomb’s term), as being at the service of narrative and dramatic aims. Nevertheless, 
the literary ballade centres the action on an only episode, depending considerably on the 
verbal element. This is the main problem with the idea of an instrumental ballade (Björling 
2002). The ballade had a resurgence during the first half of the 19th century, impelled by 
the exaltation of nationalistic feelings. Thus, simply by saying ballade a particular meaning 
emerges on the part of the listener familiar with this context. 
In spite of this, several authors, such as Tarasti (1994), have proposed approaching 
the First Ballade from a narrative perspective. Klein (2004) proposed a narrative view of 
this piece with some points in common with Tarasti. Klein considers that the introduction 
is heard as “the announcement of a profound and painful tragedy (while the reminiscence 
of the Phrygian cadence at bars 6-7) tells us that the story is an old one, as if one is about 
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to recount a legend or myth” (p. 36). In this way the entire introduction is a sort of “once 
upon a time”. Thus, the waltz that begins at bar 8 is listened to in the past tense. This is a 
very important aspect of the narrative proposal. By this, Klein is seeking to identify the 
narrator’s voice, his affective distance with respect to what is narrated and his temporal 
location in relation to what he is recounting (giving rise to the past tense narration). 
Klein also attempts to establish the relation between story and discourse during the 
Ballade’s first bars: the f# of bar 3 shakes the initial chord’s stability (A flat major) re-
meaning it as a Phrygian ii of G minor. The tonal uncertainty remains until the cadence is 
reached at bar 6. Tonal stability is related to the objective standpoint, whereas the 
chromatic passage is tied to the way in which the narrator commits himself to the narrated 
story. Thus, in the first bars, the narrator is set to narrate a story, from outside, that is, 
objectively. But throughout the following bars he gets subjectively involved in the story, 
until by the cadence, at bar 8, he re-establishes his objective position. The rests emphasize 
the narrator’s coming into and going out of the story. However, the presence of the e flat4 
in the bar 8 chord reveals that the narrator will not achieve complete objectivity. 
Klein proposes that a temporal conflict emerges from tensions between lyric and 
narrative components. In the Chopin piece, lyricism is manifested in “ballroom” 
compositions (waltzes, nocturnes and mazurkas), while narrative appears in the virtuosic 
style (etudes). Thus, extended compositions such as ballades make use of both styles. 
Therefore, the narrative character of the composition emerges almost naturally from this 
opposition. In spite of this important contribution, a comprehensive description of the 
lyric-narrative opposition exceeds the scope of this chapter, since, as mentioned, the 
analysis is centred on the beginning of the piece (the first 40 bars). 
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Although Tarasti’s analysis (1994) also includes the piece as a whole, some of his 
ideas are highly pertinent to this discussion: 
(i) The waltz that appears at bar 36 is the one that leads to dissolution and chaos. In 
the small fragment we will consider, the appearance of this theme (figure 10.7) 
precipitates the action towards the end of the ballad. In this apotheotic process, the 
cadenza-like passage at bar 33 re-conquers the wide textural space cautiously 
explored during the introduction, but now with a dominating attitude. Thus, the 
work progresses towards a more decided and virtuosic character and represents, in 
the context of the first part, a demonstration of power by the narrator. 
(ii) The introduction projects itself towards what follows with the clear intention of 
taking control, a sort of territory marking. Thus, the introduction and the waltz are 
crucial for presenting the piece’s musical content. In that sense, the entire passage 
is continuously discovering what is about to be known. 
(iii) The waltz theme directly refers to normative organizational aspects. But, knowing 
that the piece is a ballade, the listener understands that it is not a true waltz. The 
supporting texture also contributes to the passage’s allegiance to this norm. As 
indicated, this norm is progressively left aside (reaching its furthest distance at the 
bar 33 cadenza) and finally reinstated in the cadence at bar 36. 
Taking these narrative descriptions of the ballade and combining them with some 
derivations from the analyses described in the previous section, a narrative is proposed 
characterized by the following features: 
The beginning A flat major chord is strongly questioned at bar 3 when the f-sharp 
appears. This generates great uncertainty, provoking an extended silence. Indeed, we do 
not know where we are and where we are going. Therefore, that first silence is a pause 
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loaded with uncertainty. The following passage, with the neighbouring notes around the f-
sharp and d, indicates the G minor dominant. Nevertheless, the surface harmony still 
continues to offer doubts (the e flat4 at bar 8 acknowledges that “not everything was ditto” 
at that level). The melody, nevertheless, has arrived at the d. We have reached the 
Kopftone. For Schenkerian theory, once this note is reached, the die is cast: we already 
know the way and the goal is visible through every degree of the progression. Therefore 
the arrival at that d is essential – doubts are dissipated here. The following silence has 
another connotation – relief, calm, and meditation? In this way the entrance to the waltz 
theme is enunciated from that d. In such way, the introduction and the waltz’s beginning 
are unified. At the same time, the way the cadence at bars 6-7 is set out says that the long 
note at 7-8 has a different meaning to the previous silences. It operates as a springboard to 
gain impulse and start the Ballade proper. 
As said, the lyrical waltz theme does not impel the action but rather the inner states, 
feelings and emotions, and it is probably a time for internal transformations. What is 
important does not seem to be the apparent organization of stanzas, but what is happening 
at deeper levels where a single idea unifies the entire passage. The unity of this passage is 
therefore what is most important. Understanding the role of certain notes (like the g5 at the 
bar 13 register transfer) is important to understand such unity throughout the processes of 
internal transformation. When the strophic structure starts to distort, lyric and narrative 
elements are intermingled in a very subtle way. At this moment it is possible to understand 
that those inner states have begun to be narrated, with forcefully lyrical moments of 
internal expression and more extroverted moments manifested in virtuoso passages. 
The bar 36 cadence marks an important point of inflection. Against this 
background, strongly unified by the linear progressions at deep levels of the musical 
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structure, and by subtle inner transformations in expression, this is the point of greatest 
formal inflection. From here, those inner transformations are of such a nature, that the 
virtuoso breaks through into the context of the lyrical, making use of a strength supported 
by an increasing technical dominion. 
This analysis will be stopped at this point, knowing full well that this break may 
seem surprising and also inadequate. The reason for this cut is that the following 
experimental study is based only on this fragment. The choice of this cut is not arbitrary 
but obeys the cut produced in the film that is the nucleus of this experimental strategy. As a 
result from the analysis it is possible to argue that the sequence of the film The Pianist, by 
Roman Polansky, selected for this work, takes the Chopin composition, among others, as 
material to construct its narrative structure – and certain aspects in particular of the 
Ballade’s prolongational structure as analysed. Next, the way in which some famous 
pianists make use of the same material will be seen. 
10.2 A performance: The Pianist by Roman Polansky 
This section aims to show how a musical composition is transposed to a filmic format, 
thereby aspiring to illustrate both the concept of transposition and the notions of materials 
and the materials-transposition dialectic. The idea is to illustrate a genitive composition-
performance relationship involving the prolongational structure. As the film medium has a 
long history of transpositions, the notion itself may be more comprehensible if it is 
undertaken from this perspective, thereby making it easier to understand the possibilities of 
transposition in music performance. 
The transposition is a scene from the film The Pianist, by Roman Polansky (2002) 
(see the example 28 in the disc). Some details of the film and the scene are included in 
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appendix V. The way in which Polansky used Chopin’s composition is analysed in this 
section. 
10.2.1 Using the musical structure 
There are many studies that analyse the relation between music and image, and the 
implications of this relation in the audio-visual arts (cinema, television, multimedia, etc.) 
(Cook 1998b, Lipscomb and Tolchinsky 2005, Simeon 1992). Most of those studies 
examine how music contributes to understanding the film’s content, or how music and 
image are integrated in collaboration. The aim of this section, however, is to show how the 
image accounts for an interpretation of the musical composition. 
Simeon (1992) proposed different levels in the relation between music and image in 
the cinematographic context. Following his proposal, it is possible, then, to enunciate at 
least 3 categories of correspondence between both components of the filmic language: (i) 
kinetic correspondence; (ii) syntagmatic correspondence; and (iii) content correspondence. 
Kinetic correspondence refers to the musical tempo in relation to the speed of the 
action. This agreement sometimes is obtained by fitting an underlying pulse (characteristic 
in the video clip genre). However, this common pulse is often absent. The scene in 
question shows scarce movement: only one extremely long take that serves as an 
introduction to the composition’s introduction, reveals the slow walk of both characters 
towards the piano. Soon, the captain slowly walks from the piano to a distant chair in the 
room. The only important and significant movements are the movements of the 
performance, both the subtle movements of the body, and the fast movements of the hands 
on the keyboard. Although the piece begins with a Largo, it is not possible to say that the 
tempo is slow. The hand movements, therefore, are the only resource that Polansky can use 
in the context of the materials to establish kinetic correspondence. The director exactly 
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emphasizes that correspondence in the cadenza-like virtuoso passage at bar 33, and on the 
trill at bar 25. After the jump to bar 209, at the Presto, the shots are shorter in general, and 
the longest correspond to the hand movements; the pianist’s face is captured in this part in 
much briefer shots, contrarily to the first part’s long and slow shots. 
Syntagmatic correspondence has to do with the way in which the music 
segmentation “fits” the film’s segmentation. Simeon (1992) proposed that it is possible to 
establish a double syntagmatic chain in which elements of the cinematographic 
segmentation and the music’s segmentation are exhibited in parallel, making the 
reciprocity evident and allowing for a possible approach of the musical content being 
narrated. Thus, the music is intimately related to the narrative programme. 
But music can exhibit a more active and independent function, no longer as an 
accompaniment, but contributing along with the visual component in the production of 
meaning. In this way, we can speak of a crossmodal correspondence in the formation of 
this narrative programme. 
Concerning this correspondence, it is clear what point of view of the musical 
structure Polansky uses. A clear example is the articulation point at bar 36. There, an 
elaboration of the x motif appears, which seems new in the previous sequence’s uniform 
context. In the visual realm, an exterior image is seen. It is the first time the outside is 
shown. This feature is very significant since the scene has been developing for 9 minutes 
and 37 seconds inside the house. This new visual content smoothens the jump to bar 49, 
avoiding synchronizing with the shot change. 
However, it is possible to see, at the beginning of the piece, the most interesting 
syntagmatic correspondence. The first shot begins long before the start of the performance 
(1 minute 25 seconds; the complete shot lasts 1 minute 53 seconds, see example 28 in 
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disc). It is an extremely long shot related to the extensive initial arpeggio, as if the music 
existed from before, the first c being the point at which the sequence becomes audible. The 
following shot (the captain’s close-up) is articulated right on the d of bar 5 (the Kopftone of 
the first linear progression). It comprises the extensive silences and the change of tempo 
(from Largo to Moderato), and finalizes at bar 13 precisely at the transference of register 
with the octave jump. That is to say, the image unifies the transition from Largo to 
Moderato and the entire first phrase in an only shot. The articulation points work as 
phenomenal accents, capturing the spectator’s attention (Boltz 1992). Thus, the d, as the 
Kopftone, is emphasized by the visual syntagma. In this way, this syntagma reinforces the 
linear progression, focussing on its point of departure. For that reason, Polansky’s choices 
seem to reflect a depth interpretation rather than a surface one. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to think that the image captures the hierarchic structure of the passage: just when the 
refrain starts, at bar 8, the captain’s turn begins (it is the first important movement he 
makes). Throughout the entire first refrain, the captain moves to the chair. During the 
second refrain he slowly turns in front of the chair and starts to sit, and is completely 
seated at the beginning of the third refrain. Therefore the complete shot has 4 parts: (i) 
fixed face (from bar 5.2 to bar 8.3), (ii) turning and walking (b. 8.4 – 10.3), (iii) turning 
and sitting (from bar 10.4 to bar 12.3), (iv) (brief) fixed seat (b.12.3 – 12.3). In figure 10.9 
this correspondence is observed in the voice leading graphic analysis and the hierarchic 
relation is indicated, showing two hierarchical levels: the shot level (corresponding to the 
underlying voice leading of the level, see upper red arc in the figure), and the character 
movement level (corresponding to formal articulation of the stanza, see lower red arcs in 
the figure and their correspondence with the bars in the score, which are marking the 
stanza. 
331 
The following shot – Hosenfeld seated2 – goes from bar 16.3 to bar 20.1 – the first 
half of the second stanza. That is to say, the visual segment matches the articulation of the 
composition’s formal surface (see figure 10.10). 
From this point, when the refrain and its linear progressions disappear, where the 
musical segmentation becomes more ambiguous, both syntagmatic chains abandon such a 
high level of synchrony. In this section, then, Polansky abandons the syntagmatic 
correspondence as an expressive resource and deepens the third type of correspondence. 
The content correspondence refers to the direct sound references being seen. This 
correspondence is more problematic, although certain aspects of the content are easily 
identified. The correspondence of trivial content in this fragment would be given by the 
fact that a piano is heard when a pianist is seen (note that this passage focuses more on the 
pianist and the action of playing, displaying his hands, body and face). However, a subtler 
correspondence is also revealed. For example, following Klein’s idea (2004) related to 
distinguishing lyrical and narrative gestures, the lyrical gestures of bar 21 tend to be more 
                                                 
2 See in appendix V a deeper description of the film, its narrative aspects and its characters. 
Figure 10.9. Syntagmatic correspondence in the scene from The Pianist by R. 
Polansky, during the introduction and first stanza of the Ballade in G minor 
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related to face shots, and the narrative gestures (establishing a kinetic correspondence) are 
more associated with hand shots (Figure 10.10). In this way, the lyrical gestures are 
visually emphasized with the pianist’s painful gestures, his inclined face and the back 
lighting, conferring a certain mystical atmosphere to the character and accentuating the 
dramatic entailment between the musical passage and the narrative situation. This relation 
is openly shown at the upbeat of bar 22 when the gesture of the pianist’s face contributes to 
re-signify it (note that this upbeat is a crucial point in a particularly ambiguous structure). 
In spite of this apparently strong evidence, what is noteworthy at this point in relation to 
the musical structure is precisely that just where the musical structure becomes more 
ambiguous, the syntagmatic correspondence is abandoned and other types of 
correspondences are brought to bear.  
An obvious content correspondence occurs during Hosenfeld’s attitude 
transformation throughout the pianist’s performance, as he is changing his own attitude as 
a consequence of a new (momentary) relation between them, based on the power 
demonstration the pianist offers on the keyboard. Remember that this transformation in the 
power relationships is a characteristic of the compositional narrative (p. 325). 
Figure 10.10. Syntagmatic, kinetic and content rapports in the scene from The Pianist 
by R. Polansky, (mm 16-36 of the Ballade in G minor). 
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Nevertheless, the passage that shows the most eloquent content correspondence is 
probably the beginning of the Largo. Here, a deep uncertainty can be clearly seen, 
reflecting the content of the first rest (silence). The pianist’s movement, flexing his fingers 
in that silence, instils doubt in the spectator as to whether he will be able to play and 
demonstrate he is indeed a pianist. Thus, a clear correspondence between the tonal 
uncertainty (discussed above, p. 313) and the doubt about the pianist’s future is installed. 
When the performance reaches the d (Kopftone), Hosenfeld’s gesture and attitude 
indicates, indeed, that the die is cast and therefore the following pause is loaded with 
confidence and relief. Finally, the long note on the I6/4 that puts the waltz (and the ballad 
itself) in motion also puts the Nazi captain in motion (leaving). 
In summary, it is evident from this analysis that the musical structure is a material 
used by Polansky in the construction of his performance. It is also clear that it is not the 
only material and that the final artistic product is the result of the way in which the 
tensions generated by the different materials are resolved in the creative act. Thus, next to 
the Ballade’s musical structure, the scene is constructed based on the film’s narrative, the 
technical means of the cinematographic support (montage, colour, lighting), the rhythm of 
the action, the emotional particularities of the characters (which define different modes of 
expression), the stylistic particularities of the contemporary art film, etc.  
In other words, certain structural elements of the composition are taken as materials 
for the creation of the scene just as the story and emotional atmosphere are. Thus, some 
thematic relations (contrasts between the first and second motifs), syntagmatic relations 
and performance motions are used to model the scene in accordance with many other 
narrative and visual components. 
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10.2.2 Brief discussion: performance as transposition 
Did Polansky have a script on which to place Chopin’s piece? Evidently, the answer is no. 
On the contrary, the structure composed by Chopin was the key to creating that scene. The 
scene is a deep reflection of the depth and surface tensions that the musical structure 
contains. From this, Polansky took the elements that adjust to the rest of the materials he 
had. For that reason the first section uncovers the deepest level of the underlying voice 
leading, whereas the second mirrors surface issues. 
When thinking of performance as transposition, the performer proceeds in the same 
way. Thus, she constructs her own art from a multiplicity of materials. The composition’s 
structure is one of the main materials but not the only one. 
In this way, the knowledge provided by music theory, musical analysis and any 
other kind of information source related to the composition is not normative for the 
performance but is relevant for the creation of the piece. All that (often implicit) 
knowledge allows the performer to model his or her work without risk of spoiling the 
material. Just like the block of marble that can give rise to infinite sculptures, the same 
compositional structure can give rise to potentially infinite works (see in appendix IV a 
brief discussion about using an artwork as material). The final work will depend on the 
nobility of the marble, but its value will be realized through the artist’s creative act: a 
creative act that can transform a noble block of the very best marble either into a work of 
admirable art, an ordinary object or a pile of chips and dust. 
By all means, the performer has in the piano, different materials than the film 
director. Nevertheless, the common material, the musical structure, will be present in his or 
her work, operating dialectically with the other available materials. Timing is one of the 
most powerfully expressive means of a pianist. In the next section, 5 piano performances 
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of the Ballade in G minor will be analysed in order to observe how the composition’s 
structure is used in each of them to model expressive timing. Contrarily to film timing, 
performative timing is subordinated to the typical problems of performance (real time, 
completeness, etc) as seen in chapter 7. 
Briefly we can say that the analysed scene’s timing is characterized by (i) a 
parsimonious segmentation (relatively long shots) in the first part of the performance, 
before the beginning of the execution, and (ii) very slow movements except in certain key 
points of the musical discourse where the movements are very quick (the pianist’s hands). 
This temporal organization may be identified with the underlying voice leading. In 
summary, the scene uses the underlying voice leading as one of the most important 
materials on which it unfolds its timing. In a similar way to music performance, visual 
timing is one of most powerful expressive means of cinematographic language, and is 
therefore crucial in communicating the film’s content. 
10.3 Five piano performances 
Like a film, a piano performance is also a very complex phenomenon in which very varied 
materials and motivations take part. Due to this complexity, only a single attribute of the 
performance, timing, will be studied here. The choice of this attribute is based on the 
importance of the temporal experience in nonverbal communication (chapter 8), and the 
role of time in the narrative experience (chapter 9). Thus, timing is the crucial performance 
attribute in communicating the musical structure as narrative. 
Five performances of the Chopin Ballade in G minor were taken. Among them, the 
performance recorded by Janusz Olejnizack (2002) (example 29 in disc) for the original 
soundtrack of the film The Pianist was included. The other 4 performances were: Alfred 
Cortot (1933) (example 30), Vladimir Horowitz (1968) (example 31), István Székely 
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(1987) (example 33) and Evgeny Kissin (1999) (example 32). Because the introduction, 
the Largo, is a recitative-like passage, comparing the temporal features of a real 
performance with nominal timing values (as they are prescribed by the score) is 
problematic. In addition, as the first part of the introduction has received a very particular 
treatment in the film, it was not taken into account for the experiment. Thus, the following 
analyses have been developed from the waltz’s entrance (bar 8), up to bar 40, when the 
film skips more than 200 bars and goes straight to the end of the piece. 
The five artists used different global tempo strategies. Table 10.1 exhibits the 
tempo values for the first stanza (bars 8-16) and for the entrance of the elaborated x motif 
after bar 36, as a sample of the tempo variability throughout the fragment. A progression in 
tempo is observed towards the sections of great virtuosity that appear further ahead (Klein 
2004). The differences could account for different visions of the beginning, according to 
which some artists (who approach the stanza faster) recognize more of a ballroom 
character for the early waltz (the others would exploit characteristics). 
Artist Bars 8-16 Bars 36-40 
Cortot 110 178 
Horowitz 105 135 
Kissin 90 129 
Olejniczak 102 131 
Szèkely 121 173 
Table 10.1. Tempi (quarter notes per minute) for the 5 performances at the 
first stanza and at the presentation of the elaborated x motif after bar 36. 
The following graphs adhere to the timing analysis approached in chapter 5. 
Therefore, they should be interpreted in a similar way. The unit value is the quarter note so 
that 6 points per bar are exhibited. The numbers on x-axis represent bars. 
Figure 10.11. shows at a glance on the one hand the great variability and opposition 
between Kissin’s and Cortot’s strategies and on the other, Horowitz’s performance as 
337 
being strongly uniform. Additionally, Szèkely’s performance presents greater long-term 
uniformity, as may be seen in the way in which the timing pattern for each refrain is 
reiterated. In general, the pianists tend to indicate the articulation between the refrains of 
the stanzas. Nevertheless, two different strategies are demonstrated. The older artists 
(Cortot and Horowitz) lengthen the first note of the x motif (beginning of the refrain), 
whereas more current performances lengthen the last note of the y motif (end of the 
refrain). The same takes place at the end of the second refrain (bar 12). Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to notice how Kissin and Cortot comparatively emphasize this point, the end of 
the refrain on the dominant (V), more than the previous refrain finalizing on the ii7 
(Rothstein 1995). 
Figure 10.12 shows a different realization of the third refrain’s ending, due to the 
different metrical position of the following refrain’s beginning. Here the pianists tend to 
link both refrains going towards the c-sharp5 as an anticipation of bar 15, lengthening the 
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important to consider that Kissin unifies the transition from the third to the fourth refrain, 
reducing the articulatory character of that moment. On the other hand, at bar 16 similar 
behaviours to those observed at bars 10 and 12 can be detected. Nevertheless both Kissin 
and Olejniczak achieve their greatest ritardando at the end of the stanza (as Todd 1985 
suggests). In turn, Horowitz shifts the lengthening towards the following quarter note. 
Figure 10.13 (upper panel) shows a similar behaviour at bars 18 and 20. When 
leaving the strophic structure, Kissin marks this fact with an important lengthening. He is 
original in clearly separating the strophic structure from the ensuing more ambiguous 
region. Nevertheless, Olejniczak also highlights this point. In this case, he lengthens the 
following g5 (figure 10.13 lower panel). That great lengthening of the g5 grants the passage 
deep dramatic significance. Interestingly, Olejniczak parallels that action at bar 23. In this 
way, his use of the more lengthened notes segments that unit according to the underlying 
Figure 10.12 




voice leading, every four dotted half notes (figure 10.8). On the other hand, Cortot 
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Figure 10.14 shows the unfolding of the melodic sequence (figure 10.6) in a context 
of a relatively faster tempo for the whole of the performance, particularly in Kissin’s 
performance, which, in addition, emphasizes the peaks of the melodic contour of both units 
with lengthenings of the e flat5 (bar 28) and c5 (bar 30). The lower panel exhibits the 
arpeggiated chord at bar 32 consuming remarkably more time in all performances, except 
for Kissin’s. He performs this arpeggio a tempo, which is held throughout the bar 33 
Figure 10.14 






cadenza (notice the time homogeneity achieved in that bar) until the cadence at bars 34 and 
35. In the end, outstandingly, the five performances agree in retaining the f-sharp4 of the 
final cadence, although the ritenuto strategies are diverse. 
Finally, figure 10.15 shows the passage of the elaborated x motif from bar 36. In it, 
one can appreciate the way in which Olejniczak lengthens the notes in the bass, 
emphasizing the offbeat character of the passage. On the contrary, Kissin lengthens the 
octaves in the right hand, emphasizing the cantabile character of the upper voice. 
Some notably relevant elements may be appreciated in a more detailed inspection. 
For this, timing profiles according to each of the melody’s notes (instead of each quarter 
note beat) were compiled. To gain clarity, figure 10.16 shows only the profiles for the 
Kissin and Olejniczak performances (the former because presents some important 
characteristics for the following discussion, and the latter because will be the focus in the 
listening test; the rest of the performances do not present remarkable details at this level). 
The graph clearly displays how Kissin systematically lengthens each of the x motif’s a4s. 





in this section. At the surface level the a4 is located in a very weak metric position and in 
addition it is the briefest note of the entire passage, therefore, it tends to go unnoticed. 
Nevertheless on a deeper level, it is a key note both to complete the linear progressions and 
to shape the prolongation of the tonic. In addition, although Kissin also relatively lengthens 
the first d2, this lengthening is much less important than the other artists’ lengthenings. In 
this way, Kissin unifies the first linear progression and the passage from Largo to 
Moderato. With this small detail, Kissin highlights the linear progressions. Remarkably, 
when the structure becomes more ambiguous (bar 21) he shows a more homogenous 
timing, free from any underlying voice leading guideline. Therefore, it is possible to say 
that, like Polansky, Kissin makes use of the underlying voice leading to create his 
performance. Since he is operating dialectically with different materials to Polansky, his 
use of the prolongational structure is different. Nevertheless, in both cases the underlying 
Figure 10.16 
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voice leading is a key element for the organization of the narrative. In addition, the 
progressive acceleration of Kissin’s performance towards bar 33 and his notable 
homogeneity when performing the cadenza make this performance the one with greatest 
movement at this point (compared to the other performances). (Keep in mind that, at this 
point, Polansky activates the movement by showing the pianist’s hands - kinetic rapport.) 
However, can the listener experience the musical structure in the same terms as 
those used by the performer? The following listening test was designed to provide an 
answer to this question. 
10.4 The listening test 
This test is based on the idea that the multimodal redundancy reinforces some information, 
letting listeners understand some structural traits of the stimulus and organized the 
experience as a whole (Lewkowicz 1992). At the same time, the set of performance 
expressive actions may be consider as providing a sort of intramodal redundancy. Thus, 
both kinds of redundancies can elicit similar structural attributes, although they use 
different means for it. In that way, expressive features of a performance would be 
replacing the other modalities’ effects.  
For that, a similarity judgement paradigm was used. Judging similarities consists of 
comparing –although unconsciously – similar and different features of the stimuli 
(Jameson and Gentner, 2003). Extracting common features entails a previous assessment 
of the relevant features, which then are evaluated in the light of the relevant properties of 
the other stimulus. In other terms, if two stimuli are considered as similar, that is not only 
because they share some common characteristics but rather because their common features 
are highlighted in some way. 
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10.4.1 Aim of the study 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether listeners make use of the prolongational 
structure of the piece in judging the similarity between the filmic scene and the musical 
excerpt. Just as prolongational structure is reinforced in the filmic stimulus by crossmodal 
redundancy, a performance that reinforces it by intramodal redundancy (that is, by the set 
of expressive attributes) will be consider as more similar.  
10.4.2 Method 
10.4.2.1 Subjects 
One hundred and twenty-five university students (42 female, 87 male), whose average age 
was 24.8 years, participated in the experiment. All the subjects had at least 1 year of 
systematic musical training. The average musical experience was 6.1 years. This value was 
used to divide them in two groups according to musical experience. The group of moderate 
musical experience, with 84 subjects, had 1 to 6 years of musical training. In the advanced 
musical experience group the subjects, N = 41, had more than 6 years of systematic 
musical training. The subjects were randomly distributed in two experimental conditions. 
For operative reasons both conditions had a different number of subjects. 77 subjects 
participated in the experimental condition and 48 in the control condition. 
10.4.2.2 Stimuli 
An extended scene from the film The Pianist, by Roman Polansky, was used as the 
cinematographic stimulus for the experimental condition (example 28 in disc). The scene 
went from approximately 1 hour 52 minutes from the film’s beginning to the moment at 
which the performance reaches bar 40 of the composition. In this way some important 
moments for the scene’s narrative (in particular, aspects related to the use of music and the 
sound track in the narration context) were included in addition to the performance of the 
Chopin Ballade. This stimulus is the experimental video clip. 
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For the control condition a control video clip was created using a series of neutral 
images (big boxes and doors) with a non-coincident montage without any observed 
structural points in the score, and a slow and constant camera movement (example 34). In 
this way, any kind of syntagmatic, kinetic and content correspondence between the images 
and the musical piece was intentionally avoided. The scene’s sound track used in the 
experimental condition was attached to those images. In this way, in both conditions, the 
same performance of the Ballade in G minor was heard, but totally different images were 
seen. 
Five sound clips were collated by using the five analysed performances in the 
previous section taken from bar 3 (fading them in during that bar) up to bar 40 (fading out 
from 40.1 to 40.3) (examples 29-33). 
10.4.2.3 Apparatus 
The video clips were projected using a computer connected to a data projector on a white, 
wide screen (cinema style). The sound clips were recorded on a CD and played on a stereo 
sound system. The equipment setting was similar for both conditions. 
10.4.2.4 Procedure 
The subjects first saw the video clip without receiving specific instructions. In the case of 
the experimental condition a summary of the storyline, from the beginning to the moment 
of the scene of the video clip was told to the subjects, as a means of contextualizing the 
viewing and involving the subjects in the emotional atmosphere of the film. Next, they 
were asked to listen to the five sound clips. After each sound clip they were asked to 
indicate their judgment of similarity between the performance in the sound clip and the 
performance in the video clip using a nine-point scale. After that, they filled a brief 
questionnaire with personal data. 
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In both conditions the subjects did not know the procedure at the time of watching 
the video clip, that is to say, they did not know they would have to compare the 
performances, in order to avoid them concentrating exclusively on performance aspects to 
the detriment of visual aspects. In all the cases the subjects knew that the task was related 
to research in music performance. 
10.4.2.5 Design 
In the experimental condition the subjects watched the experimental video clip and then the 
5 sound clips with a few seconds between performances in order to make the similarity 
judgment. In the control condition, the control video clip replaced the experimental video 
clip. The test was developed in small groups (8-10 subjects each) that listened to the 5 
sound clips in random order. 
10.4.3 Results 
A repeated measures ANOVA with Artist as the within subject factor and Condition, 
Instrument, Experience and Gender as the between subjects factors was run. The results 
are displayed in the graph in figure 10.19. 
The Artist factor was significant (F[121-4]=3,535 p<.007). The Condition factor was 
also significant (F[124-1]=19,293 p<.000) revealing that the subjects in the control condition 
tended to consider the performances in the sound clips as more similar to that of the video 
clip. The film would apparently be weakening the similarity. Thus, the experience of the 
musical performance appears to be different when accompanying an abstract image than 
when associated with the film’s narrative. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that the 
interaction between the Condition and Instrument factors gave a marginal probability 
(F[121-2]= 4,699 p= .032), the fact that the pianist subjects presented greater differences 
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between both conditions may be appreciated. Consequently, the film context seems to 
affect pianists more than non-pianists. 
What is more relevant is the interaction between Condition and Artist factors, 
which was also significant (F[118-6]= 2,674 p= .032), showing that the similarity judgments 
were different between both conditions. In the control condition, the performance judged 
as most similar to the video clip’s was Olejniczak’s (the original). Contrarily, subjects in 
the experimental condition considered Kissin’s and Szèkely’s performances as more 
similar than Olejniczak’s. A post hoc contrast revealed that only the similarity judgments 
for the performance by Kissin and Olejniczak were significantly different (F[1-75]=6.754 p = 
0.01). In other words, the subjects who saw the scene from the film considered Kissin’s 
performance as most similar to the performance in the film than the performance that was 
indeed in the film, Olejniczak’s. 
Figure 10.19. Results of the judgments of similarity between the 
performance in the video-clips and the performances in the sound-clips, 
for the experimental and control conditions (for pianists and non pianists).
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10.4.4 Discussion 
The notion of transposition applied to music performance permits seeing the performer’s 
activity as a creative act. Speaking of transposition implies recognizing both the 
similarities and differences that transpositions present with respect to the source text. 
Similarities and differences depend on the way in which the original text interacts with the 
other materials in the artistic production. In turn, the notion of transposition allows 
overcoming any type of determinism in the relationship between the produced work and 
the source text. 
The transposition examples analysed in this chapter account for the fact that the 
musical structure is just one of many in the set of available materials for the creative act. 
As well as the difference between the materials involved both in the filmic and in the 
performative transpositions being obvious, there also are different materials involved in the 
different performative transpositions. The results of the experiment presented here account 
for this. For example, we have seen that performances by Cortot and Horowitz were 
similar with respect to certain behaviours that differentiated them from most contemporary 
performances. Evidently, materials relative to the time of production are involved in the 
work’s creation. The dialectic relation that the musical structure maintains with the set of 
those other materials directly influences the value of the work’s verisimilitude. For that 
reason, even in the case in which one considers such performances as old fashioned, they 
maintain their artistic quality. It also probably contributes to the verisimilitude (in 
aesthetic, not historical terms!) of the film. 
The analysis of the film used in this experiment accounts for the transposition from 
a musical text to a filmic support in the context of the creation of a more complex filmic 
narrative. But more interestingly, the underlying voice leading, as it arises from the 
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analysis of the musical text, may be one of the most important materials in the creation of 
the cinematographic product. If the prolongational structure can be involved in such a 
creation, is it sensible to think that it may also be involved in the performative creation, 
and if so, how? 
Both kinetic and syntagmatic correspondences between image and compositional 
structure are related to the time configuration. Knowing that timing is a crucial factor in 
nonverbal communication and that a key for such communication is linked to identifying 
the coherence of the temporal structure (see p. 277 and ff.), it is possible to affirm that we 
can identify sequences of events that share attributes of their temporal organizations. 
We have presented the strange results of an experiment in which an illusion arises 
by which a musical performance (that of Januz Olejniczak) is more similar to another 
(Evgeny Kissin’s) than to itself. It is evident that the stimulus characteristics perceived by 
the subjects on seeing the film included much more than those of Olejniczak’s 
performance. And it is also obvious that those characteristics included not only the visual 
aspects of the stimulus but also its narrative aspects. What is not so axiomatic is the fact 
that the other performance, Kissin’s, could provoke a similar experience from its 
expressive particularities. 
Timing is probably the most powerful means of expression in musical performance. 
We have seen that it contributes to communicating emotions, structural characteristics and 
kinetic images, among other factors. In the analysis of the five performances of the Ballade 
in G minor, we have identified particular timing characteristics in the different 
performances. Many of those aspects may be associated with semiotic interpretations (see 
p. 73 and ff.) of the musical structure. In particular, the performance by Evgeny Kissin 
seems to be associated in its first part with an underlying voice leading interpretation. By 
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using rubato, the performer marks certain notes that are important in conveying the 
underlying voice leading. Interestingly, the rubato thwarts the expectations stimulated by 
the piece’s time, and proposes a performance time. In other words, from this conflict a 
double temporality emerges, splitting story time from discourse time and generating a 
particular temporal tension. As we know, the configuration of the narrative time emerges 
from this tension – a configuration that reflects the tensions between “the time of the things 
in the world”, in this case the composition, and a fictional, imagined, invented time, 
recreated in that tension. For that reason, it is possible to affirm that through the small 
timing details of Kissin’s performance, the listener is guided towards a timing experience 
characterized by: (i) a parsimonious segmentation (at least more parsimonious than that of 
other performances), and (ii) an idea of movement that begins very slowly but reaches 
peaks of speed in the virtuoso passages (at least, a greater relative speed, when comparing 
this passage to the earlier tempo). Thus, that time configuration (the time configuration 
provided by the sound’s timing) can bring the listener closer to the visual timing’s 
configuration. 
According to classical psychological approaches judging similarities involves the 
identification of common structural aspects (Jameson and Gentner 2003). However, in the 
experiment presented here, the similarity judgment arises as something much more 
complex. The five performances differ basically in three dimensions: timing, dynamics and 
sound quality (timbre). On the other hand, the scene from the film and the five piano 
performances are very different artistic facts. However, they share some attributes. The 
most obvious is that both the performances as well as the film are based on the same 
musical composition: the Ballade in G minor. Of the three distinguishing performative 
characteristics, timing is the only one that takes part in visual language. We can speak of 
visual intensity and quality when talking about the image content of a film, but an analogy 
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with the dynamics and timbre of a performance involves metaphorical understanding, 
whereas at the timing level the relation is direct: image and sound regulate the passage of 
time in a particular way giving rise to a particular and unique time experience. The scene 
also has a sound quality and musical dynamics, of course, but these attributes are brought 
to the scene by the sound track, not by narrative or visual components. It is absolutely 
plausible that the characteristic in play when judging the similarity between performances, 
is clearly timing. 
As well there being evidence that (i) multimodal redundancy favours 
communication and that, for example, speech is perceived considerably better when 
accompanied by visual stimulus (Lewckowicz and Kraebel 2004), and (ii) music 
contributes to the understanding of the narrative content of the cinematographic work 
(Lipscomb and Tolchinsky 2005), it is possible to suggest that the visual stimulus 
contributes to an understanding of the musical composition. In early childhood, the 
modality of the stimulation is less important that its temporal organization (Lewkowicz 
1992), since temporal phenomena seem to be processed independently from the stimulus 
modality (Wittman and Pöppel 1999/2000). In the same way, in the experience of musical 
expression, the temporal organization is more important that the traits (or the modality of 
such traits) that determines it. 
According to Gibson (in Lewcowicz and Kraebel 2004), sensory stimulation is 
registered by multiple systems that are sensible to amodal invariants. The amodal 
invariants are those properties of the stimulus that remain common in different modalities. 
Although whether the integration of the invariant properties requires some level of inner 
processing is under discussion, it is possible that crossmodality, that is to say, the process 
by which one shifts from one perceptual modality to another, is governed by the 
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equivalence of such invariant properties. In the temporal dimension, for example, 
equivalent ways of organizing the passing of time may take place around two key relations: 
(i) the duration of time, and (ii) the sequence of events in before and after terms. The 
duration of time is not absolute and mainly has to do with the organization of time passing 
in meaningful units: for example, in how many units does this time pass? What are the 
proportions between these temporal units? What is the relation between successive 
durations? and so on. In this way what is absorbed in the time experience is a particular 
organization that goes beyond the perceptual particularities of what is being perceived 
through a specific modality. This idea resembles the concept of activation profiles by Stern 
(1985) (see chapter 8). According to this, perceptual experience in early childhood is not 
retrieved through the specific representation in the modality of the stimulation, but through 
registering the activity the stimulation assumes at every moment in time. 
Thus, the passing organization also obeys the salience of particular stimuli. For 
example, in the film, the d note at bar 3 becomes salient due to the shot change. In Kissin’s 
performance, that same note becomes salient by the structural importance it acquires when 
the underlying linear progression reveals itself (by marking the a4 at bar 8). That is to say, 
both stimulations impel the d note, although using very different resources. It is necessary 
to consider that the d note would be indirectly impelled in Kissin’s performance, through 
implicit knowledge of the linear progressions the listener has, provoked by the emphasis on 
the a note. 
We can certainly speak of crossmodal equivalence because the visual stimulation, 
on the one hand, and the microtemporal stimulation, on the other, provoke equivalent 
organizations of passing time. This should not induce us to think that we are speaking of 
equal timings (visual and expressive) in terms of real durations, or proportions that 
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determine periods in which time could be segmented. The process by which information 
circulates from one modality to another is not a simple translation. On the contrary, it 
involves building an abstract, amodal format from which it is possible to recognize any 
sensorial modality (Stern 1985). When subjects matched Kissin’s performance with the 
film they were based on that abstract format. Possibly this format is (or at least is 
analogous to) the prolongational structure as it has been previously analysed. The 
experience of time in the musical work is much more complex that the timing of any one 
of its components. It is the result of tensions provoked between all the simultaneously 
experienced temporal organizations. The story-time and discourse-time dichotomy 
emerges here in a more complex way as there may be manifold stories and discourses, 
where the novelty of every moment in the inexorability of passing time makes each 
experience unique. 
*** 
Summary. In this chapter the concept of transposition from a musical composition, 
Chopin’s Ballade in minor G, to a cinematographic work, was exemplified. This example 
showed that certain features of the temporal organization of the scene’s visual components 
account for one of the transposed contents: the musical (compositional) structure, 
particularly the prolongational structure of the piece. In addition 5 performances of the 
same composition were analysed in terms of their expressive timing attributes. One of 
them was also understood as a transposition based on that piece’s prolongational structure 
(prolongational performance). 
A listening experiment based on the similarity judgment paradigm was carried out. 
In it, subjects were asked to judge the similarity between the five performances studied and 
the musical sound track of the analysed scene (the control condition stimulus consisted of 
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using that sound track on a different visual content with a different temporal organization). 
The results indicate that the listeners considered the prolongational performance as being 
more similar to the sound track of the film than the movie’s true performance. These 
findings suggest the reception of the expressive attributes is crossmodal based on their 
temporal organization, just as with intersubjective experiences in early childhood. Both 
temporal organizations, the film’s and the performance’s judged as most similar, were 
based on similar contents. In this way, both transpositions are considered as equivalent in 
the organization of the course of time. In other words, both temporal organizations give 
rise to narrative structures that identify the one with the other. These narratives would be 
elicited from considering the prolongational structure of the music composition as one of 
the materials used in both performative works. 
355 
Chapter 11: Conclusions 
Arroz con leche, me quiero casar  
con una señorita de San Nicolás 
que sepa coser, que sepa bordar 
que sepa abrir la puerta para ir a jugar1 
Traditional, Argentina 
 
Pondering on the role of the prolongational structure in performance seems to be a 
scholarly extravagance. Nevertheless, throughout this investigation, this preoccupation has 
extended across an ample range of problems that are central in attempting to understand 
music as communication. The topic’s specificity has allowed the view that an accurate 
treatment of the communicational experience in music making should not only include a 
current description of the problem, but also an understanding of the genetic processes that 
gave rise to that current state in the first place. Thus, the examination of such a specific 
aspect of performance as the role of the prolongational structure within it, has shown, 
throughout this thesis, that communicational problems, as psychological topics, do not only 
acquire meaning when understanding their ontogenesis and phylogenesis, but can also be 
explained when framed within a given culture’s historical process. Tonal musical culture 
was a favourable realm for reflecting in this way. Within that broad field, the performance 
of 19th century solo piano music in particular was the main concern. Of course, this choice 
was the result of personal and affective matters. Nevertheless some additional 
considerations strengthened the decision: (i) this music represents a period in which the 
performer’s activity was seen as being clearly separated from the composer’s, in which the 
former was culturally valued specifically according to his or her role; (ii) consequently, 
                                                 
1 Rice pudding, I want to marry / a young lady from San Nicolás / may she know how to sew, may she know 
how to embroider / may she know how to open the door to go out and play 
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this choice allows circumscribing the problems of performance to clearly performative 
issues, including both real time and contingency matters; (iii) since this music, 
traditionally, is written music, it presents important methodological advantages in 
researching expressive performative attributes as different from compositional features; 
(iv) the selected repertoire does not directly involve religious ceremonies, dance, literary 
texts, etc. thereby making it possible to say that it is music to be listened to for its own 
sake; (v) tonal music, and the chosen repertoire in particular, has given rise to important 
theoretical endeavours about the notion of depth in music, which as approached here is 
related to the prolongational structure and thereby links communication matters to non-
explicit contents; (vi) the discussion on meaning and other types of psychological 
processes in tonal music have given rise to important investigations and academic debates 
that serve as the basis for the current research; (vii) this repertoire has crossed different 
times and subcultures, allowing purely musical structural matters to be distinguished from 
the influence of historical, social and cultural contexts, finally (viii) because of the 
versatility of the current musical production context, many of the conceptions belonging to 
different subcultures and periods coexist and still maintain their effect today in this sort of 
ideological and cultural Babel. 
Concerning this last point, in addition to the choice of the object of study, it is 
important to remark on the ideological standpoint from which the topic is approached, 
since in attempting to be relatively independent from matters of cultural hegemony it has 
permitted access to a broader perspective of the problem. This view was exhibited 
throughout this work and will be considered in this final chapter. 
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11.1 Prolongation, performance, reality and idealization 
Some important reflections arose from considering music performance as communication. 
The first concerns the very concept of music performance. Even within the cultural limits 
of tonal western art music, different conceptions of music performance are not only 
debated in the academic field but also coexist in practice. Interestingly, in analysing those 
conceptions, some ideas about music, both as cultural creation and as behavioural 
predisposition, influence the definition of musical performance, emphasizing the 
importance in this discussion of the academic realms that approach music as such a diverse 
phenomenon. From the beginning, it has been emphasized that the preoccupation here is 
mainly pragmatic. Nevertheless, the discussion has been located in a field of confluence of 
different disciplines. In particular, the relationship between musicology and psychology 
occupies a central place in this confluence, although other areas have been involved as 
well. 
In the history of western music, music performance as a way of making music is 
clearly split from the activity of music composition. Paying attention to this split was 
relevant here since, from the psychological point of view, those ways of making music are 
related to two different modalities of artistic thought: (i) projectual thought, characterized 
by a time of the creative process that is fundamentally different from the time of the artistic 
product, and (ii) performative thought, where the time of the process is either the same as 
or compatible with the time of the artistic product. It became apparent that they are actually 
never absolutely independent from each other, although the nature of each artistic activity 
is typically characterized by a greater presence of one of them. In this way, from the very 
definition of the problems of performance and communication, matters of time come into 
play. As seen, and this will be considered more deeply throughout this chapter, this is the 
core of the problem as considered in this thesis. 
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Thus, music performance, understood as a way of making music predominantly 
governed by performative thought, defines its range of influence according to the function 
or role it is carrying out in the artistic fact. At one end, a supportive function defines the 
activity of music performance as logistic in nature. In it, the performers’ actions are 
determined by their acquiescence to another person’s will and are evaluated according to 
how they adjust to that command. At the other end, an expressive function characterizes 
performative activity as cathartic in nature. In it, the primary target is the performer’s self 
expression, so the activity is appraised in the light of the originality, personality and 
individuality of the artistic product. It was argued that the history of Western music 
performance is the history of the tensions between the expressive and the supportive 
functions. 
Thus, thinking about communication in performance in a particular cultural context 
leads us to characterize those tensions throughout history. Specifically, in chapter 2 three 
historical moments in the performance of the chosen repertoire were briefly revisited. 
According to these moments three models of performers - the romantic, the modern and 
the postmodern performer - as icons were characterized by the way in which those 
performative functions are involved. Between them, the modern performer was particularly 
of interest for two main reasons. The first was the strong epistemological affinity noted 
between the modern performance programme and the development of classical cognitive 
science. This is important because most psychological studies in music performance are 
very close to classical cognitive science’s dominant paradigm. The second was the fact that 
these modern performers allowed one to see a particular way in which the power relations 
between performers, composers and audiences take place in such a way that their function 
noticeably approaches the supportive end of the continuum. 
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The second reflection concerns the communication content. That is to say, what is 
communicated? This leads directly to the realm of musical meaning, and particularly to 
meaning in music performance. In chapter 3 it was seen how prolongational theories of 
tonal music have approached the problem of content. Prolongational theories offer a 
particular way of understanding tonal music. For performance, this particular way is 
extremely appealing because it allows glimpsing bonds between tones that are not explicit 
in the score. This entails, on the one hand, the fascinating interpretative idea that the work 
holds something to be discovered, generally viewed as something profound. The idea of 
depth is related to the idea of content. In other words, prolongational theories provide an 
answer to the problem of music content, placing in view one of the most interesting 
performative issues, the problem of interpretation. Although performance and 
interpretation are frequently used as interchangeable terms, it is not always clear that this 
implies that there is something to be interpreted (Eco 1992, Imberty 1992b). The 
objectivist tradition reduced the interpretative labour to decoding tasks fitted to a priori 
rules and principles that guarantee the imposition of the intentio operis and the intentio 
auctoris. On the contrary, the romantic tradition approached interpretation as a matter of 
imposition of the intentio lectoris (as interpreter). Interpretation as process objects to some 
of the pillars of the classical cognitive science’s generative paradigm. Simply put, the 
pitfall is the idea that, when interpreting, the subject must choose the relevant information 
from a set of available data. Nevertheless, the scope of the cognitivist paradigm has been 
widened by an immense amount of studies approach clearly interpretative problems from a 
classical perspective (Jackendoff 1983, Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, Grice 1989). This 
was the perspective of the first experimental endeavours (chapter 5 and 6, appendix 3). 
But, on the other hand, prolongational theories of tonal music seem to offer a 
comfortable setting for music performance, in providing a sort of conceptual scaffolding to 
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face the high cognitive demands of certain typically performative problems such as unity 
and continuity. Thus, prolongation appears both as a promissory and a provocative concept 
to delve into the problem of communication in performance. It is an idea that brings the 
intentio lectoris to bear, while objectively intending to emerge as intentio operis from the 
score as was written by the composer. Nevertheless, the provocative nature of the idea is 
revealed through a pair of disturbing paradoxes. The first shows that the affinity and 
connection between prolongational theories and performance have been put forward by the 
objectivist tradition, in which interpretational matters have relatively little space, because 
(i) it considers a determinist structure-performance relation, in which interpretation is 
diminished because the supportive function of the performance is blown out of proportion; 
(ii) music theory is seen as regulating that supportive function; and (iii) music theory 
presents a scientificist bias. In principle, this paradox seemed not to offer any impediment 
for our research beyond appearing as ironic in the history of musicology. Nevertheless, in 
the light of the empirical research (chapter 5), it can be said that it was very difficult to 
interpret the idiosyncratic components of the performances while understanding the theory 
as normative. Originality and individuality in performance tended to break all kinds of 
bonds between theory and performance that were susceptible to being identified with an a 
priori normative format. 
The second paradox is linked to the fact that the prolongational theory based on 
voice leading (the less cognitively oriented, the less objective, and the most 
interpretational), is the more associated, theoretically, to performative problems. Thus, 
before approaching any empirical endeavour in search of explaining the role of 
prolongation in communication in performance, it was necessary to examine this paradox 
in order to evaluate whether such research was worth while or whether the association was 
confined to a theoretical sphere. 
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Prolongation is a concept that arose from and was strongly studied from a 
theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, the attempt of transferring it to the factual domain 
of performance carries strong epistemological doubts. How does prolongation attain a 
factual status? The objectivist tradition in music performance itself has significant 
problems with this. In spite of the elegance of certain proposals, the prolongational 
structure has been an impediment for the objectivist intention of mapping the musical 
structure in performance (Berry 1989). Nevertheless, in order to situate adequately this 
difficulty it is important to bear in mind that this problem arose from the transfer of 
Schenkerian ideas to the English speaking ambit. Although, as has often been repeated 
throughout this thesis, Schenker himself was strongly motivated by performative issues 
and conceived all his theory from a critical point of view regarding the problems of playing 
music, his perspective of the problem was nevertheless clearly romantic. Even though he 
used to request the hand “to obey” the background and middleground, accomplishing this 
goal was indescribable and inexplicable for him. In no way did he have a sort of mapping 
in mind. The problem of reality of the Schenkerian programme is an objectivist matter. 
Schenkerian psychologism, linked to aesthetic interests, was not impatient to demonstrate 
its factual reality. 
Therefore, this paradox emerged when Schenker’s disciples arrived to North 
America and tried to pay tribute to their teacher in an atmosphere in which his rhetoric and 
figure were uncomfortably received. On the one hand, they were ideologically very 
contentious in the atmosphere of the postwar avant-garde period because of their 
conservative attitude and German inclination. But, in addition, the Schenkerian discourse 
did not adapt to American scholarship, in the heat of the institutionalisation of musical 
specialities as academic disciplines (see chapter 2, pp. 34 and ff.), and in an atmosphere 
influenced by an empirical psychology just before the imminent cognitive revolution. For 
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that reason, not only the theory’s rhetoric, but also its ideological foundation had to be 
adapted to the new cultural atmosphere. Thus, American Schenkerism acquired a 
psychological character that would be adopted by cognitive psychology, extremely 
attracted by its empiricist chimera (theoretical systems for modelling the musical 
experience in terms of hierarchic structures, and susceptible to being expressed in the form 
of rules). The Generative Theory of Tonal Music (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983) is perhaps 
the most honest expression of this tendency; honest because it recognizes that Schenker is 
not what a cognitive psychology of music needs and abandons it without looking down 
upon many of its contributions. Nevertheless, its prolongational perspective is new and 
does not reflect the Schenkerian problems. 
The paradox is then manifested in the considerable emptiness found in psychology 
of music research that approaches the problems of expressive music performance from the 
point of view of a topic present in the theoretical literature. A way of going beyond this 
paradox could have been to abandon the Schenkerian perspective of the prolongational 
structure in order to adopt more cognitively oriented prolongational theories, even while 
overlooking the issues of voice leading and its affinity with performative problems. 
Another way was chosen which consisted of revaluating the original Schenkerian model 
according to a more contextualized musicological approach. This reconsideration did not 
imply an ideological recovery or commitment with the original programme in any way. 
Instead, it involved an awareness of that programme’s musical and general cultural 
context, manifested throughout this thesis in (i) limiting the object of study to the musical 
repertoire included in Schenker’s work; (ii) extending the determinist relationship in order 
to include aspects of the configuration of the musical form by the voice leading as this 
seems to have been the main preoccupation in Schenker’s mature work; (iii) investigating 
alternative epistemological statuses for prolongation as a theoretical construct in the 
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context of current musicology and music performance; and (iv) searching for both 
musicological and performative foundations (mainly related to individuality and originality 
in performance) that provide an account of the factual role that prolongation might play in 
music performance and listening. 
In particular, the discussion about prolongation as a sign (p. 72 and ff.) allowed the 
linking of analysis and performance more closely, both influenced by the problem of 
interpretation from a musicological and a psychological point of view. The prolongational 
structure considered as the result of abductive processes was more compatible with the 
way in which performers usually generate their own interpretative criteria, beyond any 
objectivist chimera that may limit the psychology of such structural components to 
deductive and inductive processes. 
This setting allowed the establishment of a solid but extensive frame to determine 
coherently the circumstances under which a performance may be understood as 
prolongational – or as containing the prolongation – in opposition to another that might be 
considered as non prolongational. In this way, the systematic microstructural analysis 
described in chapter 5 was carried out. 
11.2 On the objectivist point of view’s range of influence 
Going through these issues of interpretation allowed an understanding of how the 
performer’s semiotic interpretation can be identified with the listener’s semantic 
interpretation (p. 73 and ff.). Nevertheless, to complete the communicational process, the 
listener’s reception of the performance gave rise to new problems related to the aim of 
leading the theoretical construct of prolongation to a factual sphere, now in the realm of 
reception. The objectivist perspective cannot do anything with prolongation other than 
confine it to the field of percepts and/or concepts. In this framework, psychological 
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phenomena are explained through the objective description of stimuli and the way in which 
significant information about them is organized. A strong postulate of classic cognitivism 
is that the structure of the object captures the processes taking place in the subject. The 
subject’s behaviour will have to show some direct correspondence with this stimulus’s 
objective structure, in order to say that a model or theory surpasses the theoretical scope 
and is manifested in the factual sphere. This behaviour will become evidence of the 
cognitive reality of the model or theory. But what kind of behaviour can feasibly be 
expected from the prolongational structure? A broad debate about this would widely 
exceed the scope of this work (see Martinez 2007). Nevertheless, an important part of the 
listening experiments included in chapter 6 sought to answer this question. 
We know that, within the objectivist tradition, the good performer is not the one 
who chooses, but who knows, discovers, and learns what has to be done. The composition 
is a generator of behaviours that the performer learns to carry out in performance. In the 
same way, the performance is a generator of responses that the listener learns to give. From 
this perspective, the psychology of communication in music performance should explain 
how those behaviours are generated in terms of the descriptions of the composition (and 
the modifications generated while performing). The experimental psychology of music has 
concerned itself with gathering empirical evidence to guarantee this. Here the same was 
done, in reference to the prolongational descriptions of the composition. 
Most of the evidence gathered in the studies in chapters 5 and 6 points in this 
direction. This evidence suggests that many aspects of performance and its communication 
to the listener are susceptible to the adoption of a format that matches the generative 
paradigm, but it also sent a warning signal as to the range of influence this perspective can 
offer the problem. 
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In the first place, the role the prolongational structure can play in performance and 
communication seems to be associated with a personal and original search for the musical 
structure’s expressive meaning and its accomplishment in performance. Certainly, the 
problem emerges from the idiographic concern of interpretation in performance. When 
examining performances from a global perspective, analysing, for example, average 
behaviours, many behaviours were shown as fitting rules. However, as the examination 
became more individualized, codifying the performers’ actions according to nomothetic 
statements became more difficult. In these cases, expressive resources seemed to be 
associated to different intentions. 
Concomitantly, the bond between the peculiarities of the musical work as derived 
from its structural analysis and the performer’s actions was viewed as very sophisticated. 
Performers’s reflections about the piece are logically included in performances, but this 
inclusion is hardly ever perceived as banal or trivial. On the contrary, such an 
accomplishment always tends to be highly idiosyncratic. Musical structure is not 
considered as normative, nor as triggering serial actions according to pre-established 
guidelines, but rather as an excuse to organise such actions, a frame to fit the ideas into. In 
this way, structural ideas shape the performance context in which performance actions 
acquire coherence. As a result, the same action can work in different ways in different 
performative contexts. For that reason the coherence of the performance arises from the 
establishment of contextual (structural and microstructural) relations. Thus, the idea of a 
determinist relationship between structure and performance falters, producing the need to 
inquire into other kinds of relations that take into account the criticisms held against 
objectivism in performance by contemporary musicology, apart from explaining those 
contextual relations and the way in which each action affects the contextual meaning. 
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Secondly, from a reception perspective, those studies also showed the power of the 
generative paradigm to partially explain the results. According to the classic 
communicational scheme, listeners are the last link in a chain. In this sense, one expects 
them to display some behaviour that may allow inferring the way in which they understand 
the music. The segmentation task seemed to be closer to the understanding of structural 
rather than microstructural aspects. Thus, the idea that performance can elicit different 
structural representations only found weak evidence. The data gathered here could not 
totally explain the role of prolongation in the listener’s representational experience. Music 
meaning in affective, conceptual, anthropomorphic and kinetic terms would also seem to 
be highly personal and unrelated to performative interventions concerning the piece’s 
prolongational structure. Nevertheless, it would seem that performance certainly impacts 
on selected aspects of the time experience. This was the path followed from chapter 7 in 
this thesis. 
11.3 A twist in perspective 
The contradiction between the idiographic tendency that encourages musicological 
concerns and the nomothetic demand that the psychological interest yearns for, threatened 
to lead us towards epistemological scepticism. Perhaps that same scepticism led Adorno 
(1958) to withdraw from any psychological approach to music. Nevertheless, this 
contradiction is not far from certain common procedures that performers employ in 
musical praxis: music performance itself is contradictory in the same sense. When 
performers play scales and arpeggios in order to develop their technique, they are 
implicitly adopting a nomothetic, generalized perspective of the technical resources. But at 
the same time they know that each scale or arpeggio will be settled according to the 
context in which it appears, the circumstances in which they must be played, etc. In short, 
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they know that they have to solve each obstacle in a particular way. As performers, they 
have learned to weigh the general and the particular in the conformation of their own 
thought. 
The current scene also, with such a demanding and complex market for the 
performative arts, in which the demand for originality on the one hand, and a delicate 
balance between indulging and provoking the audience on the other, setting the trend in 
which there are no trends, has forced the performer to communicate with listeners beyond 
considering them as a mere depository of their message. 
Against this background, the toughest demand is placed on the performer-creator as 
opposed to performer–recreator. This fact led to the reconsideration of the relation 
between performance and composition in order to explore further a possible role for the 
prolongational structure (of the composition) in performance. The idea is that the 
composition is a material that performers have in order to construct their work. It is used 
concurrently with other materials in a dialectical relationship. The notion of composition 
as material replaces the classic concept of version by that of transposition. In this way, the 
problem may be seen from another perspective. 
Firstly, this new perspective incorporates non-sound elements into communication, 
and assigns an important role in music performances to both gestural and bodily 
components as well as the context of performance. 
Secondly, for a performer considered as a maker in a context in which meaning is 
the result of a process, studying communication following the classic information 
transmission paradigm proved not to be useful. Thus, the communication paradigm as 
dance opened a promissory perspective. At the same time, the study of this 
368 
communicational paradigm guided the search for indispensable ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic aspects to understand communication in psychological terms. 
The results of the experiments reported in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that a very 
important aspect of the performance experience (both for performers and listeners) is 
related to the problems of the performance’s temporal configuration. 
A structuralist perspective of music psychology, as focused on the description of 
stimuli as a basis to account for processes in which an objective structure of the stimulus is 
the content of the experience, appeared to be insufficient for understanding the role of 
prolongation. On the contrary, the results of those experiments seemed to follow Ricouer 
in showing that the work structurally conforms with the purpose of offering the listener “a 
set of temporal experiences to be shared” (Ricouer 1984, p. 536). Therefore, new modes of 
thinking the content of communication were explored, in which the temporal configuration 
occupies a more important place. Thus the problem of the narrativity of performance was 
approached, since narrative understanding is achieved from the time configuration in the 
musical experience (Ricoeur 1985). Narrative understanding has to do with the 
configuration of a temporal whole rather than as a logical whole. 
In addition, within the metaphor of dance as a communicational model, the 
temporal configuration is central. For that reason, musical performance was reasonably 
viewed as an intersubjective experience in which the crossmodal temporal experience is 
the basis for the mutuality bond between the partakers of such experience. Considering 
communication from the second person’s point of view, the intersubjective approach is 
advantageous since the semantic problem is removed from the debate. In this frame, 
morphological and syntactic aspects as the contents of communication are enough. It is 
thus possible to think about a kind of communication that, as in early childhood, is not 
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subordinated to language. The difference between verbal and musical communication (or, 
more broadly, artistic communication) is the fact that between the maker and the receiver 
there is no message but an object for contemplation (Deliège 2000). 
The empirical research of the chapter 10 of this thesis was undertaken in this 
context. A composition was taken and certain of its structural aspects (particularly part of 
its prolongational structure and certain interesting aspects of the motivic and formal 
articulation at the surface level) were analysed together with other contextual aspects. The 
analysis of a very unusual transposition of that composition (that of Polansky in his film, 
The Pianist) served to show the very concept of transposition and the dialectic relation 
between structure and realization (or between composition and performance). At the same 
time, different resources put into play for the temporal configuration could be observed. 
The same idea guided the analysis of the 5 performances seen as transpositions. One of 
them, Kissin’s performance, clearly seemed to take part of the prolongational structure as 
one of the materials for its realization. The affinity between Polansky’s and Kissin’s 
transpositions consisted of (among other things) the use of the prolongational structure as 
crucial material in the configuration of the work’s time. This affinity seemed to be 
perceived by the listeners when judging the similarity between the film’s scene and the 
piano performances. 
There are three important aspects of this experience that allow one to discuss some 
of the proposed theoretical questions. The first is the notion of composition as material and 
its realization from the dialectic of the materials. This notion leads to another twist in 
current performance theory, according to which any ontological distinction between a 
work’s different forms of existence does not exist, because there exists no original (Cook 
2003). On the contrary, from this perspective they are not different forms of existence but 
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different works, with their own tensions, created from certain common materials. Since 
always there are other different involved materials, the dialectical synthesis is always 
different. For that reason, they are understood as different works. The idea that the concept 
of material allows the establishment of different genitive relationships between 
composition and performance was viewed in chapter 7. This relationship, being dialectical, 
is not opposed to the most conspicuous performative issues. As seen in chapter 3 and 
reedited throughout the rest of the thesis, many performative problems have to do with 
involving the body. For Nick Kaye (mentioned by Cook 2003 p.209) that involving of the 
body appears as a place of resistance to the text, as an opposition to the desire for depth. 
From our point of view, the body does not annul depth; instead, this resistance is thought 
to be manifested in tensions between the bodily and the desire for depth dialectically 
solved when such a desire is one of the resources used in the narrative’s construction. 
Kissin and Polansky did that. But that dialectic synthesis implies avoiding the linear 
resolution of playing from the middleground, which according to Cook is the Schenkerian 
rule for performance, because it is not about producing a “more or less transparent 
revelation of the underlying structure” (Cook 2003, p. 209). There is no reason to think 
that Polansky can be interested in that. But, in the same way, it is possible to argue that 
Kissin is also indifferent to it. What they do is use the middleground in order to create their 
own speech and imagine their own story. 
This leads to the second point, related to the creation of the story. The results of the 
empirical research presented in chapter 10 advocate that performance may be understood 
as a way of narrating music. Following Bruner (1986) (who, in turn, follows Iser and 
Todorov) it is possible to think that performance offers the listener three key aspects for 
producing meaning guided by the composition: (i) presupposition, according to which the 
performer’s actions are taken as implicit meanings; (ii) subjectivation, such that the 
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performance emerges not as a truth of the reality but as point of view on that reality; and 
(iii) multiple perspective, in that the facts can be considered from manifold perspectives 
(and therefore performed in multiple ways). According to Bruner, these features 
subjunctivize reality (subjunctive in the sense of possibility, desire and unconsummated 
reality). The performer (as narrator) takes reality (in this case the work’s musical structure 
that is a part of that reality since there are many other materials in play) and transforms it, 
or subjunctivizes it. That is to say, those transformations cause a non-indicative (explicit) 
reality but a subjunctive (possible) one. Listeners are aware of the transformations and 
assign meaning to them, capturing and using them, and also transforming them into their 
own transformations according to their own cultural perspective of that reality. In this 
thesis’ experiment, it was seen that throughout this entire process of meaning, the temporal 
organization, as an important transformation, seems to be central. The performer and the 
listener take control of this subjunctive reality. It is not a reality imposed from the outside, 
but is created according to its own necessities arising from the balance between outside 
and inside (following Goehr and the notion of playing from the inside or outside (1992), 
this balance could also be understood as a dynamic balance between the supportive and 
expressive functions as seen in chapter 2.) 
This idea leads to the third aspect, which is related to the way in which this 
temporality is shaped and shared in the intersubjective experience, namely the crossmodal 
process. The experience reported in chapter 10 concerns Cook’s (1990) distinction between 
musical and musicological listening, and its relation with crossmodality. If the directions of 
the listening test had been oriented to attending to the particularities of the performance 
while observing the video, a musicological listening of the sound track would have 
prevailed. However, a more open, “neutral” direction allowed a musical listening focused 
on the time configuration. This “neutrality” solved the crucial problem in the chapter 6 
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experiments concerning the types of representations that prolongation could provoke – 
remembering that that issue lead to designing an experiment according to four categories 
of adjectives and to realize a content analysis according to those categories, assuming they 
could capture the kinds of representations emerging from the listening. When abandoning 
the representational problem, proposing a musical listening as opposed to a musicological 
one, the methodological problem was solved and a psychological explanation of the 
prolongation could be defined as a resource for the imaginative activity that gives rise to 
the configuration of time in narration. Musical listening has an available place for the 
crossmodal experience, whereas the musicological one is narrower in this sense. If listeners 
codify a message in semantic terms (Sloboda 1985) this means that when receiving certain 
information, it is processed and stored according to the meaning it has for the person who 
perceives it. Thus, the musical experience is transferred to other representational modes 
and often characterized in metaphoric terms, extremely affected by crossmodal 
considerations. This is what Reybrouck (2003) calls semanticity strategies, which are used 
by the listener to give semantic weight to the sound input (in this case certain performative 
characteristics, rubato, dynamics, etc.). Thus, the information listened to during the filmic 
sequence was processed and stored in semantic terms. Therefore, the listeners remembered 
the meaning of the sequence and soon matched it up with the semantically more 
compatible sound sequence (the piano performance). When remembering, the listeners do 
not reconstruct the auditory sequence but its meaning. For this, they are able to add or to 
remove attributes from their representation. Thus, the expressive attributes tend to 
complete the gaps in meaning left when the more complex significant attributes of the 
filmic sequence disappeared. 
As we have seen, narrating implies breaking away from the real time of the narrated 
events. This implies creating a new temporal logic. It is possible to think that new temporal 
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logics provide new narrative elements to the expressive performance, and this is the case 
with Kissin’s performance. The listener is well-disposed to understand those new temporal 
logics (Ricoeur 1985). Thus, expressive music performance has a clear fictional function 
because it breaks with real time (the time of the events in the world), the time fastened to 
the structure, and introduces a time that belongs to the performance in particular, making 
use of other interactive timing mechanisms. Those mechanisms are the ones that, in 
particular, remain during the ontogenesis of fictional capacities (Shifres and Español 2004; 
chapter 8). The use of a given timing mechanism instead of another one would affect the 
temporal experience. 
In narrative, the shaping of the plot has to do with enriching narrative time. That 
enriching takes place in the split between the narrating time and the narrated time. The 
conjunction/disjunction of these two times, in other words, its tensions, alignments and 
misalignments, synchronies and asynchronies, project a fictional experience of time. We 
have seen that in music performance it is also possible to split both times. When playing a 
rhythmical pattern, for example, the temporal structure of that pattern constitutes the 
narrated time, whereas the real time of the performance is the narrating time, on which the 
performer has the power to operate. This produces conjunction/disjunction, 
adjustment/maladjustment or synchrony/asynchrony tensions that project a temporal 
experience that is not real but fictional (Ricoeur 1985). It is fictional because it does not 
obey chronological time. The results of the intuitive time estimation test of Chopin’s 
Prelude in b minor presented in chapter 6 show that the experience of time depends not 
only on the macro structural characteristics of the musical work, but also on the tensions 
that take place in the flow of time between the different micro temporal components. 
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Following Ricouer (1984; p. 494), there is a phenomenological distinction between 
the fact of playing and what it is played: “any performance is playing something that is not 
the performance itself”. The possibility of distinguishing between the time of that which is 
played and the time used in playing it, emerges from this phenomenological difference. 
11.4 Rubato’s expressive power 
Interestingly, the expressive attribute with the most power to provoke the above discussed 
meaning seems to be timing. In this section some emergent points about the issues 
approached in this thesis that allow the formulation of a hypothesis about the triple genesis 
of this expressive resource will be discussed. 
11.4.1 The affective processing of time 
Until now, cognitive science has not been able to explain our experience of time (and, 
therefore, of time in music) beyond explaining some aspects of the demarcation of time 
subordinated to the attention, memory and expectation processes according to 
predetermined temporal windows. Nevertheless, the experience of time (and, therefore, the 
experience of time in music) includes more than this demarcation and its content depends 
on the way in which time is structured within it (Reybrouck 2004, Ricouer 1985). It was 
also seen (chapter 8) that the time configuration is crucial in the emotional and 
communicational world. In addition, certain important abilities in that emotional and 
communicational world (such as the synchronization of action with another person) 
directly depend on the time configuration, eliciting, for example, different behavioural 
interactive time mechanisms (see p. 269). Many of the problems of current performances 
of 19th century music for solo instruments are precisely these time problems. 
But, on the other hand, cognitive science has made a most important contribution to 
the study of these problems by making operative the notion of expression through the 
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concept of expressive deviation (chapter 4). This notion is vital to an understanding of the 
way in which both performers and listeners operate with time in expressive performance. 
As a starting point, it is possible to consider that human beings are neurologically and 
psychologically prepared to understand the subtle temporal variations that separate the 
time of the world, known time, the predictably structured time from the time of the 
particular experience, the time of the musical performance (Wittmann and Pöppel 
1999/2000, Trevarthen 1999/2000). But, in addition, previous experiences 
(phylogenetically and ontogenetically speaking) have prepared humans to give meaning to 
those temporal contrasts in emotional terms. In other words, those temporal structures are 
part both of the emotional interchanges with the world and of the possibility of sharing that 
time with other people (involving “sharing an action”, “joint acting”) during the musical 
experience (Shifres 2007). This preparation is very simple. It is related to an evolutionary 
line in interactive behavioural timing mechanisms that goes from a reaction time 
mechanism, according to which people act in response to another’s action, towards 
predictive mechanisms (Merker 2002a). The first of these mechanisms is a mechanism by 
familiarity, according to which human beings act by virtue of the previous knowledge they 
have of the other person’s typical behavioural patterns. The second is a mechanism based 
on an underlying pulse, according to which human beings act by adhering to a metric 
structure that is extrinsic to those in interaction. When a person listens to metric music he 
is, in a certain way, adhering to the underlying pulse of the performance. The temporal 
experience is strongly related to such a metric structure, and by it, it is possible to imagine 
what has already happened, process what is happening and anticipate what is going to 
happen. 
The disruption of the metric constraints implied in the use of rubato (expressive 
timing) forces the listener to engage more primitive interactive behavioural timing 
376 
mechanisms (Shifres 2006). In particular, the interactive mechanism of reaction time is 
important here. This mechanism not only refers to early interactive experiences but also 
allows outlining an activation profile of the other’s behaviour in time (vitality affects) that 
can convey dynamic emotional information. Thus, music performance is structurally 
shaped with the purpose of offering the listener a set of temporal experiences “to share”. In 
this way, the performance itself defines an intentionality of shared experiences, being just 
like early intersubjective experiences in that they are temporally organized. Thus rubato 
contributes to a unified emotional experience of time in music performance. 
Although it would seem that no interactive behaviour exists on the part of the 
listener, it is important to consider that the key to the consequences of such subtle temporal 
microvariations on the successful understanding of the artwork lies in the particular way of 
experiencing them. According to Clarke (1998), music performance has a particularly 
somatic character. Therefore, it is possible to hypothesize that its communication will 
involve some somatic aspects. When understanding the somatic nature of music 
performance “it may be possible to come to a better understanding of why it is that the 
apparently insignificant transformations that the performer brings to a piece of music 
achieve such important qualitative changes” (Clarke 1998 p. 89) in the listener. This is 
related to the process that some researchers term kinetic perception (Keil, in Clayton et al. 
2004), by which both the perceptions and expectations governing the actions of a person 
who is (only) listening (neither playing, nor speaking, nor producing sounds) are 
coordinated by what he is listening to. 
11.4.2 Rubato as a culture’s expression 
To investigate the ontogenetic and phylogenetic precursors of rubato does not imply a 
presumption of universality. It is almost axiomatic that rubato as an expressive resource is 
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a cultural construction belonging to a very specific musical context. The modes of musical 
expression are part of stylistic choices (Blanco 2002, Hatten 2001). Tonal musical culture 
selected and developed this resource from many other available varieties of expressive 
means to develop. The historical genesis of such choices could be hypothesized. 
Verbal language and movement (gesture and dance) are two cognitive domains 
intersecting with music in relation to the organization of the temporal and sound 
continuums. However, Western Art Music gave rise to the development of musical 
manifestations that clearly distanced themselves – at least in an explicit way- from both 
language and movement. Probably, in order to achieve this, music needed to make both 
time and frequency, two continuous dimensions, discrete (Merker 2002b). In this way, 
WAM can be understood, as Merker (2002b) proposed, as a self-diversifying system (Abler 
1989). A self-diversifying system presents discrete elements belonging to at least one 
dimension. The discrete units are atomic, it is not possible to mix them, and they can only 
be combined. The idea is that a small number of discrete units can give rise to infinite 
combinations, providing an enormously diversifying power to the system. Natural 
languages and genetics are known as typical examples of self-diversifying systems. Merker 
argues that it is possible to understand music as such since it presents at least one 
discretised dimension – frequency and/or time. 
The use of rubato and other transgression means of rigid metric patterns are not 
contrary to this affirmation since the effect of these resources depends exactly on the local 
contrasts that such resources accomplish with the established discrete proportional units. In 
other words, without the possibility of adhering to an underlying pulse (as a substrate of 
the discrete variable), understanding rubato as an expressive resource would be impossible. 
Other structural dimensions of music (for example the dynamic dimension) do not appear 
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as discrete. Sound intensities (dynamics) are used in the same way, as an expressive 
dimension, both in music and in language and therefore do not define a sound phenomenon 
per se as music. For that reason one says that such dimensions do not define a 
characterization of music. 
The co-action of both discretised dimensions (frequency and time) locates the 
historiogenesis of a particular musical practice: the common practice - according to the 
English speaking musicological description. This also agrees with the moment in which the 
proportional system of music writing was enforced in a more normative way on the 
compositional process (due to the definitive elimination of the linguistic element – text – 
from music) and when the writing system is filled with “black lists of liberties” (Deliège 
2000). During the period of the common practice, the temporal dimension, the 
performance timing, became the main expressive resource in musical communication. In 
this context, the continuous dimensions reinforced the expressive function of those 
temporal domains (now absent) that showed intersecting areas with music (language and 
movement). For example, the Chopinesque rubato emerged clearly from a style that owes a 
great deal to the operatic Italian style, but in the absence of text. In this way, rubato 
appears as a remnant of the lost verbal component’s use of time. Therefore, two modalities 
of time remain in those expressive practices, a discrete time and a continuous time. The 
result is a disruption of the metric constraint that depends on the discretisation producing 
that expressive effect, because it gives rise to a confrontation between the time of the 
musical events in the world and the time of the musical experience in the expressive music 
performance. On this matter, the evidence gathered in the experiment presented in chapter 
10 showed that rubato contributes to the meaning of music in absence of other referential 
attributes (i.e. text, image, etc.) 
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The uncoupling of language from music would mark a historiogenetic landmark in 
the expression of instrumental practice in Western musical culture. Those less specific 
characteristics (that music shares with other domains, like language and movement) are the 
key to considering a performance as expressive, since they are generally more universal in 
communicating expressive content. Put more simply, rubato serves to communicate 
feelings when speaking, doing music, moving, etc. Besides, they are present from an early 
stage in our affective life. 
None of this means that every expressive resource in music works in this way. On 
the contrary, it is simply a hypothesis about the way in which western musical culture 
assigns expressive meaning to music performance. This way has to do with a particular use 
of time that human beings have developed throughout the phylogenesis for communication 
in general. This special use of time was not kept by other musical cultures because they 
have either not needed it or did not intend to communicate affection or because they 
continue adhered to other domains, which make use of those resources (for example 
language or movement, as in song and dance). During the historiogenesis, selective, 
elaborative and transmission processes take place linked to the ways of discriminating, 
learning, memorizing and reproducing music that are proper to each culture. As music is a 
self-diversifying system, this gives rise to immense dispersion throughout the historical 
processes. 
11.4.3 The tension between the world’s time and the 
artwork’s time 
The time of the musical events in the world is marked in the listener’s experience by a set 
of more or less standardised musical structures for a given musical language. For example, 
in the classical style one can predetermine temporal cycles at the level of the musical 
phrase (for example, symmetrical phrases of 4 measures), of the metre (for example, the 
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periodicity of accents), and of the pulse (for example, the regular recurrence of the beat) 
among others. The events of the piece in music performance, on the contrary, are 
determined by their performance time. In other words, listeners contrast the time of the 
performance with the time of their life experiences, the structural time. And the narrative 
experience emerges from that tension. 
In other words, the notion of narration emerges from the conflict between the pre-
existing temporal configuration (in this case the composition’s time configuration, 
representing the time of the world) and the “re-figuration of the temporal experience by 
this constructed time” (Ricouer 1985, p. 115) (in this case the re-figuration of the listener’s 
time experience, representing what Ricouer denominates the time of the work). In this way, 
the temporal conflict introduced by rubato reinstates the narrative trait that music lost in 
becoming independent from language. 
In a Kantian sense, imagination generates a connective structure by which one has a 
coherent and unified experience throughout time. The narrative construction which the 
performer can realize from the composition, re-configuring its time, adds content to the 
music. Thus, rubato contributes to a unified narrative experience of time in music 
performance and, therefore, to the meaning of music. The great challenge of cognitive 
science regarding the time dimension is how to go from the notion of a succession of 
discrete units to a relational continuity, a whole that is more than a mere succession 
(Reybrouck 2004). This is a turning point in the current epistemological debate both in 
musicology and in music psychology. Classical cognitive science tends more towards the 
first. The culturalist perspective is more concerned with the second. In between them, 
music performance appears as a dynamic field in which both approaches may provide 
important contributions. 
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11.5 Final remarks  
Finally, a fair characterization of the intended contribution of this thesis is necessary in 
order to avoid false expectations and exaggerated conclusions. Probably, both the 
musicological and psychological perspectives have been left incomplete, still awaiting too 
many answers. But this is so because here the focus on the specific problems of music 
performance viewed from music performance itself is completed best. In other words, the 
questions asked have found some answers that are possibly more useful to the artist than to 
the researcher. In this sense, I must be frank. 
At the beginning of this investigation, the topic was clearly a problem of the 
cognitive psychology of music: the question of prolongation’s cognitive reality; I looked 
for signs of cognitive reality in performance. Nevertheless, in strict terms, this problem is 
far from my current concerns; it is a problem of the modernity related to the positivist 
paradigm in the field of music performance. Throughout this thesis, I have changed the 
focus in order to obtain a broader understanding of the role that prolongational structure, as 
a strong idea derived from music theory, may have in the peculiar communication that 
takes place when playing music with and for another. The interest then changed towards 
understanding the potential that the concept of prolongation had, modelled particularly 
from the voice leading perspective, for imagining the performative artwork, giving rise, in 
performance, to a particular temporal configuration, a key aspect of its communication. In 
other words, I simply tried to analyse whether prolongation, as an idea, may give way to a 
particular temporal configuration in performance and whether in sharing this time a new, 
original and distinctive experience may emerge between performers and listeners. The 
evidence of the crossmodal experience of music (both in performance and listening) 
supports the argument that in shared musical experiences people do not share notes but a 
kind of time configuration shaped by the notes, as well as many other elements. The 
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strength of the established bond in that communication is due to that particular, unique and 
unrepeatable time configuration. Undoubtedly, that was the strength of the bond I felt with 
my friends that time, when playing Schumann’s Ich denke dein together. 
In an epistemology based on the notion of music as performance, the place of music 
analysis and the analytical models cannot be the same as that occupied in a musicology 
concerned with scores. The analytical models cannot be taken as the models of music, and 
they will have to be considered in terms of their relevance to some experiential aspect. In 
this case, the Schenkerian model’s value cannot be evaluated outside this epistemology. 
According to Cook (1989): “If a Freudian explanation acquires its validity through being 
accepted by the patient, a Schenkerian explanation is validated when its reader accepts it 
as a satisfying account of the music in question” (p. 128). In this way, I could add here that 
in accepting this explanation, the reader can find a pillar on which he or she can 
imaginatively build an interpretation (which may be materialized in a performance) 
according to a particular narrative that gives rise to a particular narration time. Thus, in the 
context of carrying out a performance, musical analysis is involved in the handling of the 
material. From this perspective and contrarily to what happens in the frame of a strictly 
musicological epistemology, the material cannot really be questioned in terms of truth but 
rather in terms of effectiveness, coherence, potentiality, beauty, anything but truth and 
falseness. Undoubtedly, there was no problem of truth in that memorable Russian pianist’s 
performance of the Chopin etude. There were issues of beauty, coherence and 
verisimilitude. People who thought of this performance in terms of truth left the concert 
hall that night in an outrage: “Chopin must not be played like that!”; a typical objectivist 
expression. 
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In that sense, Schenkerian theory offers a flexible frame to imagine music. This is 
probably what made it so attractive for studies in music performance, because, in spite of 
its rhetoric, it represents a way of understanding without prescribing. It is a kind of “to 
open the door to go out and play”. Other more normative theories (such as cognitively 
oriented theories, GTTM and TTPS in particular) tend to reduce the game (the possibility of 
creating from imagination within the framework given by the theoretical configuration) 
with their own regulated procedure. 
This flexibility also allows for the notion of depth proposed by the theory to adapt 
itself to the historical necessities of depth exhibited by different performative traditions. 
Romantic and modern performers share the idea that there is something deep to be 
discovered. It was said here that this is compatible with the notion of depth of the musical 
structure and with the particular idea of performance value both perspectives use: the idea 
that what is deep is valuable. On the contrary, from a postmodern perspective the 
performer does not discover but create. That which is deep takes part in the performance’s 
creation, and therefore, does not contradict what is superficial; they are necessarily 
integrated in the work’s creative process. The opposition between imagining the deep 
structural levels and the necessity of committing oneself physically on the surface level is 
the dynamic on which the performative work is created. For some scholars this dynamic is 
naturally dramatic, because it can integrate the content to be narrated with the physical and 
emotional dynamics of the performance (Schmalfeldt 1985). 
***** 
At the end of this entire journey I cannot avoid returning to that spring afternoon, when an 
incredibly fine thematic counterpoint emerged at the end of the Chopin etude that I 
believed familiar, but that at that moment appeared before me as though unheard-of. And 
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that scene appears again in my memory in virtue of a mistake I made when writing the 
introduction to this work. When making the graph of figure 1.1 (p. 5) I wrote what appears 
in figure 11.1. 
Figure 11.1. Chopin’s etude in C sharp minor. bars 60-63 
Of course, when I sat at the piano and tried to play that idea, nothing that had to do 
with that really aesthetic experience could be heard. Then I noticed my mistake and 
corrected it. Nevertheless, it was not a naïve mistake. I let myself be carried away by the 
logic of the music analysis that marked my theoretical musical formation, by the logic of 
objectivist musicology. The identified relation is logical, objective, but does not have 
anything to do with the beauty of the counterpoint my teacher had shown me. In turn, that 
song that had been uncovered, the one of notes g4#-c4#-e4 at measure 63, does not resist 
any logical argument. It is integrated by notes that come from different voices. For this 
reason each one appears logically linked to different structures. My teacher had not 
analysed the piece in logical terms in order to play what she played. She created that 
dialogue that Chopin had not (or he had at least not shown explicitly). And she created it 
surpassing issues that seemed to have been imposed by Chopin: the metric structure, the 
linearity of the voices, etc. Nevertheless, my teacher did not create anything. Chopin had 
left the materials of his creation there, and she took them and just as the sculptor models 
the face of an angel from the humidity of clay, she created that dialogue, that tired and 
desolate imitation, she modelled it with those materials. She did not interpret what Chopin 
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had written; she used what he had written to imagine her own piece. She was able to 
transcend the performance as an interpretative act to restore it as an imaginative act. Like 
the young lady from San Nicolás, she was able to “open the door to go out and play.” 
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Appendix I: Prolongation in music theory 
I.1 Prolongation and voice leading 
I.1.1 The original programme  
In 1922, in his work Kontrapunkt, Heinrich Schenker proposed the development of the 
Fernhören or long distance listening: in counterpoint, “the harmony of the strong beat is as 
if it were still present in the weak beat, as if it would continue sounding” (quoted by 
Martínez 1999, p. 47). From this point of view comes the idea that dissonance prolongs 
and emphasizes consonance, producing an increase in the activity of consonance: a non-
acoustically present musical event however remains active. In this way, Schenker started to 
formalize his idea of prolongation in common with his development of the linear concept 
of music. Already in his previous works (Harmonielehre; Kontrapunkt I), Schenker had 
explained the structural hierarchy of chords as a result of the linear elaboration: a chord 
arising from the mode that another chord extends in time until a new triad of similar 
functional definition is established, is understood as of lower hierarchy, and is simply 
considered as the result of the logical movement of the voices to reach the new triad 
(Horton 1998). The voice leading develops the scale degrees and generates the triads, 
which for that reason are considered of lower structural status and of contrapuntal origin. It 
would seem as if in this stage of his production, Schenker was worried about 
differentiating what alludes to harmony - as an abstraction - from what occurs from the 
mode in which the voices are led in a real manner. Notwithstanding, this distinction is just 
accomplished in Schenker’s older works, when he developed a key concept: the linear 
progressions. A linear progression is an a priori abstract configuration (although 
sometimes it can explicitly be present in the musical surface) that consists of a scalar 
movement, generally downward, frequently filling the intervals within the triad (octave, 
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fifth or third) (Figure I.1). These linear progressions are abstractions of the musical surface 
that (i) reduce variability in the melodic path to a single direction (as we said, generally 
descendent), and (ii) define the hierarchy of the notes occupying the scale degrees within 
this plot. Linear progressions are the most abstract expression of tonal music movement 
and are responsible for tonal coherence in the musical piece. 
For Schenker, a linear progression is a mode of aesthetic assessment; it is the 
expression of general musical coherence reached as a result of a dialectic relationship 
between contrasting elements (steps vs. chordal intervals; consonance vs. dissonance, etc). 
Together with its contribution to the psychologization of the aesthetic field, the 
linear progression prepares the scenery for the mental operations responsible for the 
experience of the non adjacent links that guarantee the coherence of the piece in 
psychological terms: mental retention (see chapter 3). While mentally retaining the initial 
sound of the linear progression, a tension that reinforces and intensifies the connection is 
established (Schenker 1935; Martínez 1999). 
Accordingly, the notion of prolongation can be analysed from three different points 
of view, which in Schenker’s work are permanently associated: as a technique (both 
analytic and compositional), as an aesthetic value, and as a psychological principle. In 
regard to the first dimension, Schenker’s mature works further developed the concept of 
prolongation, redefining the harmony-counterpoint relationship as two faces of the same 
coin that engender the musical structure (Horton 1998). Harmony is essentially understood 
in terms of the external voice leading (bass and soprano), which at the same time is 
Figure I.1. Characteristic linear progressions.(From Cadwallader and Gagné, 
1998, p.79) 
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oriented by that harmony. During this period, Schenker refined the idea of reduction as an 
analytical device based on the scrutiny of the effects of voice leading. From here on, he 
formulated a system of structural levels wherein the hierarchy of notes, already outlined in 
his previous works, is better distinguished. The construction of structural levels led him to 
apply the idea of hierarchy of notes, and the concept of prolongation itself, to a high degree 
in his work. It is interesting to observe that along with this extension of the hierarchy to the 
large scale of the work, hierarchical distinctions are progressively more comprehended in 
linear terms (counterpoint). Counterpoint is what allowed Schenker to understand and 
represent the linear processes in terms of which he could define the tonal role of each of 
the notes, and therefore its structural hierarchy. For that reason some authors see 
counterpoint itself as a representational device (Blasius 1996) that embodies the 
Auskomponierung process (composition and elaboration).  
Prolongation as an effect is a powerful tool for the characterization of successive 
structural levels: by definition the most abstract levels are the least prolonged ones. On the 
other hand, the musical surface is the result of consecutive prolongational elaborations of 
those more abstract levels. In this way, prolongation is for Schenker a technique that 
allows the derivation from the Ursatz - the most abstract and reduced level of the structure 
- of consecutive levels, progressively more concrete and prolonged. According to 
Schachter (1999), the greatest formalization of these techniques can be found in the 
description Schenker makes of middleground in the second part of Der Freie Satz. Even at 
risk of being extensive in the quotation, it is interesting to show the summary Schachter 
realizes about these techniques: 
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 “1. Prolongations of the bass including space-filling motions between I and 
the V above it and the appearance of two bass arpeggios under a Fundamental 
Line. 
2. Divisions of the Fundamental Structure. Schenker discusses two 
possibilities: interruption in the case of lines from 3 and 5, and the division of 
8-lines into 8-5, 5-1. 
3. Expansions and modifications of the Fundamental Line through modal mixture, the 
use of b2 (moll second), upper neighbor note, substitution (e.g. of 7 for 2), linear 
progressions, and arpeggiations. 
4. The panoply of voice-leading categories that Schenker devised to account 
for connections between voices and for manipulations of register, among these 
such well-known techniques as Übergreifem Untergreifen, Ausfaltung, and 
Koppelung (translated here as “reaching-over,” “motion from the inner 
voice,” “unfolding,” and “coupling”).” 
It is important to remember that all of this material can also appear at later 
levels; none of it is restricted to the first (…) Schenker does not offer any 
criteria for assigning the proper level to these prolongations. The omission is 
probably justified by the difficulty or even impossibility of discussing this issue 
in a general way – the relationships between levels will vary form piece to 
piece” (Schachter 1999; p.195) 
This summary demonstrates Schachter’s preoccupation (more than Schenker’s) for 
formalizing the techniques, a concern more related to the 60’s English speaking 
musicology field than to the 30’s German musicology. At the same time, he shows that the 
generalization of the prolongational techniques over all the structural levels is another 
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requirement of the derivations that Schenker’s ideas had more in the English speaking than 
in the original enunciation of the theory. This quote can be contrasted with the summary 
Schenker himself made in 1925 in Das Meisterwerk in der Musik about the role 
prolongation plays in his analytic system, its origin in counterpoint, its epistemological 
status and its aesthetic implications: 
“The natural idea of the triad, the artistic idea of composing out this sonority, 
the perfection achieved by transforming one sonority into many by means of 
voice-lea ding prolongations, the creation of form as a consequence of the 
Urlinie: all this goes a masterwork. Idea, perfection, masterwork are one 
concept: by achieving perfection, the masterwork partakes of the eternal life of 
the idea, it is elevated beyond all ages, it becomes timeless. 
Perfection is true life, a true eternity: in opposition to it stands non-perfection, 
no-fulfillment as an incapacity for life, ultimately as stagnation and death. 
However energetically fervently the non-fulfillers may set about their toil and 
strife, they do no partake of the eternal life of the idea: the withdraw from it, 
form themselves and from others.  
Merely to share in the masterwork is a truer life than to waste away in non-
fulfillment. In this sense, the masterwork, is the only path for those who have 
not had the calling. Today more than ever, in the darkness of stagnation, it is 
the only possible way out of the chaos and confusion, the only light that points 
towards the future. (Schenker 1925; p. I) 
In the Schenkerian system, prolongation is therefore much more than a 
compositional technique, an analytical device, or a structural component. With regard to 
this, the first important implication of the prolongation concept for contemporary 
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musicology is the revalorization of the relationship between linear development of the 
voice and the vertical consonance principle. As Cook (1990) stated, the Schenkerian view 
is sometimes seen as a revelation of the vocal sensibility of tonal western composers. This 
sensibility, which appears in the tendency of the voice to unfold, through a joint and 
directed move, within a relatively small tessitura, would have transferred from surface 
levels - in pre-tonal music- to the imaginative levels of large scale musical organization in 
tonal music (Cook 1990; p.98). But moreover, as it is possible to infer from the previous 
quote, the consequences of the prolongation concept are not restricted to the fields of 
music analysis and composition; it influences the evolution of aesthetic ideas and 
consequently - and of higher relevance here - penetrates the field of performance and 
music interpretation. 
I.1.2 The Schenkerian programme in North America 
Some of Schenker’s followers in the United States tried to insert his ideas in a context 
where the harmonic component of tonal music structure was the main academic concern. 
In this way they carried out a revision of traditional harmonic techniques from a linear 
point of view. Salzer (1962), in particular, elaborated his Structural Hearing theory as a 
pedagogical proposal relating the Schenkerian idea of prolongation to academic practice of 
harmony and ear training. From a theoretical point of view this approach can simply be 
understood as a strategy to place once again counterpoint at the centre of discussion, where 
harmony had gained supremacy. However, the understanding of prolongation from the 
prolonged chord notion allowed him to expand the concept of linearity itself and to 
incorporate a vertical dimension to the problem of music directionality. Thus, prolongation 
is not only the elaboration of lines but also the elaboration of harmonies. 
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Later, Salzer and Schalter (1969) treated the bi-dimensional (harmony and 
counterpoint) prolongation idea as a whole. An example of this endeavour is the idea of the 
applied dominant. The applied dominant prolongs the degree to which it has been applied, 
for which the prolongational function of the chord is defined by its harmonic functionality. 
This bi-dimension of the prolongation concept reaches a clear expression in the work of 
Forte and Gilbert (1982), in which the harmonic prolongation of a chord defines and 
simultaneously is defined - dialectically - by melodic prolongation. These authors mention 
that harmonic prolongation is easier to understand because it is directly related to the 
concept of stability in terms of consonance-dissonance. 
From the aesthetic perspective the intention of extending the notion of prolongation 
that Schenker had delineated beyond the natural borders of tonality (for example see 
Salzer 1962, Strauss 1987) implies abandoning the aesthetic dogma of the theory. 
However, parallel to this withdrawal - probably due to pragmatic reasons and ideological 
motivations - an intensification of the psychological side of theory is produced. Therefore, 
it is adapted to the post-behaviourist psychology that monopolized the English speaking 
world since the 1960s. 
In spite of its strong cognitive appeal, the linear nature of the Schenkerian proposal, 
in other words the idea of prolongational structure derived from the voice leading, was 
clearly approached in recent times from a cognitively-oriented proposal. Larson (1997) 
presented an explanation of cognitively oriented prolongation based on critical positions of 
the objectivism sustained by classical cognitive science (see chapter 2 –pp. 38 and ff.-, and 
chapter 3-pp.65 and ff.- for a discussion about the cognitive appeal of theory). More than 
basing his ideas on musicological and traditional psychological concepts (like for example 
those of Forte and Gilbert (1982), who based melodic prolongation on melodic diminution 
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- a concept coming from the ancient techniques of continuo bass and partimento from the 
17th century (Bustamante 2002) - and harmonic prolongation on the concept of 
consonance) he derives his ideas from the philosophy of experiential realism (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987). According to them, he attributes the origin of 
prolongation to the action of three Musical Forces: (i) Gravity, the tendency of an unstable 
note to descend, (ii) Magnetism, the tendency of an unstable note to move towards the 
nearest stable note, and (iii) Inertia, the tendency of a musical pattern to continue in the 
same way. These forces are defined by a certain stylistic context and frequently operate 
performing contradictory tendencies. The contextual stability of a note arises from the 
tensions generated by this contradiction. This concept opposes the notion of inherent 
stability, which is linked to the idea of stability that the objectivist musicological tradition 
has employed, and is related to the classical notions of absolute consonance of chords and 
notes. In contrast, a note is contextually stable when it is not possible to aurally perceive 
(Larson uses the word audiate analogous to visualize) a tendency of such note to move 
towards another note from the immediate context. For example in figure 3.1.a (p. 53), on 
the first a4 of bar 1, force of gravity would make that note tend to move to g4. However, 
inertia would make it to tend towards b4. As a result of the contradiction between these 
two forces tendency of movement is counterbalanced. According to magnetism a4 is stable 
since it is equidistant both to g4 and b4. In view of that, a4 is seen as locally stable. In such 
circumstances, the musical forces do not impulse the note towards any direction and the 
particular note assumes a more structural role: its trace keeps on. So, prolongation occurs 
since the beginning of the trace, and remains until the trace of that note is shifted by the 
trace of a new melodically more stable note. In the above mentioned example this happens 
in g4 of bar 2. Only at this point does progression take place; as the opposite of 
prolongation, progression is the passage of a prolonged note at a specific structural level to 
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another of the same structural level. Thus, for example an arpeggio can represent a chord, 
because each note keeps its trace until all the notes are heard (see appendix II for some 
psychoacoustic evidence for this). 
For Larson, although aspects such as harmonic rhythm, metre, harmony, etc, can 
contribute to listen to prolongation, they do not create it. Prolongation originates in trace 
shifts regarding to magnetism, inertia and gravity forces. The violation of these forces 
causes the expansion of the reference contexts wherein those forces operate. For example, 
in example 3.1, the violation of the tendency of g4 from bar 1.3 to follow f#4 expands the 
reference context of a4. That is to say, when these forces do not take place as expected, the 
trace searches for a note where the force can effectively operate, expanding in this way the 
referential context. It is as if the a4 from bar 1.3 could comprehend that the g4 immediately 
following is not the one that can carry out the proposed forces and therefore it projects 
towards the next g. 
Within this context, harmony is not a condition but an emergent property of the 
interaction of musical forces produced by the melodies. Prolongation, instead of depending 
on the differences between consonance and dissonance, or between the harmony and 
counterpoint rules, is prior to them. Thus, prolongation - and only prolongation - always 
establishes what note is heard as stable in a particular context. In other words, a note is a 
prolongation because it acts as prolongation (it tends, projects towards another). To hear a 
note as unstable means to hear it as embellishing a more stable note and, for that reason, as 
belonging to a more remote level of the structure. Within this background the elements of a 
deeper level of the hierarchical structure are “abstractions” more than “literal events 
selected from the surface”, although they are present in notation with the appearance of 
surface events. The note in itself is not what is prolonged, other than prolongation is an 
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abstract representation. Therefore it is irrelevant to establish which note is prolonged when 
it appears many times on surface. For example, in example 3.1 (p. 53), is a4 from bar 1.3 
the one which is prolonged? Or is it a4 from bar 1.4? Or are they both? For this approach 
these questions are irrelevant, while, as we will see, it is essential for the definition of other 
prolongational perspectives. 
Cohn and Dempster (1992) made an important contribution when characterizing the 
different ideas of hierarchy underlying the diverse theoretical traditions (particularly 
prolongational theories). They basically propose that a hierarchical system is inclusional 
when the elements that occupy the most comprehensive levels are not literally taken from 
the subordinate levels, but are abstractions of them. On the contrary, a hierarchical system 
is representational when the element from the most comprehensive level is literally taken 
from the subordinate level. Cohn and Dempster declare that Schenker is ambiguous when 
ascribing to one or another type of hierarchy. However, they make clear that inclusional 
hierarchy is what better characterizes the kind of heuristic that Schenker proposed. 
From an exclusively epistemological interest, this is one the most distinctive 
features of original Schenkerian theory: a tonal musical composition can be understood in 
terms of abstract representations. Each hierarchical level is an abstraction and not a piece 
of surface. The mechanisms by which those abstractions can be justified allow splitting key 
aspects of music surface (such as rhythm and metre) without harming the temporal nature 
of music. Simultaneously the process itself, because of its heuristic nature, legitimizes 
hermeneutic creativity. For this reason, despite the highlighted contribution, Cohn and 
Dempster’s (1992) proposal is extemporary. It is probable that the sense of hierarchy used 
by Schenker is related more to a Prussian military interpretation than to a computational 
proposal, like the one used by these authors. This approach lets Schenker talk about the 
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nature of hierarchic positions and affirm the supremacy in a prioristic terms. Cohn and 
Dempster’s proposal shows a computational concern not included, of course, in the 
original agenda. However, later, that concern was granted to the prolongation idea itself, 
giving rise to other prolongational perspectives that we will briefly analyse now. 
I.2 Prolongation and implication 
The Implication- Realization (IR) model proposed by Leonard B. Meyer (1973) and 
developed and systematized by Eugéne Narmour (1977, 1990, 1992) is a reductional 
model. Its strategy consists of using notational devices that contrast the music’s structural 
elements with the representation of music surface provided by the original score. Although 
its characterization is different to the Schenkerian tradition the model employs the 
prolongation idea. Here, prolongation is not seen as the Schenkerian Auskomponierung but 
as an example of the implication principles, according to which certain structural 
configurations imply others. Consequently, it is not possible to understand the extent of the 
idea of prolongation in the Meyerian theory without comprehending the concept of 
implication. The dialectic implication-realization relationship is linked to certain 
traditional dichotomies in the theoretical ideas: opening-closing, stability-instability, etc. 
For Meyer (1973) the implicative relationship is established when the events in the music 
surface are presented in such way that they cause convincing inferences about their 
previous connections and about the ways in which they could continue by achieving the 
stability condition or closing condition. 
Although we could say that some of the principles Meyer assumed have a clear 
Schenkerian inspiration, his intention is openly more psychological, and that is why he 
intends his statements to develop beyond the limits of a style or an exclusive music 
practice. However, he soon describes the rules for which these principles are applied in a 
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particular way to a particular style. The general implicative principles are consequently 
limited by stylistic restrictions that in some extent work as a priori configurations 
(established by the stylistic practice) whose dominion in the heuristic of analysis is not 
very different to the linear progressions in the Schenkerian scheme. It is interesting to 
appreciate that both programmes have similar motivations and concerns: while Meyer 
makes explicit his concern about the problem of unity and coherence in composition 
explicit, Schenker talks about the piece as a whole and the exegesis of tonal coherence. For 
this reason it is quite suggestive that both proposals encompass the piece’s time 
configurations in those a prioristic configurations, in as much as they establish the limits of 
the structure. As Cook (1987a) mentions, “In both cases the analysis is saying why it is 
appropriate for the music to end where and how it does” (p.75). This aspect regarding the 
problem of time configuration in performance is particularly interesting (see Chapter 9). 
Within these conditions an unstable event produces an implication. The realization 
of such an implication is not necessarily immediate and may take place after other events, 
with implicative nature, are presented. These events are understood here as prolongation. 
According to this, more than just prolonging an event, they prolong an implication without 
adding an implicative function themselves. For example, in a pattern of implicative notes 
asking for realization, prolongation results from keeping the effect of the notes of the 
pattern until realization is reached (sometimes, in order to reach the realization, the notes 
that that indicate the path through which the line must move until reaching such realization 
are also prolonged). For Meyer, the most important difference with any aspect of the 
Schenkerian theory is that the implication patterns are mainly determined by the rhythmic 
impulse. Tension and relaxation, stability and instability, etc, are not only determined by 
leading voice and tonal concerns, but mainly by differences between weak and strong 
events that lead to thetic and anacrustic impulses. If the rhythmic impulse asks for 
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completion, then the note of such an impulse will be prolonged until reaching the 
realization within the proposed pitch pattern. 
This does not mean that Meyer is not paying attention to the voice leading. The 
analytical examples that he presents allow us to appreciate that his concept of prolongation 
is also based on the notion of the voice’s linear development. However, in this concept 
there is a series of principles that rule voice leading and determine the hierarchic structure 
status of an event that are new. These principles are: (i) the agreement with metric 
structure; (ii) the implicative power of the note, or how much a note implies a certain 
melodic motion; (iii) the goal function of a structural motion of the note; (iv) the structural 
importance obtained by an event in a previous presentation that makes the event maintain 
its acquired status although it has lost the source of that status (for example an event that in 
its first presentation emerges in a strong beat and then repeats in a weak metrical position, 
through repetition maintains its structural status); (v) the prominence of certain note 
obtained by a set of features (pitch, duration, dynamics, register, etc.) (Meyer 1973). 
The relative prominence of the events produces a hierarchy. But the prolongational 
hierarchy appears only vaguely here. Actually, the events that lead to prolongations do not 
seem to organize in a totally hierarchic way and prolongations can bifurcate or converge - 
the convergence of two implication patterns lead to a greater prominence of the event. 
Briefly, within this background convergence does not only depend on the abstract linear 
components that result from the voice leading arrangement in terms of strict counterpoint, 
but that also convey rhythmic-harmonic components of the musical surface. 
For Meyer, similar to the Schenkerian tradition, prolongation is understood as a 
structure-ornament opposition. However the clarification of this relationship takes place 
from the music surface to the deep structure, through a reductional process, and not the 
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other way round, as Schenker understood it. Meyer and Narmour’s interest centres on the 
surface level and not on underlying levels. Thus, the relevant information for the process 
achievement comes from the same surface, and the process in itself starts from an 
exhaustive observation of that surface. The musical surface is heuristically examined, but 
neither Meyer nor Narmour (1990, 1992) - who intended to enunciate principles tending to 
formalize the main concepts of the theory - propose a complete formalization of the 
reductional process. For them a further formalization leading to a more algorithmic 
application of the theory’s principles would threaten them by transforming the analysis in a 
circular and self-referential process. 
The prolongation role in the Implication/Realization approach can be summarized 
as Meyer (1973) does:  
“Implicative inferences are possible because the regularity and orderliness of 
a pattern suggest probable continuations which the competent listener 
understands and which the conscientious critic attempts to explain. The matter 
can also be stated objectively – as thought stylistically coherent and 
syntactically structured melodies themselves actually obeyed, or “behave” 
according to certain basic principles. In terms of proximate realization, the 
general rule would then be: once established, a patterning tends to be 
continued until a point of relative tonal-rhythmic stability is reached. 
Prolongations and extensions may, as we shall see, delay closure; and 
defections may give rise to subsidiary or alternative goals as points of closure. 
In terms of remote realizations, the general rule would be: Continuations not 
realized – or realized only provisionally - before significant pattern closure 
has taken place will probably be so subsequently. Often such delayed 
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realization will take place after a repetition of the initial pattern has reinforced 
the implications generated when it was first presented.  
These ‘laws’ may, in turn, be subsumed under a still more general principle: 
Patterns tend to be continued until they become as complete and stable as 
possible. Completeness and stability are determined not only by the particular 
attributes of the pattern itself, but by norms of the particular style being 
employed – its syntax, traditional forms and conventional schemata.” (p.130).  
Therefore, an important conceptual difference with Schenkerian tradition -
especially at the moment of considering the appeal that prolongation has for the theoretical 
studies of performance - is the static nature of prolongation. Here, implication is what 
provides the impulse for musical movement, and prolongation only delays, or varies its 
effects. This static point of view of prolongation is the consequence of the foreground to 
background orientation of the analysis that leads to a conception lacking the organic 
quality provided by the Schenkerian approach. 
I.3 Prolongation and generativity 
I.3.1 The original programme 
In 1983 Lerdahl and Jackendoff proposed a Generative Theory of Tonal Music (from now 
on GTTM) in which they intended to model the intuitions of the experienced listener. They 
described the components of musical structure that, due to their hierarchical nature, can 
produce a computational processing of musical information that results in those intuitions. 
So we see that from this perspective, music theory is considered as a branch of music 
psychology, its purpose being to describe the functioning of the musical mind (Lerdahl 
2001) and to understand musical knowledge as computational processes operated on 
mental representations that are susceptible of happening only on specific musical objects 
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that ascribe to certain structural characteristics (Jackendoff 1987, Lerdahl 1988a; see in 
chapter 4 a discussion about this approach in the field of music performance). According to 
that, this theory discerns from the just mentioned in its pretentiousness of validity based on 
the explicit search of “general psychological plausibility, (...) coherence and parsimony 
(...) and the empirical evidence for or against it” (p.5). This approach rejects all kind of 
introspective research (as phenomenological foundation), for which the ways the described 
structures and processes are organized must be reconstructed from objective data. In this 
enterprise, reduction as an analytical procedure makes evident the hierarchic mental 
representations of an ideal listener. Lerdahl (2001) himself formulates a clear comparison 
of the extent of the idea of reduction in his theory and in Schenker’s: 
Heinrich Schenker’s (1935/1979) well-known approach to reduction has both a 
metaphysical and an aesthetic basis, depends on an a priori construct (the 
Urzatz) that has a pervasive top-down influence on an analysis, is informal in 
its application, and emphasizes voice-leading features. GTTM’s, in contrast, 
has a psychological aim, has no metaphysical givens, proceeds by rule, and 
emphasizes rhythmic and harmonic features. In both approaches, structural 
importance is a question not of surface salience but of syntactic stability. 
GTTM restricts reduction to that of a strictly nested, constituent hierarchy, allowing 
the use of tree notation”. (p.10) 
The theory proposes a view of tonal music in which four of its components can be 
understood as hierarchical and consequently as generative, stating the extent of the 
theory’s description. Among these, time-span reduction shows the relative structural 
importance of the pitch events within the rhythmic units that result from the piece’s 
segmentation. Prolongational reduction reveals the hierarchy of pitch stability, seeking to 
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capture the listener’s intuitions about tension-relaxation in music. In his way, GTTM 
considers the range of music’s pitches from a prolongational perspective (it conceives the 
idea that certain events can keep their activity beyond their actual physical reach) but 
judging how pitch patterns and tension-relaxation patterns are related to the particularities 
of their own temporal developments (Lerdahl, 1988a). Rhythm participates of reductional 
decisions about tension and relaxation, as the relative importance of pitches will differ 
according to the events’ duration. 
GTTM understands tension-relaxation as consonance-dissonance (approximately 
what Larson would call inherent stability) with relation to the implicit or explicit harmony. 
Therefore the two typical prolongational situations are repetition (understood as strong 
prolongation) and consonance relationship (understood as weak prolongations). That is 
why repetition as much as consonance prolong by definition, establishing respectively 
strong and weak prolongational levels (Figure I.2c and b in that order). Although the extent 
of the explanation of the concept of prolongation that was provided at the beginning of 
chapter 3 was reduced, it allows seeing that prolongation as process implies very different 
facts according to the theory in consideration, though as product they can produce equal or 
similar configurations. This is not a minor issue, especially if the theory has the 
psychological aim of modelling the listener’s musical intuitions. In GTTM, the 
progression, as opposite of prolongation, happens when the harmonic base of two events 
are different (Figure I.2a) 
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Since Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s entire analytical programme is based on the 
possibility of segmenting the musical surface until the last levels, and on the clear isolation 
of the musical event as the unit of hierarchic organization, the tension-relaxation 
relationship is understood as dominance and subordination. The idea is that given any pair 
of linked events, one is always subordinated to the other at a given level. The graphic 
representations of the latter are the left and right branching diagrams. The branching 
constitutes an important heuristic within the theory (as are the voice leading graphics in the 
Schenkerian theory). In the GTTM the analytical decision that determines whether a 
branch goes towards right or left (for determining the subordination-dominance 
relationships) concerns metric-rhythmic aspects while they come from decisions taken in 
the time-span reduction. 
The temporal reduction regulates the events that become available in the 
succeeding levels of analysis, providing the base for an optimum prolongational 
connection. Similarly, the tension-relaxation relationship is understood within the available 
Figure I.2. Progressions and weak and strong Prolongations. (From 
Lerdahl & Jackendoff 1983 p. 181) 
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patterns from the metric and grouping structure, ranked through time-span reduction. 
Logically, the fact that the tension-relaxation conditions come from the hierarchization of 
pitch events within the temporal intervals depends on the organization of events in strong-
weak metric relationships, and on the possibility of splitting the music surface until its very 
last consequences. From this two principles that clearly distinguish the idea of the 
prolongational structure in Lerdahl and Jackendoff from that of Schenker can be derived: 
In first place, the obliged branching principle, which demands that all events of 
music surface exhibit their structural status regarding the adjacent events in each level. For 
branching establishment this condition imposes severe restrictions of well formedness. 
Figure I.3 sketches these restrictions. 
In second place, a Parallelism Principle occurs in which parallel passages must be 
interpreted in a parallel way. The idea of Ursatz that Schenkerian theory uses disqualifies 
this principle by definition. 
Figure I.3. Well formedness constrains on prolongational 
branchings. (From Lerdahl 2001, p.16). 
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Therefore, in the GTTM prolongation depends on how the listener segments 
surface, and this constitutes an ontology of prolongation entirely opposite to the 
Schenkerian one. For the GTTM the whole derives from the grouping of parts. The 
hierarchical structure originates from the capability of the events to make integral 
groupings that, by recursivity transform in events that display the same capability. Once 
more, recursivity is the distinctive principle of hierarchy. The organicist sense of the 
Schenkerian theory is the opposite. Like an embryo that reaches different embryonic states, 
hierarchy does not emerge from events’ aggregation at successive levels, but by the 
transformations of a level as a whole in an other, as a new whole (Schenker 1926). The 
succeeding levels subsume each other not resembling a tree branching but, as in a 
matryoshka each level is a totality with its own unique organic criteria, basically 
determined by a greater amount of detail and originality of the more external levels, and 
concomitantly by the most stereotyped forms of the deeper levels (see in pp. 65-9, the 
discussion about the idea of recursivity in Schenkerian theory). 
According to Lerdahl (1988a) decomposition of the musical surface into a discrete 
series of constitutive elements is an essential condition for music comprehension. As we 
will see further on, this is a statement closely related to a model of music comprehension 
based on a generative linguistic model and its concomitant cognitive approach. Given this 
idea, prolongation, as Lerdahal remarks, has a syntactic sense: 
“Intuitions about pitch derived tension and relaxation in a piece can be 
expressed in terms of strictly hierarchical segmentation of a piece in 
prolongational regions, such that:  
a) each region represents a global tensing or relaxing in the progression from 
its beginning to its end, and 
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b) tensings and relaxings internal to each region represent subordinate and 
non overlapping stages in the overall progression.” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
1983; p. 211) 
Within this background, the overlapping situations between prolongational regions 
do not happen in the listener’s intuitions; when they seem to happen, it may possibly be 
due to the emergence of a rivalry between components. Therefore, prolongational 
reduction constitutes a hierarchic structure, fulfilling recursivity, adjacency and non-
superposition principles. It is proposed as a top-down process subject to the determination 
of: (i) regions; (ii) head of the region –or more important event-, and (iii) subordination -
left or right - of the event. 
Lerdahl (1997a, 2001) is very clear about this matter: the prolongational reduction 
of the GTTM is a Representational Hierarchy, in which each hierarchic event persists at 
superordinate levels (each tree leaf persists as such in the following levels). 
We will see in next section why it is very probable that the problems of strict 
subordination (or unilateral branching) and postponing of voice leading treatment are the 
reasons why, in spite of the high degree of formalization the GTTM presents, it has not 
been approached as heuristic in the music performance studies such as those in 
Schenkerian theory. Not by chance, more current approaches seek to introduce these 
matters. 
I.3.2 Further developments of the generativist programme 
In his Tonal Pitch Space Theory (TPST), Lerdahl (2001) characterized a frame to define 
dissonance in more depth, which is central in describing tension-relaxation relations. The 
basic tonal space is a virtual space in which both psychological distances between pitch 
events (notes, chord, tonalities) and conditions of coherence between them are represented. 
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The space displays levels of representation expressed by stable typified pitch structures 
that are organized according to an order of increasing stability: (i) the octave; (ii) the 
perfect fifth; (iii) the chord; (iv) the diatonic scale; (v) the chromatic scale. A note that 
does not belong at a given level, for example the level of the chord, but that only belongs at 
the lower levels (the diatonic scale and the chromatic scale) constitutes for this reference 
level (the chord level) a dissonance. Thus, the movement by step within a certain level 
assures the coherence of the movement. For example, if one goes from a given chord’s 
note to another note that does not belong to the chord level, it will be considered as a 
dissonance regarding this level. Therefore, this note’s instability will increase. From there, 
in order to recover its stable original state, it will show a tendency to make the movements 
that are necessary to return to a note belonging to the chord level but which is only one 
step from the departure note in the chord level of reference. For example, in the pitch space 
of the chord corresponding to I degree in C Major, if the melody departs from G, and then 
comes to F, then it will tend to reach the E. These ideas try to wholly formalize the musical 
treatment of the consonance-dissonance concept and therefore they become clearly related 
to the principles of voice leading. If the extent of the activity of a pitch is very great, this 
implies that this pitch will be adjacent to another belonging to superordinate levels 
(Lerdahl, 1988b). 
The Tonal Pitch Space Theory (Lerdahl, 2001) models the cultural treatment of 
dissonance related to degrees of sensory consonance (contextual and inherent stability in 
terms of Larson [1997]), because it constrains the idea of embellishment to a certain level 
of the pitch space (Lerdahl, 1997). Then, prolongation understood in the context of the 
TPST is considered as a way of assigning a degree of relative stability to any pitch event 
(pitch class, chord, tonal region) within a multidimensional geometry which takes into 
account more than just the vertical aspects. Reduction, in this context, consists of 
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recognizing the routes that a given note would have to take in order to find the most stable 
note as parsimoniously as possible. 
The Strict Hierarchy Principle of GTTM - according to which each subordinated 
element connects to a single superordinate element - is problematic in representing the 
listener’s intuitions in tonal music. We have seen that with respect to the inclusional 
hierarchy, this is not a problem. Lerdahl (1998) proposed a solution to this question 
without moving away from his idea of hierarchy, which is, in fact a representational one. 
This solution is double branching. 
GTTM neither considers the existence of slight nuances of attachment of a given 
event to a given prolongation. Because of this, Lerdahl (1997) recognized that tree 
representations do not capture all the elements of the prolongational aspects. After that, he 
proposed a prolongational representation incorporating a network aspect, in which the 
elements are chained in nodes without the restriction of establishing an only branching. 
This new modality of representation shows the tensions between two different ontologies 
of prolongation: prolongation as association and prolongation as hierarchy, that, as is seen 
in chapter 3, involve different epistemological standpoints. 
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Appendix II: Prolongation, listening and cognitive 
science 
We have seen in chapter 3 (pp. 65-9) that the Schenkerian tradition in the American scene 
has been constrained by a strong empiricist aspiration (often, as we have seen, wrongly 
attributed to Schenker’s psychologistical thinking). Classical cognitive science and, in 
particular, music psychology, has offered important support to this. This support should 
also constitute the basis of any study on communication of the prolongational aspects in 
performance. For that reason, it will be taken as the point of departure in this thesis. In fact, 
this evidence offers both an epistemological and methodological foundation for the first 
series of experimental works described in chapters 5 and 6, which approach the 
communication of prolongational structures from a classical objectivist perspective. In 
addition, the impulse that music psychology received was of great magnitude when 
considering problems that prolongational theory elicited in the discussion of musical 
experience. Finally, it is important to consider that a part of Schenkerian psychologicism, 
in particular that tied to its naturalist aspiration, involves finding psychoacoustic and 
cognitive evidence contributing to its plausibility, in spite of the methodological and 
epistemological differences. 
II.1 Psychoacoustic evidence 
When understanding the prolongational structure of tonal music as a linear process 
conceptually derived from the consonance-dissonance opposition, numerous 
psychoacoustic phenomena become involved. Although an exhaustive treatment of all of 
them would widely exceed the scope of this work, a brief review is presented in this 
appendix. Undoubtedly, the most comprehensive research, and most closely tied to voice 
leading issues, from a psychoacoustic perspective, is that of David Huron (2001), who 
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offered a detailed analysis of the principles that govern voice leading in common practice 
music as of a psychoacoustic basis. However, from a wider perspective, the most important 
original contribution is that of Albert Bregman (1990), who introduced and developed the 
concept of auditory scene analysis. The way in which we analyse and understand our 
auditory environment, according to Bregman, involves a series of phenomena, stream 
segregation being particularly interesting for the problems under consideration. Basically, 
this principle describes how separating a stream of sound events from the rest of the 
acoustic environment is possible by selecting those events that constitute such a stream. 
Although it was developed for non-musical contexts, this idea could present a certain 
affinity with the notion of abstracting, listening to and understanding prolongation. But, in 
addition, sufficient evidence exists that allows us to affirm that these principles can operate 
in musical contexts. In other words, certain cultural stylistic guidelines have been able to 
capture some forms of acoustic processing. Thus, for example, some principles of 
Renaissance counterpoint (that control voice leading in Schenkerian Theory), seem to be 
crystallized to serve: (i) preventing the parts (voices) from integrating into each other; and 
(ii) that each part tries to be well integrated in itself. In this way the historical permanence 
of such principles would be a result of them mirroring some principle of aural 
organization. "(The rules) were not just the arbitrary dictates of a particular style of music. 
The goals were the goals of that style, but many of the methods made use of universals of 
auditory perception." (Bregman 1990; p.494) Against this background, stream segregation 
is a sort of psychoacoustic umbrella operation that includes and depends on a series of 
more precise and defined phenomena. Among these, it is possible to mention the following 
phenomena. 
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II.1.1 Acoustic continuance 
This consists of maintained sound energy over time. Continuance may be both physical as 
well as mental. This phenomenon is an example of an imaginative activity that can be 
controlled at will by listeners - especially musicians (Huron, 2001). The degree of presence 
of the indeed absent sounds depends on the temporal distance from the moment of its real 
manifestation (echoic memory). Therefore, both sustained and recurrent sounds are 
susceptible to be able to preserve more aural images than brief and intermittent stimuli. 
However, it is opportune to notice that this topic does not seem relevant to Schenkerian 
theory, since rhythm - and therefore the frequency of appearance of a sound and its total 
time of presence during the musical stream is considered basically as a surface 
phenomenon, without implications for the configuration of the deeper levels. Nevertheless, 
in common practice, notes considered tonally more structural are quantitatively more 
emphasized. 
II.1.2 Pitch proximity 
Alternation between low and high notes in the course of a melody gives rise to a virtual 
split of the melody in different voices. The pitch proximity in each one of such voices 
creates an association between them strong enough to compensate and suppress the 
entailment based on the temporal proximity between contiguous notes. Thus, pitch 
proximity and velocity co-vary in this operation. This phenomenon clearly refers to 
Körte’s Third Law. It was originally enunciated in relation to visual phenomena. This law 
indicates that the visual phenomenon of apparent movement depends on the distance 
between the objects and the speed of the exposition. Huron and Mondor (mentioned by 
Huron 2001) attributed certain kinematic principles to this law. This is interesting in the 
light of the incidence that the representation of motion may have in the performer’s 
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representation of the musical structure. In other words, the way in which the performer 
may obtain the representation of a melody at a certain speed could be influenced by the 
kinetic aspects involved in instrumental sound production. The principle of pitch proximity 
(Huron 2001) has strong implications. Firstly, the possibility of identifying melodic lines 
depends on the overlap degree of the pitches. In this way, the fact that the underlying voice 
leading shows a “much more linear” nature than the surface becomes a condition for voice 
leading abstraction process. In other words, if the underlying voice leading were not more 
linear than the surface level it would be contradicting the principle of pitch proximity, and 
therefore identification of a split line and the subsequent voice leading abstraction would 
be harmed. Secondly, the pitch proximity principle contributes to the interpretation of two 
crossed lines as two lines changing their direction when “they touch each other”. Thirdly, 
in pitch sequences, listeners tend to extrapolate future pitches according to their proximity 
instead of according to time proximity. In other words, when listeners evaluate melodic 
continuity they prefer the nearest note in pitch rather than continuing the directional 
tendency of the contour. 
The pitch proximity principle: (i) powers the presence of small intervals (steps) 
over large intervals, in order to psychoacoustically preserve the line continuity; (ii) 
anticipates the segregation of more than one line when large intervals exist; and (iii) 
regulates the melodic continuity expectations. 
II.1.3 Fusion 
This is the process by which events that have risen at different moments from a same 
source are connected (Bregman 1990 p. 30). Fusion can be (i) simultaneous - for example 
when two single sounds fuse into each other and therefore are experienced as properties of 
a single compound sound (spectral fusion); or (ii) successive - when sounds in a sequence 
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can be organized as a line. Although more specific research is needed, it is possible to 
think that this phenomenon contributes to the mental configuration of a melodic line. 
Other psychoacoustic principles would also contribute evidence to outline the 
possible role of performance in the perception of prolongation. Among them, Huron (1992) 
proposed onset synchrony and timbral differentiation. 
II.2 Psychological evidence 
In addition to those psychoacoustic foundations, there is an important body of empirical 
evidence gathered in order to demonstrate the cognitive reality of some theoretical 
concepts such as underlying voice leading. For example, Deutsch and Feroe (1981) 
developed a formal logical model for tonal structural information processing when 
listening, memorizing and imitating a tonal melody. In this model two fundamental 
components exist. In the first place the alphabets, or modes in which pitches are typically 
organized in the context of tonal music language. Thus, the chromatic scale, diatonic scale, 
major perfect chord, etc. are alphabets. In the second place there is the formal operator that 
captures the kind of relation established between two elements in an alphabet (for example, 
ascent, descent, repetition, etc.) Thus, for example, processing the interval C-E implies 
applying |+1| on the major perfect chord alphabet, but |+1 +1| on the diatonic scale 
alphabet. According to this system prolongation, as a mental process, would arise when 
operating with the formal logical system and therefore would depend on the use of 
alphabets and operators. The operator would reveal the prolongational nature, whereas the 
alphabet would delimit the “scene” of the prolongation. In this sense there is a certain 
parallel with Salzer and Schachter’s (1969) assertion regarding the functions of harmony 
and melody in the prolongation process: one indicates the proper way of unfolding the 
prolongation and the other organizes a certain scene for it. 
414 
The logical system for pitch processing appears with important computational 
advantages. Melody is understood through a set of operations applied to certain notes 
belonging to the most important hierarchic levels, which are taken as a reference element 
to apply the operator in question. Accordingly, those notes are easier to process and 
remember. This is due to notes in the more structural levels being represented more times 
in the system, and this redundancy increases the probability of their being remembered. 
The model offers a reasonable framework for the hierarchic computational processing of a 
tonal melody that is not contradicted by other structural principles of melodic configuration 
(good continuity, proximity, etc.). In an experiment, Deutsch and Feroe presented 
structured and non structured melodic sequences – according to the model. They found that 
the listeners could recall better the structured sequences. This means that greater pitch 
structuring influences melody recall. In other words, tonal structure in terms of hierarchic 
levels (as defined by the model) is used by listeners when remembering melodies. 
Mary Louise Serafine (1988) was a pioneer in incorporating the notion of 
hierarchical levels in Schenkerian terms to a set of cognitive processes that would 
characterize musical development throughout childhood. Thus, abstraction of hierarchic 
levels is a non-temporal process, since this  
“do(es) not result from immediate, note to note, phrase to phrase, reality; 
rather (this is a) more formal, logical abstract operation performed on the 
musical material... (the non-temporal processes) must be distinguished from 
the temporal processes (…) tied to surface level, event to event groupings.” 
(Serafine 1988, pp. 79-80). 
From her studies with children, resolving simple matching (goodness of fit) tasks 
between melodies and their rendered structures (foreground and middleground voice 
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leading reductions) she found that, understood in this way, abstraction of hierarchical 
levels is a process that settles in human cognition at about the age of 8. If one considers 
that the acquisition of the harmonic-tonal frame takes place between the age of 5.5 and 6 
(Lamont, 1998; Welch, 1998; Davidson, 1985), it is possible to think that this operates as a 
pre-requisite for the abstraction of the hierarchic levels. In spite of the evidence supporting 
the idea that this is a maturational process, the differences found by Serafine with respect 
to child and adult success in the tasks make one think that abstraction of hierarchic levels 
might require a greater formal knowledge. 
In studies with adults, Serafine, Glassman and Overbeeke (1989) used compound 
melodies. A compound melody is a melodic organization in which although all the notes 
that take part in it sound in succession they comprise different voices from the voice 
leading point of view. The most typical examples are compositions for solo melodic 
instruments (especially from the Baroque repertoire), in which the presence of great 
melodic jumps alternating with step successions split the melody into two different lines 
(Forte and Gilbert 1973). From a collection of those melodies the authors administered two 
types of experimental tests: a) by goodness of fit matching between a melody and its 
rendered voice leading reduction; and b) by similarity judgment between melodies with 
either the same or different underlying voice leading. Their findings revealed that listeners 
could correctly match a melody with its exposed prolongational structure and that they 
would unconsciously use the prolongational structure when judging similarity. These 
findings provide evidence for the cognitive reality of the reductional representation. 
Nevertheless a more comprehensive generalization is not possible, since although the 
researchers used compound melodies very associated to some principles of Schenkerian 
theory, they would not be useful for making a more inclusive analysis of prolongation as a 
psychological process, since the study is limited to phenomena proper to prolongation in 
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such kinds of melodic configuration (as counterpart, see for example Cook 1987b, where 
other Schenkerian principles could not be demonstrated empirically). 
Unlike Serafine and her colleagues, Bigand (1990, 1994) used a sui generis 
interpretation of the GTTM prolongational reduction. For it, he made use of the family 
resemblance notion (Jackendoff 1987) attributing to a four melody family the same 
prolongational reduction as the only common attribute; and by applying the same rhythmic 
and melodic contours to different harmonic frames he generated another four melody 
family with analogous surfaces. He could verify that “(t)he listener manages to hear 
melodies belonging to the same family as variations on an underlying pattern which is 
more important than the differences observed on the musical surface ” (Bigand 1990, p. 
57). This would provide reinforcing evidence for the cognitive reality of prolongational 
reduction. 
Dibben (1994) took up the studies of Serafine, in which she criticized: (i) the 
shortness of musical fragments, (ii) the use of instructions that may convey a bias in the 
answers, (iii) the unsystematic treatment for composing the reductions, and (iv) the 
reduction’s proximity at the surface level. In order to overcome the two first observations 
she proposed the use of longer examples (up to 16 measures), and warning the subjects 
about the fact that the reductions are simplified versions of the melody to match, 
respectively. Aiming to find more consistent evidence concerning the cognitive reality of 
the hierarchic structure of music and avoiding the difficulties that the treatment of 
Schenker’s theory offers for experimental designs, she made use of the theoretical frame 
offered by the GTTM time-span reduction (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983). In using the 
time-span reduction, she could guarantee a more systematic treatment in the composition 
of the reductions reaching deeper structural levels, thus overcoming her two latter 
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observations. In her experiments, listeners were successful when matching up the correct 
reduction with the melody. In addition she observed that this ability increased in relation to 
the structural level at which the events characterizing the wrong reductions belonged. 
Although she did not approach the prolongational structure itself, this evidence contributes 
to consider the cognitive reality of underlying structure theories. 
Following Serafine’s route, Shifres and Martinez (1999, 2000a; Martinez and 
Shifres 1999a, 1999b) began from the analysis of reciprocal influences between musical 
surface attributes (understood as the note-to-note level) and those of the underlying voice 
leading (as the prolonged structural component) in tonal music cognition. In a first 
experiment 190 adults and 774 children between 6 and 14 years had to compare a target 
melody with two comparison melodies. The first of these had the same underlying voice 
leading as the target melody, and the second had a different underlying voice leading. This 
difference consisted of one or two changed notes. Results showed that listeners made 
unconscious use of the underlying voice leading in judging the similarity between pairs of 
melodies. This behaviour appeared at the age of 7 and was generally maintained stable 
throughout childhood until adulthood. In adulthood, representation of the prolongational 
structure does not seem to be influenced by musical training, continuing the tendency 
demonstrated at previous stages.  
Interesting evidence arose from the methodological treatment of the stimuli used in 
the test: in order to experimentally control surface similarity a similarity model was 
developed using a correlation coefficient that measured the association between melodic 
contours. This correlational model turned out to be a useful measurement in order to 
estimate the theoretical similarity between the members of each trio of melodies. In this 
way, the reciprocal influence of musical surface and underlying voice leading when 
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judging similarity could be assessed. This correlational model was validated in a 
comparative study with other theoretical similarity models (Martínez and Shifres 2000). 
From this, listening to a musical piece was understood as a dialectic relation 
between listening to the surface and to the deeper structural levels. A second set of 
experiments with adults, using the same experimental paradigm (similarity judgment), 
confirmed the previous studies. But, in addition, they revealed that neither the contour 
hypothesis (according to which two melodies are judged as more similar if the correlation 
between their surfaces is higher) nor the structure hypothesis (which predicts that two 
melodies will be judged as more similar if they present the same underlying voice leading) 
could explain by themselves the found perceptual similarity. These results lead to the 
proposal of a perceptual rivalry hypothesis by which attributes of the surface interact with 
those of the underlying voice leading influencing the listener’s judgments. After this, 
Martinez (2001, 2002) verified the constituency hypothesis of prolongation from which she 
established that prolongation is experienced by the listener as a syntactic component. 
Shifres and Martinez (2002) found ontogenetic evidence of this capacity. 
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Appendix III - Towards a pragmatics of music 
interpretation 
III.1 Introduction 
In his study on how people give meaning to a conversation, H. P. Grice proposed the 
cooperative principle (Grice 1989). This principle can be briefly enunciated as: Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (p. 26). This 
superordinate principle comprises a series of rules or "maxims". Grice’s cooperative 
principle may be of most value in the analysis of communication in performance since for 
many scholars this approach can be understood as a nexus between the generative and the 
interpretative approaches (Eco 1979). According to Jackendoff (1983), Grice’s 
conversational maxims can be understood as a preference rule system. In addition, the 
interest is increased because although Grice enunciates the principle as a set of directives 
oriented to the speaker, many intellectuals think that those rules are, at the same time, 
organizing the interpretation on the part of the listener (at this precise point the system 
emerges as a preference rule system [Jackendoff 1983]). For example, when a listener, who 
(implicitly) knows this principle, listens to a reinforced utterance such as: “For me, this is 
Chopin’s piano prelude in B minor”, he or she understands that the speaker has a certain 
doubt about it being so. This ‘for me’ presents a manifest meaning in this context which is 
not inherent to its intrinsic characterization: if the speaker did not have good reason for 
saying it, according to the cooperation principle, he or she would not say it. Grice 
formalizes this good reason by the series of “maxims” or sub-principles. The meaning that 
the listener obtains from following the cooperation principle is a conversational 
implicature – a sort of inference arising from the interaction. This kind of implicature “is 
calculable and one can make it explicit by a reasoning: even though it can be known 
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intuitively, it is not valid as conversational implicature if it is not possible to substitute it 
by a reasoning” (Bertucelli Papi, 1996). Grice states a number of needed conditions for a 
given implicature to be understood as conversational, that is to say, typical of the 
interaction. These conditions differentiate a conversational implicature from the other 
kinds of implicatures, namely conventional ones, that do not arise from the cooperation 
principle and are strongly linked by convention to lexical elements. 
In music performance, the performer contributes to the conversation by carrying 
out an expressive action; for example a ritardando or a crescendo. These actions have not 
only a semantic value but also a value of use. For example, the semantic scope of a 
ritardando, which is fixed to a convention as a lexical element, highlights the grouping 
structure of the musical piece (Todd, 1985; Clarke, 1988). Furthermore, the listener has an 
implicit knowledge of the musical structure. For example, the listener knows principles – 
well formedness and preference rules (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983; Temperley 2001) – 
with which he or she establishes, while listening to a piece, a given segmentation into a 
number of units. If the expressive contribution that the performer adds does not satisfy 
both the expectations that the listener generated according to that implicit knowledge and 
the semantic convention of the expressive feature, then the listener of course may assume 
that it exists or that the performer has a good reason for doing it. For example, if the 
listener notices a ritardando but it is not at the end of the grouping unit, he or she may 
assume that the performer has a good reason to do it, wishing to imply something, for 
example, to express a given character, to give a sense of unity to the composition as a 
whole, etc. That good reason may constitute the basis of the performer’s communicative 
strategy. 
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We are suggesting that the listener infers both in a conventional and in a 
conversational way. The conventional implicature arises when there is an agreement 
between the attributes of the musical structure and the lexical convention of the expressive 
feature. For example, a conclusive cadence (II-V-I) agrees with the action of a ritardando. 
This expressive musical resource implies that a musical grouping unit has finished. The 
conversational implicature arises while applying the cooperation principle, when there is 
no agreement between the structural attribute and the convention of use of such an 
expressive feature; for example, a ritardando without a conclusive cadence. This musical 
utterance implies that (i) the performer wants us to focus on this passage; (ii) in this 
passage there are some structural elements worth keeping in mind; (iii) these elements are 
related to other elements that the performer wants us to bear in mind, etc. 
As Grice establishes, there are a series of parameters to differentiate conversational 
from conventional implicatures. One of them is the notion of cancellability. A 
conversational implicature can always be cancelled by the addition of information that 
either interrupts or makes it clear that the speaker is ignoring the cooperation principle. On 
the contrary, a conventional implicature cannot be cancelled. In the next section, we will 
analyse the data gathered in the segmentation experiment (chapter 6) in terms of the 
cancellability of the implicatures, in order to advance towards a pragmatics of music 
interpretation. 
III.2 Analysis of the empirical evidence 
At bar 22 of the Chopin piano prelude in B minor, a strong cadence takes place, marking 
the end of a group at the highest grouping structural level. As has already been said, the 
remaining bars may be interpreted either as a coda or as a delay of the progression - - , 
which therefore may not be considered as a group at the same hierarchical level; simply 
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put, it is an expansion of that group, expanding once it has reached the harmonic 
relaxation. Here, both Martha Argerich and Alfred Cortot make the piece’s most emphatic 
ritardando. Both of them are implying that an articulation between two groups of the same 
structural level has taken place. The information that Cortot gives after that (bar 24) agrees 
with this implicature: he takes up the initial tempo again, as if starting over again, and 
holds the dynamic nuance. On the contrary, Argerich adds information, cancelling this 
implicature: she continues this progressively slower tendency until the end, involving that 
ritenuto in a global process of stoppage and decrease that continues until the last note. Note 
how the listeners understood that the implication was cancelled at bar 22 in Argerich’s 
performance and therefore tended to segment it much less than Cortot’s. In a certain sense, 
Cortot implies the quasi interruption (see pp. 125 and ff.). 
At bar 8 both artists perform an important ritardando, implying that a group of the 
highest structural level ends there. This agrees with the structural information: the first 
branch of the interrupted form (Schenker 1935) also ends there. The implicature (the fact 
that there is a point of structural segmentation at the highest hierarchical level here) 
cannot be cancelled, it is a conventional implicature. The opposite information that Martha 
Argerich’s performance gives us after that – the more pronounced ritardando at bar 13 – 
does not succeeded in cancelling that implicature. In that way, listeners do not hesitate to 
segment at bar 8. According to the cooperation principle, Argerich has a good reason to 
play such a pronounced ritenuto with such an important forte at bar 13, even though this 
reason is not to highlight a highest level grouping articulation point. 
Finally, observe bar 13. Two identical ascending arpeggios take place, one 
immediately after the other. Alfred Cortot plays the second one much more piano and a 
little slower. For an experienced listener, this may imply that Cortot is applying a sort of 
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“baroque echo” criterion, playing the repetition softer. However, the following information 
(at the end of bar 14) cancels the previous implication since he does not take the initial 
values again and the echo character is abandoned. He implies that he has a good reason to 
do this piano for the second arpeggio. That good reason may be “to contribute to the unity 
of the passage at a point where so many superficial attributes seem to attack that unity.” 
This would be his conversational implicature. Results of the high level segmentation task 
for the Cortot performance indicate that listeners tended to understand all the passage as a 
unit. The difference concerning this tendency observed for the lowest level segmentation 
(at bar 14 it is high and goes down at bar 15) indicates how the segmentation implicature is 
cancelled at this point. 
III.3 Conclusions 
In this appendix we have tried to explain the findings of one of the previous studies 
according to the Grice’s cooperation principle. This conceptual framework permits 
characterizing the performance context while giving way to a description of the relations 
between musical structure and expressive microstructure and the way in which those 
relations operate on listeners’ representations. In that way, the listener considers the 
context of the performance according to the way in which a given expressive action is 
related to (i) the musical structure (for example a cadence, a repetition, etc.) and (ii) other 
expressive actions in the same performance (a crescendo, a ritardando, etc.). 
This double modality of the contextual links is evidence of the way in which the 
performance itself operates on the listener’s (and probably the performer’s) cognitive 
background, modelling the experience. Differentiation between conventional and 
conversational implicatures contributes to elucidate how the interpretative paradigm can 
complement the generative one. The latter could contribute to explain the way in which the 
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listener processes structural and expressive information lexically established by 
convention, whereas the former might shed light on inferential processes involved in 
understanding music performance. 
The ideas presented here constitute a first attempt at understanding communication 
between performers and listeners in inferential terms. This theoretical frame may 
contribute to elucidate an important part of this intricate communicational process that 
takes place when we listen to music and could be generically understood as music 
interpretation. However, the data examined here reveals that not all communicative 
aspects seem to be related to problems of inferential thinking. Particularly, current 
performance of 19th century music seems to present features that go beyond reasoning 
problems. In chapters 7-10, a new and opposite communication paradigm will be 
investigated hoping to go deeper into the study of communication and performance. It 
understands communication in terms of intersubjectivity. 
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Appendix IV - In search of a lost relationship 
In an illuminating article, Johnson (1999) argued that there certainly is a genitive 
relationship between composition and performance. However, there is no reason why that 
primary relation has to be determinist. Therefore, what is the nature of that relationship? In 
order to venture an answer, Johnson makes us reread Marcel Proust’s A la recherche du 
temps perdú with the hope of finding a reasonable answer. In spite of the clarity of his 
intention, it would be opportune here to retake and extend that quotation, at the risk of 
focussing on other people's reminiscences. Readers will be able to understand and indulge 
this literary parenthesis if they consider a series of reasons. In the first place, Proust 
mentions some issues that, being relevant to the topic we are treating, are not treated by 
Johnson. Secondly, the route that the Proustian hero makes around his ideas concerning the 
problems of interpretation as art is greatly identified with what has been outlined here, 
especially in chapters 2 and 7. And finally, I could of course not express those ideas more 
clearly or more beautifully. When retaking the route on which Proust understood the 
artwork as part of his strong experience while attending Mme. Berma’s performance, it 
will be possible, in principle, to investigate how the artwork is carried out in the 
performative act, and, from this, to contribute to a definition of the artistry of musical 
performance. In this way it will be possible to outline a redefinition of the artwork in 
performance that contributes to finding healthy relations between the organization of 
structural attributes, created by the composer, and the particularities and constraints of the 
performative act. 
Mme. Berma is an emblematic character within the Proustian narrative. She 
represents one of the creator performer models and allows the author to reveal enough of 
his aesthetic thought (Morán 1996). In this sense, it is interesting how she, as a performer, 
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is put at the same artistic height as other creators in the story (for example, Elstir, the 
painter, or Vinteuil, the composer), thus deeply considering her artistry. In this passage in 
particular (in The world of Guermantes) the hero’s devotion towards Berma is clearly 
identified with the romantic conception of performer, tied as seen, to the idea of 
interpretation as mystical revelation and, concomitantly, to the myth of the talented 
performer as genius. The protagonist attends a representation of Racine’s Phèdre, by 
Berma. It is the second occasion that he has seen her onstage. The first had happened far 
back in the midst of youthful expectations surrounding her interpretative genius, and had 
finished in confused disappointment regarding said talent. However, this time...  
“(Mme Berma) had just come onto the stage. And then, miraculously, like 
those lessons which we have laboured in vain to learn overnight and find 
intact, got by heart, on waking up next morning, and like those faces of dead 
friends which the impassioned efforts of our memory pursue without 
recapturing and which, when we are no longer thinking of them, are there 
before our eyes just as they were in life, the talent of Berma, which had evaded 
me when I sought so greedily to grasp its essence, now after these years of 
oblivion, in this hour of indifference, imposed itself on my admiration with the 
force of self evidence. Formerly, in my attempts to isolate this talent, I 
deducted, so to speak, from what I heard, the part itself, a part, the common 
property of all the actresses who appeared as Phèdre, which I my self had 
studied beforehand so that I might be capable of subtracting it, of gleaning as 
a residuum Mme Berma’s talent alone. But this talent which I sought to 
discover outside the part itself was indissolubly one with it.” (Proust, 
1921/1922 p. 54) 
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The first approach to the problem was to see the work of Racine and Berma’s 
performance as detachable organizations. It clearly represents the perspective of the work 
of art as object. As they are separated existences, any considered quality or valuable 
attribute will correspond either to one or the other. This ontological split in music is shown 
to be deeply rooted in both common and academic language (and therefore thought): we 
talk about playing a composition. As it could be seen, the concept of work is itself erratic, 
but both for the objectivist tradition and for many of the perspectives that criticise it, this 
distinction is represented by the musical structure-performance dichotomy. The relation 
between work and performance, as presented in the previous quotation, appears as 
univocal. The work is everlasting and its essence is not affected by any performative 
aspect. 
The first pitfall that faces this viewpoint is a variable and uncertain boundary 
between both terms of the relation. It is modified according to the performance context, 
which, in turn, is modified by the performance effect. The anecdote about the Argentine 
National Anthem mentioned in chapter 2 (p. 26) reflects this dynamic. When García 
recorded his performance of the National Anthem, he was not doing anything different 
from what was common in the rock music circles. But he mistook the context: rock’s 
context is not the same that the National Anthem’s. The limit defining what is performance 
and what is musical structure was another. However, although controversial, this artistic 
fact produced such a quagmire that it “moved the limit”, allowing for performances that 
appeared afterwards to be taken as valid. 
In the western academic tradition it would seem that the limit was clear because the 
score exists. But, as it was seen, the score has a certain opacity that can only become 
transparent through the oral tradition. This idea is present in the fragment from Proust in 
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suggesting the work is a little more than just the written text: it is what all the actresses 
have done with it. This idea of work that rescues the oral tradition and is defined as the set 
of performances that have taken place over all its history, is used by many musicologists 
(Bowen 1999) – in Peircian terms, it would be a type of which each real performance is a 
token. However, both the romantic tradition and the objectivist perspective maintain that 
the score encloses the key to its own revelation. The way in which the performer forms a 
relationship with it will be proper to each tradition and will tend to guarantee that 
revelation. The degree of performance artistry depends on the result of this revelation. 
Berma is a great actress because her genius is able to reveal the sense of Racine. 
When Proust says that talent and roles comprise one same thing, he is referring to 
that. However, how can they comprise one same thing? Continuing on his course it we will 
be possible to see how the relation between talent and roles (at least in the field of musical 
performance) has been singularly elusive. 
“...her stage presence, her poses, which she had gradually built up, which she 
was to modify yet further, and which were based upon reasoning altogether 
more profound than those which traces could be seen in the gestures of her 
fellow-actors, but reasonings that had lost their original deliberation, had 
melted into a sort of radiance whereby that sent throbbing, round the person of 
the heroine, rich and complex elements which the fascinated spectator 
nevertheless took not for a triumph of dramatic artistry but for a manifestation 
of life1.” (Proust 1921/1922 p. 55)  
                                                 
1 “non pour une réussite de l’artiste mais pour une donnée de la vie” (in the original). Probably, the 
translation does not reveal two issues. Firstly, he mentions a donnée that is different from a life 
manifestation. Moreover, and most importantly, the original is talking about the artist, the person and not 
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Berma constructs her own performance without mysticism, by a detailed 
examination, deep reasonings, that encourage her to constitute her attitude in the scene. 
From this, Phèdre arises so triumphant that the spectator cannot see Berma. Cook (1999) 
wrote that it was said that when Hans von Bülow played Beethoven one lost the sense of 
Bülow’s presence and only felt Beethoven’s. This is the great performance paradox. As it 
was seen (chapter 2), the creative genius’ soul has led so many to deny the performer. The 
performer is locked up in the secret spy paradox: if his or her talent is discovered his or her 
talent expires. 
The objectivist tradition, as it was seen (Stein 1957, Cone 1967, Berry 1989) 
strongly enlists itself in this line, establishing a determinist relation between the revelation 
of the musical work from the score as the source of knowledge and every performative 
action.2 According to Johnson (1999) the illusion that disoriented Proust is a fallacy whose 
false premise contains the concept of work: “The assumption that the work is fully 
predetermined and knowable from its score, its promotion as opus perfectum ed integrum 
such that any transformation is by definition a fall, is naïve in its idealism and 
pragmatically unworkable.” (p. 55) 
Finally, the paradox makes manifest a dilemma: to either deny the performer or 
deny the work. We appear before an impasse. Nevertheless, as Cook requests (1999) “it 
may seem possible to develop models of the relationship between analytical conception 
and performance that are more challenging (both intellectually and musically) than those 
in general currency.” (p. 11) 
                                                                                                                                                    
about the drama as abstraction, because, as will be seen further ahead, for Proust this artistry represents “a 
gift of life”. 
2 Berry (1989) says: “this book asks how, in very precise terms and carefully defined circumstances, a 
structural relation exposed in analysis, can be illuminated in the inflections of an edifying performance” (p. 
ix-x). Notice the similarity of this paragraph with Proust’s. 
430 
The reading of A la recherche…may continue offering some clues… 
“...all these, voice, posture, gestures, veils, round this embodiment of an idea 
which a line of poetry is (an embodiment that, unlike our human bodies, is not 
an opaque, screen, but a purified, spiritualised garment), were merely 
additional envelopes which instead of concealing, showed up in greater 
splendour the soul that had assimilated them to itself and had spread itself 
through them, lavaflows of different substances, grown translucent, the 
superimposition of which causes only a richer refraction of the imprisoned, 
central ray that pierces through them, and makes more extensive, more 
precious and more beautiful the flame drenched matter in which it is 
enshrined. So Berma’s interpretation was, around Racine’s work, a second 
work, quickened also by genius.3” 
If the problem were simply to reveal the work, Berma need not have enveloped the 
work with lavaflows of different substances. On the contrary, she had only to get rid of 
them. The presence of those substances is what makes Proust see Berma’s presence, what 
rescues her from oblivion. Nevertheless, he does not yet manage to understand what is 
Racine and what is Berma. He still does not see that porous frontier. 
As we have seen (chapter 4, p. 89), from the psychological perspective, the 
interpretative conception of understanding is opposed to the generative in that the task of 
determining the relevant knowledge’s hierarchy is, for the latter, the subject’s 
responsibility. For the former, understanding both the environment and thinking takes 
                                                 
3 In the original: “a seconde oeuvre, vivifiée aussi par le génie; par le génie de Racine?” Notice that the 
word vivifiée has a life connotation that the word quickened has not. Moreover, in the English translation, the 
final emphasis in the repetition – clarifying the reference to Racine’s genius – is absent. This is the key to 
what the author is questioning at this moment. The translation does not let one see this deep and personal 
questioning.  
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place via a heuristic process in which information acquires progressively higher integration 
through a fabric of relations constructed from the information itself in its own context. 
Undoubtedly, the music reception conditions vary according to the performance’s context 
and circumstances (Small 1998). The contemporary notion that the work “is finished” with 
the performer’s participation arises from there, and although it is not completely clarified, 
it nevertheless once again gives a non-supportive role to the performer, in a new 
relationship in which the performer considers the piece’s structural aspects in order to 
maintain the scaffolding of her own artwork. 
For that reason, when Cook (2003) pleads to explore more deeply the relationship 
between the musical work and its performance, he speaks of going from a vertical linear 
relationship to a more horizontal one, in which meaning emerges through the relations 
among all the versions. 
The trembling presence of Berma here is disconcerting. Evidently, she is finishing 
off the work (Eco 1981). In the particular case of music, the work is not only what the 
composer wrote, but also what is completed in the performer’s interpretation translated 
into a particular set of actions. This appears clearly in the critical proposals (see chapter 2) 
that see performance as drama or narrative (Schmalfeldt 1985, Rothstein 1995, Shaffer 
1995). But what actions make up this interpretative set? As Johnson says (1999), the 
interpretative act is a set of actions exerted personally within the work’s intentionality. For 
this, studies of performance - in spite of their apparently objectivist methodologies - may 
be interpreted from a different perspective to the cognitive perspective, in order to relocate 
academicism and orient towards involving performance as a central factor in the work’s 
ontology (Johnson 1999). For this it is necessary to advance more in the relation between 
composition and performance. 
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“...Was this genius, of which Berma’s interpretation was only the revelation, 
solely the genius of Racine?... I though so at first...” (p. 58). 
“…I realised then that the work of the playwright was for the actress no more 
than the raw material, more or less irrelevant in itself for the creation of her 
masterpiece of interpretation, just as the great painter whom I had met at 
Balbec, Elstir, had found the inspiration for two pieces of equal merit in a 
school building devoid of character and a cathedral which was itself a work of 
art. And as the painter dissolves houses, carts, people, in some broad effect of 
light which make them homogeneous, so Berma spread out great sheet of 
terror or tenderness over the word which were equally blended, all planed 
down or heightened, and which a lesser artist would have carefully detached 
from one another. Of course, each of them had an inflexion of its own, and 
Berma’s diction did not prevent one from distinguishing the lines (...) But 
Berma at the same time made the words, the lines, the whole speeches even, 
flow into an ensemble vaster than themselves, at the margins of which it was a 
joy to see them obliged to stop, to break off; thus it is that poet takes pleasure 
in making the word which is about to spring forth pause for a moment at the 
rhyming point, and a composer in merging the various words of the libretto in 
a single rhythm which runs counter to them and yet sweeps them along. Thus 
into the prose of the modern playwright as into the verse of Racine, Berma 
contrived 4 to introduce those vast images of grief, nobility, passion, which 
were the masterpieces of her own personal art, and in which she could be 
                                                 
4 “savait” in the original.  
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recognised as in the portraits which he has made of different sitters, we 
recognise a painter.” (Proust 1921/1922; p. 59-60) 
From this perspective, what the composer made was the material. Thus, the 
performance does not derive from examining the musical structure but is created from it. 
Then, for the performer, knowing the musical structure is to know the material that she 
must dominate in order to make her own work. Of course, there are finer materials than 
others, as there are materials with more potential than others. But the value of the 
performative work depends more on the performative creative labour with such a material 
than on the material itself. In chapter 7 the relationship between composition and 
performance, considering the former as a material for building the latter, is explored. This 
relationship, based on Adorno’s idea of the Dialectics of the Material, is supported by the 
notion of Transposition (coming from the field of the semiotics of the mass media). 
Chapter 7 opens up both of them. 
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Appendix V - A performance, The Pianist, by Roman 
Polansky 
This appendix presents some materials used together with the musical structure of 
Chopin’s Ballade in G minor, in a particular transposition of this piece to a film. This 
description aims to contribute both to a better understanding of the concept of transposition 
and to an illustration of the notions of material and dialectic material-transposition. The 
idea is to illustrate that the genitive composition-performance relationship not only 
involves some aspects of the musical structure (as shown in chapter 10) but also many 
other materials concerning the historical, visual, social and cultural contexts. As film has a 
long history of transpositions, the notion itself may be more apprehensible if undertaken 
from this perspective. Understanding the complexity of transposition in music performance 
after this may be easier. 
As presented in chapter 10, the transposition is a scene from the film The Pianist, 
by Roman Polansky (2002). The film tells the true story of a young Polish Jewish pianist - 
Wladyslaw Szpilman - during World War II. He was first imprisoned in the Warsaw 
Ghetto, but soon escaped from the terrible destiny of the extermination camps, fleeing 
from the Nazis already in retreat. The scene that will be considered is decisive for the 
story’s development: Szpilman, who is fleeing from the destruction with which the Nazi 
army is devastating Warsaw in its retreat, faces a completely desolate city in which he 
looks for refuge, shelter and food. He finds shelter in a house that miraculously remains 
upright and relatively inhabitable. Precisely for this reason, it is also chosen by a German 
officer, Captain Wilm Hosenfeld, to establish logistic resources. In his inspection of the 
house, Hosenfeld discovers Szpilman and interrogates him. Hosenfeld discovers the 
pianist’s profession and in distrust asks him to play the piano that still survived in the 
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room. The piece that Szpilman chooses is the Ballade in G minor. The scene is crucial 
because, in the first place, it defines Szpilman’s destiny but in addition synthesizes the 
work’s content as far as the relation between music and life (or more specifically survival) 
and the waning of power relations while forcing an opposition between art and destruction. 
In addition it is a pivotal point in the psychology of both characters, a transformation that 
is perceived throughout the scene. 
 
The materials that Polansky used to carry out the scene are abundant and the way in which 
these materials are organized in the finished artistic creation is exceedingly complex. One 
of these is the composition, what Chopin composed, involving all the structural and 
narrative characteristics that were analysed in chapter 10. The sole choice of the Chopin 
piece by Polansky implies the participation of a series of other materials that are also 
important in the construction of the cinematographic performance. Some of them are of a 
historical nature. For example, Chopin as a cult figure for the Polish national identity, 
probably derived from Chopin’s political ideas about the contemporary situation of Poland 
being divided between the neighbouring military powers (Russia, Prussia and Austria). 
This image was generated even during Chopin’s lifetime. Already by the 1820s Chopin 
had begun to be considered a national composer in Poland. This fact reflects the main 
changes in 19th century performance, related to the musical production migrating from the 
courts to the bourgeois centres in the large cities.  
Other materials derived from the choice of the Ballade are related to more 
exclusively musicological questions. One of them is the Slavic folkloric connotations the 
ballade has (see chapter 10) as opposed Germanic culture. Also important in this pianist’s 
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story, is Chopin’s place and that of his work as emerging from the common idea of him as 
the apotheosis of the Piano. 
“Chopin´s achievement was to refine and give new substance to the 
conventions of popular pianism, enriching those conventions by drawing upon 
elements from other – and weightier – musical worlds. In this way he achieved 
a unique synthesis of the public and private, the popular and private, the 
popular and the significant. When it came to extended forms that meant a 
synthesis of the formal methods of popular concert music – above all the 
alternation of bravura figuration and melodic paragraphs based on popular 
genres – and the sonata based designs and organic tonal structures of the 
Austro-German tradition. The first Scherzo and the first Ballade were the 
earliest fruits of that synthesis”. (Björling 2002; p. 14)  
But in addition to these materials, Polansky also is compelled to work with 
elements derived from the context of the narration. For example, Szpilman’s personal 
history, the epic of his survival, the context of the war, the Holocaust, and all this within 
the particular emotional situation of the encounter with Captain Hosenfeld. 
In addition to all these musical, historical and narrative materials Polansky has a 
complete range of materials belonging to the transposition’s cinematographic support: 
cinematographic time, lighting, sound, montage. These are only some of the elements in 
play for a cinematographic creation. 
In addition to all of this, a series of social and cultural considerations of the current 
moment of cinematographic production also functions as material. In particular, the 
aesthetic and socio-political reception conditions at the moment of the film’s realization 
are undoubtedly also materials on which the filmmaker works. For example, the film’s 
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reception would have been different if Hollywood had not produced Steven Spielberg’s 
Schindler's List earlier. Probably, Polansky worked with that – even unconsciously – when 
making his film. 
Surely many more materials were dealt with. Many of them linked to Polansky’s 
personal concerns: his own history, feeling, ideology, etc. By all accounts, the way in 
which all these materials take part in carrying out the art work is so complex that any 
attempt to describe it exhaustively is chimerical by definition. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to appreciate a few clear manifestations of the idea of a 
dialectic of the materials in this scene. For example, during the scene only a short fragment 
of Chopin’s complete composition is heard. This fact implies a choice, a decision made 
before the musical material. Thus, it goes from measure 40 to measure 45, and soon, from 
the first beat of measure 49 directly to the second beat of measure 209. It is possible to see 
here how two of the materials – the musical structure of Chopin’s Ballade and the 
cinematographic time – are operating dialectically at this point. The duration of Chopin’s 
complete score went against the very essence of the film’s cinematographic time. The logic 
of this dialectic achieves that nobody is surprised when the said jump occurs. This use of 
Chopin’s composition is believable in this context, there is therefore no need to criticize it, 
nor does it feel strange. What Polansky did is perfectly comprehensible (and highly 
artistic) from the point of view of the materials he had at his disposal. In this case, not only 
the structural characteristics but also many other narrative components allow him to 
perform this musical montage without jeopardising the sense of unity. When speaking of 
narrative in the Ballade, the passage that begins at measure 36 was mentioned as 
narratively leading the established order towards its dissolution. This passage accelerates 
the movements, and precipitates the character towards the apotheotic area (see chapter 10). 
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In short, this passage clearly manifests the way in which the artist built the scene using the 
materials dialectically. 
The scenes that precede the one analysed here also show this dialectic. For 
example, from the moment the character of Szpilman leaves his hiding place (being 
destroyed by the German army) until he meets Hosenfeld, a very extended action sequence 
takes place in which only “the sound of war” is heard (bombs, shots, fire, breakages, 
marching soldiers and speaking or shouting voices without recognizable words). In that 
sound context, only three moments are extremely contrasting. In the first, the pianist 
imagines playing the piano (a passage from the Ballade in G minor) while showing a street 
of the city that was the scene of happier moments, introducing the identification of the 
musical piece with “Polishness, things familiar, that which is one’s own.” In the second, 
the pianist goes out for the first time to the totally devastated city while an old folk melody 
is played by a clarinet. Here the devastated context deepens the music’s folkloric feeling. 
In the third, the pianist hides in the attic of the house and listens to a piano. It is 
Beethoven’s Sonata number 14, a quasi fantasy in C# minor. Without seeing him, we 
already know this other pianist is German. 
440 
References 
Abbate, C. (1991). Unsung Voices. Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth 
Century. New Jersey: University of Princeton Press. 
Abler, W. L. (1989). On the particulate principle of self-diversifying systems. Journal of 
Social and Biological Structures, 12, 237-248. 
Adorno, T. W. (1930). Reaktion und Fortschritt [Reacción y Progreso (J. Casanovas, 
trans.) Barcelona: Tusquets, 1970]. Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Adorno, T. W. (1958). Philosophie der Neuen Musik [Filosofía de la Nueva Música (A.L. 
Bixio, trans.) Buenos Aires: SUR, 1966]. Frankfurt/Main: Europäische 
Verlagsanstalt GmbH.  
Agawu, K. (1994). Ambiguity in tonal music: a preliminary study. In A. Pople (ed.), 
Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
86-107. 
Almen, B. (2005). Narrative archetypres: a critique, theory, and methods of narrative 
analysis. Journal of Music Theory, vol. 47/1, 1 – 39. 
Arom, S. (2000). Prologomena to a biomusicology. In N. L. Wallin; B. Merker y S. Brown 
(eds.), The Origins of Music. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 27- 29. 
Baroni, M. (1997). Emotional aspects of singing voice. In A. Gabrielsson (ed.), 
Proceedings of the III Triennial ESCOM Conference. Uppsala: University of 
Uppsala. 484-489. 
Beebe, B.; Knoblauch, S.; Rustin, J. and Sorter, D. (2003). I. Introduction: A systems view. 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, vol. 13, No. 6, 743-776. 
441 
Beebe, B.; Sorter, D.; Rustin, J. and Knoblauch, S. (2003). A comparison of Meltzoff, 
Trevarthen, and Stern. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, vol. 13, No. 6, p. 777-804. 
Bellman, J. (2000). Chopin and his imitators: notated emulation of the “true style” of 
performance. 19th Century Music, vol. XXIV/ 2, 149-160. 
Berry, W. (1987). Structural Functions in Music. New York: Dover. 
Berry, W. (1989). Musical Structure and Performance. Boston: Yale University Press. 
Bertuccelli Pappi, M. (1993). Che Cos’e la Pragmatica [Qué es la Pragmática (N. Cortés 
López, trans.) Barcelona: Paidós, 1996]. Milano: Gruppo Editoriales Fabbri, 
Bompiani, Sonzogno, Etas S.p.A. 
Bharucha, J. J. (1984). Anchoring effects in music: The resolution of dissonance. Cognitive 
Psychology, 16, 485-518. 
Bigand, E. (1990). Abstraction of two forms of underlying structure in a tonal melody. 
Psychology of Music, 18, 1, 45-59. 
Bigand, E. (1994). Contributions de la musique aus recherches sur la cognition auditive 
humain. In S. Mc Adams y E. Bigand (eds.) Penser les Sons. Psychologie Cognitive 
de l'Audition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 249-298. 
Björling, D (2002). Chopin and the G minor Ballade. D-uppsats Musik, 2002:01, 1-55. 
Blanco, F. (2002). Psicología y experiencia estética: trampantojos para pensar. Paper 
presented at the First International Seminar of Psychology and Aesthetics. 
Miraflores de la Sierra, Madrid. January, 2002.  
Blanco, F. and Castro, J. (2005). Psicología, arte y experiencial estética. Manual para 
náufragos. Estudios de Psicología, vol. 26 (2), 131-137. 
442 
Blasius, L. D. (1996). Schenker’s Argument and The Claims of Music Theory. Cambridge: 
University Press. 
Boltz, M. (1992). Temporal accent structure and the remembering of filmed narratives. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, vol. 18, 
No. 1, 90-105. 
Bowen, J. A. (1999). Finding the music in musicology: Performance history and musical 
works. In N. Cook and M. Everist (eds.), Rethinking Music. Oxford: University 
Press. 424-451. 
Bråten, S. (1998a) (ed.). Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. 
Cambridge: University Press. 
Bråten, S. (1998b). Intersubjetive communion and understanding: development and 
perturbation. In S. Bråten (ed.), Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in 
Early Ontogeny. Cambridge: University Press. 372- 382. 
Bråten, S. (1998c). Infant learning by alterocentric participation: the reverse of egocentric 
observation in autism. In S. Bråten (ed.), Intersubjective Communication and 
Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge: University Press. 105-124. 
Bregman, A. S. (1990). Auditory Scene Analysis. Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Brown, S. W. and Boltz, M. G. (2002). Attentional processes in time perception: Effects of 
mental workload and event structure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, vol 28 No. 3, 600-615. 
Bruner, J. (1986). Actual Minds, Posible Worlds [Realidad Mental y Mundos Posibles. Los 
Actos de la Imaginación que Dan Sentido a la Experiencia (B. López, trans.) 
Barcelona: Gedisa, 2004]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
443 
Bruner, J. (1991). The narrative construction of reality. Critical Inquiry, 18.1, 1-22. 
Bühler, K. (1933). Das System an der Geschichte aufgezeigt [Teoría de la Expresión (H. 
Rodríguez Saenz, trans.) Mardid: Alianza, 1980]. Stuttgart: Gustav Fisher Verlag. 
Burkhart, C. (1973). The polyphonic melodic line of’s B-minor Prelude. In T. Higgings 
(ed.), Chopin’s Preludes. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Bustamante, C. (2002). La práctica napolitana del “partimento”. In S. Furnó y M. Arturi 
(eds.), Encuentro de Investigación en Arte y Diseño, EnIAD. La Plata: UNLP. 
Cadwallader, A. and Gagné, D. (1998). Analysis of Tonal Music. A Schenkerian Approach. 
Oxford: University Press. 
Canazza, S and Rodá, A. (1999). Analisi acustiche e percettive dell'interpretazione 
musicale. Bollettino di analisi e teoria musicale, 6 - 1, 61-82. 
Caplin, W. E. (1998). Classical Form. A Theory of Formal Functions for Instrumental 
Music of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven. Oxford: University Press. 
Carpentier, A. (1980). Ese Músico que Llevo Dentro. La Habana: Letras Cubanas. 
Castellano, M. A.; Bharucha, J. J. and Krumhanls, C. L. (1984). Tonal hierarchies in the 
music of North India. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 394-412. 
Castro, J.; Pizarroso, N. and Morgade-Salgado, M. (2005). La psicologízación del ámbito 
estético entre mediados del siglo XIX y principios del Siglo XX. Estudios de 
Psicología, 26 (2), 195-219. 
Chatman, S. (1981). What novels can do that films can’t (and vice versa). In W. J. T. 
Mitchell (Ed.) On Narrative. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 117-136. 
444 
Clarke, E. F. (1985). Structure and expression in rhythmic performance. In P. Howell, R. 
West and I. Cross (eds.), Musical Structure and Cognition. London: Academic 
Press, 209-236. 
Clarke, E. F. (1988). Generative principles in music performance. In J. Sloboda (ed.) 
Generative Processes in Music. The Psychology of Performance, Improvisation and 
Composition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-26. 
Clarke, E. F. (1989a). Issues in language and music. Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 4, 
9-22. 
Clarke, E. F. (1989b). The perception of expressive timing in music. Psychological 
Research, 51, 2-9.  
Clarke, E. F. (1995). Expression in performance: generativity, perception and semiosis. In 
J. Rink (ed.), The Practice of Performance. Studies in Musical Interpretation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 21-54. 
Clarke, E. F. (1998). The semiotics of expression in musical performance. Contemporary 
Music Review, vol 17 part 2, 87-102. 
Clarke, E. F. (2001). Meaning and the specification of motion in music. Musicæ Scientiæ, 
5 – 2, 213-234. 
Clayton, M; Herbert, T. and Middleton, R (2003) (eds.). The Cultural Study of Music. New 
York and London: Routledge. 
Clayton, M; Sagel, R and Hill, U (2004). In time with the music: The concept of 
entrainment and its significance for ethnomusicology. ESEM Counter point, vol. 1, 
pp. 1-45 
445 
Clynes, M. (1983). Expressive microstructure in music, linked to living qualities. In J. 
Sundberg (ed.), Studies of Music Performance. Stockholm: Royal Swedish 
Academy of Music, 76-181. 
Clynes, M. (1995). Microstructural musical linguistics: composers’ pulses are liked most 
by the best musicians. Cognition, 55, 269-310. 
Cobley, P. (2001) (ed.). The Routledge Companion to Semiotics and Linguistics. London: 
Routledge. 
Cohn, R. and Dempster, D. (1992). Hierarchical unity, plural unities: toward a 
reconcialition. In K. Bergeron and P. V. Bohlman (eds.) Disciplining Music. 
Musicology and Its Canons. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 
156-181. 
Cone, E. T. (1968). Musical Form and Musical Performance. New York: Norton & 
Norton. 
Cone, E. T. (1995). The pianist as critic. In J. Rink (ed.), The Practice of Performance. 
Studies in Musical Interpretation. Cambridge: University Press, 241-254. 
Cook, N. (1987a). A Guide to Musical Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cook, N. (1987b). The perception of large-scale tonal closure. Music Perception, vol. 5 
No. 2, 197-206. 
Cook, N. (1987c). Structure and performance in Bach’s C major Prelude (WTC1). An 
empirical study. Music Analysis, 6 (3), 257-272. 
Cook, N. (1989). Music theory and “good comparison”: a Viennese perspective. Journal of 
Music Theory, 33, 117 – 141. 
Cook, N. (1990). Music, Imagination and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
446 
Cook, N. (1998a). Music. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cook, N. (1998b). Analysing Music Multimedia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cook, N. (1999). Words about music, or analysis versus performance. In F. Agsteribbe and 
P. Dejans (eds.), Theory into Practice. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 9–52. 
Cook, N. (2003). Music as Performance. En M. Clayton, T. Herbert and R. Middleton 
(Eds). The Cultural Study of Music. A Critical Introduction. New York and 
Londres: Routledge, 204-214. 
Cooper, G. and Meyer, L. B. (1960). The Rhythmic Structure of Music. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Correa Salgado, A. (2001). Contributo para a comprensão de alguns dos processos 
perceptivos e cognitivos implicados no reconhecimento da expressão da emoção 
facial e vocal no canto. In F. Shifres (ed.) La Música en la Mente. Buenos Aires: 
SACCoM.  
Cortot, A. (1934). Cours d’Interprétation [Curso de Interpretación (R. Carman, trans.) 
Buenos Aires: Ricordi, 1954] Paris: R. Legouix Librairie Musicale. 
Cross, I. (1998). Music analysis and music perception. Music Analysis, 17/I, 3-20. 
Cross, I. (2001). Music, cognition, culture and evolution. Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences, vol 930, 28-42. 
Dahlhaus, C. (1978). Die Idee der Absoluten Musik [La Idea de la Música Absoluta (R. 
Barce Benito, trans.), Barcelona: Idea Books, 1999].Kassel: Bärenreiter. 
Davidson, J. W. (1993). Visual perception of performance manner in the movements of 
solo musicians. Psychology of Music, 21 (2), 103. 113. 
447 
Davidson, J. W. (2001). The role of the body in the production and perception of solo 
vocal performance: A case study of Annie Lennox. Musicæ Scientiæ, vol. V, No. 2, 
235-256. 
Davidson, J. W. (2002). Developing the ability to perform. In J. Rink (ed.), Musical 
Performance. A Guide to Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
89-101. 
Davidson, L. (1985). Tonal structures of children’s early songs. Music Perception, 2 (3), 
361-74. 
DEA Dirección de Educación Artística (2003). La educación artística en el sistema 
educativo. Documentos de trabajo. [Artistic education in the educational system]. 
In www.abc.gov.ar/LaInsititucion/ SistemaEducativo/Artistica. (pages viewed on 
27.09.2006). 
DeBellis, M. (2003). Schenkerian analysis and the intelligent listener. The Monist, vol. 86 
No. 4, 579-607. 
Deliège, C. (2000). The music work as discourse and text. Musicæ Scientiæ, Vol. IV No. 2, 
213-225. 
Deliège, I. (1987). Grouping conditions in listening to music: An approach to Lerdahl & 
Jackendoff’s grouping preference rules. Music Perception, vol. 4 No. 4, 325-360. 
Deliège, I. and El Ahmadi, A. (1990). Mechanisms of cue extraction in musical groupings: 
A study of perception of Sequenza VI for viola solo by Luciano Berio. Psychology 
of Music, 18, 18-44. 
Deutsch, D. and Feroe, J. (1981). The internal representation of pitch sequences in tonal 
music. Psychological Review, vol. 88 No. 6, 503-522. 
448 
Dibben, N. (1994). The cognitive reality of hierarchic structure in tonal and atonal music. 
Music Perception, 12 No 1, 1-25. 
Dissanayake, E. (1992). Homo Aestheticus. Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press. 
Dissanayake, E. (2000a). Antecedents of the temporal arts in early mother-infant 
interaction. In N. L. Wallin; B. Merker and S. Brown (eds.), The Origins of Music. 
Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 389-410. 
Dissanayake, E. (2000b). Art and Intimacy. How the Arts Began. Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press. 
Dissanayake, E. (2001). Becoming homo aestheticus: sources of aesthetic imagination in 
mother-infant interactions. Substance, vol. 30 (1/2), 85-103. 
Dissanayake, E. and Miall, D. (2003).The poetics of babytalk. Human Nature, 14 (4), 337-
364.  
Distler, J. (2006). Comment on Pollini’s Performance. In http://www.this-is-
great.com/info/xbffffsxrsxsxu. (pages viewed on 30.05.2006). 
Drake, C. (1993). Perceptual and performed accents in musical sequences. Bulletin of the 
Psychonomic Society, 31, 107-110. 
Drake, C. and Palmer, C. (1993). Accent structures in music performances. Music 
Perception, vol. 10 No. 3, 343-378. 
Ducrot, O. (1972). Lenguaje y acción. In O. Ducrot and T. Todorov (eds.) Dictionnaire 
Encyclopédique des Sciences du Langage [Diccionario Enciclopédico de las 
Ciencias del Lenguaje (E. Pezzoni, trans.), México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1974, 380-
386] Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
449 
Dunn, J. (1998). Siblings, emotion and the development of understanding. In S. Bråten 
(ed.), Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 158-168. 
Dunsby, J. (1989). Guest editorial: performance and analysis of music. Music Analysis, 
8:1-2, 5-20. 
Dunsby, J. (1995). Performing Music. Shared Concerns. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Dutton, D. (2003). Aesthetics and evolutionary psychology. J. Levinson (ed.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Aesthetics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 693-705. 
Eco, U. (1976). A Theory of Semiotics [Tratado de Semiótica General (C. Manzano, trans.). 
Barcelona: Lumen, 2000], Milano: Valentino Bompiani & Co. 
Eco, U. (1979). Lector in Fabula. [Lector in Fabula. La Cooperación Interpretativa en el 
Texto Narrativo (R. Pochtar, trans), Barcelona: Lumen, 1999], Milano: Cada 
Editrice Valentino Bompiani & C.S.p.A. 
Eco, U. (1990). I Ilmiti dell'Interpretazione [Los Límites de la Interpretación (H. Lozano, 
trans) Barcelona: Lumen, 1998], Milano: Gruppo Editoriale Fabbri, Bompiani, 
Sonzogno, Etas S.p.A. 
Eco, U. (1992). Interpretation and Overinterpretation [Interpretación y 
Sobreinterpretación (J. G. López Guix, trans.), Cambrigde: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995], Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Epstein, D. (1995). Shaping Time. Music, the Brain and Performance. New York: 
Schirmer Books 
450 
Español (in press). Live movement in symbol formation. In J. Valsiner and A. Rosa. (eds.) 
The Cambridge Handbook of Social-Cultural Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press  
Español, S. and Shifres, F. (2003). Música, gesto y danza en el segundo año de vida. 
Consideraciones para su estudio. In I. Martínez and C. Mauleón (Eds.) Música y 
Ciencia. El Rol de la Cultura y la Educación en el Desarrollo de la Cognición 
Musical. La Plata: SACCoM. In CD-ROM. 
Felman, J; Epstein, D and Richards, W. (1992). Force dynamics of tempo change in music. 
Music Perception, 10 (2), 185-204. 
Ferris, D. (2003). Public performance and private understanding: Clara Wieck’s concerts in 
Berlin. Journal of the American Musicological Society, vol. 56 No. 2, 351-408. 
Fessel, P. (1996). Una gramática generativa de la superficie musical. Arte e Investigación, 
1, 47-53. 
Fink, R. (1999). Going flat: post-hierarchical music theory and the musical surface. In N. 
Cook and M. Everist (eds.), Rethinking Music. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
102-137. 
Fogel, A. (1999). A relational perspective of the development of self and emotion. In H. A. 
Bosma and E. S. Kunnen (eds) Identity and Emotion. A Self Organizational 
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Forsey, J. (2003). Art and identity. Expanding narrative theory. Philosophy Today, vol. 
47.2, 176-190. 
451 
Forte, A. and Gilbert, S. E. (1982). Introduction to Schenkerian Analysis [Introducción al 
Análisis Schenkeriano (P. Purroy Chicot, trans) Barcelona: Labor, 1992]. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Fraisse, P. (1982). Rhythm and tempo. In D. Deutsch (ed.), The Psychology of Music, New 
York: Academic Press, 149-180. 
Friberg, A. (1995). Matching the rule parameters of phrase arch to performances of 
“Traumerei”: A preliminary study. In A. Friberg and J. Sundberg (eds.), 
Proceedings of The KTH Symposium on Grammars For Music Performance. 
Stockholm: Department of Speech Communication and Music Acoustics, 37-44. 
Friberg, A. and Sundberg, J. (1999). Does music performance allude to locomotion? A 
model of final ritardandi derived from measurements of stopping runners. Journal 
of the Acoustical Society of America, 105 (3), 1469-1484. 
Friberg, A. and Sundberg, J. (eds.) (1995). Proceedings of The KTH Symposium on 
Grammars For Music Performance. Stockholm: Department of Speech 
Communication and Music Acoustics. 
Gabrielsson, A. (2001). Emotions in strong experiences with music. In P. Juslin and J. 
Sloboda (eds.) Music and Emotion. Theory and Research. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 431-449. 
Gabrielsson, A. and Lindström, E. (2001). The influence of musical structure on emotional 
expression. In P. Juslin and Sloboda (eds.), Music and Emotion. Theory and 
Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 223-248. 
Gallagher, S. (2001). The practice of mind: theory, simulation or interaction?. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 8 N° 5-7, 83-108. 
452 
Gembris, H. and Davidson, J. W. (2002). Environmental influences. In R. Parncutt and G. 
E. McPherson (eds.), The Science and Psychology of Music Performance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 17-30. 
Godlovitch, S. (1998). Musical Performance. A Philosophical Study. London: Routledge. 
Goehr, L. (1992). The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works. An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Music. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gómez, J. C. (1998). Do concepts of intersubjectivity apply to non-human primates? In S. 
Bråten (ed.), Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 245-259. 
Gopnik, A. and Meltzoff, A. (1997). Words, Thoughts, and Theories. [Palabras, 
Pensamientos y Teorías (M. Sotillo and I. Saul, trans.). Madrid: Visor. 1997], 
Cambridge, MA.: Bradford, MIT Press. 
Grice, H. P. (1989). In The Way of Words. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press.   
Guck, M. A. (1991). Two types of metaphoric transfer. In J. C. Kassler (ed.), Metaphor - A 
Musical Dimension. Sydney: Gordon & Breach Publishers, 1-12. 
Hamman, M. (1999). From symbol to semiotic: representation, signification and the 
composition of music interaction. Journal of New Music Research, 28 (2), 90-104. 
Hargreaves, D. J; MacDonald, R. and Miell, D. (2005). How do people communicate using 
music? In D. Meill, R. MacDonald and D. Hargreaves (eds.), Musical 
Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-25. 
453 
Hatten, R. S. (2001). Musical gesture. Lectures Cyber Semiotic Institute, In 
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/cyber/hatout.html. (pages viewed on 
30.12.2006). 
Hegel, J. G. F. (1818). Vorlesungen Über die Ästhetik [t. I Estética, (Bénard, C. trans.) 2a 
ed. Madrid: Daniel Jorro, 1908]. 
Horton, T. (1998). Some Formal Problems with Schenkerian Representations of Tonal 
Structures. Unpublished MPhil Thesis. University of Cambridge. 
Hunter, M. (2005). “To play as if from the soul of the composer”: the idea of the performer 
in early romantic aesthetics. Journal of the American Musicological Society, vol. 
58, 357-398. 
Hunter, M. (2006, February). Self-expressive fidelity to the work as (only) a historical 
ideal. Paper presented at The Reflective Conservatoire. An International 
Conference. Guildhall School of Music and Drama and SEMPRE. London. 
Huron, D. (2001). Tone and voice: A derivation of the rules of voice-leading from 
perceptual principles. Music Perception 19 (1), 1-64. 
Imberty, M. (1981). Les Écritures du Temps. Semantique Psychologique de la Musique. 
Tome 2. París: Dunod. 
Imberty, M. (1992a). Stabilité et instabilité: comment láuditeur organise-t-il la progression 
d'une æuvre musicale. In R. Dalmonte and M. Baroni (eds.) Secondo Convegno 
Europeo di Analisi Musicale. Trento: Universita' degli Studi di Trento, 91-104. 
Imberty, M. (1992b). De quelques problemès méthodologiques dans l’approche 
psychologique expérimentale de l’interprétation musicale. In R. Dalmonte and M. 
454 
Baroni (eds.) Secondo Convegno Europeo di Analisi Musicale. Trento: Universita' 
degli Studi di Trento, 41-49. 
Imberty, M. (1997a). Peut-on parler sérieusement de narrativité en musique?. In Alf 
Gabrielsson (ed.), Proceedings of the Third Triennial ESCOM Conference. 
Uppsala: University of Uppsala, 23-32. 
Imberty, M. (1997b). Formes de la répétition et formes des affects du temps dans 
l‘expression musicale. Musicæ Scientiæ, 1-1, 33-62. 
Imberty, M. (2001). Nuevas perspectivas en psicología de la música. La problemática del 
tiempo continuo y del tiempo discontinuo en la música del siglo XX. In F. Shifres 
(ed.), Actas de la Primera Reunión Anual de SACCoM. Buenos Aires, SACCoM. 
Imberty, M. (2002). La musica e il bambino. In J. J. Nattiez (ed.), Enciclopedia della 
Musica. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 477-495. 
Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Jackendoff, R. (1987). Consciousness and the Computational Mind [La Conciencia y la 
Mente Computacional (A. Ardid Gumiel, trans.) Madrid: Visor, 1998] Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press.  
Jackson, R. (2005). Schoenberg as performer of his own music. Journal of Musicological 
Research, 24, 49-69. 
Jaffe, K. S. (1980). The concept of genius: its changing role in eighteenth century French 
aesthetics. Journal of The History of Ideas, vol. 41 No. 4, 579-599. 
Jameson, J. and Gentner, D. (2003). Mundane comparisons can facilitate relational 
understanding. Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive 
Science Society. 
455 
Jiranek, J. (1992). Ein Beitrag zu Nattiez Analyse der Musikanalysen. In Rossana 
Dalmonte and Mario Baroni (eds) Secondo Convegno Europeo de Analisi Musicale. 
Trento: Universita degli Studi di Trento, 577-584. 
Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and 
Reason. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Johnson, P. (1999). Performance and the listening experience: Bach’s “Erbarme Dich”. In 
F. Agsteribbe and P. Dejans (eds.), Theory into Practice. Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 55-101. 
Jones, M. R. (1992). Attending to musical events. In M. R. Jones and S. Holleran (eds.), 
Cognitive Bases of Musical Communication. Washington: American Psychological 
Association, 91-110. 
Jones, M. R. and Boltz, M. (1989). Dynamic attending and responses to time. 
Psychological Review, vol. 96, No. 3, 459-491. 
Juslin, P. N. (1997). Emotional communication in music performance: A funtionalist 
perspective and some data. Music Perception, vol. 14 No. 4, 383-418. 
Juslin, P. N. (1998). A Functionalist Perspective on Emotional communication in Music 
Performance. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. 
Juslin, P. N. (2005). From mimesis to catharsis:expression, perception, and induction of 
emotion in music. In D. Meill, R. MacDonald and D. Hargreaves (eds.), Musical 
Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 85-115. 
Keiler, A. (1978a). Bernstein’s The Unanswered Question and the problem of musical 
competence. The Musical Quarterly, 68, 195–222. 
456 
Keiler, A. (1978b). The empiricist illusion: Narmour’s Beyond Schenkerism. Perspectives 
of New Music, 17, 161–195. 
Keller, H. (1955). Phrasierung und Artikulation. Ein Beitrag zu einer Sprachlehre der 
Musik. [Phrasing and Articularion. A Contribution to a Rhetoric of Music. (L. 
Gerdine, trans.) New York: W. W . Norton & Company, 1973], Kassel und Basel, 
Im Bärenreiter Verlag. 
Kendall, R. A. and Carterette, E. C. (1990). The communication of musical expression. 
Music Perception, vol 8 No. 2, 129-164. 
Kim, Sung-do (n.d.). The aesthetic phenomenology of abduction. In Arbeitskreises für 
Abduktionsforschung. www. http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth/abdindd.htm (pages 
viewed on 20.06.2002). 
Kirschner, S. R. (2003). On the varieties of intersubjective experience. Culture & 
Psychology, vol. 9(3), 277-286. 
Kivy, P. (1995). Authenticities. Philosophical Reflections on Musical Performance. Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press. 
Klein, M. (2004). Chopin’s Fourth Ballade as musical narrative. Music Theory Spectrum, 
26, 23 – 55. 
Kronman, U. and Sundberg, J. (1987). Is the musical ritard an allusion to physical motion?. 
In A. Gabreilsson (ed.), Action and perception in Rhythm and Music. Stockholm: 
Publications issued by the Royal Swedish Academy of Music No. 55, 57-68. 
Krumhansl, C. L. (1990). Cognitive Foundations of Musical Pitch. Oxford: University 
Press. 
457 
Krumhansl, C. L. (1995). Music psychology and music theory: problems and prospects. 
Music Theory Spectrum, 17, 53-80. 
Krumhansl, C. L. (1996). A perceptual analysis of Mozart’s Piano Sonata, K 282: 
segmentation, tension, and new ideas. Music Perception. Vol. 13, Nº 3, 401-432. 
Krumhansl, C. L. and Schenck, D. L. (1997). Can dance reflect the structural and 
expressive qualities of music? Musicæ Scientiæ, 1-1, 63-85. 
Kugiumutzakis, G. (1998). Neonatal imitation in the intersubjective companion space. In 
S. Bråten (ed.), Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 63-88. 
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh. New York: Basic Books. 
Lamont, A. (1998). Music, education and the development of pitch perception: The role of 
context, age and musical experience. Psychology of Music, 26, 7-25. 
Larson, S. (1997). The problem of prolongation in tonal music: terminology, perception, 
and expressive meaning. Journal of Music Theory, 41.1, 101-136. 
Lerdahl, F. (1988a). Cognitive constraints on compositional systems. In J. A. Sloboda 
(Ed.) Generative Processes in Music. The Psychology of Performance, 
Improvisation and Composition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 231-259. 
Lerdahl, F. (1988b). Tonal pitch space. Music Perception, Vol 5 No. 3, 315-350. 
458 
Lerdahl, F. (1991). Underlying musical schemata. In P. Howell, R. West and I. Cross 
(eds.), Representing Musical Structure. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 273-290. 
Lerdahl, F. (1997). Issues in prolongational theory: A response to Larson. Journal of Music 
Theory, 41.1, 141-155. 
Lerdahl, F. (1998). Prolongational structure and schematic form. Musicæ Scientiæ, Special 
Issue, 27-41. 
Lerdahl, F. (2001). Tonal Pitch Space. Oxford: University Press. 
Lerdahl, F. and Jackendoff, R. (1983). A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press. 
Lester, J. (1995). Performance and analysis: Interaction and interpretation. In J. Rink (ed.), 
The Practice of Performance. Studies in Musical Interpretation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 197-216. 
Levy, J. (1995). Beginning-ending ambiguity: consequences of performance choices. In J. 
Rink (ed.), The Practice of Performance. Studies in Musical Interpretation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 150-169. 
Levy, J. M. (2001). The power of the performance. The Journal of Musicology, vol. XVIII 
No. 1, 31-55. 
Lewkowicz, D. J. (1992). Infants' response to temporally-based intersensory equivalence: 
The effect of synchronous sounds on visual preferences for moving stimuli. Infant 
Behavior and Development, 15, 297-324. 
Lewkowicz, D. J. and Kraebel, K. (2004). The value of multimodal redundancy in the 
development of intersensory perception. In G. Calvert, C. Spence, and B. Stein 
(eds.), Handbook of Multisensory Processing. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
459 
Lipscomb, S. D. and Tolchinsky, D. E. (2005). The role of music communication in 
cinema. In D. Meill, R. MacDonald and D. Hargreaves (eds.), Musical 
Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 383-404. 
Liska, M. M. (2006). Un recorrido por la experiencia musical de bailarines de tango. In F. 
Shifres and G. Vargas (eds.), Sonido, Imagen y Movimiento en la Experiencia 
Musical. Buenos Aires: SACCoM, 205-214. 
Macdonald, C. (2002). Schumann’s piano practice: Technical mastery and artistic ideal. 
The Journal of Musicology, vol. XIX, issue 4, 527-563. 
Magarshack, D. (1968). Introducción a El Arte Escénico de Konstantin Stanislavsky. 
Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno. 
Malloch, S. (1999/2000). Mothers and infants and communicative musicality. Musicæ 
Scientiæ, Special Issue, 29-57. 
Malloch, S. (2002). Musicality: The art of human gesture. In C Stevens, D. Burham, G. 
McPherson, E. Schubert and J. Renwick (eds.), Proceedings of the 7th 
International Conference of Music Perception and Cognition. Sydney: University 
of Western Sydney, 143-146. 
Martínez, A. (1999). Las "intuiciones del oyente" en perspectiva. Algunas notas sobre el 
rol de las teorías en la percepción y cognición de la música tonal. Arte e 
Investigación, 3, 46-52. 
Martínez, A. (2002). La noción de “estructura” en música: algunas consideraciones sobre 
la relación entre teoría y experiencia musical. In S. Furnó and M. Arturi, (eds.). 
Actas del Encuentro de investigación en Arte y Diseño (ENIAD) Iberoamericano 
2002. La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 44-47. 
460 
Martinez, I. C. (2001). The use of prolongation in music attending. Paper presented at the 
SMPC 2001 Conference, Kingston, Ontario: Queens University. 
Martínez, I. C. (2002). Prolongation in music attending. A click localization study. In C 
Stevens, D. Burham, G. McPherson, E. Schubert and J. Renwick (eds.), 
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference of Music Perception and 
Cognition. Sydney: University of Western Sydney. 
Martínez, I. C. (2005). La audición imaginativa y el pensamiento metafórico en la música. 
In F. Shifres (ed.), Actas de las 1ras Jornadas de Educación Auditiva. La Plata: 
CEA. UNLP, 47-72. 
Martínez, I. and Shifres, F. (1999a). Music education and the development of structural 
hearing: A study with children In M. Barrett; G. Mc Phearson and R. Smith (eds.) 
Children and Music: Developmental Perspectives. Proceedings of the Second 
International Musical Education Research Symposium. Lounceston: University of 
Tasmania, 184-190. 
Martínez, I. and Shifres, F. (2000). Testing models as predictors of the rivalry between 
structure and surface in the perception of melodies. In C. Woods; G. Luck; R. 
Brochard; F. Seddon and J. A. Sloboda (eds.) Proceeding of the Sixth International 
Conference on Music Perception and Cognition. Keele University, CD-ROM. 
Martínez, I. and Shifres, F. (1999b). Utilización de la estructura jerárquica de melodías en 
juicios de similitud. Boletín de Investigación Educativo-Musical, 18. 
Maus, F. E. (1997a). Music as drama. In J. Robinson (ed.), Music & Meaning. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 105-130. 
461 
Maus, F. E. (1997b). Narrative, drama, and emotion in instrumental music. The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55: 3, 193-303. 
McDonald, M. (2004). Silent narration? Elements of narrative in Ives’s The Unanswered 
Question. 19th Century Music, XXVII/3, 263-286. 
Meltzoff, A. N. and Moore, M. K. (1998). Infant intersubjectivity: broadening the dialogue 
to include imitation, identity and intention. In S. Bråten (ed.), Intersubjective 
Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 47-62. 
Merker, B. (2000). Synchronous chorusing and human origins. In N. L. Wallin; B. Merker 
and S. Brown (eds.), The Origins of Music. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 315-
327. 
Merker, B. (2002a). Principles of interactive behavioral timing. In C Stevens, D. Burham, 
G. McPherson, E. Schubert and J. Renwick (eds.), Proceedings of the 7th 
International Conference of Music Perception and Cognition. Sydney: University 
of Western Sydney, 149-152. 
Merker, B. (2002b). Music: the missing Humboldt system. Musicæ Scientiæ, Vol. VI, N° 
1,3-21. 
Meyer, L. B. (1956). Emotion and Meaning in Music Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Meyer, L. B. (1973). Explaining Music. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Micznik, V. (2001). Music and narrative revisited: degrees of narrativity in Beethoven and 
Mahler. Journal of the Royal Musical Association, vol. 126 No. 2, 193-249. 
462 
Miroudot. L. (2000). Structuration Melodique et Tonalité chez l’Enfant. París. 
L’Harmatan. 
Monelle, R. (1992). Linguistics and Semiotics in Music. Chur: Harwood Academic 
Publishers. 
Morán, J. C. (1996). La Música como Develadora del Sentido del Arte en Marcel Proust. 
Serie Estudios Investigaciones. La Plata: Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la 
Educación. 
Murray, L. and Trevarthen, C. (1985). Emotional regulation of interactions between two-
month-olds and their mother. In T.M. Field and N.A.Fox (eds.), Social perception 
in infants. Norwood: NJ: Ablex, 177-198. 
Narmour, E. (1977). Beyond Schekerism. The Need for Alternatives in Music Analysis. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Narmour, E. (1990). The Analysis and Cognition of Basic Melodic Structures: The 
Implication-Realization Model. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Narmour, E.: (1992). The Analysis and Cognition of Melodic Complexity. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Nattiez, J. J. (1987). Musicologie Générale et Sémiologie [Music and Dicouerse. Towar a 
Semiology of Music. (C. Abbate, trans.). New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1990]. Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur. 
Nattiez, J. J. (1990). Can one speak of narrativity in music? Journal of the Royal Musical 
Association, vol. 115 No. 2, 240-257. 
Newcomb, A. (1987). Schumann and late eighteenth-century narrative strategies. 19th 
Century Music, XI/2, 164-174. 
463 
Palmer, C. (1989). Mapping musical thought to musical performance. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, vol. 15 No. 12, 
331-346. 
Palmer, C. (1996). On the assignment of structure in music performance. Music 
Perception, vol. 14 No. 1, 23-56. 
Palmer, C. (1997). Music performance. Annual Review of Psychology, 48, 115-138. 
Papoušek, H. (1996). Musicality in infancy research: biological and cultural origins of 
early musicality. In I. Deliège and J. A. Sloboda (eds.), Musical Beginnings. 
Origins and Development of Musical Competence. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 37-55. 
Papoušek, M. (1996). Intuitive parenting: a hidden source of musical stimulation in 
infancy. In I. Deliège and J. A. Sloboda (eds.), Musical Beginnings. Origins and 
Development of Musical Competence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 88-112. 
Papoušek, M. and Papoušek. H. (1981). Musical elements in the infant´s vocalizations: 
their significance for communication, cognition and crativity. In L. P. Lipsitt (ed.), 
Advances in Infancy Research, vol 1, New Jersey: Ablex Norwood, 163-224. 
Pederson, S. (1996). The methods of musical narratology. Semiotica, 110-1/2, 179-196. 
Penel, A. and Drake, C. (1998). Sources of timing variations in music performance: A 
psychological segmentation model. Psychological Research, 61, 12-32. 
Petrobelli, P. and Rostagno, A. (2004). Musica e Linguaggio. Roma: Edizioni Nuova 
Cultura. 
464 
Proust, J. (1998). Intencionalidad. In O. Houdé (ed.). Vocabulaire de Sciences Cognitive 
[Diccionario de Ciencias Cognitivas (C. Molinari, trans.), Buenos Aires: 
Amorrurto, 2003, 231-233]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Proust, M. (1921/1922). A La Recherche du Temps Perdu. 3. La Coté de Germantes. [In 
Search of Lost Time. Vol III The Germantes Way. (C. K. S. Moncrieff and T. 
Kilmartin, trans.), New York: The Modern Library]. Paris: Gallimard.  
Purroy Chicot, P. (1992). Ensayo - prólogo sobre la teoría de Schenker y el método de 
investigación. Prologue for Spanish edition of Forte, A. and Gilbert, S. E. (1982) 
Introduction to Schenkerian Analysis [Introducción al Análisis Schenkeriano (P. 
Purroy Chicot, trans) Barcelona: Labor, 1992]. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 9-60. 
Raphael, S. I (2004). Unraveling narrativity: A reflexive paradigm. Current Musicology, 
78, 53-76. 
Real Academia Española (2001). Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Edición XXI 
Madrid: Espasa. 
Repp, B. H. (1989). Expressive microstructure in music: A preliminary perceptual 
assessment of four composers’ “pulses”. Music Perception, 6 (3), 243-274. 
Repp, B. H. (1990a). Composer’s pulses: Science or art? Music Perception, 7 (4), 423-434. 
Repp, B. H. (1990b). Patterns of expressive timing in performance of a Beethoven minuet 
by nineteen famous pianists. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 88, 622-
641. 
Repp, B. H. (1992a). A constraint on the expressive timing of a melodic gesture: Evidence 
form performance and aesthetic judgment. Music Perception. 10 (2), 221-242. 
465 
Repp, B. H. (1992b). Probing the cognitive representation of musical time: Structural 
constrains on the perception of timing perturbations. Cognition, 44, 241-281. 
Repp, B. H. (1992c). Diversity and commonality in music performance: An analysis of 
timing microstructure in Schumann’s “Traumerei”. Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, 92 (5), 2546-2568. 
Repp, B. H. (1994). Musical motion: Some historical and contemporary perspectives. 
Proceeding of the Acoustical Conference Stockholm 93. 128-135. 
Repp, B. H. (1995a). Expressive timing in Schumann’s “Traumerei”: An analysis of 
performances by graduate student pianists. Journal of the Acoustical Society of 
America, 98 (5), 2413-2427. 
Repp, B. H. (1995b). Detectability of duration and intensity increments in melody tones: A 
partial connection between music perception and performance. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 57 (8) 1217-1232. 
Repp, B. H. (1998a). Obligatory “expectations” of expressive timing induced by 
perception of musical structure. Psychological Research, 61, 33-43.  
Repp, B. H. (1998b). The detectability of local deviations from a typical expressive timing 
pattern. Music Perception, 15 (3), 265-289. 
Repp, B. H. (1998c). Variations on a theme by Chopin; Relations between perception and 
production of timing in music. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 24 (3), 791-811. 
Repp, B. H. (1998d). A microcosm of musical expression. I. Quantitative analysis of 
pianists’ timing in the initial measures of Chopin’s Etude in E major. Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America, 104 (2), 1085-1100. 
466 
Repp, B. H. (1999a). A microcosm of musical expression. II. Quantitative analysis of 
pianists’ dynamics in the initial measures of Chopin’s Etude in E major. Journal of 
the Acoustical Society of America, 105 (3), 1972-1988. 
Repp, B. H. (1999b). A microcosm of musical expression. III. Contributions of timing and 
dynamics to the aesthetic impression of pianists’ performances of the initial 
measures of Chopin’s Etude in E Major. Journal of the Acoustical Society of 
America, 106 (1), 469-478. 
Reybrouck, M. (2003). Biological roots of musical epistemology. Functional cycles, 
Umwelt, and enactive listening. Semiotica, 134- 1/4 , 599-633. 
Reybrouck, M. (2004). Music cognition, semiotics and the experience of time: 
Ontosemantical and epistemological claims. Journal of New Music Research, vol. 
33 No. 4, 411-428. 
Richard, M. (1997). Propositional attitudes. In B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion 
to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 197-226. 
Ricouer, P. (1984). Temps et Rècit. II: La Configuration Dans Le Récit de Fiction [Tiempo 
y Narración II. La Configuración del Tiempo en el Relato de Ficción. (A. Neira, 
trans.) México: Siglo XXI, 2001]. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Ricouer, P. (1985). Temps et Rècit. I: L’Histoire et le Rècit [Tiempo y Narración I. La 
Configuración del Tiempo en el Relato Histórico. (A. Neira, trans.) México: Siglo 
XXI, 2003]. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Riemann, H. (1916). Handbuch des Klavierspiels [Manual del Pianista. (A. Ribera y 
Maneja, trans.), Barcelona: Labor, 1928], Berlin: Hesse. 
467 
Rink, J. (1995). (ed.), The Practice of Performance. Studies in Musical Interpretation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ristad, E. (1982). A Soprano on her Head. Real People Press 
Riviere, A. (1991). Objetos con Mente. Madrid. Alianza. 
Rodríguez (2003). Estructura de agrupamiento y percepción de relaciones de similitud 
(RsS). In I. C. Martínez and C. Mauleón (eds.) Proceedings to the III Annual 
meeting of SACCoM. CD-Rom. 
Rothstein, W. (1995). Analysis and the act of performance. In J. Rink (ed.). The Practice of 
Performance. Studies in Musical Interpretation. Cambridge: University Press, 217-
240. 
Salgado Correia, J. (1999). Embodied meaning: All languages are ethnic…. Psychology of 
Music, 27, 96-101. 
Salgado Correia, J. (2006). Como comunicamos musicalmente?. In F. Shifres and G. 
Vargas (eds), Sonido, Imagen y Movimiento en la Experiencia Musical. Buenos 
Aires: SACCoM, 135-145. 
Salkie, R. (2001) The Chomskyan revolutions. In P. Cobley (ed.), Semiotics and 
Linguistics. London: Routledge, 105-117. 
Salzer, F. (1962). Structural Hearing. Tonal Coherence in Music. New York. Dover. 
Salzer, F. and Schachter, C. (1969). Counterpoint in Composition. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Samson, J. (1992). Chopin: The Four Ballades. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
468 
Schachter, C. (1999). Unfoldings. Essays in Schenkerian Theory and Analysis. Edited by 
Joseph Straus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schenker, H. (1906). Harmonielehre. [Tratado de Armonía (R. Barce, trans.), Madrid: 
Real Musical, 1990]. 
Schenker, H. (1922). Kontrapunkt. [Counterpoint (J. Rothgeb and J. Thym, trans.) New 
York: Schirmer Books, 1987]. 
Schenker, H. (1925). Das Meisterwerk in der Musik [The Masterwork in Music. A 
Yearbook. Volume I (I. Bent et al., trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1994], Munich, Vienna and Berlin: Drei Masken Verlag. 
Schenker, H. (1926). Das Meisterwerk in der Musik [The Masterwork in Music. A 
Yearbook. Volume II (I. Bent et al.trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994], Munich, Vienna and Berlin: Drei Masken Verlag. 
Schenker, H. (1935). Der freie Satz.[Free composition, (E. Oster, trans.)]. New York: 
Schirmer Books, 1979]. Wien: Universal Edition. 
Schmalfeldt, J. (1985). On the relation of analysis to performance: Beethoven's Bagatelles 
op. 126 Nos. 2 and 5. Journal of Music Theory, 29/1, 1-31. 
Schögler, B. (1999/2000). Studying temporal co-ordination in jazz duets. Musicæ Scientiæ, 
Special Issue, 75-91. 
Self. M. W and Zeki, S (2004). The integration of colour and motion by the human visual 
brain. Cerebral Cortex. Published on line in 
http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/papers.html, (pages viewed on 25.02.2006) 
Serafine, M. L. (1988). Music as Cognition. New York: Columbia University Press. 
469 
Serafine, M. L.; Glassman, N. and Overbeeke, C. (1989). The cognitive reality of 
hierarchical structure in music. Music Perception, 6 (4), 397-430. 
Shaffer, L. H. (1992). How to interpret music. In M. R. Jones and S. Holleran (eds.), 
Cognitive Bases of Musical Communication. Washington: American Psychological 
Association, 263-278. 
Shaffer, L. H. (1995). Musical performance as interpretation. Psychology of Music, 23, 17-
38. 
Shanker, S. G. and King, B. J. (2002). The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language 
research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25 (5), 605-620. 
Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. 
Urbana, University of Illinois.  
Shifres, F. (2002). De la fuente de la expresión musical al contenido de la experiencia del 
oyente. In Martínez, I and Musumeci, O (eds), Actas de la Segunda Reunión Anual 
de SACCoM (Sociedad Argentina para las Ciencias Cognitivas de la Música). 
Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes y SACCoM. CD-ROM. 
Shifres, F. (2002). Lo común y lo personal. Un estudio sobre la individualidad de la 
ejecución musical desde la perspectiva interpretativa. En S. Furnó y M. Arturi 
(Editores) Encuentro de Investigación en Arte y Diseño (Iberoamericano) 2002. La 
Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata. 57-61. 
Shifres, F. (2003). ¿Puede la teoría musical explicar la experiencia del ejecutante?. In I. 
Martínez and C. Mauleón (eds.), Música y Ciencia. El rol de la Cultura y la 
Educación en el Desarrollo de la Cognición Musical (Actas de la III Reunión 
Anual de SACCoM). La Plata: SACCoM. CD-ROM. 
470 
Shifres, F. (2004). Invariantes temporales como rasgos de identidad de la ejecución 
musical expresiva. In Actas de las I Jornadas de Investigación en Disciplinas 
Artísticas y Proyectuales. La Plata: UNLP, 519-526. 
Shifres, F. (2006). Tocar juntos: ¿Entrainment, comunicación o comunión? In F. Shifres 
and G. Vargas (eds.), Sonido, Imagen y Movimiento en la Experiencia Musical. 
Buenos Aires: SACCoM, 189-203. 
Shifres, F. (2007). La ejecución parental. Los componentes performativos de las 
interacciones tempranas. In M. de la P. Jacquier and A. Pereira Ghiena (eds.), 
Música y Bienestar Humano. Buenos Aires: SACCoM, 13-24. 
Shifres, F. and Martínez, I. (1999). Control experimental de la estructura jerárquica y la 
superficie musical. Boletín de Investigación Educativo-Musical, 17, 42-46. 
Shifres, F. and Martínez, I. (2000a). Incidencia del contorno melódico en la representación 
reduccional en músicos y no músicos. In J. Tafuri (ed.) La Ricerca per la Didattica 
Musicale. Quaderni della SIEM, 16, 294-304. 
Shifres, F. and Martínez, I. (2000b). The role of performance in the cognitive reality of the 
hierarchic structure. In C. Woods; G. Luck; R. Brochard; F. Seddon and J. A. 
Sloboda (eds.), Proceeding of the Sixth International Conference on Music 
Perception and Cognition. Keele Keele University, CD-ROM. 
Shifres, F. and Martínez, I (2002). The acquisition of prolongation as a structure 
constituent in musical attending. In C. Stevens et al (ed). Proceedings of the 7th 
ICMPC. Sydney: University of New South Wales. 
471 
Shifres, F. and Español. S. (2004). Interplay between pretend and music play. Paper 
accepted to the 8th International Conference on Music Perception & Cognition, 
Evanston, IL..USA 
Shifres, F.; Español, S; Cevasco, M; Gómez, E.; Jiménez, M; Martínez, A and Pérez Vilar, 
P. (2004). Hacia una caracterización de los componentes musicales presentes en la 
génesis de las capacidades ficcionales. In Actas de las XI Jornadas de 
Investigación. Buenos Aires: UBA. Facultad de Psicología. Volumen III 212-214. 
Shove, P. and Repp, B. H. (1995). Musical motion and performance: theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. In J. Rink (ed.), The practice of Performance. Studies in 
Musical Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55-83. 
Simeon, E. (1992). Programmi narrative e stratificazioni del senso nella musica per film. Il 
caso di “Entr’acte”. In R. Dalmonte and M. Baroni (eds.), Atti di Secondo 
Convegno Europeo di Analisi Musicale. Trento: Universita degli Studi di Trento, 
389-399. 
Sloboda, J. A. (1983). The communication of musical metre in piano performance. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 35A, 377-396. 
Sloboda, J. A. (1985). The musical mind. Oxford: University Press. 
Sloboda, J. A. (1991). Musical expertise. In K. A. Ericsson and J. Smith (eds.), Toward a 
General Theory of Expertise. Cambridge: University Press. 153-171. 
Sloboda, J. A. (1998). Does music mean anything? Musicae Scientiae, vol. II, no1, 21-31. 
Sloboda, J. A. (1999). Music. Where cognition and emotion meet. The Psychologist, vol. 
12 No. 9, 450-455. 
472 
Sloboda, J. A. and Davidson, J. W. (1996). The young performing musician. In I. Deliège 
and J. A. Sloboda (eds.), Musical Beginnings. Origins and Development of Musical 
Competence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 171-190. 
Sloboda, J. A. and Howe, M. J. A. (1991). Biographical precursors of musical excellence: 
An interview study. Psychology of Music, 19, 3-21. 
Sloboda, J. A. and Lehmann, A. C. (2001).Tracking performance correlates of changes in 
perceived intensity of emotion during different interpretations of a Chopin piano 
prelude. Music Perception, 19 (1), 87-120. 
Small, C. (1998). Musicking. The Meanings of Performing and Listening. Hanover and 
London: Wesleyan University Press. 
Small, C. (1999). El musicar. Un ritual en el espacio social. Revista Transcultural de 
Música. Transcultural Music Review, 4. In www.sibetrans.com/trans/index.html 
(pages viewed on 30.08.2005) 
Snarrenber, R. (1994). Competing myths: the American abandonment of Schenker’s 
organicism. In A. Pople (Ed.) Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 29-56. 
Snyder, B. (2000). Memory and Music. Cambridge, MA. The MIT Press.  
Solís Fonseca, G. (1998). El mapa de las tribus amazónicas de Raúl Porrás Barrenechea 
(1943). Alma Mater, 15, 37-46. 
Stanislavsky, C. (1922). Mi Vida en el Arte. Buenos Aires: Quetzal. 
Steimberg, O. (1980). Producción de sentido en los medios masivos: las transposiciones de 
la literatura. Lenguajes, 4, 19-25. 
473 
Steimberg, O. (2003). Las dos direcciones de la enunciación transpositiva: el cambio de 
rumbo en la mediatización de relatos y géneros. Figuraciones, 1/2. 295-302. 
Stein, E. (1954). Form and Performance. New York: Limelight Editions. 
Stern, D. (1985). The Interpersonal World of the Infant. A View from Psychoanalysis and 
Developmental Psychology. New York: Basic Books. 
Straus, J. N. (1987). The problem of prolongation in post tonal music. Journal of Music 
Theory, Vol 31.1, 1-21. 
Stravinsky, I. (1970). Poetics of Music. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Stubley, E. (1992). Philosophical foundations. In R. Colwell (ed.), Handbook of Research 
in Music Teaching and Learning. New York: Schirmer Books, 3-20. 
Sundberg, J. (1993). How can music be expressive? Speech Communication, 13, 239-253. 
Sundberg, J. and Lindblom, B. (1976). Generative theories in language and music 
descriptions. Cognition, 4, 99-122 
Sundberg, J. and Verrillo, V. (1980). On anatomy of retard: A study of timing in music. 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 68, 772–779. 
Sundberg, J.; Firberg, A. and Frydén, L. (1991). Common secrets of musicians and 
listeners: An analysis-by-synthesis study of musical performance. In P. Howell, R. 
West and I. Cross (eds.), Representing Musical Structure. London: Academic Press, 
161-197. 
Tagard, P. (1996). Mind. Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
474 
Tanner, M. (2000). The power of performance as an alternative analytical discourse: The 
Liszt Sonata in B minor. 19th Century Music, Vol. XXIV/ 2, 173-192. 
Tarasti, E. (1994). A Theory of Musical Semiotics. Bloomintong and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press. 
Taruskin, R. (1995). Text and Act. Essays on Music Perfornace. Oxford: University Press. 
Termperley, D. (2001). The cognition of Basic Musical Structures. Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press. 
Thaut, M. H. (2005). Rhythm, human temporality, and brain function. In D. Meill, R. 
MacDonald and D. Hargreaves (eds.), Musical Communication. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 171-191. 
Thompson, D. N. (2001). Aesthetics, authenticities, and appeals to authority. The auditor 
as author. Current Musicology, 64, 7-25. 
Thompson, W. F. (1989). Composer-specific aspects of musical performance: an 
evaluation of Clynes’s theory of pulse for performances of Mozart and Beethoven, 
Music Perception, 7 (1), 17-42. 
Thompson, W. F. and Cuddy, L. L. (1997). Music performance and the perception of key. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, vol. 23 
No. 1, 116-135. 
Timmers, R.; Marolt, M.; Camurri, A. and Volpe, G. (2006). Listeners’ emotional 
engagement with performances of a Scriabin etude: an explorative case study. 
Psychology of Music, 34 (4), 481-510. 
Todd, N. P. (1985). A model of expressive timing in tonal music. Music Perception, 3 (1), 
33-58. 
475 
Todd, N. P. (1992). The dynamics of dynamics: A model of musical expression. Journal of 
the Acoustical Society of America, 91(6), 3540-3550. 
Todd, N. P. (1993). Vestibular feedback in music performance. Music Perception, 10 (3), 
379-382. 
Todd, N. P. (1995). The kinematics of musical expression. Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America, 97 (3), 1940-1949. 
Todorov, T. (1972). Signo. In O. Ducrot and T. Todorov (eds.) Dictionnaire 
Encyclopédique des Sciences du Langage [Diccionario Enciclopédico de las 
Ciencias del Lenguaje (E. Pezzoni, trans.), México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1974, 121-
128] Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (2001). Does beauty build adapted minds? Toward an 
evolutionary theory of aesthetics, fiction and the arts. Substance, 94/95, vol. 30, N° 
1&2, 6-27. 
Traversa, O.(1995). Carmen, la de las Transposiciones. La Piel de la Obra, Instituto de 
Artes del Espectáculo. Buenos Aires: UBA. 
Trehub, S. (1993). The music listening skills of infants and young children. In T. J. Tighe 
and W. J. Dowling (eds.), Psychology and Music. The Understanding of Melody 
and Rhythm. New Jersey: LEA Press, 161-176.  
Trehub, S. (2000). Human processing predispositions and musical universals. In N. L. 
Waliin, B. Merker and S. Brown (eds.), The Origins of Music. Cambridge MA: The 
MIT Press, 427-448. 
476 
Trehub, S. (2003). Musical predispositions in infancy: an update. In I. Peretz and R. 
Zatorre (eds.), The Cognitive Neuroscience of Music. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 3-20. 
Trevarthen, C. (1998). The concept and foundations of intersubjetivity. In S. Bråten (ed.), 
Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 15-46. 
Trevarthen, C. (1999/2000). Musicality and the Intrinsic Motive Pulse: evidence from 
human psychobiology and infant communication. Musica Scientie, Special Issue, 
155-213. 
Trevarthen, C. (2004). Learning about ourselves, from children: Why a growing human 
brain needs interesting companions. In http://www.perception-in-
action.ed.ac.uk/publications.htm. (pages viewed on 10.10.2005). 
Trevarthen, C. and Hubley, P. (1978). Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence confidings 
and acts of meaning in the first year. In Lock, A. (ed.), Action: Gestures and 
symbol. The Emergence of Language. London: Academic Press, 183-229. 
Trevarthen, C. and Malloch, S. (2000). The dance of wellbeing: Defining the musical 
therapeutic effect. Nordic Journal of Music Therapy. Vol.9 (2), 3-17. 
Trevarthen, C. and Schögler, B. (2002). The natural science of musical time, and gestures 
of musicality in communication. In C Stevens, D. Burham, G. McPherson, E. 
Schubert and J. Renwick (eds.), Proceedings of the 7th International Conference of 
Music Perception and Cognition. Sydney: University of Western Sydney, 147-148. 
Turner, M. (1996). The Literary Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. 
477 
Watt, R. J. and Ash, R. L. (1998). A psychological investigation of meaning in music. 
Musicae Scientiae, vol. II, No1, 33-53. 
Welch, G. (2001). The Misunderstanding of Music. London: Institute of Education. 
Welch, G. (1998). El desarrollo del canto en el niño. En S. Malbrán (ed.) Hacia un Nuevo 
Siglo y una Nueva Música. Buenos Aires: FEM, UNLa. 
White, H. (1981). The value of narrativity in the representation of reality. In W. J. T. 
Mitchell (ed.), On Narrative. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1-23. 
Willems, E. (1954). Le Rythme Musical. Étude Psychologique. [El Ritmo Musical (V. 
Hemsy de Gainza, trans.), Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1964], Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
Williamon, A. and Davidson, J. W. (2002). Exploring co-performer communication. 
Musicae Scientiae, Vol. VI No. 1, 53-72. 
Williams, A. (1950). Teoría de la Música. Buenos Aires: La quena.  
Wittmann, M. and Pöppel, E. (1999/2000). Temporal mechanisms of the brain as 
fundamentals of communication – with special reference to music perception and 
performance. Musicæ Scientiæ, Special Issue, 13-28.  
Young, K. and Saver, J. L. (2001). The neurology of narrative. Substance, 94/95, vol. 30, 
N° 1&2, 72-84. 
Zbikowski, L. M. (2002). Conceptualizing Music. Cognitive Structure, Theory and 
Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
478 
Zeranska-Kominek, S. (1992). Mode: Process and/or structure? A study of the Tukmen 
mukam Gökdepe. In R. Dalmonte and M. Baroni (eds.), Secondo convegno europeo 
di analisi musicali. Trento. Universitá degli Studi di Trento, 249-258. 
Discography  
Chopin’s First Ballade in G minor op 23 
Cortot, A. (1933) Chopin, Ballades, Preludes [1933, 1942]. AB 78 862 
Horowitz, V. (1968). Favorite Chopin. CBS, MK 42306 
Kissin, E. (1999). Frédéric Chopin, The Four Ballades, Berceuse, Barcarolle and 
Scherzo N° 4. RCA, BMG 09026 63259 2 
Olejnizack, J. (2002) Music From and Inspired by “The pianist”, A Roman 
Polansky Film. Sony Music Soundtrax, 2-87739. 
Székely, I. (1987). Four Ballades, Four Scherzi. HNH, Lydian 18022. 
Chopin’s Prelude in B minor Op. 28 N° 6 
Argerich, M. (1997). Frédéric Chopin, 26 Préludes, Barcarolle, Polonaise As-dur 
and Scherzo N° 2. Deutsche Grammophon, 415 836-2 
Ashkenazi, V. (1979). Chopin Preludes. Decca Record 417476-2. 
Cortot, A. (1934). Chopin: Preludes, Impromptus, Barcarolle and Berceuse. EMI, 
CDH 7610502. 
Cortot, A. (1942). Chopin, Ballades, Preludes [1933, 1942]. AB 78 862. 
Cortot, A. (1955). Chopin, 24, Preludes, Sonata N° 2, URA 4251. 
Horowitz, V. (1964). Favorite Chopin. CBS, MK 42306. 
479 
João Pirés, M (1994). Chopin Concerto N° 2 and 24 Preludes Op. 28. Deutsche 
Grammophon. GH 437 817 –2. 
Katsaris, C. (1993). Preludes (24) for piano, Op. 28, Sony CT. 166-189 
Lucchesini, A. (1988). Chopin: Preludes & Impromptus, EMI CDC 7 49725 2. 
Pollini, M (1975). Chopin Preludes, Deutsche Grammophon GH 413-796-2 
Escofet’s. Meditación 6 
Escofet, S. (2000) Meditaciones. Asterisco Records *001 
Parra’s Gracias a la Vida 
Baez, J. (1974). Classics Volume 8. A & H Records. CD2506 
Sosa, M. (1971). Homenaje a Violeta Parra. Philips. 818 332-2 
Chopin’s Prelude in C Major Op. 28 N° 1 
Lucchesini, A. (1988). Chopin: Preludes & Impromptus, EMI CDC 7 49725 2. 
Pollini, M (1975). Chopin Preludes, Deutsche Grammophon GH 413-796-2 
Chopin’s Prelude in C sharp minor Op. 28 N° 24 
Lucchesini, A. (1988). Chopin: Preludes & Impromptus, EMI CDC 7 49725 2. 
Pollini, M (1975). Chopin Preludes, Deutsche Grammophon GH 413-796-2 
Villegas, E; López Ruíz, J. and Casalla, E. (1967). Metamorfosis de los 24 
Preludios de Chopin. TROVA 69-09 
Traditional (Spain): De los Cuatro Muleros 
López, E. (1992). Poetas para el Cante. Federico García Lorca. EMI 7996502. 
Montoya, E. (1992). Poetas para el Cante. Federico García Lorca. EMI 7996502. 
480 
Filmography 
Polansky, R. (2002) The Pianist. Transeuropa Video Entertainment. TVE-IC 023. 
481 
Table of Multi–media contents (sound and video) 
Example 1. Two performances of Meditación 6 by Sebastián Escofet ([1] from CD 
Meditaciones. Buenos Aires: Asterico Records 001; [2] from the 12-10-2001, 
live concert. Buenos Aires (personal communication)) 
Example 2. Two performances of Prelude in C major op 28 N° 1 by Chopin ([1] by 
Andrea Lucchesini (1988); [2] by Maurizio Pollini (1975)) 
Example 3. Two performances of Gracias a la vida by Violeta Parra ([1] by Mercedes 
Sosa (1971); [2] by Joan Baez (1974)) 
Example 4. Two performances of Los cuatro muleros Traditional Spanish ([1] by 
Encarnación López and Federico García Lorca (1931); [2] by Enrique 
Montoya (1960)) 
Example 5. Three performances of Prelude Op. 28 N° 24 by Chopin ([1] by Andrea 
Lucchesini (1988); [2] by Maurizio Pollini (1975); [3] by Enrique Villegas, 
Jorge López Ruiz and Eduardo Casalla (1967)). 
Example 6. Martha Argerich’s performance (1977) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 7. Vladimir Azkenazy’s performance (1979) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 8. Alfred Cortot’s performance (1934) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 9. Alfred Cortot’s performance (1945). (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 10. Alfred Cortot’s performance (1954) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 11. Vladimir Horowitz’s performance (1964) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 12. Maria Joao Pires’s performance (1994) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 13. Cyprien Katzaris’s performance (1993) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
482 
Example 14. Andrea Luccessini’s performance (1988) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 15. Maurizio Pollini’s performance (1975) (Chopin prelude in B minor) 
Example 16. Chopin’s Prelude in A major op 28 N° 7 (performed by Maurizio Pollini, 
1975) 
Example 17. Complete stimulus: Non prolongational EAS with coinciding OAS (Direct 
condition) 
Example 18. Complete stimulus: Non prolongational EAS with non - coinciding OAS 
(intersecting condition) 
Example 19. Complete stimulus: Prolongational EAS with coinciding OAS (direct 
condition) 
Example 20. Complete stimulus: Prolongational EAS with non - coinciding OAS 
(intersecting condition) 
Example 21. Type A heard sequences.(for the Retrieval Task) 
Example 22. Type B heard sequences (for the Retrieval Task) 
Example 23. Unheard sequences (for the Retrieval Task) 
Example 24. Type A pairs (for the Temporal Order Recognition Task) 
Example 25. Type B pairs (for the Temporal Order Recognition Task) 
Example 26. Mixes pairs (for the Temporal Order Recognition Task) 
Example 27. Ballade op 23 in G minor by Chopin (complete) (Performed by Evgeny 
Kissin 1999) 
Example 28. The Pianist, scene The meeting, by Roman Polansky 
483 
Example 29. Comparison stimulus. Fragment of Januz Olejnczak’s performance (2002) 
(Chopin Ballade in G minor) 
Example 30. Comparison stimulus. Fragment of Alfred Cortot’s performance (1933) 
(Chopin Ballade in G minor) 
Example 31. Comparison stimulus. Fragment of Vladimir Horowitz’s performance (1968) 
(Chopin Ballade in G minor) 
Example 32. Comparison stimulus. Fragment of Evgeny Kissin’s performance (1999) 
(Chopin Ballade in G minor) 
Example 33. Comparison stimulus. Fragment of Itsván Sekely’s performance (1987) 
(Chopin Ballade in G minor) 
Example 34. Control video clip 
